Charles Mandeville v. Deborah Mandeville ( 2015 )

I FILED IN
1ST COURT OFAPPEALS
f HOUSTON. TEXAS
ORIGINAL APR'7 »
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
NO. 01-15-00119
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
IN THE
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST DISTRICT
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V
Appellant
vs.
DEBORAH MANDEVILLE
Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE 387™ DISTRICT COURT
April 2015 Charles Mandeville, V
1323 Sunset Lane
Guymon, OK 73942
(505)417-9933
Appellant Pro Se
PARTIES
Charles Mandeville, V
1323 Sunset Lane
Guymon, OK 73942
(Pro Se)
Deborah Mandeville (Crowley),
represented by:
Vicki L. Pinak
Pinak Law Firm, PLLC
12946 S. Dairy Ashford Road, Ste. 400
Sugar Land, TX 77478
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2
RELEVANTFACTS 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5
ARGUMENT 7
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Excluding A Post-Martial Separate
Property Agreement From the Jury Where The Exclusion Was The Result of An
Unnoticed Discovery Motion That Was Not Made Until The Eve of Trial, And
The Issues Within The Motion Were Being Raised For The First Time. 7
2. The District Court Abused Its Authority By Imposing On Appellant Supervised-
Only Visitation For Seeing Any Of His Children When No Such Request Was
Even Made In Any Pleading, And No Grounds At All Were Stated For Seeking
Any Deviation From The Standard Possession Order. 12
CONCLUSION 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters,, L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App. Houston
[14th Dist] 2005 7
Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975) 10
Fanning v. Fanning, 828 S.W.2d 135 (1992) 8
Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976) 10
ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case that was initiated January 17,2014 by appellee Deborah
Mandeville (Crowley). (CR 8)1 After Appellant Charles Mandeville Answered the
petition, he filed a counter-petition for divorce March 21,2014 which demanded a
jury trial. (CR 30). After Answering the counter-petition, Appellee Deborah
submitted a Second Amended divorce petition in August 2014. (CR 123). After
entry of several interim and temporary orders, the case was set for trial and tried by a
jury October 22,2014. (CR 321 - 327). A final decree of divorce was entered
November 12,2014. (CR 377). Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial December
12,2014. (CR443).2 Whennoaction was taken on the motion, the notice of appeal
was filed February 10,2015, within the 60 day period allowed from the new trial
motion filing date. (CR515).
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant believes all issues will be sufficiently set forth in the briefs, and no
oral argument may be necessary.
i <
CR' refers to the Clerk's Record and page number.
2The clerk's record incorrectly shows a date of December 24, 2014. Appellant has
previously submitted a letter requesting correction of the incorrect date.
1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding A Separate Property
Agreement From the Jury As a Result of An Unnoticed Discovery Motion
(Disguised Inside a Motion in Limine) That Was Not Made Until The Eve of
Trial, And The Issues Within The Discovery Motion Were Being Raised For
The First Time?
2. Did The District Court Err In Deviating From The Standard Possession Order
And Imposing On Appellant Supervised-Only Visitation For Seeing Any Of
His Children When No Such Request Was Even Made In Any Pleading, And
No Grounds Were Stated At All For Making Any Deviation?
RELEVANT FACTS
The parties to this case were married in New Mexico in June 2000. (CR 9 and
30). On June 25, 2001, and while still in New Mexico, they executed an agreement
that transmuted community property to separate property under New Mexico law.
(CR 30). The document expressly states that each spouse "divests [him or her] from
any right, interest, or claim [each] may have in, or to, any community property",
including wages and income of any sort 'that was acquired by the parties own labor
and/or initiative' at least from the date of execution and forward. This document was
recorded in the Socorro County, New Mexico records on July 20, 2001. (Id). Prior
to this divorce proceeding, no attempt was ever made by either party to alter/amend
this document. [No such claim in appellee's responses to counter-petition].3
The parties eventually moved away from New Mexico, and were living in Illinois
(a non-community property state). In February 2013 appellant moved to Oklahoma for a
job, and expected his then-wife to join him after the school year was over for the children.
(continued...)
Appellee Charles filed a counter-petition in response to the initial Petition
filed. The counter-petition alleged the existence of, and provided a copy of, the
separate property agreement. (CR 30). In response to the counter-petition, Deborah
submitted a 'Supplemental Amended Answer' alleging denial of a valid separate
property agreement, fraud in the inducement, unconscionableness, lack of fair and
reasonable disclosure, vagueness, and breach of the agreement by Charles. (CR
184). The trial court never considered or ruled on any of the separate property
agreement issues. And (for reasons described below) although the jury was never
allowed to see the agreement, it was nonetheless asked whether appellant Charles
had committed the sort of fraud alleged in the 'Supplemental Amended Answer'. It
ultimately answered 'no'. (CR 358-360).
At a pre-trial conference just prior to the trial starting, for the first time ever,
appellee's counsel handed appellant a 'motion in limine'. (CR 319). Among other
things in this last minute surprise was an unnoticed motion concerning vaguely
described discovery issues. It sought exclusion of specific items of evidence, which
included the 13 year old separateproperty agreement that had been executed by the
parties. (CR 319) Although this portion of the motion did not even complywith the
3(...continued)
Since then, appellant's domicile has been in Oklahoma. He has not been a resident of,
and has had nothing to do with Texas. It was only after appellee Deborah fled to Texas
from Illinois that she began this divorce proceeding.
general Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or the trial court's own local rules regarding
discovery disputes,4 the trial court considered and granted the motion anyway,
excluding the 13 year old agreement from the jury. (CR 337).
Other than appellant's retirement accounts, the sole property at issue was
personal property already held in the respective party's possession, and separate
personal bank accounts. There was no real estate, no investments, and no joint
accounts of any sort. The existence of de facto separate property was also reflected
in the trial court's own ultimate 'Division of Martial Estate' portion of the Final
Decree of Divorce. (See CR 377). The only meaningful property change that
occurred was appellee Deborah being awarded 100% of appellant's retirement
accounts (with no explanation for this grossly unequal division, even assuming this
could have been subject to a community property claim). There was no other
4T.R.Civ.P. 215.1 requires "reasonable notice to other parties" for any discovery
dispute to be heard. It could hardly be considered 'reasonable notice' for someone to
hand an opposing party a discovery motion (or anything containing a discovery dispute)
as that party is walking into the courtroom for purposes of a hearing on that motion. In
addition, the trial court's own Local Rules require at least 10 days notice for motions (See
L.R. 3.3.3) and any discovery sanction related motions must contain the exact text of the
both the discovery request and response within the motion itself (See L.R. 3.3.6). Instead
of following these rules, Petitioner's counsel decided to side-step them and couch these
matters within a 'Motion in Limine' (something not even mentioned in any rule of
procedure), and the Court went along with this. But since specific rules exist regarding
discovery disputes/sanctions, those rules would exclusively govern (see T.R.Civ.P. 2)
instead of some undefined, catch-anything-else, motion in limine. Since the above rules
were not followed, the Court should not have even entertained opposing counsel's
discovery dispute via its slick side-step of the specific rules regarding this type of dispute.
substantive change in either party's property rights.
Without any explanation, the trial court also deviated from the child standard
possession order in the Final Decree of Divorce and imposed on appellant supervised
only visitation for seeing any of his children. (CR 381-383). This is so even though
no grounds were stated for seeking this deviation from the standard order. (CR 125).
Moreover, the only condition ever requested in any petition was supervised visitation
if appellant would be "in possession of all of the children at the same time".
On December 12,2014, within 30 days of the filing of the Final Decree,
appellant filed his Motion for New Trial which argued (1) the discovery ruling was
abusive since (i) the discovery issues (masquerading inside the Motion In Limine)
had been raised too late and should not have even been considered at all, (ii) even if
they could have been considered, the exclusion sanction was excessive/abusive, and
(2) no support existed for deviating from the child standard possession order. (CR
443). !
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court seriously abused its discretion by even entertaining an alleged
discovery dispute (which was masquerading under the name 'Motion in Limine')
concerning discovery issues that were only being raised for the first time on the eve
of trial (and did not comply with the general and local rule requirements for noticed
discovery motions). It has been held more than once that a party waives any
discovery dispute when they wait until the last minute to present it.
But to make matters worse, the court went from making a completely initial
determination about the dispute, by-passed any (initial) order (to compel responses),
any lesser sanction if the order to compel was not obeyed, and went straight to an
exclusion sanction. The Supreme Court has held this sort of action to unquestion
ably be abusive. The exclusion also seriously invaded the province of the jury to
decide what may be separate property. It also took from the jury the question of the
validity of the agreement — an issue that had been raised by appellee herself. After
effectively removing the separate property agreement decision from the jury, the trial
court then proceeded to simply ignore the entire matter in its Final Decree.
Next, the trial court should not have deviated from the standard possession
order for child custody. No grounds were even stated in appellee's Second Amended
Petition for making any such deviation. Moreover, the trial court even went beyond
any request from appellee for the deviation. While appellee's petition only sought
supervised visitation on appellant when he had possession of 'all of the children at
the same time', the court issued a supervised-only visitation restriction on appellant
regardless of the number of children he might possess. Since deviating from the
standard possession order is questionable enough in itself, certainly going beyond
what a party might request for a deviation cannot stand up.
For these reasons, the trial court's exclusion order should be reversed/vacated,
along with its decision to award appellee the entirety of appellant's retirement
accounts. The order imposing on appellant supervised-only possession ofhis
children should also be vacated.
ARGUMENT5
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Excluding A Post-Martial
Separate Property Agreement From the Jury Where The Exclusion Was The
Result of An Unnoticed Discovery Motion That Was Not Made Until The Eve
of Trial, And The Issues Within The Motion Were Being Raised For The First
Time.
Paragraph 4 of the purported 'Motion In Limine' refers to a purported 'failure
to respond to the interrogatory request requiring each item of separate property to be
identified.' Paragraph 5 refers to a 'Request For Production that was not timely
produced'. Based on these vague references to purported discovery misconduct by
appellant, the motion sought to exclude any reference to any 'specific item, bank
account, or retirement account as being [appellant's] separate property'. The motion
did not (and couldnot) refer to any prior Orderfor any such disclosure or 'inventory'
since none existed.6 Nor did any prior discovery order exist that addressed the
Since appellant's motion for new trial raised the issues presented in this appeal,
that motion preserved these issues. Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C., 171
S.W.3d 481, 491 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2005 (holding parties preserved error
where they filed a motion for new trial after the trial court retroactively converted a
preliminary hearing into a trial on the merits); Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 236
(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (appellant preserved his issue regarding lack of
particularity in the sanctions order by filing a motion for new trial which detailed issues).
