Carmen Avila v. Ynocencio Avila ( 2005 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION  

No. 04-04-00196-CV

Carmen B. AVILA,

Appellant

v.

Ynocencio A. AVILA,

Appellee

From the 229th Judicial District Court, Jim Hogg County, Texas

Trial Court No. CC-03-85

Honorable Alex W. Gabert, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:    Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting:            Catherine Stone, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed:   March 30, 2005

AFFIRMED

            Carmen Avila appeals from the final decree of divorce signed by the trial court on February 25, 2004. Carmen presents three issues for review: (1) the trial court erred in concluding that a claim for economic contribution is an equitable remedy; (2) the court erred in not finding that the Appellant made an economic contribution of $7,294.98 benefitting the Appellee’s estate; and (3) the trial court erred in concluding that it could not calculate her claim for economic contribution under section 3.403(b) of the Texas Family Code. We overrule all three issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

            Carmen and Ynocencio married on July 18, 1995, and ceased to live together as husband and wife on or about August 1, 2003. Each party brought substantial separate property assets into the marriage. Specifically, Ynocencio owned two pieces of property in Jim Hogg County, a 10.2 acre tract of land known to the parties as “El Ranchito”and another tract known to the parties as “Loma Blanca.”

            Following Ynocencio and Carmen’s marriage, in approximately 1996 or 1997, Carmen proposed that they tear down the existing home on the “El Ranchito” land and erect a much larger, dream home. Although initially reluctant to the idea, Ynocencio ultimately contracted to have the old structure demolished and began the construction of the new residence. Ynocencio and Carmen executed a 30-year mortgage loan on the new home for $182,047.00. Following its completion, both parties lived in the home until Carmen moved to San Antonio in August of 2003.

            Upon divorce, the trial court found that the new marital home erected on the “El Ranchito” property was Ynocencio’s separate property. In addition, the trial court found that the “Loma Blanca” property remained part of Ynocencio’s separate estate. In her First Amended Petition to the trial court, Carmen requested that the court grant her claim of economic contribution for monies she expended for the benefit of Ynocencio’s separate property. In its final decree of divorce, the trial court denied Carmen’s claim for economic contribution due to the absence of information necessary to make a calculation of economic contribution. Carmen appeals from this decision of the trial court.ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION

             In three issues on appeal, Carmen contends that the trial court erred in failing to award any economic contribution for payments made by her separate estate for the benefit of Ynocencio’s separate estate. A marital estate that makes an economic contribution to property owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic contribution with respect to the benefitted estate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Nevertheless, economic contribution does not equal to the amount of money paid by one estate to another estate. See generally DON KOONS, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 10.25 (2002). Instead, by statutory definition, economic contribution reflects a betterment of one marital estate by an advancement made by another marital estate and concerns sharing between estates any enhanced value which the contributing estate helped create. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Specifically, it must reduce the principal amount of a debt secured by the property, refinance such debt to the extent it reduces the principal amount, or make capital improvements to the benefitted estate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(a)(1), (5), (6) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). After an economic contribution has been established, we apply a mathematical formula to determine the allocation of the enhanced value between the contributing and benefitting estates. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); LaFrensen v. LaFrensen, 106 S.W.3d 876, 879 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

            Here, it is undisputed that Carmen made substantial disbursements from her personal checking and retirement accounts during the parties’ marriage. Carmen failed, however, to meet her burden of showing that these disbursements were made either to reduce the principal amount of debt or to make capital improvements to the property. See Langston v. Langston, 82 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.). Moreover, Carmen failed to bring forth sufficient evidence for the court to make the calculations necessary to determine the allocation of the enhanced value between the contributing and benefitting estates. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). In most instances, three items will be needed to calculate the claim for economic contribution: (1) the equity value of the property at the date of marriage, or the value on the date contribution was started or made, if later; (2) the equity value of the property at the date of divorce; and (3) the dollar amount of the economic contribution. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Here, however, Carmen failed to present evidence to the trial court regarding the equity values of the properties as of the date of the first contribution to those separate properties, as well as any evidence of the additional contribution to the equity by Carmen’s estate from that point forward. Thus, we cannot make the calculations required by law without speculating as to the pertinent values. Accordingly, we overrule all issues on appeal.

CONCLUSION

            Having overruled all issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Karen Angelini, Justice