Barbara Regina Schlein v. Anthony Griffin ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-14-00799-cv
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS
5/20/2015 4:09:18 PM
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
HOUSTON, TEXAS
BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN,
Appellant,
vs.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
Appellee.
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
Appellant: Barbara Regina Schlein
Counsel for Appellant: Stephen H. Cagle, Jr.
State Bar No. 24045596
scagle@csj-law.com
Heather Panick
State Bar No. 24062935
hpanick@csj-law.com
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 659-7617
Facsimile: (713) 659-7641
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Appellee: Anthony P. Griffin
Counsel for Appellee: Ms. Norma Venso
State Bar No. 20545250
nvenso@earthlink.net
830 Apollo
Houston, Texas 77058
Facsimile: (281) 286-9990
Telephone: (409) 789-8661
Trial Judge: Honorable Barbara E. Roberts
PARTIES IN UNDERLYING DIVORCE MATTER
Cross Plaintiff/Petitioner: Barbara Regina Schlein
Counsel for Plaintiff/Petitioner: Anthony P. Griffin
Cross Defendant/Respondent : Robert John Schlein
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent: Bill De La Garza
Trial Judge: Honorable Barbara E. Roberts
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually,
to Enforce This Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Standard for Privity and Capacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to
Enforce the Fee Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom
or Routine Practice.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish
that He Always Kept All of His Clients Informed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints. . . . . . . . 18
D. Complaints were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence. . . . 21
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1. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2. Texas Cases Examined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility while
Damaging Schlein’s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages. . 25
III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to
Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A. Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on the Breach of
Fiduciary Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against
the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. Standard of Review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
C. The Evidence Admitted Established Breach Conclusively. . . . . . . . 34
VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence which Established a Breach
of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a
Matter of Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s
Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance
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of the Evidence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A. The Jury’s Verdict Should be Disregarded Because Some Evidence of
Damages was Provided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been
Permitted to Testify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A. Procedural Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own
Discovery Control Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
IX. McGarvey’s Testimony was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s
Fees were Reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. There is no Evidence to Support the Jury’s Finding of Damages
in Question No. 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Alvarado v. Farah Mfg., 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44, 45
Anglot-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C.,
352 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1965).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). . . . 46
Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Cas. Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50 (Tex. 1939).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646
(Tex. App.–El Paso 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880
(Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Conquest Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int’l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299
(Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co. of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138
(Tex. 1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Davis v. Raney Auto Company, 249 S.W.878 accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport, L.P.,
308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005). . . . . . . . . 36
Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp.,
871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1994, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22, 24
Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
First Texas Sav. Ass’n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179
(Tex. App.–Tyler 1982, no writ.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723
(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186
(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . 21
Hoover Slovacek, LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2001).. . . . . . . . . 20
In re Allied Chemical, 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645
(Tex. App.– Dallas 2013, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
-viii-
Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P.,308 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010).. . . . . . 14
Keck, Mahin & Cale v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,
20 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kurtz v. Kurtz, 158 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. App. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Landry’s Seafood House-Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430
(Tex. App.–Dallas 2007, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207
(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1996). . 12
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363
(Tex. App.–El Paso 2002, writ denied).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Ortiz v. Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, pet denied) . . . . . 20
Perez v. Kirk Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261
(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Sanders v. Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907
(Tex. App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 23
Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc.,
847 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
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39 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 1998)
rev’d on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 25, 26
Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb,
746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no writ).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22
U.S. v. West, 22 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34
Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821
(Tex. App. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Statutes
Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Other Authorities
PJC 104.2-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 45
Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 45
Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Tex. R. Civ. P. 278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Tex. R. Evid. 401.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Tex. R. Evid. 404.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Tex. R. Evid. 406.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
25 Tex. Jur. 3d Evidence 261 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J.
3 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case. This is a case involving breach of an attorney fee
agreement. Appellant Barbara Regina Schlein (“Schlein”) was persuaded to engage
Appellee Anthony Griffin (“Griffin”) in her ongoing divorce case. Parties to the fee
agreement were Appellant and “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” (the
“Firm”). After a final decree was entered in the underlying divorce case, Appellant
was sued, alleging failure to pay on that case and other cases. [CR 3] The original
plaintiff was Griffin, individually. Schlein answered with a general denial, a verified
denial challenging Griffin’s capacity to sue, and counterclaimed for breach of contract,
legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraud for failure to disclose,
defamation, libel, libel per se, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
[CR 363] Subsequently, in response to Schlein’s traditional motion for partial
summary judgment on Griffin’s lack of capacity to maintain suit, Griffin amended his
pleadings to identify the plaintiff as “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers.” [CR
3; CR 628]
Course of proceedings. The parties’ claims were tried to a jury, which found
for “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” on its breach of contract claim. The
jury assessed $105,750 in actual damages, representing attorney’s fees incurred by
Griffin in representing Schlein in her divorce; $22,399.29 in costs related to same; and
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$62,866 in attorney’s fees for the instant action. The jury also found that Griffin had
knowingly engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action; it assessed actual
damages in the amount of “0” and $5,000.00 in exemplary damages. [CR-Supp-25-26]
Griffin subsequently filed two motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and Schlein filed a motion for new trial, all of which were denied. [CR 1144; CR
1175; CR 1209; CR 1245] The trial court entered judgment on the verdict on June 30,
2014. [CR 1249] This appeal followed.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:
(1) The trial court permitted “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” to
prosecute this case, although Anthony Griffin was not a party to the
subject fee agreement. A Griffin Lawyers is not a registered d/b/a and
Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. is a corporation that has not been in good
standing since 1998. It further barred evidence that A Griffin Lawyers
was a d/b/a, not of Anthony Griffin, but of Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. Did
the trial court err?
(2) Griffin offered testimony that his habit and routine practice was to keep
all of his clients informed about their cases. In rebuttal, Schlein offered
32 grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin by other clients since
January 1, 2009 that raised issues about his fee and complained that he
failed to keep clients informed . While Griffin was permitted to call
former clients to testify that he kept them informed, the trial court
excluded all 32 of these grievances and lawsuits brought against him.
Did the trial court err?
(3) The trial court permitted Griffin to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses
to testify that he always keeps them informed. They also provided
favorable character testimony for Griffin. Griffin failed to show good
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cause for not disclosing these witnesses before trial. Did the trial court
err?
(4) The trial court placed the burden on Schlein, rather than Griffin, on the
issue of breach of fiduciary duty. Schlein submitted a substantially
correct form of the question, which placed the burden on Griffin.
Schlein’s question was rejected. Did the trial court err?
(5) The jury’s answers to the court’s charge on breach of fiduciary duty were
supported by insufficient evidence.
(6) Schlein offered Griffin’s original petition to establish that Griffin
disclosed privileged communications and that Griffin sued Schlein on a
non-existent contingency fee contact. The trial court excluded the
original petition. Did the trial court err?
(7) The jury’s refusal to find actual damages resulting from Griffin’s
unconscionable conduct was against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence.
(8) Griffin failed to timely produce a report or disclose the information
relating to his expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, as required by Rule
194.2(f), Rule 195, and the docket control order issued by the trial court.
After pr4eviously ordering that McGarvey was stricken as a result of
Griffin’s failure to produce a report and make the requisite disclosures,
the trial court changed her mind at trial, and allowed McGarvey to testify.
Did the trial court err?