It should be noted that there is no general, standing, statutory requirement for
(continued...)
specific discovery issues that were being raised. So opposing trial counsel Waited
until the eve of trial to bring up the discovery issue, and the discovery sanction
sought right out of the gate was an exclusion order on key evidence, without any
prior determination that a discovery violation even existed or any order compelling
responses. Nonetheless, based on this, the trial court ruled that appellant:
"shall not mention or refer to a specific item, bank account, or retirement
account, as being his separate property as CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V,
failed to respond to the Interrogatory request requiring him to identify and
state the value of each item he claims is his separate property." (CR 338).
Appellant was therefore barred by this order from making any reference to the fact
that separate property might exist, much less to the separate property agreement since
it specifically listed these types of items.
As an initial matter, appellant would point out that courts have held that a
party Who does not obtain an order compelling discovery responses, and waits until
the eve of trial to complain about discovery issues has waived them. Mandell v.
6(...continued)
making any pre-trial 'inventory' of separate property. In fact, the term 'inventory' only
appears one place in the entire Family Code (§ 6.502). This statute addresses 'Temporary
Injunction and Other Temporary Orders'. No such order was ever issued in this case.
Moreover, cases exist where separate property was determined by reference to the
separate property agreement alone, Without any 'inventory'. Williams v. Williams, 720
S.W.2d 246, 248-249 (Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) 1986) (trial court correctly
characterized items as separate property since they Were "by definition in the agreement";
no separate 'inventory' even mentioned in case); Fanning v. Fanning, 828 S.W.2d 135,
(Tex.App.-Waco 1992) (judgment reversed where trial court failed to enforce separate
property agreement, and divided property contrary to agreement; separate property was
listed in agreement; no separate 'inventory' even mentioned in case).
8
Mandell, 214 S.W.3d 682, 691-692 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2007) (evidence
exclusion claim waived where no prior order compelling discovery, and party waited
until eve of trial to file discovery sanction motion). Based on this alone, the trial
court should have disregarded any initial complaints about discovery on the eve of
trial. But even if it could/ should have considered the complaints, the sanction it
imposed was abusive.
In discussing discovery sanctions in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (1991) the Texas supreme court held that a sanction "should
be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose", and that a court
must "consider the availability of less stringent sanctions and whether such lesser
sanctions would fully promote compliance". Id, at 917. The court when on to state
that 'trial by sanctions' is not justified, and a sanction which is so severe as to
"preclude presentation of the merits of the case should not be assessed absent a
party's flagrant bad faith or counsel's callous disregard for the responsibilities of
discovery under the rules". Id at 918. After noting nothing in the record of that case
showed any consideration by the trial court of any lesser sanction, the supreme court
held the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sanction that resulted in
dismissal of the claim.
In this case, the trial court's imposition of the exclusion sanction plainly
precluded presentation of the merits of the case regarding separate property, and
effectively resulted in a default on that issue by appellant. But, just as in Trans-
AmericanNatural Gas, there is nothing in the record which shows any attempt at any
lesser sanction by the trial court. Moreover, there is not even anything in the record
of the motion (or hearing) which showed any 'flagrant bad faith' on appellant's part.
The discovery issues opposing counsel raised were essentially being raisedyor the
first time, and therefore the motion had to be seeking an initial determination of
whether any discovery violation had even occurred at all (and it all only occurred on
the eve of trial). To jump from making an initial determination of a discovery
violation occurring to the immediate imposition of an exclusion sanction is leaping a
huge chasm, and would not stand up under the test of TransAmerican Natural Gas.
This would be especially true where a jury right is involved. In divorce cases,
when a proper jury demand is made, it is the jury's exclusive province to determine
what may be separate or community property, and reversible error if all relevant
disputed facts are not submitted to the jury. Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716, 718
(Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976) (reversing decision where pertinent property facts
excluded from jury). A court must also abide by the jury's determination of separate
and community property in any property division. See Cockerham v. Cockerham,
527 S.W.2d 162,173 (Tex. 1975) ("Though the trial court has wide discretion in
dividing the propertyof the spouses as it feelsjust and in disregarding advisory
answers of the jury, it may not ignore the jury's answers which extend to issues of
10
fact from which the status ofproperty is determined.")
This issue gets even more ridiculous when: (1) consideration is given to the
fact that the very validity of the separate property agreement was specifically put in
dispute by appellee Deborah's own Answer to the Counter-Petition, and (2) the jury
was specifically asked whether appellant had committed acts that might invalidate
the agreement. Despite these circumstances, the jury was precluded from seeing the
agreement itself. That, of course, is senseless by itself. But it gets 'better'! After the
trial, the trial court then summarily ignored the issues about the agreement that had
been specifically raised by appellant in his counter-petition, and appellee Deborah's
own 'Supplemental' Answer to the Counter-Petition. It just summarily rendered a
Final Decree without even mentioning the separate property agreement issue.
Given the above circumstances, and the absolute right of a jury to determine
the character of the property involved, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion
to summarily exclude a key agreement that long ago declared the separate property
intentions of the parties. This agreement, and listing ofproperty items within it, was
known by everyone long before any trial, was plainly a factor in any determination
concerning the character of any property, and its application was an issue for the jury
to decide. By excluding it, the trial court improperly invaded the province of the
jury.
But even beyond this, the trial court then proceeded to summarily ignore issues
11
concerning the validity of separateproperty agreement that appellee Deborah herself
had put at issue. All these issues were raised in appellant's Motion For NewTrial,
which the trial court simplyignored. Clearly, all the above presents reversible error.
2. The District CourtAbused Its Authority By Imposing OnAppellant
Supervised-Only Visitation For Seeing Any Of His Children When No Such
Request Was Even Made In Any Pleading, And No Grounds At All Were
Stated For Seeking Any Deviation From The Standard Possession Order.
In the Final Decree of Divorce the Court appointed appellant as a parent
possessory conservator of the children. But despite this appointment, the Court
issued a modified possession order which imposed supervised-only visitation on him
for seeing any of his children. (CR341). No grounds are stated in the Orderfor this
modification. The onlything everrequested in anypetition was supervised visitation
if appellant would be "inpossession of all ofthe children at the same time" (CR
125), and no amendment ofthis requests exists. Moreover, no grounds were alleged
for even this requested modification. (Id).
The Texas Family Code §153.252(a)-(b) includes a rebuttable presumption
thatthe standard possession order "provides reasonable minimum possession of a
child for a parent named as possessory conservator orjointmanaging conservator"
and "is in the best interest of the child." A partyseeking a deviation from the
standard possession order has the burden to establish that the modification is in the
best interest ofthe child. Prause v. Wilder, 820 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex. App. 1991).
Since a party seeking the deviation has this burden, they would clearly have the
12
obligation of making allegations in their petition to satisfy that burden. See, e.g.
Smith v. Aramark Corporation, 13-11-00500-CV (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi
7-31-2014) p. 7 (party's failure to make allegations in pleadings against presumption
contrary to their position provided no evidence to overcome presumption); In re
Sullender, 12-12-00058-CV (Tex.App.-Tyler 7-11-2012), p. 4 (failure to make
appropriate allegations against presumption in favor of opposing party fails to
overcome presumption).
Here, although a standard possession order modification was requested in
appellee's amended petition, no grounds whatsoever were alleged for any such
modification. This alone should have resultedin the failure to state a claim for any
modification; and no modification allowed. The trial court abused its authority by
issuing a modification anyway when no grounds were even alleged for it.
But even beyond the above, the only modification requested was supervised
visitation if and when appellant might be in possession ofall the children at the same
time. The trial court nonetheless went beyond that and imposed unconditional
supervised visitation on appellant, regardless of the number of children he may have.
Since no such request was ever even made, the trial court abused its authority for
imposing the supervised-only condition it did for appellant to see his children.
Therefore, the portion of the Final Decree imposing supervised-only visitation
should be reversed/vacated, and the matter remanded for a different order regarding
13
child possession.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the district court's Final Decree
awarding appellant's retirement accounts to appellee should be reversed/ vacated.
The supervised-only visitation/possession restriction imposed on appellant to visit
and/ or possess his children should also be vacated. Appellant should also be
awarded his costs for this appeal.
is Jv^mdeville, y^~
Appellant In Pro Per
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In accordance with T.R.A.P. 9.4, it is hereby certified that the foregoing
content consists of less than 4000 words.
14
APPENDIX INDEX
Community Property Declaration and Agreement -6
Order On Motion in Limine 1
Jury Instructions 3
Charge of Court / Verdict Form .,9
Final Decree of Divorce ..19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that on the below date a copy ofthe foregoing document
were served on the following by depositing the same in a sealed envelope in the
United States mail with postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Vicki L. Pinak
Pinak Law Firm, PLLC
12946 S. Dairy Ashford Road, Ste. 400
Sugar Land, TX 77478
(Counsel for Deborah Mandeville (Crowley))
Date: /fn/ Ht >/
Adverse Spouse Qook S^7Pa_
-Page
^St^
Both of the above named spouse's communityproperty interests will be adversely affected by this
agreement. Therefore both spouses are the adverse parties to this agreement.
Intent to Divest and Transmute Community Property
In that it has been determined that for the intent of the marriage consummated between the parties,
to be properly adhered to, that Deborah M. Mandeville, wife, voluntarily divest herselfof anyright,
interest, or claim she may have to, or in, any community property considered interest income, stocks,
bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income or other earnings, and all realty and personal vehicles
whichCharles Mandeville, V acquiredby and through his own labor anoYor initiative which Deborah M.
Mandeville, wife,mayhaveacquiredbyand throughthe marriage ofCbarlesMandevifle, Vand Deborah
M. Mandeville on June 10, 2000. DeborahM. Mandeville further divests herselfof any community
propertyinterestshemayacquire in anyfutureinterestincome, stocks, bonds, dividends, wages, income,
rental income and/or all other earnings, and all realty and personal vehicles whichCharles Mandeville,
V may acquire by and through his own labor and/or initiative.
Additionally it is the kitent of DeborahM. Mandeville, wife, to transmute such property from the
status ofcommunity property to the status ofseparateand personal property ofCharles Mandeville, V,
husband.
