Francisco Sanchez v. State ( 2021 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-20-00379-CR
Francisco SANCHEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-CR-3376
Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 31, 2021
AFFIRMED
Appellant Francisco Sanchez appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his community
supervision and sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment. In his sole issue on appeal, Sanchez
contends the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte hold an informal competency hearing. We
overrule Sanchez’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
BACKGROUND
In March of 2015, the State charged Sanchez with two counts of possession of a controlled
substance. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Sanchez pled guilty to the possession of a controlled
04-20-00379-CR
substance charge, and the trial court placed Sanchez on community supervision for ten years. Over
the next couple of years, the State filed motions to revoke Sanchez’s community supervision, and
the trial court entered orders amending the conditions of his community supervision. On June 9,
2020, the State filed an amended motion to revoke Sanchez’s community supervision, alleging
Sanchez violated several conditions of his community supervision. The trial court held a hearing
on the State’s motion on June 24, 2020, during which probation officer Dante Hines and the mother
of Sanchez’s children, Fabiola Gamez, testified. Prior to the testimony, Sanchez pleaded not true
to all violations. However, when Gamez started testifying, Sanchez pleaded true to all the
violations. The trial court entered a judgment revoking community supervision and sentenced
Sanchez to ten years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, Sanchez perfected this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial and shall be found competent unless
proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
46B.003(b). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have (1) sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003(a).
“Either party may suggest by motion, or the trial court may suggest on its own motion, that the
defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art. 46B.004(a). The initial inquiry is informal
and is required only if evidence suggesting incompetency comes to the trial court’s attention. Id.
art. 46B.004(b)-(c); Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.).
The trial court, on its own motion, “shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand
trial” if evidence suggesting that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial comes to the trial
1
A probation revocation hearing is a trial for purposes of competency issues. Thompson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 26, 28
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1983, no pet.).
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court’s attention. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(b); Lewis v. State, 532 S.W.3d 423,
432 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).
Under article 46B.004, a suggestion of a defendant’s incompetency to stand trial may
consist solely of a credible source’s representation that the defendant may be incompetent. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c–1). Evidence suggesting the need for an informal inquiry
may be based on observations made in relation to one or more of the factors set forth in article
46B.024 or on any other indication that the defendant is incompetent within the meaning of article
46B.003. Id. The factors set out in article 46B.024 include the capacity of the defendant during
criminal proceedings to (1) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential
consequences of those pending charges, (2) disclose to his defense counsel pertinent facts, events,
and states of mind, (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, (4) understand
the adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings, (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior, and
(6) testify. Id. art. 46B.024(1)(A)–(F). Additional considerations include information regarding
whether the defendant has a mental illness or an intellectual disability, “whether the identified
condition has lasted or is expected to last continuously for at least one year,” whether medication
is necessary to maintain the defendant’s competency, and “the degree of impairment resulting from
the mental illness or intellectual disability . . . and the specific impact on the defendant’s capacity
to engage with counsel in a reasonable and rational manner.” Id. art. 46B.024(2)–(5).
We review a trial court’s decision not to sua sponte hold an informal inquiry into a
defendant’s competency for an abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d
676, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Under this standard, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court but determine whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montoya,
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291 S.W.3d at 426. This is because the trial court, which observes first-hand the behavior of the
defendant, is “in a better position to determine whether [the defendant] was presently competent.”
Id.APPLICATION
Sanchez contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte hold an
informal hearing regarding his competency. Sanchez argues there was evidence before the trial
court suggesting his incompetency, specifically pointing to when he changed his plea from not true
to true while Gamez was testifying. The State responds that the trial court’s duty to inquire into
Sanchez’s competency was not triggered. We agree with the State.
At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court asked Sanchez whether he wanted to plead
true or not true to violating the conditions of his community supervision, and Sanchez pleaded not
true to all of the violations. The State then called Gamez to testify, and when Gamez began
testifying about Sanchez’s character as a good father, Sanchez interjected stating, “[a]ll of them
are true. I’m not going to let her testify against me. They’re all true. It’s all true.” Defense
counsel then requested a recess to have a private discussion with Sanchez, and he advised Sanchez
not to plead true. However, Sanchez refused to take defense counsel’s advice and stated that he
understood his attorney’s advice and was competent to proceed, as shown in the following
exchange:
[Counsel]: Mr. Sanchez, you understand that I have advised you to take the plea
offer, correct?
[Sanchez]: Yes, sir.
[Counsel]: And you have declined to take the plea offer?
[Sanchez]: Yes, I declined. I’m very competent at the moment and I’m very aware
of what is happening and what is going on.
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Additionally, the record shows the trial court made certain that Sanchez understood the
conditions he was alleged to have violated. As the State read each allegation against Sanchez, the
trial court questioned Sanchez about whether he understood each violation, and Sanchez
acknowledged he understood. The record also shows that towards the end of the hearing both the
trial court and defense counsel verified Sanchez understood the consequences of his “true” pleas.
Accordingly, after reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court’s duty to conduct an
informal inquiry on a suggestion of incompetence was not triggered. See In Matter of J.P., No.
04-16-00584-CV, 2017 WL 3159456, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 26, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding that the trial court’s duty to conduct an informal inquiry on a suggestion of
incompetence was not triggered when the appellant continuously affirmed his competency and
ability to understand his pleas of true at a motion to revoke hearing). Here, the record does not
suggest Sanchez was incompetent during the hearing and supports the trial court’s decision not to
delve further into Sanchez’s competency. See id. We therefore conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by not sua sponte holding an informal competency hearing. See id.CONCLUSION
We overrule Sanchez’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Do Not Publish
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