(9) The testimony of Griffin’s expert witness, Genevieve McGarvey, was
legally insufficient to support a judgment awarding Griffin damages in
the form of reasonable attorney’s fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Schlein’s divorce action had been ongoing for over thirteen months when she
was introduced to Griffin by a volunteer attorney in a women’s shelter. [RR 6, 42:6-
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23] Griffin urged her to hire his firm to finish her difficult divorce action. Citing his
firm’s reputation as “the best,” he told her that he could effectively counter the tactics
of her husband’s lawyer. [RR 6, 45:7-18; RR 6, 51:11-21] According to Schlein,
Griffin also promised to finish her divorce case for a flat fee. [RR 6, 43:19-25] After
two meetings, Schlein agreed to hire A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. (the
“Firm”). Schlein testified that the promised fee structure, and Griffin’s statements
about the reputation of the Firm, were key to her decision to accept the offer. [RR 6,
45:14-18]
On November 3, 2009, Schlein and Griffin executed the five-page fee
agreement at issue in this case (the “Fee Agreement”). [RR 6, 49:12-50:9; PX-1 (Tab
3)] Also on November 3, Griffin tendered a “Letter of Explanation and Letter
Agreement” (“Letter Agreement”). The Letter Agreement was signed by Griffin,
referenced the Fee Agreement, and explained its terms and scope. [PX-2 (Tab 4)]
Appellant testified that Griffin used the Letter Agreement to explain the Fee
Agreement before she signed. [RR 6, 47:1-3] [PX-2] Read together, these two
documents outlined the scope of the relationship as follows:
(a) Schlein was hiring “A Griffin Lawyers/Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” to
represent her in her divorce and certain listed claims involved in division
of property. [PX-1, p. 1]
-4-
(b) As consideration, Schlein agreed to pay a $35,000 nonrefundable retainer
at a future date. [PX-1, p. 2-3] This retainer was set significantly higher
than the firm’s normal retainer for similar work. [PX-1, p. 2] “The
retainer is set at an amount that is anticipated that no additional fees will
be charged.” [PX-2, p.1] Although Schlein was only required to pay a
$35,000 retainer, the Fee Agreement entitled the Firm to seek recovery
of its full reasonable fee from Schlein’s ex-husband in the divorce
proceeding. [PX-1, p. 3]
(c) Two related claims – one involving a suit against a homebuilder (the
“Builder Case”) and one involving Schlein’s son – would be handled
outside the Fee Agreement. The Explanation Letter stated that for each
of these matters “[a] separate contract will be drawn for this purpose; no
retainer is contemplated (contingent fee).” [PX-2, p.2] No written fee
agreements were drafted or executed in these matters. [RR 6, 48:1-9; RR
6, 48:10-15; RR 6, 48-49: 24-8; RR 7, 17:9-14]
(d) The Firm promised to “produce copies of documents as related to this
litigation and to keep the client fully informed.” [PX-1, p. 5]
The divorce action was tried to a jury verdict in May 2011; a final decree
was entered on October 24, 2011. [PX-6] However, the first and only bill by the Firm
-5-
was created months after trial.1 [RR 4, 113-115; RR 6, 53] This bill was more than
triple the $35,000 retainer and purported to include fees for work on matters other than
the divorce proceeding, including the Builder Case. [PX-147 (Tab 5)] The Fee
Agreement provided that the Firm would “not bill for any additional work unless and
until the services rendered exceeded the retainer amount.” [PX-1] Griffin testified that
he rendered services in the amount of $35,000 on or about May 17, 2010. [RR 8,
103:2-5] However, Griffin created the only invoice on or about August 5, 2011, over
a year later. [RR 8, 103:6-8] Schlein offered to pay Griffin the $35,000 retainer;
instead, he terminated the relationship. [RR 4, 102:17-20; RR 4, 111:7-24; RR 4, 112-
115:16-4; RR 4, 133:5] A day later, Griffin sent Schlein an email threatening: (1) to
set aside the October 24th judgment by claiming fraud; (2) to retain the valuable tile
entrusted to him during the divorce proceeding; (3) assert a lien for his costs and fees
in the divorce proceeding; (4) to file a lien based on a contingent fee interest in the
Builder Case; and (5) to hold onto Schlein’s client file, comprised of approximately
30 boxes, for up to 30 days. [PX-146 (Tab 6)]
Griffin filed suit (in his individual capacity) on March 20, 2013. The Original
Petition sought recovery for Griffin’s work on both the divorce case and for a
contingent interest in the Builder Case. [CR 3 (Tab 8)] Specifically, Griffin sought “a
1
While the invoice [PX-147] is dated August 5, 2011, Schlein testified she did not see it until
October 28. [RR 6 53:14-23]
-6-
declaratory judgment with respect to the contingent fee contract on the construction
litigation that the contract is a valid and enforceable contract and remains in effect.”
[CR 3] Subsequently, Griffin amended his pleadings to drop this claim. [CR 296]
Schlein challenged Griffin’s capacity, claiming he could not recover against her
because he was not a party to the contract and “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” was not in
good standing. [CR 481] Griffin claimed he was a party because “A Griffin Lawyers”
was his assumed name, not the corporation’s. [CR 633; RR 8, 87:10-20] This was
contradicted by a bankruptcy petition filed on behalf of the corporation. [CR 522] The
trial court refused to consider the bankruptcy petition and did not take judicial notice
of same. [RR 10, 7-8:22-20]
Schlein’s counterclaim against Griffin was centered on Griffin’s breach of his
duty to keep her reasonably informed. [CR 26] Lacking copies of signed letters or
relevant emails, Griffin adduced testimony that it was his office’s habit or routine
practice to copy clients on all correspondence and pleadings. [RR 6, 165:7-18; RR 6,
125:7-15] In response, Schlein sought to introduce evidence of 32 grievances and
lawsuits filed against Griffin by clients whom he represented during the approximate
time frame he represented Schlein. Most, if not all of these grievances and lawsuits,
were based on Griffin’s fee and his failure to keep his clients informed. [RR 8, 67:3-
14; DX-32-46 and 75-79] Although Schlein was allowed to mention limited portions
-7-
of three of the grievances, the trial court excluded all of the grievances and lawsuits.
[CR 1143; RR 10, 90:18-92:7; RR 10, 172:2-5] The trial court then permitted Griffin
to call undisclosed “rebuttal” witnesses to refute these grievances. [RR 10, 168:2-13;
RR 10, 170:6-172:22]
After nine days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Griffin. This
appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Griffin failed to demonstrate his capacity to enforce the fee agreement at issue.
Griffin chose to contract with Schlein through a corporation that has not been in good
standing with the Texas Secretary of State since 1998. Such a corporation is barred
from using the courts of this state to enforce its obligations. And, as is apparent on
the face of the Fee Agreement, A Griffin Lawyers purports to an assumed name of the
Firm, not Griffin personally. Because Griffin is not a party to this contract, he cannot
enforce it.
The trial court erred in excluding the 32 grievances and lawsuits offered to rebut
Griffin’s evidence of habit or routine practice. Notwithstanding Griffin’s position
taken at trial, the grievances and lawsuits were admissible as habit evidence, as
evidence of similar happenings, and in support of Schlein’s claim for exemplary
damages. However, once Griffin testified that he always keeps his clients informed
-8-
of everything going on in their cases, he opened the door to allow Schlein to present
this evidence to rebut Griffin’s own habit evidence. The door was opened even further
when Griffin was permitted to elicit testimony from his former clients that Griffin kept
them informed. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits filed against Griffin
since January 1, 2009, conclusively rebutted any inference of habit or routine practice
and destroyed any claim that Griffin kept all his clients informed. Therefore, by
excluding this evidence, the trial court permitted Griffin to create a false impression,
while depriving Schlein of the opportunity to prosecute her own claims.
The trial court compounded its error by permitting Griffin to rebut the mere
mention of grievances with a parade of the aforementioned undisclosed “rebuttal”
witnesses. These witnesses were permitted to testify as to the good character of
Griffin and his habit of keeping them informed. Because these witnesses were
undisclosed and because their testimony should have been reasonably anticipated, they
should have been excluded.
Schlein established that Griffin breached his fiduciary duties as a matter of law.
It is undisputed that Griffin took possession of Schlein’s valuable imported Travertine
tile during the underlying divorce. When Griffin terminated his relationship with
Schlein, he refused to release her tile until his motion to set aside the verdict in the
divorce case was heard. Griffin never filed this motion and never returned Schlein’s
-9-
tile. It is also undisputed that Griffin only sent Schlein one invoice for his services,
an invoice that was created months after trial. The chronology of events demonstrate
conclusively that Griffin failed to keep Schlein informed, especially with respect to
the amount of attorney’s fees he was incurring.
Despite this evidence demonstrating Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty, the trial
court rejected Schlein’s jury issue, which placed the burden on Griffin to prove he
complied with his fiduciary duty.
The trial court further erred by excluding Griffin’s original petition in this
action, which asserts an interest in a non-existent contingency fee agreement and
discloses a privileged conversation between Schlein and Griffin. Thus, the excluded
petition establishes breach of fiduciary duty as a matter law.
Finally, Schlein was ambushed at trial not only by undisclosed rebuttal
witnesses, but also by a previously stricken expert who was permitted to testify when
the issue was raised at trial. Griffin failed to timely designate his expert, Genevieve
McGarvey, in accordance with the docket control order, Rule 194.2(f), and Rule 195.
Nevertheless, McGarvey was permitted to testify regarding the reasonableness of
Griffin’s attorney’s fees in the underlying divorce matter over Schlein’s objection.
McGarvey’s conclusory testimony, however, was legally insufficient to support
an award of attorney’s fees for Griffin.
-10-
ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court Erred by Permitting Anthony Griffin, Individually, to
Enforce This Agreement.
The Fee Agreement listed "A Griffin Lawyers / Anthony P. Griffin, Inc." as
the only party, other than Schlein, to the agreements at issue. [PX-1] When Anthony
Griffin brought suit individually to enforce the Fee Agreement, Schlein raised the
issue of capacity by verified pleading, and sought summary judgment on the issue.
[CR 481] Attached to the Motion were discovery responses and deposition testimony
from Griffin, establishing that Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. was not a party to the lawsuit.
[CR 504-520] Also included was a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed in 2012 by
“Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.,” which claimed “A Griffin Lawyers” as its assumed name.