In that it hasbeen determined that for the intentofthe marriage consummated between the parties,
to be properlyadheredto, that Charles Mandeville, V, husband, voluntarily divest himselfof anyright,
interest, or claim he may have to, or in, any community property considered interest income, stocks,
bonds, dividends* wages, income, rental income or other earnings, andaO realty andpersonal vehicles
which Deborah M. Mandeville acquired by and through her own labor andXor initiative which Charles
Mandeville, V, husband, mayhave acquired by andthrough the marriageofCharles Mandeville, V and
Deborah M. Mandevflle on June 10, 2000. Charles Mandeville, V fiuther divests himself of any
community property interest he may acquire in any future interest income, stocks, bonds, dividends,
wages, income, rental income and/or all other earnings, and al realty and personal vehicles Which
Deborah M. Mandevflle mayacquire by and through her own labor and/or initiative.
Additionally, it is the intent ofCharles Mandeville, V, husband, to transmute saidproperty from the
status ofcommunityproperty to the statusofseparate and personal property ofDeborahM. Mandevflle,
wife.
Divestiture and Transmutation of Community Property
That DeborahM Mandeville hereby, voluntarily andwithout reservation, conveys to herhusband as
thepersonal andseparate property ofCharles Mandeville, V, and thereby divests fromherself anyright,
interest or claim to, or in, the community property as set forth herein, effective from the date of this
agreement and forward; and that allinterest income, stocks, bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental
income orother earnings, and realtyandpersonal vehicles which CbarlesMandevifle, Vacquired byand
through his own labor and/or initiative, is now and forever hereafter transmuted from the status of
community property to the separate anddistinct personal propertyofCharles Mandeville, V, disposable
by him without the consent of and recourse to the adverse spouse.
That Charles Mandeville, V hereby, voluntarily and without reservation, conveys to his wife as the
personal and separate property ofDeborah M. Mandeville and thereby divests from himselfany right,
Prop/Agreement 2
S
Book 5lJ_Paqe j£l£/ '
interestor claim to, or in, the community property as set forth herein, effective from the date of this
agreement and forward; and thatall interest income, stocks, bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental
income orotherearnings, andrealty andpersonalvehicles which DeborahM. Mandeville aequired byand
through her own labor and/or initiative, is now and forever hereafter txaremuted from the status of
community property to the status of the separate and distinct personal property of Deborah M.
Mandevile, disposable byher without the consent of andrecourse to the adverse spouse.
Express Property Exclusions
Allother propertynot included witMnthe confinesofthe above section is considered exclusiveofthis
agreement as herein set forth Thisincludes, andis limited to, realty held injointtenancy and/or joint
tenancy incommon, orin anyother manner, other than inthe individual name ofthe maternal orpaternal
spouse, as the ease may be, which would subject said realty to the conimurrity property laws; family
vehicles, wearing apparel, gifts, orany othertangible orintangible items otherwise considered statutory
community property or the separate property ofthe maternal/paternal adverse spouse, as the case may
be.
This section does notserve toprohibit the rnaternal/paternal adverse spouse, asthecase maybe,from
exercismg, at a later date, anyright to convey to eitheradversespouse, or divest from either adverse
spouse, me property excluded by this section Any modification ofthis agreement shall be set forth in
writing,signedanddatedbythe respectivespouses, andattached totheoriginal agreement Ifnecessary,
anymodification shall be recorded with the county recorder's office as requiredbylaw.
Implied Property Inclusion
All other property not expressly listed in the above section as a specific property exclusion is
considered included, by implication, intheDivestiture and Transmutation clauses ofthjs agreement, and
is hereby transmuted to the personal and separate property of the spouses, divested by the
matemal/patemaJadverse spouse and conveyedtothematemaVpaternal adverse spouse, asthe case may
be, as their own separate andpersonal property, including, but not limited to, taxdeferred annuities,
IRA's, savings accounts and allother property not expressly set forth within theExpress Property
Exclusions clause.
Common Law Obligation of Paternal Spouse - Defined
It is understood that Charles Mandeville, V hasa Common Lawduty and obligation to provide for
hiswife, children, and otherdependents, andto support them, clothemem,feed them,shelter them and
generally provide for the necessities of life and for their well-being pursuant to the customs of the
Common Law.
Such obligation shaE notbe interpreted as the conveyance byCharles Mandeville, V, husband, to
Deborah M. Mandeville, wife, ortheacceptance byher ofcommunity property rights regarding interest
income, stocks, bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income orotherearnings, andrealtyandpersonal
vehicles of Charles Mandeville, V, acquired byandthrough his ownlabor anoYor initiative as set form
herein.
Liability of Adverse Spouse, Deborah M. Mandeville.
AnyhabUiues incurred bytheadverse spouse, DeborahM Mandeville, willbesatisfied first from the
personal property of Deborah M Mandeville, and then from the communiy property estate, ifany, of
Prop/Agreement
-H-
0ock pJ-Lp*z? <&£?
theparties signatory hereto as set formabove, consistent with thecommunity property laws ofthe State
of New Mexico.
Deborah M. Mandeville willbe solely responsible for satisfying anyliabilities, whatsoever, incurred
against, or byreceiptofany interest income, stocks, bonds,dividends, wages, income, rental income or
other earnings, realtyandpersonalvehicles ofDeborah M.MandeviUe acquired byandthrough herown
labor and/or initiative.
Liability of Paternal Spouse, Charles Mandeville, V
Any liabilities incurredby the adverse spouse, CharlesMandeville,V, will be satisfiedfirstfrom the
personal property ofCharles Mandeville, V,andthen from thecommunity property estate, ifany, ofthe
parties signatory hereto as setforth above, consistent with the cornmunity property laws of the State of
New Mexico.
Charles Mandeville, V will be solelyresponsible for satisfying anyliabilities, whatsoever, incurred
agamst, or by receipt of any interest income, stocks,bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income or
other earnings, andrealty andpersonal vehicles ofhimselfacquired byandthrough his ownlabor andYor
initiative.
Husband's Control of Personal Property
Charles Mandeville, V wfll have exclusive control over Ins own personal and separate property,
including, but not limited to, interest income, stocks, bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income,
and other earningsreceived, andreaty andpersonal vehicles to dispose ofas he deems proper without
the consent of, and without recourse to Deborah M. Mandevflle.
Wife's Control of Personal Property
Deborah M. Mandeville will have exclusive control over her own personal and separate property,
including, butnot limited to, tax deferred annuities, IRA's, savings accounts, interest income, stocks,
bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income, and other earnings received, and realty and personal
vehicles to dispose of as she deems proper without the consent of, and without recourse to Charles
Mandeville, V.
Bank Accounts
CharlesMandeville, Vshall have aseparatebankaccount for bis separate andpersonal funds, should
a bank account be desired, which the adverse partyhereto will neither have access to norbe signatory
thereon. Bank account includes any type of account offered by commercial and/or private banks.
Deborah M Mandeville shall have a separate bank account for her separate and personal funds,
should a bank account be desired, which the adverse party hereto willneither have access to norbe
signatory thereon. Bank account includes any type ofaccount offered by commercial and/or private
banks.
Should a joint bank CHECKING account be desirable for purposes ofpaying the marital support
obligations incurred by the paternal spouse, as herein before stated, that istosay, support ofthe famual
necessities, said accountshalneither be interpreted nor construed tobe an abrogation ofmis agreement
relative to the intent ofthe specific transmutation ofproperty between the spouses.
Prop/Agreement 4 ``* ~Z.
Commingling ofSeparate and Community Property
The parties signatoryhereto agree that there will be no commingling oftheir separate property with
the community propertyofthe marital estate. Any incidental or inadvertent commingling ofproperty
shall not serve to nullify the intentof this agreement, unless and until it can conclusively be shown by
either spouse, or a thirdparty, that such commingling ofpropertywas not incidental or inadvertent and
was done so as to achieve favorable consideration for either ofthe parties signatory hereto, with the
consent and knowledge ofthe other party, with respect to the community propertylaws ofthe State of
New Mexico and contrary to the intent of this agreement.
Coniminghhg offunds shallnot include nor be interpreted as estebfishment ofajoint bank account
between the parties to pay for familial necesskies.
Furthermore, it is understood, that supplying the maternal adverseparty hereto, with funds to pay
necessary family living expenses and to provide food, clothing and shelter for the family and the
dependents thereof, and providing for the same a comfortable manner of living within the means of
CharlesMandeville, V shall notconstitute, expresslyor byimplication, the commingling ofseparate and
communityproperty.
Divorce
Should eitherpartyhereto institute andcomplete divorce proceedings as against theotherparty, mis
agreement is binding fir those proceedings, and the interest income, stocks,bonds, dividends, wages,
income, rentalincome, andotherearnings, realtyandpersonal vehicles ofCharles Mandeville, V acquired
byandthrough hisownlabor and/or initiative, shall be recognized ashis separate and personalproperty
for said divorce proceedings, for which neither the wife nor anythird party shall have any claim to as
community property, forsatisfaction ofcommunity propertydebts, the wife's personal debtsor for any
other reason, exceptingthe personal debts ofCharles Mandeville, V, which willbe satisfied consistent
with the terms and conditions ofthis agreement and the prevailing New MexicoStateLaw inexistence
at the time this agreement is entered into by, and between the parties signatory hereto.
Should eitherpartyhereto institute andcomplete divorce proceedings asagainst theotherparty, this
agreementisbinding forthoseproceedings,and the tax deferredannuities,IRA's, interestincome,stocks,
bonds, dividends, wages, income, rental income, and other earnings, realty and personal vehicles of
Deborah M. Mandeville acquired byand through her own labor and/orinitiative, shall berecognized as
her separate and personal property for saiddivorce proceedings, forwhich neither thehusband norany
thirdpartyshall have anyclaimto as community property, for satisfactionofcommunityproperty debts,
the husbands personal debts or for any other reason, excepting the personal debts of Deborah M.
Mandeville, which will be satisfied consistent with the terms and conditions ofthis agreement
Death of Paternal Spouse. Charles Mandeville. V
Upon the death of Charles Mandeville, V,andin the absence ofdivorce proceedings prior to death,
all separate personalproperty hereinsetforth above mthe DivestitureandTransmutation ofCommunity
Property section, and subsequent sections governing inclusion of property by implication shall
automatically revert to the adverseparty of this agreement, DeborahM. Mandeville.
This section shall not beconstrued to include thepersonal liabilities, if any, of Charles Mandeville,
V,upon his death, acquired prior to the death of Charles Mandeville, V,and/orprior to the marriage of
Charles Mandeville, V and Deborah M. Mandeville.
Pmn/A/rroomanf c
—z.
