in the Matter of J.A. ( 2010 )


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    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-09-00556-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF J.A.
    From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2009JUV01956
    Honorable Laura Parker, Judge Presiding1
    Opinion by:       Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Sitting:          Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: March 10, 2010
    AFFIRMED
    The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in
    committing J.A. to the Texas Youth Commission (“TYC”). J.A. contends the record indicates that
    probation, either in the home or in placement, would have been a more appropriate disposition. We
    affirm the juvenile court’s order of disposition.
    BACKGROUND
    The complainant, C.G., reported that he was walking with a friend on April 4, 2009, when
    he observed J.A. with three other individuals. C.G. and his friend walked down a drainage ditch to
    … Referee Lisa K. Jarrett presided over the hearing and made recommendations to the
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    Honorable Laura Parker who signed the orders in the underlying cause.
    04-09-00556-CV
    avoid J.A. because they knew J.A. caused trouble. J.A. and the others followed them and pushed
    C.G. to the ground. J.A. and the others started punching and kicking C.G. The officer responding
    to the complaint observed physical injuries to C.G.’s eye and arm, and photographs of the injuries
    are included in the record. J.A. and the others removed C.G.’s shoes and took the shoes and C.G.’s
    backpack. J.A. and the others were yelling “We are BDTs, don’t fuck with us.” C.G. reported the
    BDT stands for Brown Down Thugs, a gang, and J.A. and the others were wearing brown bandanas
    around their neck. C.G. knew J.A. because he used to go to C.G.’s school before J.A. was sent to
    alternative school.
    J.A. pled true to the offense of robbery without a plea bargain agreement. At the disposition
    hearing, the Bexar County Juvenile Probation Department’s Pre-Disposition Report was admitted
    into evidence without objection. J.A. was previously referred to the juvenile probation department
    for a charge of arson on December 11, 2008. The charge stemmed from an allegation that J.A. had
    started a fire in a dumpster. Although J.A. was positively identified at the scene as the suspect, the
    charge was rejected on April 28, 2009. J.A. also was previously referred for expulsion on January
    8, 2009.
    J.A. reported that he smoked marijuana once a month. J.A. had a history of disruptive
    behavior at school. From September 2006 until December 2008, J.A. had thirty-nine disciplinary
    referrals. The referrals consisted of violations of classroom and school rules, offensive physical
    contact, disruptive behavior in the classroom, and persistent misbehavior. As a result of his
    persistent misbehavior, J.A. was sent to alternative school. J.A. was subsequently expelled by the
    school district and sent to the Bexar County Juvenile Justice Academy. Although J.A. denied being
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    04-09-00556-CV
    associated with gangs when questioned by the probation officer, J.A. previously admitted to being
    affiliated with “brown” to an officer of the school district’s police department.
    Although the report noted that J.A. has a stable home environment, J.A.’s mother reported
    she had issues with J.A.’s behavior in the past and stated J.A. can be disrespectful and defiant. J.A.’s
    step-father reported he had told J.A. for years that his attitude and behavior were eventually going
    to get him in trouble.
    The State recommended commitment to TYC. The probation officer also recommended
    TYC; however, seven of the ten individuals on the juvenile probation department’s staffing
    committee recommended probation with participation in GANG ISP and the KAPS program. The
    probation officer reported that his recommendation was based on J.A.’s persistent misbehavior at
    home and at school and the best interest of the community. The probation officer also testified that
    his recommendation was based in large part on the nature of the offense because a person should not
    be afraid to walk down the street.
    J.A.’s attorney asserted that J.A. was diagnosed with depression disorder and qualified for
    special education. J.A.’s attorney also asserted that J.A. had not received any prior resources and
    requested that J.A. be placed on probation.
    The juvenile court noted that she trusted the probation officer’s judgment. The juvenile court
    found reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for J.A.’s removal from the
    home, but the child, in the child’s home, could not be provided the quality of care and level of
    support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. The juvenile court
    also found that commitment to TYC was the appropriate disposition due to J.A.’s behavior problems
    and inadequate supervision at home.
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    04-09-00556-CV
    DISCUSSION
    In order for a juvenile to be committed to TYC, the juvenile court must find that: (1)
    placement outside the home is in the juvenile’s best interests; (2) reasonable efforts were made to
    prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home; and (3) the juvenile, in the juvenile’s
    home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision the juvenile needs
    to meet the conditions of probation. TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 54.04(i)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009). A
    trial court’s order committing a juvenile to TYC “must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
    standard divorced from legal and factual sufficiency standards.” In re K.T., 
    107 S.W.3d 65
    , 67 (Tex.
    App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard requires that we ‘view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,’ affording almost total deference to
    findings of historical fact that are supported by the record.” In re 
    K.T., 107 S.W.3d at 75
    (quoting
    Guzman v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 85
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “However, when the resolution of
    the factual issue does not turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial
    court’s determination of the applicable law, as well as its application to the appropriate law to the
    facts it has found, de novo.” 
    Id. In his
    brief, J.A. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in not placing him on
    probation, noting he had no prior juvenile adjudications and describing “many of [the thirty-nine
    school disciplinary] infractions to be rather minor.” A trial court, however, is not required to exhaust
    all possible alternatives before sending a juvenile to TYC. In re J.R.C., 
    236 S.W.3d 870
    , 875 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). Although J.A. may not have had any prior juvenile adjudications,
    he was first given the chance to attend alternative school as a result of his disciplinary problems, but
    was subsequently expelled by the school district and required to attend the Bexar County Juvenile
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    04-09-00556-CV
    Justice Academy. Although J.A. seeks to describe his disciplinary referrals as minor infractions, J.A.
    was referred numerous times for “disrespectful/profanity” and a few times for “insubordination,”
    which is consistent with J.A.’s mother describing him as disrespectful and defiant in the home. In
    addition, J.A. had multiple referrals for participating in gang activity, two referrals for offensive
    verbal/physical conduct, and one referral for scuffling/aggressive physical conduct, which the
    juvenile court could have believed were not “minor” infractions. Moreover, even if some of the
    infractions in isolation may appear to be minor, they must be considered in the context of J.A. having
    received thirty-nine referrals in just over a two-year period. Finally, the juvenile court also had to
    consider the offense in which J.A. engaged, i.e., attacking an individual who was simply walking
    down the street, the relation of the offense to J.A.’s gang involvement, and J.A.’s admitted on-going
    use of marijuana. Based on this evidence, we hold the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
    committing J.A. to TYC.
    CONCLUSION
    The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
    Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
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Document Info

Docket Number: 04-09-00556-CV

Filed Date: 3/10/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021