[CR 522 (Tab 7)]
In response, Griffin filed an amended petition, which added A Griffin Lawyers
to the suit and listed “Anthony Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers” as Plaintiff. [CR 628]
Anthony Griffin filed an affidavit asserting that, contrary to prior representations in
the bankruptcy court and his deposition, A Griffin Lawyers was not an assumed name
of “Anthony P. Griffin, Inc.” but was his own. [CR 640] Schlein objected, asserting
that Griffin’s response relied on a conclusory “sham” affidavit and failed to show
compliance with the mandatory provisions of Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 71.051-054,
or display an assumed name record which was filed pursuant to that statute. [CR 699]
-11-
The trial court denied Schlein’s motion for summary judgment. [CR 751] The
trial court also denied Schlein’s effort to raise the issue at trial. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR
3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20]
A. Standard for Privity and Capacity
A party must have both standing and capacity to bring a lawsuit. “A plaintiff has
standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal
authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of
whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson
Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). A challenge to a party’s
privity of contract is a challenge to capacity. See John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v.
SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2013, no pet.); Landry’s
Seafood House - Addison, Inc. v. Snadon, 233 S.W.3d 430, 433-34 (Tex. App. - Dallas
2007, pet. denied). Privity between the injured party and the party sought to be held
liable is an essential element for recovery in any action based on contract. Sanders v.
Total Heat & Air, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 907, 912 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). Privity
is established by proving that the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with
either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff. Conquest
Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int'l, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004,
no pet.).
Once the issue of capacity is properly raised by a verified pleading, a plaintiff
-12-
bears the burden of bringing forward evidence showing capacity to act. Coastal
Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001).
Failure to do so can result in waiver of a right to recovery. Id.
B. Griffin Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Establishing Capacity to
Enforce the Fee Agreement
Because his capacity to sue had been challenged in the trial court, Griffin bore
the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate capacity to sue.
See Coastal Liquids Transportation L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 46
S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001). However, the only evidence presented by Griffin was his
own conclusory affidavit, which contradicted his earlier deposition testimony without
explanation. He produced no assumed-name certificate filed with any governmental
agency and, in fact, admitted that no assumed-name certificate was ever filed. [RR 3,
38:23-39:1] Because Griffin failed to adduce competent, admissible evidence of his
capacity to enforce the Fee Agreement, the trial court should have granted Schlein’s
motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Tex. 2000). Instead, the trial court
thwarted Schlein’s efforts to raise the issue during trial. The trial court’s actions
resulted in the rendition of an improper verdict.
It is axiomatic that an assumed or trade name has no separate legal existence
and cannot enter into a contract by itself. See, e.g., Davis v. Raney Auto Company,
-13-
249 S.W. 878; accord Kahn v. Imperial Airport L.P., 308 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. App.
– Dallas 2010). As a matter of law, Griffin’s signature on the Fee Agreement was on
behalf of the only party which it could be – Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., which is also
owned by Griffin. [RR 8 87:21-24] Because it was the corporation which Griffin
bound by his signature; only the corporation could bring suit. See Anglot-Dutch
Petroleum International, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 352 S.W.3d 445, 450-51
(Tex. 2011). Griffin’s own sister, who works for the Firm, testified at trial that the
legal name for A Griffin Lawyers is Anthony P. Griffin, Inc. [RR 6, 130:22-25] Yet
the corporation has never been a party to this suit. The trial court’s pretrial decision
to permit the suit to go forward is a clear abuse of discretion.
Further, no deemed finding can supply Griffin with the capacity to bring and
maintain suit, because no evidence supports the finding. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 263 (Tex.2002). When challenged pretrial, Griffin failed to produce evidence of
compliance with mandatory filing requirements for assumed names. Tex. Bus. Comm.
Code 71.051. See [CR 699] At trial, Griffin offered the bare conclusion that A Griffin
Lawyers is the assumed name for him, individually. [RR 8, 87:7-20] These
conclusions, which are contradicted by overwhelming evidence, are no evidence at all.
At trial, the trial court intervened to keep Plaintiff’s capacity arguments away from the
jury. [RR 3, 30:8-31:16; RR 3, 33:17-42:17; RR 4, 108:3-20; DX-4; DX-26]. Cross-
examination of Griffin was limited to Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., the other “party” to the
-14-
Fee Agreement. [RR 8, 87:1-88:11] Schlein’s attorney was reduced to a running
objection to any reference to Griffin as a party to the contract. [RR 4, 108:3-19]
Ultimately, it was Griffin’s burden to secure a finding on capacity, and absent
legally sufficient evidence, no finding can be deemed in his favor. In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 263. Because no legally sufficient evidence was introduced, the error
caused the entry of an improper judgment.
II. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence of Griffin’s Habit, Custom
or Routine Practice
A significant portion of this trial boiled down to whether Griffin kept his client
informed. This issue was relevant to whether Griffin complied with the Fee
Agreement; it was also central to Schlein’s claims that Griffin misrepresented the
nature of their fee agreement and breached his fiduciary duty during and after he
represented Schlein. Both Griffin and Schlein offered evidence of habit or routine
practice pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 406. While Griffin’s offer was permitted,
Schlein’s was largely rejected. The trial court’s rulings on this issue fostered a
mistaken impression which led to the rendition of an improper verdict.
A. Standard for Habit or Routine Evidence; Rule 406
Texas Rule of Evidence 406 authorizes evidence of an entity’s routine practice
“to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was
in conformity” with that practice. See, e.g., Mediacomp, Inc. v. Capital Cities
-15-
Communication, 698 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
For testimony of the routine practice of an organization to be admissible, it must show
a regular response to a repeated specific situation. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Cabler, 73 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2002, writ denied). Under the
nearly identical Federal rule, courts require a showing that the cited conduct is “more
than a mere ‘tendency’ to act in a given manner;” the conduct must be “semi-
automatic” in nature. Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290,
1293 (7th Cir. 1988). Such a showing necessarily requires comparing the number of
transactions where the conduct occurred against the total number of transactions. U.S.
v. West, 22 F.3d 586, 591-592 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Griffin Opened the Door to the Grievances by Attempting to Establish that
He Always Kept His Clients Informed
On the crucial issue of whether Griffin kept Schlein informed, Griffin was
forced to admit that he had no proof that the vast majority of electronic transmittal
letters were actually sent to Schlein; that his firm did not bill copies to individual files;
that he did not bill postage to individual files; and that he did not have any of the
either. [RR 10, 9:1-19; RR 7, 21:12-14; RR 8, 63:5-10] Faced with this lack of direct
evidence, Griffin turned to evidence of routine practice under Rule 406. He offered
the testimony of himself and his sister/legal assistant, Linda Griffin, that it was the
customary practice of his office to keep clients informed. [RR 6, 126:20-24; RR 6,
-16-
165:7-18] In his enthusiasm to create this hypothetical paper trail, Griffin opened the
door to the grievances and lawsuits at issue.
On direct examination, Griffin testified:
Q. Did you keep Barbara Schlein informed of what you were doing
on her behalf.
A. Absolutely. We have an office manual and we’ve always had this
practice: If I write a letter and I send that letter to another lawyer,
I copy the client on the letter and client gets a copy of everything.
If somebody sends me something that relates to that client, I will
then generate a letter to that client and sent it out to that client.
There is – with the – if there’s a fax send out, the client gets a
copy. If the client doesn’t have a fax, I’d mail it to them.
[RR 6, 165:7-18]
Linda Griffin’s testimony was in total agreement with her brother’s:
Q. Do you know if Barbara Schlein was mailed copies of any parts of
her file as the file progressed?
A. The practice of the office is all clients receive every piece of paper
that goes out from the beginning to the end of the case.
Q. So did Mr. Griffin give her copies of what the other side filed, as
well?
A. Yes.
[RR 6, 125:7-15]
On the strength of this testimony, Griffin was able to leverage the admission of
literally dozens of unsigned electronic letters, which were not even on the Firm’s
letterhead, from his computer network as evidence of his communications with
-17-
Schlein. [RR 10, 10:17-19; PX-85-94; PX-96-117; PX-118-134; PX-136; PX-138-
139; PX-142] Schlein’s objection that these constituted no evidence of sending
anything to Schlein was overruled. [RR 8, 14:10-16:6]
When Griffin raised the issue of his office’s routine practice with respect to all
his clients, he “opened the door.” Put another way, he raised the issue first, inviting
a response. Schlein was then entitled to offer evidence rebutting that issue. Serv.
Corp. Int'l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 234-35 (Tex. 2011).
Griffin represented to the jury that every client got every piece of paper that was
sent out or received in every case. [RR 6, 165:7-18] By doing so, he secured
admission of 48 word documents as evidence that he kept Barbara Schlein informed.
In doing so, he placed his regular practice with respect to all his clients at issue.
C. The Trial Court Erred by its Treatment of the Complaints
Schlein responded to Griffin’s evidence by offering the 32 grievances and
lawsuits filed against Griffin between January 1, 2009 and the close of discovery (the
“Complaints”). Each related to disputes regarding his “non-refundable retainer” and
alleged that Griffin failed to keep his clients informed. See Tabs 9, 10 and 11 for
samples of such grievances. The trial court limited Schlein’s original discovery
request to those which asserted malpractice, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty or fraud. [RR 2, 25:20-24; RR 2, 29:23-30:6; RR 2, 31:19-24; DX-32-48; DX-75-
79; see also CR 1015, p.2] Of the grievances offered, five were final; ten were
-18-
pending; the rest were dismissed by the disciplinary committee for various reasons.