^..^L/L £#&
In the event thatNew Mexico State law, whether it bethe common law, statutory law, or decisional
lawrequires assumption ofthe personal Kabflities of Charles Mandevflle, V, upon acceptance and recent
ofhis separate property by Deborah M. Mandeville, asprovidedherein, Deborah M. Mandeville reserves
the right to waive acceptance and receipt ofany or all of the separate property of Charles Mandeville,
V.
Thisparagraph is inoperative asto anywflls, intervivostrusts oranyother document orvehicle which
isestablished byCharles Mandeville, V, which would otherwise serve to convey his separate property
to a party other than Deborah M. Mandevflle.
Death of Maternal Spouse. Deborah M. Mandeville
Upon the death ofDeborah M. Mandeville, and inthe absence ofdivorce proceedings priorto death,
all separate personalpropertyherein set forth above in the Divestiture and Transmutation ofCommunfty
Property section, and subsequent sections governing inclusion of property by implication shall
automatically revert to the adverse partyof this agreement, CharlesMandeville, V.
This section shall not be construed to include the personal liabilities, if any, of Deborah M.
Mandeville, Upon her death, acquired prior to the death of Deborah M Mandeville and/or prior to the
marriage ofDeborah M. Mandevflle.
In the eventthatNew Mexico State law,whether it be thecommon law, statutory law,or decisional
lawrequires assumptionofthe personalliabflitiesofDeborahM. Mandeville uponacceptance and receipt
ofher separate property by Charles Mandeville, V, as provided herein, Charies Mandevflle, V reserves
the right to waive acceptance and receipt of any or all of the separate property of Deborah M.
Mandevflle.
Thisparagraphisinoperativeasto anywills, intervivos trusts or anyotherdocument orvehicle which
isestablished byDeborah M Mandevflle which would otherwise serve to conveyherseparate property
to a party other than Charles Mandeville, V.
Merger and Construction
This Contract sets forth theentire understanding and agreement ofthe parties and maybe modified
only by anagreement inwriting executed by the parties hereto. All negotiations are merged into this
Contract. This Contract shall not be construed against the party preparing it, but shall be construed as
ifbothparties prepared theContract. The paragraph headings used herein are for convenience only and
do not form aportion ofmis Contract. This contract shall beconstrued and interpreted pursuant toand
under the common law, statutory law, and decisionallaw of the State ofNew Mexico.
Severability Of Provisions
In the event that any provision of this contract conflicts with any applicable law, or if any provision
is held invalid by acourt with jurisdictionover the parties to this contract, such provision orpart thereof
shall be deemed deleted, ordered replaced or renegotiated in this contract, but the remainder ofthe
contract shall remain in full force and effect.
Prop/Agreement
Agreement Binding
This agreement isbinding on both parties, signatory hereto, and cannot be modified or dissolved
without the express written consentof bothparties.
Effective Date of Agreement
This agreement shall be deemed effective, by oral agreement, the date the marriage between the
partiesisconsummated, regardless and irrespectiveofthe date this Contract isformally executed; the oral
agreement being subject to the statute of frauds.
Witness our hands this ePSdayof J
k&MnoJ-i M AUodUp,uU.
Deborah M, Mandeville, Wife iMandevilleVV, Husband
Maternal Adverse Spouse Paternal Adverse Spouse
l3%^BA)oc U)cu>^.
Address Address
City, State, Z\p City, State, Zip
On this gJC day of r"* .intheyear jlo» I beforeme, Peyyy A C-/*.--*.*
aNotary Public, State ofN^uv^Miuuoo, duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared, Mr. Charles
Mandeville, Vand Deborah M Mandeville known tome, orproven to meon satisfactory evidence to
be the person whose names are subscribed tothe within instrument, and acknowledge the same.
INWITNESS THEREOF I have hereunto set myhand andaffixed myofficial seaL
Notary Publ*, State ofHuwMuJkd &**3o *-v
My commission expires on: *+—/* —& *f
Prop/Agreement
O
OrJitt On
in
p'tflfttt.
U-DW-211809
ORDER Filed
Order 10/20/2014 4:39:12 PM
3276849 Annie Rebecca Elliott
District Clerk
Fort Bend County, Texas
NO. 14-DCV-211809 Herlinda Nanez
IN THE MAJTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE MAJtftLV&E OF §
§
H MANDEVILLE § 387thJUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
§
§
§ FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
OTION IN LIMINE
On October 17, 2; d the Motion in Limine filed by Counsel for
DEBORAH MANDEVIL h Motion and hearing arguments by
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, d CounseJ rar DEBORAH MANDEVILLE, the Court
determined that the following Orders shojafa
1. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that CH^Rto^AND^VH^LkTv, pro se, and Counsel for
DEBORAH MANDEVILLE shall not rteflnon, reftrfo%fi>ring before the jury, directly or
indirectly, on voir dire examination, reading^of/the oksauTngSxstatement of the case,
interrogation ofthe witnesses, argument, objections beToj^rihe jury^ol\in any other manner
any ofthe matters enumerated below, unless and until/the matters first t^envcalled to
the Court's attention out of the presence and he jury and/a' favorable ruling
received on the admissibility and relevance ofthe matters
2. IT IS ORDERED that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V, pro se, shall t> •
cruelty, or other acts of fault in disrupting the marital relationship
by CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V to support such a claim.
/
3. IT IS ORDERED that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V,prose, shall not mention anyevidence
ofthe character reputation, or quality of, or the fees for, legal services rendered by counsel
for DEBORAH MANDEVILLE.
4./1T IS-ORDERED that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V, pro se, shall not mention orrefer to a
specific item, bank/account, or retirement account, as being his separate property as
^CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V, failed to respond to the Interrogatory request requiring him
toSdentuVand^gfate the value of each item he claims is his separate property.
5. IT IS ORDEREpmatCHAk.ES MANDEVILLE, V, pro se, shall not mention orrefer to or
show th^jury or offer any^exhibit that was requested in DEBORAH MANDEVILLE'S
Request for Productiofithatwas not timely produced by CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V.
6. IT IS ORDERED that >EVILLE, V, pro se, shall not mention or refer to
the fact that a Motion /Judgment-was denied by the Court.
7. IT IS ORDERED that CHAREES M shall not mention or refer to
any terms, discussions or eviden; ations or settlement offers
relating to the issues in this case
Granted in open Court on October 17,2014
And entered this df day ofOctober, 2014
J2
jury X-flsTrvciforts
Filed
10/20/2014 4:39:12 PM
Annie Rebecca Elliott
District Clerk
Fort Bend County, Texas
Heriinda Nanez
NO. 14-DCV-211809
IN THE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE
387th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
onio Jupy-ParM before Voir Dire Examination
MEMBERS OF THE JURY
Thank you for being 1 eTecta-jury. Twelve of you will be chosen for
the jury. Even if you are not cl ;ou\ are performing a valuable service that is
your right and duty as a citizen of a free col
Before we begin: Turn off all pljofies and a nic jie\jces. While you are in the
courtroom, do not communicate with anyone thrau'gh^any ei mo-device. For example, do not
communicate by phone, text message, email message, an, blog, or social networking
websites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagrarnfetc. I you a number where others may
contact you in case of an emergency. Do not po atjon-about the case on the Internet
before these court proceedings end and you are\re'. rojn--tnrv. duty. Do not record or
photograph any part ofthese court proceedings, because ifisprohibited pyMaw.
If you are chosen for the jury, your role as juror ill be to dei disputed facts in
this case. My role will be to ensure that this case is tried les of law.
Here is some background about this case. This is a case in d Custody
issues between DEBORAH MANDEVILLE and CHARLES Mv%BEV presenting
the petitioner is Vicki L. Pinak, and respondent is representing himselfi 1 askVoto some
questions during jury selection. But before their questions begin( ifmusi some
instructions for jury selection.
Every juror must obey these instructions. You may be called into ctfurWO
any violations oftheses instructions. If you do not follow these instructions, you will b^guilty
ofjuror misconduct, and I might have to order a new trial and start this process ov"er again. This
would waste your time and parties' money, and would require the taxpayers ofthisMounty to pay
for another trial.
3
These are^the instructions.
To ayoicl looking like you are friendly with one side ofthe case, do not mingle or talk with
mHawyer, witnesses, parties, or anyone else involved in the case. You may exchange casual
reelings like "hello" and "good morning." Other than that, do not talk with them at all.
leyhave to foliowjthes£>instructions too, so you should not be offended when they follow
i the instructions.
>nc Sptaayfavo \from the lawyers, witnesses, parties, or anyone involved in the case,
and' •anyfi t>r |br them. This includes favors such as givingrides and food.
Do not discu£§ this' case wfth yryone, even your spouse or a friend, either in person or by
other meaA^jrfcluding by^phohe, text message, email message, chat room, blog, or social
networking websites suen a/Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram. Do not allow anyone to
discuss the case witjyyou^or in^ourjjearing. If anyone tries to discuss the case with you or
in your hearing, tellme irruned^ately/^Ve do not want you to be influenced by something
other than the evidence admitfea in coij
4. Vicki L. Pinak and CHARliES MANDEViLLF,, v^ ie the right to ask you questions about
your background, experieWas^nd-aratudes not trying to meddle in your affairs.
They are just being morouglK4rjd_iFying tpxclioos^ fai >rs who do not have any bias or
prejudice in this particular case.
Remember that you took an oath tha^you will S&-1& tmthful when the lawyers
ask you questions, and always give complete'ans^ers. u aonot answer a question that
applies to you, that violates your oath, a^etimes nil ask a question ofthe whole
panel instead of just one person. If die question ai lb you, raise your hand and keep it
raised until you are called on.
6. Do not investigate this case on your own. For examp
a. try to get information about the case, lawye outside this
courtroom;
b. go to places mentioned in the case it inspect the p
c. inspect items mentioned in this case unless they are pre
d. look anything up in a law book, dictionary, orpublic rf
the case;
e. look anything up on the Internet to try to learn more about
f. let anyone else do any of these things for you
This rule is very important because we want a trial based only on evidenoi presentepym open
court. Your conclusions about this case must be based only on what you see aiid^near^dn this
courtroom because the law does not permit you to base your conclusions on inrorniation that
has not been presented to you in open court. All the information must be presented in open
court so the parties and their lawyers can test it and object to it. Information from other
4
sources, like the Internet, will not go through this important process in the courtroom. In
addition, information from other sources could be completely unreliable. As a result, if you
mvestigate'uus^case on your own, you could compromise the fairness to all parties in this
case ana jeopardize the results of this trial.
ese instructions? Ifnot please let me know now.
