in Re Jeffery Scott Maddin ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-08-475-CV
IN RE JEFFERY SCOTT MADDIN RELATOR
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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On November 26, 2008, the trial court confined Relator, Jeffery Scott
Maddin, to the Cooke County Jail pursuant to an order holding him in contempt
and directing his confinement. On December 11, 2008, Maddin filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from the Cooke County Jail, and the
next day, this court ordered Maddin released on a $1,000 bond pending the
outcome of this original proceeding. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b)(3).
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… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
In this habeas corpus proceeding, Maddin complains that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in holding him in contempt and ordering him confined
for violating the trial court’s September 22, 2008 letter ruling and the
November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce; therefore, he contends he is being
illegally confined and restrained. We grant his petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
Real Party in Interest, Dianna Sue Darby, sued Maddin for divorce on
November 15, 2006. On July 11, 2008, the trial court held a final hearing. On
September 22, 2008, the trial court notified the parties by letter of its decision
regarding the division of property and debts and provided that Darby’s counsel
was to prepare the divorce decree. Listed among the property to be awarded
Darby was the real property located at 321 CR 211, Gainesville, Texas (“the
Gainesville property”), a cattle trailer and flatbed, and a John Deere Gator. On
October 21, 2008, Maddin entered the Gainesville property and removed the
flatbed trailer and John Deere Gator.
The final decree of divorce rendered by the court on November 12, 2008
awarded Darby the exclusive use and possession of the Gainesville property and
other property including the cattle trailer, flatbed, and John Deere Gator. On
November 13, 2008, Darby filed a second amended motion for enforcement
and contempt in which she alleged for the first time that Maddin entered onto
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the Gainesville property and removed the flatbed trailer and John Deere Gator.
Darby argued that Maddin’s actions violated the trial court’s September 22,
2008 letter ruling and the November 12, 2008 divorce decree. Alternatively,
Darby argued that Maddin’s actions violated the May 4, 2007 temporary orders
which granted her the exclusive use and possession of the Gainesville property
and “all of the property of the parties subject to this suit not specifically
awarded to [Maddin] while this case is pending.”
On November 26, 2008, the trial court found Maddin guilty of violating
the court’s September 22, 2008 letter and the November 12, 2008 final decree
of divorce. The court also found Maddin in contempt and ordered that he be
committed to the Cooke County Jail for “a period of 45 days with no credit for
good time and . . . thereafter until all the property taken October 21, 2008 is
returned.”
Maddin first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding
him in contempt and committing him to the county jail for allegedly violating the
November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce because the contempt order finds
that his actions occurred on October 21, 2008, prior to the entry of the divorce
decree.
An original habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on the
contempt judgment. See Ex parte Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967)
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(orig. proceeding); In re Bielefeld, 143 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g). A writ of habeas corpus will
issue when the relator has not been afforded due process or when the order
requiring confinement is void. In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding). We review a petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine
if the order of commitment is void, either because it was beyond the power of
the court to enter or because the contemnor was not afforded due process.
See id.; Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding);
In re Mann, 162 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig.
proceeding); Ex parte Casillas, 25 S.W.3d 296, 298–99 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Friedman, 808 S.W.2d 166, 168
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, orig. proceeding). Guilt or innocence of the relator
is not an issue; the only issue concerns the lawfulness of the relator’s
imprisonment. In re Mann, 162 S.W.3d at 432.
Among the due process rights accorded an alleged contemnor is the right
to reasonable notice of each alleged contumacious act. Ex parte Barlow, 899
S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
Texas courts have been very strict in requiring that proper notice be given
before a person may be held in contempt for actions done outside the presence
of the court. Ex parte Eureste, 614 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin
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1981, orig. proceeding). When proper notice is not given, then the contempt
order is invalid. Id.
If this court concludes that a relator was deprived of his liberty without
due process of law, or that the contempt and commitment orders are void, we
must order the relator’s release. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 596; Ex parte
Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); In re Alexander,
243 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding).
A contempt order may not be based on an ambiguous order. See Ex parte
Price, 741 S.W.2d 366, 367–68 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding). In order for
the trial court to punish a party for disobeying a written order, the order itself
must be definite and certain. See Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.
1990) (orig. proceeding). To be enforceable by contempt, the written order
must set forth the terms of compliance clearly and specifically so that the
person charged with obeying the order will readily know exactly what duties
and obligations are imposed on him. Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 317
(Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967)
(orig. proceeding). Thus, to sentence a party to confinement for contempt of
a prior court order, that order must have “unequivocally commanded” the party
to perform the duties or obligations imposed on him. Ex parte Padron, 565
S.W.2d 921, 921 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). A written order that is
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equivocal or susceptible to more than one interpretation is not punishable by
contempt. In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding).
The contempt order at issue here clearly finds that Maddin violated the
final decree of divorce when he took and retained property on October 21,
2008. However, it was not possible for Maddin to have violated the November
12, 2008 final decree of divorce because it was not in existence on October
21, 2008. A contemnor cannot be held in constructive contempt of court for
actions taken before the trial court’s order is reduced to writing. See Ex parte
Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding). Here, there
was no order in place commanding Maddin to perform any duties or obligations
or refrain from any action and thus enforceable by contempt. See id.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Maddin
in contempt of the November 12, 2008 divorce decree.
Next, Maddin argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
holding him in contempt and committing him to the county jail for allegedly
violating the court’s September 22, 2008 letter to the parties because the letter
was not an order of the court subject to contempt. In general, letters from the
court to counsel are not the type of documents that constitute a judgment,
decision, or order. See Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398–99 (Tex.
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1982). As in Goff, here, the trial court’s letter directed counsel to prepare and
present an order reflecting the court’s rulings. See id. Only a letter evidencing
a decision actually rendered, describing such decision with certainty as to
parties and effect, and publicly announcing entry of such decision by prompt
filing possesses all the necessary attributes of an order. Schaeffer Homes, Inc.
v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, no writ).
Here, we cannot say that the September 22, 2008 letter complies with
all the requisites of formal entry of the decision rendered. See id. The
September 22, 2008 letter from the trial court to counsel advised the parties
of the trial court’s decision regarding the division of the community property
and debts and concluded by directing Darby’s counsel to prepare the divorce
decree. Subsequently, on November 12, 2008, the final decree of divorce was
signed and filed. The later entry of a formal order reflects that the trial court
did not intend the earlier letter to serve as an entered order. See id.
Accordingly, we hold that the September 22, 2008 letter did not constitute an
order enforceable by contempt. Because the letter was not an order, the trial
court abused its discretion in finding Maddin in contempt of the letter.
In this case, in finding that Maddin had violated the September 22, 2008
letter and November 12, 2008 divorce decree by his actions on October 21,
2008, the trial court exceeded its contempt authority. We issue a writ of
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habeas corpus if a trial court’s contempt order is beyond the court’s power or
the court did not afford the relator due process of law. See In re Henry, 154
S.W.3d at 596. W e therefore vacate the contempt order, grant Maddin’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus, and order him released from bond and
discharged from custody.
JOHN CAYCE
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.
WALKER, J. dissents without opinion.
DELIVERED: April 20, 2009
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