[DX-32-48; DX-75-79]
The trial court refused to admit the Complaints. [RR 10, 56-59; RR 10, 67:10-
20; RR 11, 163-166] Schlein was restricted to questioning about only three of the
Complaints, which involved agreed judgments or public reprimands. [RR 10, 56:14-
57:9-64:22] Schlein was not allowed to discuss the findings in these cases, only their
ultimate outcome. [RR 10, 62:21-22] The trial court excluded one Complaint because
Griffin represented it was being appealed, though he never provided any
documentation supporting the same. [RR 8, 70:22-72:9; RR 10, 6:19-7:9] This
Complaint involved suspension of Griffin’s license. [RR 8 70:20-22]
When the trial court refused to otherwise admit the Complaints, the trial court
erred. The documents themselves were more reliable than the unsigned client letters
previously admitted.
The Complaints were offered not only to rebut Griffin’s Rule 406 evidence, but
to establish the opposite. The sheer number of grievances and lawsuits speak directly
to the way Griffin runs his law practice and the habits and routines that he uses in
billing and communicating with his clients. Thus, under rule 406, the Complaints are
evidence that “the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was
in conformity with the habit or routine practice.” Tex. R. Evid. 406.
-19-
Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a matter committed to the trial court's
sound discretion. See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753
(Tex.1995). A complaint about exclusion of evidence requires a showing that the
error probably resulted in an improper judgment. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756,
758 (Tex.1992). This requires the reviewing court to review the entire record.
McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 756; Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co, 765 S.W.2d 394, 396
(Tex. 1989). A successful challenge usually requires the complaining party to
demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted.
Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.2000); Interstate
Northborough P'ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001).
The 32 excluded grievances and lawsuits were relevant to rebut Griffin’s
testimony about the “habit or routine practice” of his office. Griffin relied on Rule
406 to establish a presumption that he acted in accordance with his habit or routine of
keeping his clients informed. The law affords a presumption based on Rule 406 only
when a response is Pavlovian; that is, “the same one directed at the same specific
stimulus.” Ortiz v Glusman, 334 S.W.3d 812 (Tex.App–El Paso 2011, pet. denied).
In the face of the sheer number of these Complaints, Griffin’s right to this presumption
is destroyed and admission of the 48 unsigned letters becomes a gross abuse of
discretion. The trial court’s error left an erroneous impression in the jurors’ minds and
likely led to the rendition of an improper verdict.
-20-
D. Complaints Were Admissible as Similar Happenings Evidence
1. Standard
The Complaints were also admissible for another reason: to show a common
scheme or plan. While evidence of other wrongs or acts is generally not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, such
evidence may be admissible for other purposes. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence
is relevant and admissible for this purpose where the offering party can demonstrate
sufficient similarity of subject matter and parties. U-Haul Int’l Inc. v. Waldrip, 380
S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 2012). They are especially relevant if the acts involve the same
personnel. See Durbin v. Dal–Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 268–69 (Tex.App.-El
Paso 1994, writ denied), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Golden Eagle
Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362 (Tex.2000); Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v.
Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
2. Texas Cases Examined
In Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., the plaintiff alleged the Defendant wrongfully
terminated him after he sustained an on-the-job injury. Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 268-69.
The trial court excluded testimony and other evidence that referenced other lawsuits
brought against the employer for illegal terminations after a workers compensation
claim was filed and instances of other employees who had been similarly wrongfully
terminated. Id. The appellate court held that evidence showing that prior employees
-21-
were terminated illegally was relevant and admissible. Id. The appellate court
remanded the case for a new trial holding that “the trial court's exclusion of evidence
prevented [the plaintiff] from receiving a fair trial.” Id. at 273.
In Cobb, the plaintiff was permitted to offer evidence of the defendant
underwriter's previous denials of claims. The court held they were admissible because
they were denied around the same time as the plaintiff's claim was denied, they were
denied on the same basis, and were admissible to show that the defendant's refusal to
pay the plaintiff's claim was “committed or performed with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice.” Id., Cobb, 746 S.W.2d at 815. The court held
that the evidence was necessary to establish the plaintiff’s causes of action, especially
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant had breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Id.
Here, the grievances involve the “same . . . personnel,” the same law practice,
and “the same pattern of conduct.” Id. They all occurred in the same time period of
Schlein’s representation and establish an essential element of Schlein’s claims, that
Griffin breached the fiduciary duty of care owed to Schlein, that he made
misrepresentations regarding the fee agreement, and that Griffin intended to defraud
Schlein through a bait-and-switch scheme. The evidence the court ordered admitted
in Durbin was for pending lawsuits and unresolved allegations. Here, Schlein has not
only pending and dismissed grievances and lawsuits, but grievances that resulted in
-22-
public reprimands as well. Schlein also has substantially more instances than existed
in Durbin which firmly establish the way Griffin ran his practice and communicated
with his clients. Both issues are crucial to Schlein establishing her case and
substantially more relevant than prejudicial under the Durbin court’s analysis.
Such evidence is uniformly held admissible if it shows a party’s material intent
because the prior acts were “so connected with the transaction at issue that they may
all be parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d
608, 613 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998) rev'd on other grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex.
2001). This is “shown through evidence of similar acts temporally relevant and of the
same substantive basis.” Serv. Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex.
2011).
Here, like in Cobb, the grievances occurred around the same time, were made
on the same basis as Schlein’s claims, and are admissible to show Griffin’s business
practices. The grievances are essential to establish Schlein’s claims that Griffin
breached his fiduciary duties owed to her. Additionally, Griffin’s failure to disclose
his grievances and disputes with clients was a material omission made the basis of
Schlein’s fraud in the inducement and fraud by nondisclosure claim. Therefore, the
grievances are also necessary for Schlein to establish her fraud claim against Griffin.
-23-
E. Exclusion of the Complaints Bolstered Griffin’s Credibility While
Damaging Schlein’s
In Durbin, the Court held that the trial court’s exclusion of examples of other
workers being fired after making compensation claims left a false impression with the
jury that plaintiff was unable to rebut. The Court also considered the effect the
excluded evidence likely would have had on the credibility of key witnesses:
Minyard was himself terminated, and without specific examples of how
the company policy was implemented, the jury may well have concluded
he was simply a disgruntled ex-employee seeking revenge. Allowing
testimony from other witnesses corroborating Minyard would have
added to his credibility, but that was not an option for plaintiff, either.
Precluding Minyard from discussing specific instances of termination
following on-the-job injuries harmed plaintiff's case by seriously
undermining the credibility of his star witness.
Second, the trial court's ruling made it impossible for plaintiff to refute
Dal–Briar's claim that “no one was ever fired as a result of a worker's
comp claim.” As plaintiff was prohibited from introducing examples of
workers fired after making compensation claims, the jury was entirely
justified in believing Dal–Briar's claim was correct. Had Durbin been
allowed to introduce the excluded evidence, Dal–Briar's claim would
have been far less plausible. We therefore conclude the exclusion of this
evidence was reasonably calculated to lead to, and probably resulted in,
an improper verdict. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1).
Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 271 (emphasis added).
In much the same way, if the jury had known that on 32 other occasions since
January 1, 2009, clients have complained about Griffin’s conduct, including his failure
to keep them informed. Schlein certainly would have benefitted greatly by having her
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story corroborated by other witnesses. Likewise, Griffin’s contention that he always
keeps every client informed, would appear much less plausible.
F. The Complaints are Necessary Evidence for Exemplary Damages
Schlein must be able to put on evidence of Griffin's intent to establish her
exemplary damages. Griffin's intent is shown through the numerous grievances filed
against him on the same basis on which Schlein brings her claims. Excluding the
grievances impermissibly limits Schlein's ability to establish her damages and is
therefore reversible error.
In Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the appellate court held that exclusion of
prior lawsuits as evidence resulted in the improper rendition of judgment and sent the
case back to the trial court for a new trial on damages. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39
S.W.3d at 613. The trial court excluded evidence of five prior lawsuits and their
judgments that were brought on the same cause of action as the plaintiffs. Id. The
court stated that while prior bad acts may be prejudicial, and exception lies where
“they are so connected with the transaction under consideration in point of time that
they may all be regarded as parts of a system, scheme or plan.” Id.
The Court held that Wal-Mart's intent was required to establish exemplary
damages and the prior lawsuits resulting in judgment against Wal-Mart served to
establish Wal-Mart's intent. Because the trial court excluded the evidence, the
appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the issue of exemplarily damages.
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Because the evidence admitted made it appear that Wal-Mart's actions had been an
isolated incident, the court held that the prior judgments were necessary for the jury
to properly award damages. Id. at 614. The Court further stated:
The excluded prior lawsuit documents evidenced the frequency of similar
wrongs Wal-Mart committed; the character of the conduct involved; the
degree of Wal-Mart's culpability; the extent to which Wal-Mart's conduct
offends a sense of public justice and propriety, and the amount needed to
deter similar acts in the future. In addition, the prior lawsuits appellants
sought to introduce were evidence of a course of conduct showing
Wal-Mart's intent to interfere with prospective business relations.