Filed
10/20/2014 4:39:12 PM
Annie Rebecca Elliott
District Clerk
Fort Bend County, Texas
Heriinda Nanez
NO. 14-DCV-211809
IN THE § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE
§ 387™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
§ FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
You have been chosen to serve on oath you have taken and your
selection for the jury, you become offj e participants in our justice
system.
'O
You have each received a set of writteninsTructions: Lam going to read them with you
now. Some of them you have heard before aradsome
1. Turn off all phones and other electronic devid : courtroom and while
you are deliberating, do not communicate with any lectronic device. For
example, do not communicate by phone, text mess •, chat^objn, blog, or
social networking websites such as Facebook. Tw wmgive you a
number where others may contact you in case of em brmation about
the case on the Internet before these court proceedings"el released from jury
duty. Do not record or photograph any part of these co' 6eedirfl5jsT~bBcause it is
prohibited by law.
To avoid looking like you are friendly with one side ofthe case,
the lawyers, witnesses, parties, or anyone else involved in the c
casual greetings like "hello" and "good morning." Other than that,
all. They have to follow these instructions too, so you should not be
follow the instructions.
Do not acceptany favors from the lawyers, witnesses, parties, or anyone else involved in the
case, and do not do any favors for them. This includes favors such as giving rides and food.
(*
Do not discusa^his case with anyone, even your spouse or a friend, either in person or by any
other mearis, including by phone, text message, email message, chat room, blog, or social
networiang/websites such as Facebook, Twitter, or Myspace. Do not allow anyone to discuss
the^case^with you or in your hearing. If anyone tries to discuss the case with you or in your
fcarifig, tell me immediately. We do not want you to be influenced by something other than
'to./evidence admittedWn court.
oNJot discms^fliis^case with anyone during the trial, not even with the otherjurors, until the
end OT4h©-mal,/You should not discuss the case with your fellow jurors until the end ofthe
tn roudo opinions about the case before you have heard everything.
After you evidence, received all of my instructions, and heard all of the
arguments,' to the jury room to discuss the case with the other jurors and
reach a verdict.
6. Do not investigat For example, do not:
a try to get information about thejca^e, lawyers, witnesses, or issues from outside this
courtroom;
b. goto places mentic^eUinJhe'cas©' it i ees;
c. inspect items mentioned in thiscase presented as evidence in court;
d. look anything up in a law book, ord to try to learn more about
the case;
e. look anything up on the Infc abodtNhe case; or
f. let anyone else do any of these thing!
This rule is very important because we warff a trial nly on evidence presented in open
court Your conclusions about this case must b it you see and hear in this
courtroom because the law does not permit yoiiurbase, os on information that
has not been presented to you in open court. All the, be presented in open
court so the parties and their lawyers can test it brmatic5n\from other
sources, like the Internet, will not go through this e courtroom. In
addition, information from other sources could be coi a result, if you
investigate this case on your own, you could compromr b all parties in this
case and jeopardize the results of this trial.
7. Do not tell other jurors of your own experiences or other people's e,
you may have special knowledge of something in the case, such
professional information. You may even have expert knowledge
know what happened in this case or another similar case. Do not
Telling other jurors about it is wrong because it means the jury will be co
were not presented in court.
8. Donot consider attorney's fees unless I tell youto. Donot guess about attorneys5 fees
7
During the trial, if taking notes will help focus your attention on the evidence, you may take
notes using thexmaterials the court has provided. Do not use any personal electronic devices
to take notes, Irtaking notes will distract your attention from the evidence, you should not
1aken«rtes;/Your notes are for your ownpersonal use. Theyare not evidence. Donot show
orread.your notes to anyone, including other jurors.
Y«fa must leave yournote^ in the jury room or with the bailiff. The bailiff is instructed not to
read your notes andto£fve your notes to me promptly after collecting them from you. I will
sure yqurnotes'are kept in a safe, secure location and not disclosed to anyone.
Youmay_laKe your ack into the jury room and consult them during deliberations. But
keep in mind thj e not evidence. When you deliberate, each of you should rely
on your indj on of the evidence and not be influenced by the fact that
another jui :en notes. After you complete your deliberations, the bailiff
will collect your notes.
When you are re e bailiff will promptly destroy your notes so that
nobody can read wriat yo
10.1 will decide matters of 1 to listen to and consider the evidence
and to determine fact issues e end ofthe trial. After you have
heard all the evidence, I wil as you make your decision. The
instructions also will have questions u will not be asked and you
should not consider which side wj eed to answer the specific
questions I give you
'O
Every juror must obey my instractionsXlf you bllow these instructions, you will
be guilty of juror misconduct, and I may have to orcler ne\#4riakand start this process over
again. This would waste your time and the parties' jnone equire the taxpayers of
this county to pay for another trial.
Do you understand these instructions? If you do
Please keep these instructions and review them as is case. If anyone
does not follow these instructions, tell me.
2
Cht*rs\t or CourT
Vtrknf "forms
14-DW-211809
mni
No FeeDocuments
NO. 14-DCV-211809
IN THEN LETTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE MAItRJAGEOF §
,TH
DEBGRAH MANDEVILLE § 387'" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
iCHARLES MANDEVILLE, V §
§
i' INTEREST OF § FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
§
§
§
»e of the Court
MEMBERS OF THI
After the closing lents, youXviU go to thejury room to decide the case, answer the
questions that are attached,1 /erdicti^YxptfrruiyNhscuss the case with other jurors only
when you are all together in LJbTyi
Remember my previous mstrac^ions^Do not :ase with anyone else, either in
person or by other means. Do not d^apyWependem^iri about the case or conduct
any research. Do not look up any words inkmcpkma orvpn^the Internet. Do not post
information about the case on the mtemet^Do ndt share ecial knowledge or experiences
with the other jurors. Do not use your\phbne or electronic device during your
deliberations for any reason. I will give you a n [ere others may contact you in case of
an emergency.
Here are the instructions for answering the ques;
1. Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part
2. Base your answers only on the evidence admitted in co1 is in these
instructions and questions. Do not consider or discuss any entedin
the courtroom.
3. You are to make up your own minds about the facts. You
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony,
you must follow all ofmy instructions.
4. If my instructions use a word in a way that is different from its ordinary ing, use the
meaning I give you, which will be a proper legal definition.
?
5. All the questions and answers are important. No one should say that any question or answer
is not important.
wwer^yes" or "no" to all questions Unless you are told otherwise. A '"yes" answer must be
on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise. Whenever a
lestion requires an^nswer other than "yes" or "no," your answer must be based on a
preponderance o/me^vtdence unless you are told otherwise.
temv^preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible evidence
entedjirrais case'. >If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a
yes answer, "no." A preponderance of the evidence is not measured by the
number of e number of documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be
proved f the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true
than not
7. Do not decide win before you answer the questions and then just
answer the questions ecision. Answer each question carefully without
considering who will win, uss or consider the effect your answers will have.
8. Do not answer questio ofchance.
9. Do not trade your answers. Forexam answer this question your way if
you answer another question my w;
10. Unless otherwise instructed the answers mus^be based on the decision ofat
least ten ofthe twelve jurors. The sama^en mfors an e on every answer. Do not agree
to be bound by a vote of anything less m^irten if it Would be a majority.
As I have said before, if you do not folk; truciions," (ou will be guilty of juror
misconduct, and I might have to order a new triaf and, s pro overxhnor>^u^Higree on every answer in the charge. This means you may not have one
_ofJeH^urors/agrae on one answer and a different group often jurors agree on another
answer.
2. Iftenjun wer, those ten jurors sign the verdict,
If eleven jurors eryanswer, those elevenjurors sign the verdict.
If all twelve of you agr er, you are unanimous and only the presiding juror
signs the verdict.
3. All jurors should delio lay end up with all twelve of you
agreeing on some answ< you agree on other answers. But
when you sign the verdict, only [answer will signthe verdict.
4. There are some special instruci ining how to answer those
questions. Please follow the instructions, wer those questions, you
will need to complete a second verdict estions.
Do you understand these instructions? If y
FILED
OCT 2 2 20M ,
Clerk DWrfct Court, Fort Bend Co., TX
//
A divorce-, may be decreed without regard to fault if the marriage has become
insupportabfeJ>ecause of discord or conflict ofpersonalities that destroys the legitimate ends of
themarnagerelationship andprevents anyreasonable expectation of reconciliation.
A divorce may he^decreed in favor of one spouse if the other spouse is guilty of cruel
lent toward tlje^complaining spouse of a nature that renders further living together
subportable.
QUESTION 1
Do grounds exist veen Charles Mandeville, V and Deborah Mandeville as to:
A. insupportabi between Charles Mandeville, V and Deborah
Mandeville?
Answer "Yes" or
Answer: ] ^-^
B. cruel treatment by Charles M andeville, if any?
Answer "Yes" or "No."
Answer: rO O
IX
The best interest ofthe children shall always bethe primary consideration in determining
questions of conservatorship.
appoint both parents joint managing conservators unless you find thatsuch an
not in the best interest ofthe children. In making this determination, you shall
"all the following factors:
, psychological, or emotional needs and development ofthe children
e appointment ofjoint managing conservators.
ents to give first priority to the welfare of the children and reach
best interest ofthe children.
encourage and accept a positive relationship between the
at
Whether boi in child-rearing before the filing ofthe suit.
The geographical of theYareuts' residences.
At all times, each parent ubje>st to any limitation imposed by court
order:
1. To receive information from an^Jthejr^riseWatef'of th^vchildren concerning the health,
education, andwelfare of each'chjld;
2. To confer with the other parent to^the^xtent no^sible before making a decision
concerning the health, education, arid welfare ofjeach^ehild.
3. Tohave access to medical, dental, psycty I records of each child.
4. To consult with a physician,dentist, or psychoh 'ofeach^p^s >v
5. To consult with school officials concerning eac l's welfare ju»d\ducational status,
including school activities.
6. To attend school activities.
7. To be designated on each child's records as a person to
emergency.
8. To consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment during an
immediate dangerto the health and safetyofeachchild.
9. To manage the estate of each child to the extent the estate has been createdby the parent
or the parent's family.
IS
During the period that a parent has possession of a child or children, that parent retains the
following rightsand duties, subject to any limitation imposed by courtorder:
ofcare, control, protection, and reasonable discipline ofeachchild.
duty to support each child, including providing each child with clothing, food,
shelter, andmedicefkand dental carenot involving an invasive procedure.
ent for each child to medical and dental care not involving an invasive
oral and religious training of each child.
