Rainer Vnon Falkenhorst III v. Arthur Kwok, Qai Asset, LP, Erika Lynnsey, Kwok, Rush Green Asset LP, Erika J. Kwok, Metropolitan Escrow & Title LLP ( 2023 )


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  • Opinion issued March 21, 2023
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-22-00370-CV
    ———————————
    RAINER VON FALKENHORST, III, Appellant
    V.
    METROPOLITAN ESCROW & TITLE, LLC, ERICA J. THOMAS, AND
    MICHAEL L. FUQUA, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 269th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 2021-18661
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On May 6, 2022, appellant, Rainer von Falkenhorst, III, filed a notice of
    appeal from the trial court’s April 26, 2022 interlocutory order granting summary
    judgment in favor of appellee, Metropolitan Escrow & Title, LLC (“Metropolitan
    Escrow”). On August 5, 2022, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
    August 5, 2022 “Order Expunging Lis Pendens on Memorial Drive Condominium.”
    And on September 6, 2022, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
    August 29, 2022 interlocutory order granting summary judgment in favor of
    appellee, Michael L. Fuqua.
    We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    In his fifth amended petition, appellant brought claims against Metropolitan
    Escrow and Fuqua as well as appellee, Erica J. Thomas, and others. Subsequently,
    Metropolitan Escrow and Fuqua each moved for summary judgment on appellant’s
    claims against them, as alleged in his fifth amended petition, asserting that they were
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 On April 26, 2022, the trial court granted
    Metropolitan Escrow summary judgment on appellant’s claims against it. On
    August 29, 2022, the trial court granted Fuqua summary judgment on appellant’s
    claims against him.
    Further, on June 29, 2022, Thomas filed a motion to expunge lis pendens,
    which the trial court granted on August 5, 2022.
    “[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.”
    Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 
    369 S.W.3d 137
    , 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal
    quotations omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 
    273 S.W.3d 759
    ,
    1
    Metropolitan Escrow and Fuqua each filed their own motion for summary judgment
    in the trial court.
    2
    763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (jurisdiction fundamental in
    nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law,
    which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 
    233 S.W.3d 835
    ,
    840 (Tex. 2007). If this case is an appeal over which we have no jurisdiction, the
    appeal must be dismissed. V.I.P. Royal Palace, LLC v. Hobby Event Ctr. LLC, No.
    01-18-00621-CV, 
    2020 WL 3579563
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2,
    2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ragsdale, 
    273 S.W.3d at 763
    .
    Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments
    and specific interlocutory orders that the Legislature has designated as appealable
    orders. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012; CMH Homes v. Perez,
    
    340 S.W.3d 444
    , 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 51.014(a) (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders). A judgment
    issued without a conventional trial is final for appeal only if it: (1) actually disposes
    of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language or (2) states
    with “unmistakable clarity” that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.
    Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 192–93, 200, 204 (Tex. 2001).
    Here, neither the trial court’s April 26, 2022 interlocutory order nor the trial
    court’s August 29, 2022 interlocutory order actually dispose of all claims against all
    parties. See V.I.P. Royal Palace, 
    2020 WL 3579563
    , at *4 (“Because the trial
    court’s . . . order does not actually dispose of all claims and all parties, it is
    3
    interlocutory and not final . . . .”). The trial court’s April 26, 2022 interlocutory
    order only granted summary judgment on appellant’s claims against Metropolitan
    Escrow, and the trial court’s August 29, 2022 interlocutory order only granted
    summary judgment on appellant’s claims against Fuqua.
    Additionally, the trial court’s April 26, 2022 and August 29, 2022
    interlocutory orders do not contain finality language that could turn an otherwise
    interlocutory order into a final judgment. See 
    id.
     at *4–6. An order that does not
    actually dispose of all claims and all parties and does not state with unmistakable
    clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties must be classified for
    purposes of appeal as an unappealable interlocutory order. See id. at *6.
    As to the trial court’s August 5, 2022 “Order Expunging Lis Pendens on
    Memorial Drive Condominium,” we note that “there is no statutory authority for an
    appeal of an interlocutory order expunging notices of lis pendens,” and we have no
    jurisdiction to review a complaint about such an interlocutory order. Margetis v.
    Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 
    553 S.W.3d 643
    , 644–45 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018,
    no pet.); see also Smith v. Schwartz, No. 02-15-00146-CV, 
    2015 WL 3645862
    , at *1
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]e find no statutory
    authority for an appeal of an interlocutory order expunging notices of lis pendens.”);
    Casmir v. Frontera Energy, LLC, No. 14-12-00023-CV, 
    2012 WL 8015783
    , at *1
    4
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing
    appeal from order expunging lis pendens).
    On July 28, 2022, August 18, 2022, and January 19, 2023, this Clerk of this
    Court notified appellant that we lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and directed
    appellant that, unless a response was provided within ten days, in writing,
    demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the appeal would be
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Appellant
    did not adequately respond.
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and for appellant’s
    failure to comply with a notice from the Clerk of this Court requiring a response.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c), 43.2(f). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-22-00370-CV

Filed Date: 3/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2023