Id.
Here, Schlein has requested exemplarily damages. Because the prior and
current grievances and lawsuits filed by Griffin's clients are evidence of his intent, the
grievances are relevant, admissible evidence that Schlein must be allowed to present
to the jury.
III. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Undisclosed Character Witnesses to
Testify as Rebuttal Witnesses.
Having excluded all 32 grievances and lawsuits, the trial court compounded its
error by permitting Griffin to call undisclosed rebuttal character witnesses in response.
Griffin claimed that the rebuttal witnesses were necessary to refute Schlein’s
accusation that he failed to keep her reasonably informed while representing her. [RR
9, 56:19-59:3] Thus, these surprise rebuttal witnesses were called for the purpose of
establishing that Griffin kept them informed when he represented them and that they
were satisfied with the services he provided. [RR 10, 168-173] Griffin’s former
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clients also provided character testimony that cast Griffin in a favorable light. [RR 11,
14-15:14-7; RR 11, 18:10-18; RR 11, 30:11-31:4] None of Griffin’s rebuttal
witnesses were disclosed in response to Schlein’s Request for Disclosure or identified
on Griffin’s Witness List. [CR 63; CR 573]
A. Standard
A party may introduce previously undisclosed rebuttal or impeachment evidence
if (1) the evidence is solely for impeachment or rebuttal, (2) its use could not have
been anticipated, and (3) the evidence is not responsive to a direct discovery request.
See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added).
B. Griffin Cannot Meet the Standard
Griffin cannot satisfy the above standard for several reasons. First, Schlein’s
Original Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed on June 18, 2013, specifically
alleges that Griffin breached his fiduciary duty owed to Schlein by failing to “inform
client of matters material to the representation.” [CR 29] Griffin knew for close to a
year before trial that his office’s practices with respect to keeping clients informed
would be at issue. Therefore, the need for such witnesses was forseeable for at least
that long.
Second, it is disingenuous for Griffin to contend they did not anticipate
Schlein’s attempt to introduce the grievances and lawsuits at trial, when Schlein
fought so hard to obtain them. Schlein’s interrogatories required Griffin to “[i]dentify
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and describe the nature, source, substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim
or complaint that has been made at or against you, including, but not limited to, claims
or complaints related to malpractice, misrepresentations, fraud, mishandling of funds
or any violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct.” [CR 152] As a result
of Griffin’s objection to this interrogatory, a hearing on Schlein’s motion to compel
was heard on October 31, 2013. [CR 196] The trial court narrowed the scope of
Interrogatory No. 3 and ordered to Griffin to “[i]dentify and describe the nature, scope,
substance, and disposition or resolution of every claim or complaint filed with the
State Bar or in which a lawsuit was filed that has been made at or against Griffin,
limited to claim or complaints relating to malpractice, misrepresentation, fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 308]
On February 14, 2014, Griffin supplemented his answer to Interrogatory No. 3
and the corresponding request for production and identified 32 separate lawsuits and
grievances filed against him since January 1, 2009. [CR 624] Most, if not all of the
Complaints arose from issues regarding Griffin’s fee, usually his retainer, and his
failure to keep the client informed as required by Disciplinary Rule 1.03. [DX-32-48;
DX-75-79] Griffin was deposed regarding these lawsuits and grievances on February
28, 2014. [CR 624; RR 2, 32:22-34:12]
The Complaints brought by Griffin’s former clients relating to Griffin’s failure
to keep clients informed, among other things, were squarely at issue throughout the
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entire case. Consequently, Griffin was required to disclose the identity of these
character witnesses prior to trial and the trial court erred in permitting the testimony.
At trial, Schlein objected to these witnesses on the grounds that they were not
identified in Griffin’s Responses to Request for Disclosure and were not listed on
Griffin’s witness list. [RR 9, 58:17-24; RR 10, 161:16-21] Thus, it was Schlein who
was surprised by and unprepared for Griffin’s undisclosed rebuttal witnesses.
The trial court’s decision regarding Griffin’s rebuttal witnesses led to the
rendition of an improper verdict because the issue of whether Griffin keeps his clients
informed was key to nearly all of Schlein’s causes of action against Griffin. Because
the undisclosed character witnesses were permitted to testify, the jury was left with
an inaccurate impression regarding how Griffin treats his clients. Specifically, the jury
was left with the impression that Griffin always kept his clients informed, provided
periodic billings, and returned unearned fees.
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Charging the Jury on Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Schlein’s pleading raised the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. [CR 2, 764] The
Court’s original charge placed the burden on Griffin to prove he complied with his
fiduciary duty. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury
Charges Business-Consumer-Insurance-Employment 104.2] At the charge conference,
Griffin persuaded the Court to instead submit a question placing the burden on
Schlein. [RR 12 26:22-28:15; see PJC 104.3] Schlein tendered a substantially correct
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question based on PJC 104.2 which was marked “Refused” by the trial court. [CR-
Supp-31] Because the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof, reversible error
is shown.
Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty allegations against Griffin center on actions
after the attorney-client relationship arose. These claims include his failure to keep
her informed of facts material to her case, his failure to safeguard property entrusted
to his care, and failure to keep her apprised of the status of the amount of attorneys’
fees incurred. As such, Schlein requested a jury question which placed the burden on
Griffin to show that his actions were fair. See PJC 104.2-3.
The trial court is required to submit to the jury such questions and instructions
as are raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 278.
Charge error is preserved by the proponent of a question or instruction by timely
requesting an issue, and, where refused, submits a question or instruction in
substantially correct form. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. “[A] judgment cannot be permitted
to stand when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or a
vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence.” Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842
S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992).
Because the acts complained of by Schlein were committed during the
relationship, the burden should have been placed on Griffin to show the fairness and
reasonableness of his actions. Griffin benefitted because he secured a claim for over
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$100,000 in attorney’s fees. The trial court’s misplacing of the burden of proof
probably led to the rendition of an improper verdict.
V. The Jury’s Answers to the Court’s Charge on Fiduciary Duty was Against
the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence.
Schlein presented substantial evidence to the jury of Griffin’s breaches of his
duties during and after his representation. The jury’s failure to find that Griffin
breached his fiduciary duty was against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. Alternatively, this failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was supported by
factually insufficient evidence.
A. Standard of Review
To prevail on her legal sufficiency challenge, Schlein must demonstrate that the
evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241-42 (Tex. 2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil
Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). In reviewing a “matter of law” challenge, this
Court must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while
ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Sterner, 767 S.W.2d
at 690. If there is no evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court will then
examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a
matter of law. Id. The point of error should be sustained only if the contrary
proposition is conclusively established. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58
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(Tex.1983). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to
be given their testimony, and the fact-finder may choose to believe one witness and
disbelieve another. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex.2005). The
Court should presume the fact-finder resolved all evidentiary conflicts in accordance
with its decision, but only if a reasonable juror could have done so. See Id.
In this review, certain evidence contrary to the verdict cannot be disregarded by
the reviewing court, even if it leads to a reversal of the verdict. Favorable evidence
must always be placed in its proper context, even if that contextual evidence is not
favorable to the verdict. Similarly, the reviewing court must consider evidence
contrary to the verdict if it shows that favorable evidence is incompetent; this includes
unqualified experts. Finally, undisputed or otherwise conclusive evidence may not be
disregarded. Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 811-817; see also W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s
Standards of Review in Texas, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. 3, 33-37 (2010).
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue
on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse
finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Francis, 46
S.W.3d at 242; Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. The court of appeals must consider and
weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak
or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that
it is clearly wrong and unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635
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(Tex.1986). In doing so, the court of appeals must “detail the evidence relevant to the
issue” and “state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence
in support of the verdict.” Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.
B. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Attorneys
In Texas, attorneys are held to the highest standards of ethical conduct in
dealing with their clients. Hoover Slovacek, 206 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tex. 2006);
Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965). Attorneys owe their clients
“absolute perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment
or deception.” Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, pet. denied). The duties owed by an attorney to his client include duties of
loyalty; duties of confidentiality; and duties of candor.
The attorney’s duty of candor includes a duty of “full and fair disclosure of facts
material to the client’s representation.” Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.
1988). “A fact is material if it would likely affect the conduct of a reasonable person
concerning the transaction in question.” Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723, 736
(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (applying definition to alleged breach
of fiduciary duty by attorney); see also Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Tex. Bank & Trust Co.
of Dall., 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex.1974) (outlining same definition of “material” in
context of fraud). Because the client must trust his attorney’s advice, an attorney’s
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failure to disclose material facts is tantamount to concealment. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at
645.
The duty of loyalty includes a duty to safeguard client confidences and not make
hostile use of those confidences. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.
App. – Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Brown v. Green, 302 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex.