A pare linted joint managing conservator will be appointed possessory
conservator and grant* ;sion of and access to the children under terms and conditions
specified by the cot
"Possessory cons n" means the person appointed to have possession
of or access to the chil and upon certain conditions. In addition to the
rights and duties listed abo as at all times or during periods
of possession ofthe child, court order on those rights and
duties, a parent appointed right or duty of a managing
conservator expressly granted to that ting that parent a possessory
conservator.
ff
A parent appointed the sole managing conservator of the children has the following
exclusive rights, subject to any limitation imposed by court order:
1. The^rightto designate the primary residence of the children.
2.X .The right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment involving invasive
nt to psychiatric and psychological treatment.
to receiv^and give receipt for periodic payments for the support of the child
hold oruisbuisesdiese funds for the benefit ofthe child.
5. The r^ttorepresent tiechild in legal action and to make other decisions of substantial
legal significance concerting the child.
6. The right to^»nsent tcvmarnage^and to enlistment in the armed forces of the United
States.
7. The right tomake decisions concgfain'g the education ofthe children.
8. The right to the services arlcrearmngs ol
9. Except when a guardian of the crfild>'estate or attorney ad litem has been
appointed for the child, the rrmoo act as ' bWchild in relation to the child's
estate if the child's action is requir* S, tftetfaited States, or a foreign
government.
IS"
Verdict Certificate
Check one
verdict is unanimous. All twelve of us have agreed to each and every answer. The
ling juror has signepVthe certificate for all twelve of us.
Printed Name of Presiding Juror
lous. Eleven of us have agreed to each and every answer and
imous. Ten of ushave agreed to each and every answer and have
/*
14-DC¥-211«»
FLU
NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE DATA. RnaiJwiBimmib»Ji«yVwdiei
NO. 14-DCV-211809
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
387™JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
On October 21, 201 a jury was duly accepted,
impaneled, and sworn. The trial contin The jury returned its verdict
afterhearing the evidence, argument, an!
'O
Appearances
DEBORAH MANDEVILLE, appeared inpereoniui.
Pinak
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V, appeared in pen*
Record
The record of the trial was duly reported by Lauren Rain
387th Judicial District Court ofFort Bend County, Texas.
Jurisdiction and Domicile
The Court finds that the pleadings of DEBORAH MANDEVI
contain all the allegations, information, and prerequisites required by
receiving evidence, finds that it has jurisdiction ofthis case and of all the p
sixty days have elapsed since the date the suit was filed
The Court further finds that, at the time this suit was filed, DEBORAH MANDEVILLE
had been a domiciliary ofTexas for the preceding six-month period and a resident ofthe county
in which this suit was filed for the preceding ninety-day period. AH persons entitled to citation
n
were properly cited.
Jury
was selected, questions of fact were submitted to the jury, and a verdict was
duly filed.
AND DECREED that DEBORAH MANDEVILLE and CHARLES
'were^pronounced divorced on October 22, 2014, and that the marriage
between foem-is^chssolytfcl owhe groundof insupportability.
Children of the^Marriage
The Court finds that.BEBtfRAH MANDEVILLE and CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V are
the parents ofthe following drildre
The Court finds no otherchildren ofthe marriage are expected
20
Parenting Plan
The GaurtJBrnds that the provisions in this decree relating to the rights and duties ofthe
parties wjthrejation to the children, possession of and access to the children, child support, and
optirmztneme development of a close and continuing relationship between each party and the
cWldreivdonstitute the parenting plan established by the Court.
Conservatorship
jeCourr;having considered the circumstances of the parents and ofthe children, finds
that the• • •• ofthe children concerning the
health, education, and
2. the right to confer with the othej le before making a decision
concerning the health, educatiol
the right of access to medical educational records of the
children;
4. the right to consult with a physician, children;
5. the right to consult with school officials concerning they cMldren's^welfare and
educational status, including school activities; \ \ \J ^ V/
6. the right to attend school activities;
7. the right to be designated on the children's records as a
emergency;
8. the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment ^unng^
involving an immediate danger to thehealth and safety of thechile
9. the right to manage the estate of the children to the extent the estate has beejs
the parentor the parent's family.
IT IS ORDERED that, atall times, DEBORAH MANDEVILLE, as parent sole managing
conservator and CHARLES MANDEVILLE as parent possessory conservator, shall each have
XI
the following duties:
the duj^toidform the other conservator ofthe children in a timely mannerof significant
tron concerning the health, education, and welfare ofthe children; and
£ duty to inform the other conservator ofthe children if the conservator resides with for
at least thirty day^nrarries, or intends to marry a person who the conservator knows is
registered assr^xsffiendei under chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is
urrentlyph^gedwith an offense for which on conviction the person would be required
totegister under tha*shapter. IT IS ORDERED that this information shall be tendered in
'of an ade as soon as practicable, but not later than the fortieth day after
the date the the children begins to reside with the person or on the tenth
day afti ge occurs, as appropriate. IT IS ORDERED that the notice
must hi) f the offense that is the basis ofthe person's requirement to
register as a sex r or of the offense with which the person is charged.
WARNING: COMMITS AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A
CLASS C CONSERVATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE THIS
NOTICE.
IT IS ORDERED DEBORAH MANDEVILLE, as
parent sole managing conse: ts and duties:
1. the duty of care, control, protection* ne ofthe children;
2. the duty to support the cMldre^includinf ^Children with clothing, food,
shelter, and medical and dental care not a lWprocedure;
the right to consent for the children to-medical^ care not involving an invasive
procedure; and
4. the right to direct the moral and religious training childrer
IT IS ORDERED that DEBORAH MAND
conservator, shall have the following exclusive rights and
1. the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of th<
geographical restriction;
the exclusive right to consent to medical, dental, and surj
invasive procedures;
3. theexclusive right to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatm
4. theexclusive right to receive and give receipt for periodic payments for1 6rt ofthe
children andto hold or disburse these funds forthe benefit ofthe children;N
5. the exclusive rightto represent the children in legal action and to make otherdecisions of
J12~
substantial legal significanceconcerning the children:
the ewSlusjve right to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the armed forces of the
ltedStates, after consultation with possessory conservator;
le exclusive right tp^make decisionsconcerning the children'seducation;
^except as prpvlded^by section 264.0111 ofthe Texas Family Code, the exclusive right to
ie services and'earnings ofthe children;
exeeprwhen f thechildren's estate or a guardian orattorney adlitem has been
appointed e exclusive right to act as an agent ofthe children in relation
to the c] children's action is required by a state, the United States, or a
foreign government
10. the duty to children to the extent the estate has been Created by
community pr< ofthe parent
Possession and Access
1. Modified Possession
IT IS ORDERED that each conserv; 1 terms and conditions of this
Modified Possession Order. IT IS O: ossession Order is effective
immediately and applies to all peri g Orrand after the date the Court
signs this Modified Possession Order. IT IS, D:
(a) Definitions
1. In this Modified PossessSoj"Ord cans the primary or
secondary school in which the child is ei Id is not enrolled in a
primary or secondary school, the public /school in wMSh the child
primarily resides.
2. In this Modified Possession Order "cj each child, whether
one or more, who is a subject of this suit while Id is<5findeT\the age of
eighteen yearsand not otherwise emancipated.
IT IS ORDERED that the conservators shall have possessioi
specified terms set out in this Modified Possession Order. Excep
provided in this Modified Possession Order, CHARLES MANDEVILLE^
to supervised possession ofthe children through an agreed upon supervisor thaws m
signed by the parties and absent agreement such supervised possession shall
Harris County, Texas S.A.F.E. programas follows:
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all periods of possession of or access to the
75
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Modified Possession Order, when
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V resides 100 miles or less from the primary residence of the
children, CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V shall have the right to possession of the children as
followsjm^ujhfthe Harris County, Texas Safe program and at the times designated by the Safe
prog
1. / /Weekends - Onweekends, beginning at 9:00 a.m. on the Saturday following the first
third and fifth Friday^f each month and ending at noon that same day and beginning at 9:00
a-m-NonHp* Sunday following the first, third and fifth Friday of each month and ending at noon
that same/Hay^sufeject toihe provisions relating to supervised visitation through the SAFE
program. IT IS QRDERmstiiat CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V shall give DEBORAH
MANDEVILLEJhree^fS) days i^otice if he intends on exercising his periodsof possession.
(d) Parents 100 Miles Apart
IT IS ORD od of possession and access by CHARLES
MANDEVILL, V to rvised by the S.A.F.E. Program, as stated above
and when CHARLES les more than 100 miles from the residence ofthe
children, CHARLES 1 have the right to possession of the children as
follows:
1. Weekends - Unless C elects the alternative period of
weekend possession described in the tt 9:00 a.m. on the Saturday
following the first, third and fifth Fri at noon that same day and
beginning at 9:00a.m. on the Sunday following Friday of each month and
ending at noon that same day, subject to thi o supervised visitation through
the SAFE program. IT IS ORDERED ^rhat MANDEVILLE, V shall give
DEBORAH MANDEVILLE three (3) days noti s~OTKexercising his periods of
possession.
Alternate Weekend Possession—In lieu of the- Weekend pos'sesfeion described in the
foregoing paragraph, CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V sWlhave the rtg^tk^possession of the
children not more than one weekend per month ofhis choice^rcglnlung at^tOjm.M. on Saturday
and ending at 5:00 P.M. that same day and beginning at 9:00 a.m. cm^tWs1mday_and ending at
5:00 P.M. that same day, subject to the provisions relating to supenased visifsgjon^mrough the
SAFE program. CHARLES MANDEVILLE, Vmay elect an optiotiTfor/mlralteimaSv^Period of
weekend possession by giving written notice to DEBORAH MANDE,
of entry of this Decree. If CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V makes
DEBORAH MANDEVILLE fourteen days' written or telephonic notic
weekend. The weekends chosen shall not conflict with the provisions
Thanksgiving, the child's birthday, and Mother's Day possession below.
(e) Holidays Unaffected by Distance
IT IS ORDERED that each period of possession and access by CHARLES
MANDEVILLE, V to the children shall be supervised by the S.A.F.E. Program as stated above.
^
W
MANDEVILLE child support of one thousand five hundred ninety-one dollars and two cents
($1,591.02) r^rrno^th, due and payable on the first day ofthe first month immediately following
the date of p& eajHest occurrence of one of the events specified above for another child and a
like sum^ one thousand five hundred ninety-one dollars and two cents ($1,591.02) due and
payable op/the first day of each month thereafter until the next occurrence of one ofthe events
sr^eifiedDelow for another.child:
1. a child reaches le^age of eighteen years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs
ater, subjeeftoj fe provisions for support beyond the age ofeighteenyears set out below;
the pare is terminated based on genetic testing that excludes the
obligor as the childyfer c father;
5. the child enlists irr^e^emej^torce of the United States and begins active service as
defined by section lOJKof^tftle 10 of United States Code; or
6. a child's disabilities ed for general purposes.
Thereafter, IT IS O! )EVILLE, V pay to DEBORAH
MANDEVILLE child support of oiKrtnc uenty-five dollars and eighty-five
cents ($1,325.85) per month, due and the first month immediately
following the date of the earliest occurrence of one ihts^pecified above for another
child and a like sum of one thousand three hi -fivesdpllars and eighty-five cents
($1,325.85) due and payable on the first day ter until the next occurrence of
one ofthe events specified below for anothei
1. a child reaches the age of eighteen years or, school, whichever occurs
later, subject to the provisions for support en years set out below;
2. a child marries;
3. a child dies;
4. the parent-child relationship is terminated based on genej excludes the
obligor as the child's genetic father;
5. the child enlists in the armed forces of the United States an<
defined by section 101 of title 10 ofthe United States Code; or
6. a child's disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes
Thereafter, IT IS ORDERED that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V pay to
MANDEVILLE child support ofone thousand sixty dollars and sixty-eight cents £$f,u&u.o»; per
month, due and payable on the first day ofthe first month immediately followingHhedate ofthe
earliest occurrence of one ofthe events specified above for another child and a like sum of one
thousand sixty dollars and sixty-eight cents ($1,060.68) due and payable on the first day of each
11
A '1
month thereafter untilthe next occurrence of one of the events specified belowfor anotherchild:
s the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs
to the provisions for support beyond the age of eighteen years set out below;
relationship is terminated based on genetic testing that excludes the
childXgenetic father,
the child enjisfs in-the^armed forces ofthe United States and begins active service as
defined bysection 101 oftitle 10 ofthe United States Code; or
6. a child's disabilities i srwise removed for general purposes.
If a child is ge and has not graduated from high school, IT IS
ORDERED that CHAKLES .V'S obligation to pay child support to DEBORAH
MANDEVILLE shall not ter iic but shall continue for as long as the child is enrolled-
1. under chapter 25 of ^the. Texas Edue accredited secondary school in a
program leading tov^rXaiughrscb r section 130.008 ofthe Education
Code in courses for jomthigtscnool credit and is complying with the
minimum attendance requirements ter 25 of the Education Code
or
2. on a full-time basis in a private secom program leading toward a high
school diploma and is complying wi ance requirements imposed by
that school.
Child Support Arrearages
IT IS FOUND, CONFIRMED and ADJUDGED that DEBORAH MANDEVILLE is
awarded ajudgment against CHARLES MANDEVILLE^ yin the amount offiv^Abusand four
hundred forty-five dollars and seventy cents ($5,445.70)toKsWIcLsupport arrearages from April
2, 2014 through October 17, 2014. This judgment is GR"H^D and^ENDERED against
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, Vand in favor of DEBORAH MANDE^n"cJuding interest at
the rate of 6%perannum for letwrit of execution issue. <(
IT IS ORDERED that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V s.
MANDEVILLE two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per month
arrearage judgment with the first payment due and payable on Dece
payment of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) due and payable on the
thereafter until paid in full.
Retroactive Child Support
IT IS FOUND, CONFIRMED and ADJUDGED that DEBORAH MANDEVILLE is
awarded a judgment against CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V in the amount of five thousand four
12
z°
Spousal Support.
Payment
RDERED that all payments shall be made through the state disbursement unit at
d Support Disbursement Unit P.O. Box 659791, SanAntonio, Texas 78265-9791, and
promptly rernittefTto CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V for the support ofthe children,
IS ORDERED arty shall pay, when due, all fees charged to that party by the state
other agency statutorily authorized to charge a fee.
Cham lent.
IT IS FUR D that CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V shall notify this Court
and DEBORAH-MANDEVILL] U.S. certified mail, return receipt requested, of any change
of address and o£any termination (f employment. This notice shall be given no later than seven
days after the change of addfes ir the termination of employment. This notice or a subsequent
notice shall also providrme of CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V and the name and
address ofhis current employej it information becomes available.
Clerk's Duties
IT IS ORDERED that^tktijiej^quesj/ofa^rosecutir^attorney, the title IV-D agency, the
friend of the Court, a domestKretetioris^fficj^ CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V, DEBORAH
MANDEVILLE, or an attorney representi^ig^aiA"S/MA^pEVILLE, Vor DEBORAH
MANDEVILLE, the clerk of this Cotn^taHcausejp certified\opy of the Order/Notice to
Withhold Income for Child Support to
exceed 9 percent of CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V'S annual resources, as described by
section 154^062(b) ofthe Texas Family Code.
?le and necessary health-care expenses not paid byinsurance and incurred by or
m behalf of a child" include, without limitation, any copayments for office visits or
escription drugs, the yearly deductible, if any, and medical, surgical, prescription drug,
mental health-care^seryices, dental, eye care, ophthalmologic^, and orthodontic charges.
These reasonable and necessary health-care expenses do not include expenses for travel
to and fromiheJxealth-care provider orfor nonprescription medication.
curnisl
to handdeTiver^heNdocument by a person eighteen years of age or older either to
ten ipient or tc) aperson who is eighteen years ofage or older and permanently
Sides with th< ient;
to delive the recipientby certified mail, return receipt requested,
to thei iling or residence address; or
to deliver th< e recipient at the recipient's last known mailing or
residence ad< pe/son.or^nti^rwhose principal business is that of a
courier or del? or qo^nnents\ither within or outside the United
States.
Findings on Health Insurance Ay; the cost accessibility, and
quality ofhealth insurance covi ie Court finds:
Health insurance is available or is children through CHARLES
MANDEVILLE, V'S employment o on, trade association, or other
organization at a reasonable cost
IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the fc i th-care coverage are in
the best interest ofthe children.
Provision of Health-Care Coverage o
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, Vis ORDERED to tftotiiiue^o^ntaln health insurance
for the children who are the subject ofthis suit that covej^asrt healtb^are services,
including usual physician services, office visits, hospitalization, JatoraWy>^5\ray, and
emergency services.
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V is ORDERED to maintain sudh fyealmlnsarance/m full,
force and effect on the children who is the subject ofthis suit asMohg^as^cmld^suppor
payable for that child. CHARLES MANDEVILLE, Vis ORDERED to^conve
group insurance to individual coverage or obtain other health insurancyfbr
within fifteen days of termination of his employment or other disqualific^tfon^frbm the
group insurance. CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V is ORDERED to\exercise any
conversion options or acquisition of new health insurance in such a manner that the
resulting insurance equals orexceeds that in effect immediately before the change.
15
33
CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V is ORDERED to furnish DEBORAH MANDEVILLE a
true and/c6*rect copy of the health insurance policy or certification and a schedule of
benefits yyitnin 15 days ofthe signing ofthis order. CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V is
iD to furnish DEBORAH MANDEVILLE the insurance cards and any other
Toprfs necessary for use of the insurance within 15 days ofthe signing ofthis order.
.HARLES MANDEVILLE, Vis ORDERED to provide, within three days ofreceipt by
her, to DEBORAH>MANDEVILLE any insurance checks, other payments, or
^xplanation^ofhenefits relating to any medical expenses for the children that
^EBORAil MANDEVILLE paid or incurred.
"to seetifSn J$04.051 of the Texas Insurance Code, IT IS ORDERED that if
CHARLES/>fAN©EA(mLE, V is eligible for dependent health coverage but fails to
apply to^Wh coverage\for the children, the rnsurer shall enroll the children on
applicatioXofDEBORAfl MANDEVILLE orothers as authorized by law.
Pursuant to sectiprf 1SKI83 •fthe Texas Family Code, the reasonable and necessary
health-care expenses o that are not reimbursed by health insurance are
allocated as follows ~ EVILLE is ORDERED to pay fifty percent
(50%) and CHARL V is ORDERED to pay fifty percent (50%) of
the unreimbursed •s if, at—the time the expenses are incurred,
DEBORAH MANDEYi: iing%ealthjnsin,ance as ordered.
The party who incurs a kbebj the children is ORDERED to
submit to the otherparty all formsq>ts, b: aifcu and explanations ofbenefits
reflecting the uninsured portioii'oftne health; reje> lensetf^thin thirty days after he or
shereceives them. The nonincurring D to^pay his or her percentage of
the uninsured portion of the healthrCan ter by paying the health-care
provider directly or by reimbursing_^tne km; Tarty for any advance payment
exceeding the incurring party's percentage portion of the health-care
expenses within thirty days after the nonii jyesMheforms, receipts, bills,
statements, and explanations of benefits.
These provisions apply to all unreimbursed heall fthe ^i^ren who is
the subject ofthis suit that are incurred while chil ^ the child.
Secondary Coverage - IT IS ORDERED that if a secondary health
insurance coverage for the children, both parties shall c fully ^Sirregard to the
handling and filing of claims with theinsurance carrier p order to
maximize the benefits available to the children and to ensure iys for
health-care expenses for the children is reimbursed for the pa ersto
the fullest extent possible.
Compliance with Insurance Company Requirements- Each party?is>
conform to all requirements imposed by the terms and conditions of L .
insurance covering the children in order to assure maximum reimbursemenTor direct
payment by the insurance company ofthe incurred health-care expense, including but not
limited to requirements for advance notice to any carrier, second opinions, and the like.
Each party is ORDERED to attempt to use "preferred providers," or services wthin the
16
sV
health maintenance organization, if applicable; however, this provision shall notapply if
emergenpyWe is required. Disallowance ofthe bill by a health insurershall not excuse
the oMigation of either party to make payment; however, if a bill is disallowed or the
iefij^feduced because of the failure of a party to follow insurance procedures or
ements, IT IS ORDERED that the party failing to follow the insurance procedures
5rrequirements shajlsbe wholly responsible for the increased portion of that bill.