App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
C. The Admitted Evidence Conclusively Established Breach
Here, the jury’s verdict is contrary to the evidence, thus it cannot stand. Both
Griffin and Schlein testified that she entrusted certain valuable tile from an unfinished
house to Griffin’s care, and Griffin stored this tile in his warehouse. [RR CR765; RR
8 6:14-21; RR 8 7:] Griffin then threatened to keep the tile until the trial court heard
his motion to intervene and undo the verdict in Griffin’s underlying divorce case. [PX-
146 (Tab 6)] Griffin still had the tile on the date of trial, years later. [RR 6 91:20-22]
Lillian Hardwick, Schlein’s expert on duties owed by lawyers, testified this
action constituted a breach of the duty of safekeeping of the client’s property. [RR 10
137:25-138:8] This undisputed evidence conclusively establishes Griffin’s breach with
respect to safekeeping of his client’s property. This evidence established a breach of
fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s verdict is against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence.
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Similarly, Griffin’s own testimony established that he failed to keep Schlein
informed with respect to his billing. The Fee Agreement and Letter Agreement were
dated November 3, 2009. [PX-1 (Tab 3); PX-2 (Tab 4)] His first bill was dated
August 5, 2011; three months after trial and more than 21 months after engagement.
[PX-147 (Tab 5)] Griffin testified that he did not send Schlein a bill during that time.
[RR 8 72:20-73:18] The uncontroverted testimony of Schlein’s expert, Lillian
Hardwick, established that this alone was a breach of Griffin’s duty to keep his client
informed. [RR 10 132:5-25] These uncontroverted or undisputed pieces of evidence
establish a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of law; alternatively, the jury’s failure
to find this fact is a finding against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.
VI. The Trial Court Erred by Excluding Evidence Which Established a Breach
of Fiduciary Duty as a Matter of Law.
Schlein offered Griffin’s Original Petition as evidence of two further breaches
of fiduciary duty. The trial court excluded Griffin’s Original Petition because it was
superceded by Griffin’s amended petitions. [RR 10 44:2-12] By excluding Griffin’s
Original Petition, the trial court excluded evidence which presented a prima facie case
of breach of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty and prejudiced Schlein’s ability
to establish her breach of fiduciary duty case. In doing so, the trial court erred.
-35-
A. Admissibility of Superceded Pleadings
Superseded pleadings in a civil action are admissible, although not as judicial
admissions. See generally 35 Tex.Jur.3d Evidence 261 (2015). Pleadings in a civil
action that are inconsistent with the pleading party's position in another civil action
are admissible as admissions of a party opponent. Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005, no pet.).
B. Griffin’s Original Petition Establishes Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a
Matter of Law
The Original Petition sought recovery for a contract which never existed – a
contingent-fee agreement in the Builder Case. See Tab 8. As a matter of law,
contingent-fee agreements must be reduced to writing in order to be enforceable. See
Tex. Gov’t §82.065(a). Griffin is charged with knowing this because the Fee
Agreement called for a separate, written agreement for any suit against Centre
Builders, and Griffin knew he didn’t have one. [RR 7 17:12-14]
Second, the trial court’s refusal to admit the Original Petition filed in this case
– a petition not superseded until just before trial – was a clear abuse of discretion. [RR
10, 44: 2-12] This Petition contained within its four corners two breaches of fiduciary
duty with respect to Schlein. First, the Original Petition allegedly disclosed
confidences revealed by Schlein within the context of the representation in the
underlying divorce case. The Petition quoted a conversation with Schlein to establish
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that she hid assets in the underlying divorce case. [CR-17] This disclosure, in a
publicly filed document, constituted a breach of loyalty and confidentiality.
The trial court’s action in excluding this previously-filed petition damaged both
Schlein’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and her claim for exemplary damages. These
pleadings were admissible as statements against interest and admissions of a party
opponent. No rule of evidence prevented their inclusion. The trial court’s failure to
admit these key pieces of evidence resulted in harmful error, which caused rendition
of an improper verdict.
VII. The Jury’s Refusal to Find Actual Damages Resulting from Griffin’s
Unconscionable Conduct was Against the Great Weight and
Preponderance of the Evidence.
The jury found that Griffin had engaged in an unconscionable course of
conduct, and that he had engaged in that conduct knowingly and intentionally. [CR
Supp 23-24; PJC 102.7; Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 17.49] However, the jury answered
the damages question as follows:
QUESTION NO. 20
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and
reasonably compensate Barbara Schlein for her damages, if any, that
resulted from such conduct?
a. The amount, if any, that Barbara Schlein paid in excess to Anthony Griffin
for legal services promised by Anthony Griffin.
Answer: [0]
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b. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees incurred as a
result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the
divorce matter.
Answer: [0]
c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's fee incurred as a
result of Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to complete the
other matters started by Anthony Griffin.
Answer: [0]
QUESTION NO. 21
What sum of money, if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded
to Barbara Schlein against Anthony Griffin because Anthony Griffin's conduct
was committed knowingly or intentionally?
…
Answer: [$5,000.00]
A. The Jury’s Verdict Should Be Disregarded Because Some Evidence
Was Provided of Damages.
Schlein’s expert, Gary Jewell, testified as to his firm’s work directed at
completing the following matters: offered the following testimony as to the reasonable
and necessary fees accrued by Schlein and caused by Griffin’s unconscionable
conduct:
• Matters related to the underlying divorce action: $ 27,962.50 [RR 11 79:14-
23]
• Matters related to the case against homebuilders: $ 9,896.25 [RR 11 81:11-
24]
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• Removal of wrongful lien against unfinished home: $ 2,800.00 [RR 11
81:25-82:11]
• Expunction of arrest record related to divorce: $ 2,481.25 [RR 11 82:12-
19]
• Resolution of tax case related to the house: $7,498.75 [RR 11 82:20-83:3]
The trial court errred in entering judgment for no damages when some evidence
supported Schlein’s claim for damages. The cause should be remanded for a
redetermination of reasonable attorney’s fees.
Generally, if evidence of reasonable attorney's fees is offered, a finding that the
services of an attorney are without monetary value is factually insufficient. First Texas
Sav. Ass'n of Dallas v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Tex.App.—Tyler
1982, no writ).
VIII. Griffin’s Expert Witness, Genevieve McGarvey, Should Not Have Been
Permitted to Testify
The trial court erred in permitting Genevieve McGarvey (“McGarvey”) to testify
regarding whether the fees charged by Griffin in the divorce matter were reasonable
and necessary. At trial, the trial court reversed its previous order striking McGarvey’s
testimony without any showing of good cause by Griffin, or lack of surprise or
prejudice. [RR 3, 12:13-13:6; RR 4, 95:16-20; RR 5, 13:18-19:18 17] The trial court’s
ruling violated both the Rules and its own discovery control order and probably
resulted in rendition of an improper verdict.
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A. Procedural Background
On August 16, 2013, the trial court issued a docket control order (the “DCO”)
requiring experts for all plaintiffs to be designed by August 30, 2013. [CR 1, 85]
Likewise, the DCO set the deadline to designate all other expert witnesses for
September 27, 2013. Id. The DCO also stated the following:
Any party designating a testifying expert witness is ORDERED to
provide no later than the dates set for such designation, the information
set forth in Rule 194.2(f) and a written report prepared by the expert
setting the substance of the experts’ opinions, unless a deposition is taken
of the expert. Any expert not designated prior to the ordered deadlines
shall not be permitted to testify absent a showing of good cause.
Id.
On September 13, 2013, Schlein served her Designation of Expert Witnesses,
which disclosed the information called for by Rule 194.2(f). The designation also
included a 51 page report from Schlein’s expert, Lillian Hardwick. [CR 1, 312]
On September 23, 2013, the trial court entered an amended docket control order
(the “Amended DCO”). The Amended DCO set the deadline for all plaintiffs and all
other parties for September 30, 2013 and October 30, 2013, respectively. [CR 1, 115].
The Amended DCO contained the same disclosure requirements as the DCO, which
are set forth above.
On October 3, 2013, a hearing was held on Schlein’s Motion to Compel
Discovery and the Court extended Griffin’s deadline to designate his experts and
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provide the requisite report required by the Amended DCO until October 31, 2013.
[CR 1, 117; CR 1, 196; CR 2, 851. This October 31, 2013 deadline was never
modified or extended.
On October 8, 2013, Griffin identified Genevieve McGarvey as an expert in his
First Amended Response to Defendant’s Motion for Disclosures. [CR 1, 573-582]
However, Griffin neither disclosed the information required by Rule 194.2(f), nor
produced a report. Id. Instead the designation stated:
Witness can provide testimony with regards to work performed on behalf
of Plaintiff and the issue of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in
context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary fees
in context of the breach of contract and the reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ nature of fees for the representation of Defendant.
[CR 1, 579]
Because Griffin failed to designate McGarvey in compliance with Rule 194.2(f),
as well as the Amended DCO, Schlein filed her Motion to Strike Expert Witnesses on
January 31, 2014. [CR 2, 568] No response to this motion was filed by Griffin. [RR
4, 95:16-96:22].
On March 14, 2014, the trial court heard and granted Schlein’s Motion to Strike
as to experts Greg Enos, Becky Reitz, Marcia Zimmerman, Christopher Beck,
Genevieve McGarvey and Norma Venso. [RR 3, 12:20-13:5; RR 4, 95-96; CR 2, 806]
On April 2, 2014, Griffin served his Second Amended Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Disclosures, which attempted to provide additional disclosures regarding
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McGarvey’s testimony. [CR 2, 814] However, this Second Amended Response was
both late and insufficient. Specifically, McGarvey’s export report attached to the
Second Amended Response failed to identify any amount she claimed was a
reasonable and necessary fee in the underlying divorce proceeding. [CR 2, 822]
On April 7, 2014–155 days after the court ordered deadline, 200 days after
Schlein served its expert reports, and 63 days after Schlein moved to strike Griffin’s
experts–Griffin filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order granting
Schlein’s Motion to Strike the Expert Designation of McGarvey and Norma Venso.
[CR 2, 806; RR 4, 96:21-22]
Schlein filed her response on April 10, 2014[CR 2, 833] Griffin’s Motion to
Reconsideration was never set for hearing.
Nor did Griffin raise the Motion for Reconsideration at the May 2, 2014 pre-
trial conference. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 248. [RR 4, 96:21-97:8] Not until the day before
trial – May 7, 2014 – did Griffin seek to be heard on his Motion to Reconsider. [RR
3, 82:8-86:18; RR 4, 95:10-100:15; RR 5, 4:5-19:18] Despite Schlein’s objections,
he trial court reversed its earlier decision and held that McGarvey was permitted to
testify. [RR 5, 4-8; RR 5, 12-13; RR 5, 16-17]
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B. Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Rules Governing Experts and its Own
Discovery Control Order
The trial court permitted Genevieve McGarvey to testify, despite her untimely
designation and lack of an expert report. Griffin made no showing of good cause for
her untimely disclosures; further, surprise and prejudice is established on the face of
this record. The trial court erred in permitting her to testify.
Parties to a lawsuit are under a duty to make a “complete response, based on all
information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at the time its
response is made.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1. Such responses must be made timely; that
is, “within the time provided by court order or these rules.” Id. Failure to comply
results in automatic exclusion of the evidence or the witness in question, unless the
trial courts finds a) good cause; or b) that the opposing party was not surprised or
prejudiced. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6. The burden is on the offering party, and such a
finding must be supported by the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(b).
The “trial court has no discretion to admit testimony excluded by the rule
without a showing of good cause.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; Good v. Smith Cty.
Judge Baker, 339 S.W.3d 260, 271 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2011, pet. denied). The
burden of establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good
cause must be shown in the record. Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp.,
965 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.–El Paso, 1998, no pet.) (emphasis added). The good
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cause exception “permits a trial court to excuse a failure to comply with discovery in
difficult or impossible circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, Griffin failed to produce any evidence to support a finding of good
cause, or establishing a lack of surprise or prejudice. Griffin’s Motion for
Reconsideration and his argument in the trial court is devoted solely to explaining that,
as long as he provided the material at issue within 30 days of the actual trial date, his
designations and supplementations were timely. [CR 802; RR 4 95:10-100:8] This has
not been the case since the discovery rules were amended in 1999; plaintiffs “can no
longer simply choose to delay disclosure until the last minute.” In re Allied Chem.
Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. 2007)(citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.5 and 193.6).
Griffin’s later attempt to supplement his expert disclosures on April 2, 2014,
also failed to comply with the plain language of Rule 194, which requires disclosure
of the “general substance of the expert mental impressions and opinions and brief
summary of the basis for them,” as well all documents, tangible things, reports,
models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by
or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony.” [CR 2, 818-823] Tex. R.
Civ. P. 194.2(f). Likewise, the report attached to the supplemental disclosures failed
to comply with the Amended DCO and Rule 195.5, which requires “factual
observations, tests, supporting data, calculations, photographs, or opinions of an
expert” to be reduced to tangible form. Schlein’s attorney complained, on the first day
-44-
of trial, that while an “expert report” containing McGarvey’s opinions was delivered
thirty days before trial, the attachments supporting the substance of her testimony were
not. [RR 4 99:3-100:8]
Schlein relied on the trial court’s order striking McGarvey as a witness and,
therefore, suffered surprise and prejudice by the trial court’s change of heart at trial.
In Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court clearly holds that good cause must be
demonstrated by the noncomplying party to provide the trial court with the opportunity
to exercise discretion as to whether the untimely discovery should be admitted.
Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914. Griffin never tried to establish good cause for his
failure to timely produce McGarvey’s report. [RR 4, 99-100; RR 5, 5-17] Because
a showing of good cause is mandatory, the decision to permit McGarvey to testify was
reversible error. The evidence further supports a finding that the inclusion of
McGarvey’s testimony caused the rendition of an improper judgment, as McGarvey
was the only witness designated to testify regarding the reasonableness of Griffin’s
attorneys’ fees in the underlying divorce case. Therefore, the trial court’s decision led
to the rendition of an improper verdict because it provided credence to the amounts
included on Griffin’s invoice, which were otherwise unsubstantiated.
-45-
IX. McGarvey’s Testimony Was Legally Insufficient to Prove that Griffin’s
Fees Were Reasonable
Griffin was required to prove that the attorney’s fees he sought to recover from
Schlein were reasonable. Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Cond. 1.04; Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997). In addition to the requirement of
Rule 1.04, Texas courts have held that “[w]here parties do not expressly agree as to
the amount, the law raises a promise to pay that which is reasonable.” Kurtz v. Kurtz,
158 S.W.3d 12, 18 (Tex. App. 2004)(citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Koenigsberg, 65 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1933, no writ). The court in
Kurtz agreed that, “as a matter of public policy, reasonableness is an implied term in
any contract for attorney’s fees.” Id. The court concluded that their holding was
consistent with Disciplinary Rule 104, governing a lawyer’s fee arrangement with his
clients. Id. at fn. 6.
In Texas, “[t]he issue of reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees requires
expert testimony.” Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422
S.W.3d 821, 830 (Tex. App. 2014). McGarvey was Griffin’s sole witness on the
reasonableness of his fees in the underlying divorce case. Over Schlein’s objection,
McGarvey was permitted to testify. However, her testimony was legally insufficient
to prove that the attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable, as required by
-46-
Disciplinary Rule 1.04, which considers the following factors to determine the
reasonableness of a fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or
uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been
rendered.
Of the 8 above-listed factors, McGarvey offered no evidence of numbers 1, 2,
4, 5 or 8. Moreover, McGarvey’s opinion regarding numbers 3, 6 and 7 was merely
conclusory and not evidence of the reasonableness of the entire fee charged by Griffin.
For the issues McGarvey did mention, her testimony was the classic ipse dixit of a
-47-
credentialed witness, with no support or analysis. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,
235 (Tex. 1999).
Specifically, McGarvey testified that she is familiar with the reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees in Galveston County, but offered little more than a bare
opinion as to the reasonableness of the $300 hourly rate charged by Griffin to Schlein.
[RR 10, 100:11-23 and 101:15-20). At no time did McGarvey testify that a certain
amount of attorney’s fees charged by Griffin were reasonable and necessary. [See
generally RR 10, 94-110]
Instead McGarvey offered irrelevant statements such as, “...[Griffin] spent about
700 days on this file...” (RR 10, 103:15-18). The number of days spent on a file is not
evidence of Griffin’s actual time spent working on the case.
A. No Evidence to Support Jury’s Finding of Damages in Question No. 5
Lastly, McGarvey’s opinion that the time included on Griffin’s bill “was
reasonable and necessary” is conclusory and not competent evidence. Opinion
testimony that is conclusory is not relevant evidence because it does not tend to make
the existence of a material fact “more probable or less probable.” See Tex. R. Evid.
401. McGarvey provides no analysis or underlying facts supporting how the time
spent was reasonable. As such, McGarvey’s testimony is incompetent evidence and
cannot support a judgment awarding Griffin damages for attorney’s fees. [See Supp.
CR 8] See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009); See Cas.
-48-
Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939); Wadewitz v.
Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex.1997).
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
The trial court erred by allowing Griffin, individually, to prosecute this lawsuit.
Griffin’s attempt to cure was ineffective. As such, this court should reverse the
judgment of the trial court and render a take nothing judgment based on Griffin’s lack
of capacity.
The trial court erred by excluding Schlein’s offer of grievances and lawsuits
filed against Griffin, which were admissible for purposes of establishing Schlein’s
affirmative claims against Griffin. Additionally, Griffin opened the door by presenting
evidence that he keep all of his clients informed. Thus, the trial court permitted
Griffin to create a false impression regarding his habits in dealing with clients. The
trial court’s treatment on this hotly contested issue, probably led to the rendition of an
improper verdict.
The trial court erred in permitting undisclosed rebuttal witnesses to testify
regarding Griffin’s routine practice in keeping clients informed. This testimony, when
viewed against the backdrop of the trial court’s previous ruling, probably led to the
entry of an improper judgment.
-49-
The trial court erred in placing the burden on Schlein with respect to her claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. This improper submission probably led to the rendition
of an improper verdict.
The jury’s failure to find breach of fiduciary duty was against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, the evidence conclusively
established Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty.