Claims - Except as/provided in this paragraph, the party who is not carrying the health
urance^ic>^covering the children is ORDERED to furnish to the party carrying the
vrithrn fifteen days of receiving them, any and all forms, receipts, bills, and
reflectm&me health-care expenses the party not carrying the policy incurs on
behalf of accordance with section 1204.251 and 1504.055(a) ofthe
Texas S ORDERED that the party who is not carrying the health
insurance/policy cov© ie children, at that party's option, may file any claims for
health-care expense; y with the insurance carrier with and from Whom coverage is
provided for dren and receive payments directly from the insurance
company. Fi of section 1204.251 ofthe Texas Insurance Code,
CHARLES MAUDE ignated the managing conservator or possessory
conservator ofthe ci
The party who is c overing the children is ORDERED
to submit all forms requtteojjyjne ins for payment or reimbursement of
health-care expenses incurred by ei the children to the insurance
carrier within fifteen days of receipt, bill, or statement
reflecting the expenses.
Constructive Trust for Payments ORDERED that any insurance
payments received by a party fromNhe^health ice carrier as reimbursement for
health-care expenses incurred by or on be! shall belong to the party
who paid those expenses. IT IS FUR' the party receiving the
insurance payments is designated a constnie'tive ve. any insurance checks
or payments for health-care expenses paid by tin the party\carrying the
policy shall endorse and forward the checks or th^ny\xplanation of
benefits received, to the other party within three ivmg I"
9. WARNING - A PARENT ORDERED TO PROVIDE HE. OR TO
PAY THE OTHER PARENT ADDITIONAL CHILD S OSTOF
HEALTH INSURANCE WHO FAILS TO DO SO IS SARY
MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILDREN, WITHOUT iTHER
THE EXPENSES WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID IF HE.
BEEN PROVIDED, AND FOR THE COST OF HEALTH IN
OR CONTRIBUTIONS, IF ANY, PAID ON BEHALF OF THE C
Miscellaneous Child Support Provisions
No Credit for Informal Payments
IT IS ORDERED that the child support as prescribed in this decree shall be exclusively
17
3^
discharged in the manner ordered and that any direct payments made by CHARLES
MANDEVILLE/v\to DEBORAH MANDEVILLE or any expenditures incurred by CHARLES
MANDEVILLl^Xduring CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V'S periods of possession of or access
to the dnfdjenf as prescribed in this decree, for food, clothing, gifts, travel, shelter, or
entertainment aredeemed in addition to and notin lieu ofthe support ordered in this decree.
inert as Obligation ofEstate
JT IS ORDERED that the provisions for child support in this decree shall be an
oblig^dn^fjhe^e^ateofCHARLES MANDEVILLE, Vand shall not terminate on the death of
CHARJ^E"lANDEVEUE^y. Payments received for the benefit of the children, including
payments from the SociaJ-S^Mty Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs or other
governmental agency/or lifeNmsurance proceeds, annuity payments, trust distributions, or
retirement surv^orbenefits, shall be acredit against this obligation. Any remaining balance of
the child supportis an obligationokCHARLES MANDEVILLE, V'S estate.
Termination of Ord ematlriageoC Parties but Not on Death of Obligee
The provisions of truVd to current child support terminate on the remarriage
of DEBORAH MANDEVHiL IMANDEVILLE, V unless a nonparent or agency
has been appointed cohserva! 153 ofthe Texas Family Code.
Information Regarding Parti
The information required for eaej a) of the Texas Family Code
is as follows:
Name: DEBORAH M
Social Security number
Driver's license number:
Current residence address
Home telephone number:
Name: CHARLES MANDmJ^U
Social Security number:!
Driver's license number: Unknown Issuing state
Current residence address:
Home telephone number: 505-417-9933
Name of employer: High Plains Biodiesel, a Subsidiary of Seaboard1 F
Address of employment: 3300-32" Street, Guymon, OK 73942
Work telephone number: 800-262-7907
EACH PERSON WHO IS A PARTY TO THIS ORDER
NOTIFY EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE C&SE REGISTRY
OF ANY CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S CURRENT RESIDENCE^DDRESS,
MAILING ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, NAME OF EMPLOYER,
ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT, DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER, AND WORK
TELEPHONE NUMBER. THE PARTY IS ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF AN
18
36
INTENDED CHANGE IN ANY OF THE REQUIRED INFORMATION TO EACH
OTHER PARTY^ THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY ON OR
BEFOREKffi^eOTH DAY BEFORE THE INTENDED CHANGE. IF THE PARTY
rXJES^OT^KNOW OR COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF THE CHANGE IN
SU^CJENT TIME TO PROVIDE 60-DAY NOTICE, THE PARTY IS ORDERED TO
GIVWOTICE OF THEiSHANGE ON OR BEFORE THE FIFTH DAY AFTER THE
DATE THAT THE PARJY KNOWS OF THE CHANGE.
SH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY,
THE COJJRJ STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS
ANY PERSON, B3 OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO
PAY CHILD >RTO ITLED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A
CHILD.
FAILURE BY O OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO
PROVIDE EACU<0 THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE
REGISTRY WITH THE/CHANGE THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY
RESULT IN FURTHERjL|TIGATIO O ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING
CONTEMPT OF COURT. \A. FIND OFAfJONT^MPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY
CONFINEMENT IN JAILFOR-UPr SIX)M0NTHS^ A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR
EACH VIOLATION, AND^A^MO Y/^rtSDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT
Notice shall be given to the otherp^arty by^efrv^fthg)a cop^fthe notice to the party by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested Noti>2e^ha11 be given to the Court by
delivering a copy of the notice either in pereoarto the clen^oT this Court or by registered or
certified mail addressed to the clerk at 301 Jackson Street^Rwhmond, TX 77469. Notice shall
be given to the state case registry by mailing a^cor"f^he^nb^ce. to State Case Registry,
Contract Services Section, MC046S, P.O. Box 120^Aiistm^TexlS^8711-2017.
NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF T, XAS^YOU MAY
USE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE jyCUSTODY
SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER. A PEACE OFFICE THE TERMS
OF A COURT ORDER AND THE OFFICER'S AGENCl D TO THE
APPLICABLE IMMUNITY AGAINST ANY CLAIM, RWISE,
REGARDING THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PE COPE
OF THE OFFICER'S DUTIES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS T
RELATE TO CHILD CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WHO KN
FOR ENFORCEMENT AN ORDER THAT IS INVALID O
EFFECT COMMITS AN OFFENSE THAT MAY BE P
CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS ANlM F
MUCH AS $10,000.
WARNINGS TO PARTIES: FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR
CHILD SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD MAY
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RESULT IN FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING
CONTEMPTQFNpOURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY
CONFrNE>!ENriN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR
EACH/VJ0LATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
FAILURE OFXPAHTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE
AND IN^TOE^ANNER REQUIRED BY ACOURT ORDER MAY RESULT
'S>t6t RECEIVING CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT.
?TY TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT DOES NOT JUSTIFY
DENYING IT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A
CHILD. RE TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A
CHILD DOE FAILURE TO PAY COURT-ORDERED CHILD
SUPPORT TO THAT
Division of Marital
The Court finds that thel following ijg a just and i division ofthe parties' marital estate,
having due regard for the rightsVfeachj ofthe marriage.
Property to CHARLES MAND"
IT IS ORDERED AND DEC EVILLE, V is awarded the
following as his sole and separate pro VILLE is divested of all
right title, interest and claim in andto that prj
H-l. All household furniture, furnishings, objects, collectibles, appliances,
and equipment in the possession of the LE, V or subject to bis
sole control.
H-2. All clothing, jewelry, and other personal effecfs the posse'ssjlon of the\CHARLES
MANDEVILLE, V or subject to his sole control
H-3. All sums of cash in the possession ofthe CHARLE or subject to his
sole control, including funds on deposit together with ace in the
First Financial Bank account ending HI
H-4. The 2011 Volkswagen Jetta motor vehicle, together with all pi
title documents.
H-5. One hundred percent (100%) of the gold and silver coins in the
MANDEVILLE, V or subject to his sole control.
Property to DEBORAH MANDEVILLE
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that DEBORAH MANDEVILLE is awarded the
following as her sole and separate property, and CHARLES MANDEVILLE, V is divested of all
20
5*
right title, interest and claim in and to that property:
furniture, funiishings, fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances,
ment in the possession ofthe DEBORAH MANDEVILLE or subject to her sole
and other personal effects in the possession of the DEBORAH
iject to her sole control.
in the possession of the DEBORAH MANDEVILLE or subject to her
sojecontoa^mcludni^funds on deposit together with accrued but unpaid interest in the
following accoufits:
a. The tfendingHB and
b. The count endingl
W-4. One hundred pejKentiTO0J£)-ef-4he funds in the Merrill Lynch 401(k) as ofOctober 22,
2014 together\wjtii any^nteFes^dividends, gains, or losses on that mount more
particularly defined ir/a Qualified^DomesticRelations Order signed by the Court on the
day this Final Decree of/Divorce is entered.
W-5. One hundred percent\l0Q%)j)i>uie 401(k) as of October 22, 2014
together with any interest^iiyjderfa's, on that mount, more particularly
defined in a Qualified Domestic Rel the Court on the day this Final
Decree of Divorce is entered
W-6. All sums, whether matured or Immature un^cphied, vested or otherwise,
together with all increases thereof, th and any other rights related to
the following accounts:
a. The Vanguard Roth IRA; and
b. The Vanguard Traditional IRA.
Division of Debt
Debts to CHARLES MANDEVILLE. V
o
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that CHARLES MAN 1 pay, as a
part of the division of the estate of the parties, and shall in BORAH
MANDEVILLEand her property harmless from any failure to so
H-l. All debts, charges, liabilities, and other obligations incurri
MANDEVILLE, V, unlessexpressprovision is madein this deci
Debts to DEBORAH MANDEVILLE
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that DEBORAH MANDEVILLE sh; as a part
of the division of the estate of the parties, and shall indemnify and ho! CHARLES
MANDEVILLE, V and his property harmless from anyfailure to so discharge, these items:
W-1. The following debts, charges, liabilities, and obligations:
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3rt
a Sears account endin igfl land
b. Chase^aecount ending
sfcharges, liabilities, and other obligations incurred solely by DEBORAH
SEVILLE, unless express provision is made in this decree to the contrary.
DECREED that each party shall send to the other party, within
*& ^°pPy of ^y correspondence from a creditor or taxing authority
"^]ity of theother party.
ITIS !REED that the following described property is confirmed as
the separate property of DEj MANDEVILLE:
2006 Kia Sedona autwnohHe' VI •2M1WY163893
Chevy Malibu automobj 33066093055
Injunctive Relief
IT IS ORDERED AND DEVILLE and CHARLES
MANDEVILLE, V are permanently enjoi
a. Making disparaging remarks regarding