The trial court erred by excluding evidence, which conclusively established
Griffin’s breach of fiduciary duty. This omission likely led to the rendition of an
improper verdict.
The jury’s finding of zero actual damages, in light of their findings on liability,
is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Alternatively, some
evidence supported Schlein’s actual damages on this issue.
The trial court erred by permitting an expert witness to testify, whose opinions
were not timely disclosed and whose exclusion should have been automatic. Even if
considered, her testimony was incompetent to support the reasonableness of Griffin’s
damages. Her testimony was key, as no other competent evidence supported Griffin’s
recovery of actual damages. This Court should reverse and render a take nothing
judgment.
Appellant Barbara Schlein respectfully requests that this Court reverse the final
judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial, or where
-50-
appropriate, render judgment in her favor, and for all further relief to which she may
be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTIAN , SMITH & JEWELL, LLP
By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr.
Stephen H. Cagle, Jr.
State Bar No. 24045596
scagle@csj-law.com
Heather Panick
State Bar No. 24062935
hpanick@csj-law.com
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 659-7617
Facsimile: (713) 659-7641
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
-51-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument has been forwarded to all counsel of record via the Rules on this the 20th
day of May, 2015
Ms. Norma Venso
830 Apollo
Houston, Texas 77058
Facsimile: (281) 286-9990
Telephone: (409) 789-8661
By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr.
STEPHEN H. CAGLE, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that Appellant’s Brief
contains less than 15,000 words (counting all parts of the document). Specifically,
this brief was prepared using WordPerfect and according to its word-count function,
this document contains 13,696 words. Further, the typeface used in this brief is no
smaller than 14-point, except for footnotes, which are no smaller than 12-point.
By: //s// Stephen H. Cagle, Jr.
STEPHEN H. CAGLE, JR.
-52-
CAUSE NO. 01-14-00799-cv
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN,
Appellant,
vs.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
Appellee.
APPELLANT’S APPENDIX
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
1. Trial Court’s Judgment dated June 30, 2014, CR 3:1249. . . . . . . . . . Tab 1
2. The jury charge and verdict, RR 13:4-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 2
3. November 3, 2009 Retention Agreement, P. Ex. 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 3
4. November 3, 2009 Letter of Explanation, P. Ex. 2.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 4
5. August 5, 2011 Invoice, P. Ex. 147. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 5
6. October 29, 2011 Email, P. Ex. 146. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 6
-53-
7. Anthony P. Griffin Lawyers, Inc. Bankruptcy Petition.. . . . . . . . . . . Tab 7
8. Anthony P. Griffin Original Petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 8
9. C. Vereen Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 9
10. Guzman Grievance File.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 10
11. Reddin Grievance File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tab 11
-54-
TAB 1
001249
CAUSE NO. CV-0069481
IN THE COUNTY COURT
AT LAW N0.2
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiffy
s and Defendant Barbara Schlein appeared and alU1ounced
swom, it heard evidence and ar.f:,'tltnents of counsel.
estions of fact in the case to the jury. In
charge of the court and the verdict oftl
Griffin Lawyers is entitled to recover from Defenda
fees as set forth below.
Barbara Schlein, as follows:
a)
b) The sum of SIXTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUND!f:OUtlX
00/100 DOLLARS ($62,862.00) for reasonable and necj}sa~y ;tto,.; e~ fees. for
preparation and trial; tf~-ti.>;"'' ,r, .x_:;:;;.li~
;;~"·"'~IIY l~l. :::·~K
GAl v-;:·.: :· .· ·i-'~.\S
Ex. 1
NOTICE OF HEARING PAGE 1 00~49
001250
c) Thesumof~USANDAND00/100DOLLARS($15,000.00)intheevent
fa appeal to the Court of Appeals; for reasonable and necessary attorney 1s fees
r representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00) in the event of
an appeal e Supreme Court of Texas for reasonable and necessary attorney's
fees f re esentatlon at the petition for review· stage in the Supreme Court of
T
nterest on the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND EIGHTEEN AND
:JG'-'·~~'''? ($16,018.66).
te est on the total sum awarded at the annual rate of Five Percent
g)
It is further ORDER
from Griffin's unconscionable
rt is further ORDERED, ADJUDGE
enforcement and collection of this Judgment or th
All relief not expressly t;,rranted is denied.
This is a final judgment which disposes of all clait s
SIGNED this <..30 day of June, 2014.
. /·
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY- Defendant ( 1) disagrees with the contt.mJ~J~j~{j~~i«MII:J51'-..,
agrees only to the fonn of this judgment, and (3) plans to appeal this d tttnl' Yn ore,
Defe11dant expr~ssly reserves all rights to modifY or appeal this proposed ju8~lrte · ·,..g r ···Flrsf NaP 5
Bank v. Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d 632,633 (Tex. 1989)
:"'OTICE OF HEARING PAGE2@~50
TAB 2
CAUSE NO. CV~0069481
IN THE COUNTY COURT
v. AT LAW N0.2
B
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
COURT'S CHARGE
THE JURY:
estions about the facts, which you must decide fi·om
l. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the
e given th it testimony, but in matters of law, you must be
additional instructions which
L
2.
case.
3. Since every answer that is required by
state or consider that any required answer · 1
4. You must not decide who you think should win an
questions accordingly. Simply answer the qu ti
concern yourselves with the effect of your answers.
5. You \Vill not decide the answer to a question by a lot ob~""
any other means of chance. Do not return a quotient ve ~ 'ent v · ict
means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reache bx din ' ge er
each juror's figures and dividing by the number of jurors to an era . Do
not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not a
cettain question one way if others will agree to answer another q
way.
Pagel of29
6. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer a question upon the vote of 5 or
o jurors. If you answer more than one question upon the vote of 5 or more
jt rs, the same &rroup of at least 5 of you must agree upon the answers to each of
those questions.
u have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your
ii J the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not
shO\ or · ad your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your
tes ·e not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection
o 1e evi n e and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not
taken tes.
duct is subject to review the same as
it should be found that you have
uct and it may require another trial
When words are used in this charge i a sense
understood, you are given a proper legal definitio
any other meaning.
Answer "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless ot erwise ins
must be based on a preponderance of the evidence un s.s otherlvise . ·tru
find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "Yes'' a1 . then
"preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight a
evidence introduced before you and admitted in this case. W
answer other than "Yes" or "No," your ans,ver must be base
evidence unless otherwise instructed.
A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstm ia
fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary ev
who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is establish
evidence \Vhen it may be fairly and reasonably infened from other facts prove .
If you answer questions about damages, answer each question separa ely. Do not
increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of the instructions in or your answers to
any other questions about damages. Do not speculate about what any party's ultimate recovery
Page 2 of29
may or may not be. Any recovery will be detennined by the court when it applies the la\v to
- time of judgment. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.
er ou retire to the jury room you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing
esi · gjuror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will deliberate
ur answers to the stions asked.
3.
4.
5. in the space provided; and
6.
r~[l n
u
rc=~ [[")
L~~~ LU
01-~-
1 MAY Z3 2014
!!WVIGHT () SUt UV/\N G()UU1Y ClCRK .,
By \
Ol'-'lLVt::STON CO., T(£1(/\$
\;
•
Page 3 of29
QUESTION NO. 1
ar 'ra Schlein fail to comply with the tem1s of the agreement for legal services
er 3, 2009, between her and Anthony P. Griffin d/b/a A Griffin Lawyers?
Page 4 of29
QUESTION NO.2
Griffin fail to comply with the agreement for legal services dated
The circumstances to consider in detennining
c.
d. t the party failing to perform or to offer to perfonn will cure his
· o ace unt the circumstances including any reasonable
e.
Answer "Yes" or6'{Q~ )
ANSWER: ;VC)
-'------~ ...
Page 5 of29
If you ans\vered "Yes" to both Question 1 and Question 2, then answer the fol!O\ving question.
Otherwise, do 1swer the following question.
QUESTION NO.3
with the Agreement Hrst?
Page 6 of29
If you answered ''Yes" to Question 1, then ans\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not
answer the toll :v1 g question.
QUESTION NO.4
's failure to comply excused?
arhara Schlein is excused if compliance is waived by Anthony
it is excused if the following circumstances occurred:
1.
a. false representation or concealed
h. kno\vledge or infom1ation that
d . cover the facts, and p... o
c. in would rely on the false
et ·n ac '1 or deciding not to act; and ~''"·
2.
a.
b.
of material f~tcts. 1t ·
Failure to comply \:vith one agreement is agr~ that a new
agTeement would take its place. ;<"
Failure to comply \Vith a tenn in an agreement is ex~""""-~
term would take its place. ,u>
_,.,"""-~ ~----\
Answer "Yes" or(N()_:}
ANSWER: _ _c_.JJ_o_._ _
Page 7 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, then atlS\ver the following question. Otherwise, do not
answer the foll 'I g question
for economic damages is subject to federal
QUESTION NO. 5
, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
iffin Lawyers, for his damages, if any, that resulted from such
nents of damages, if any, and none other.
a
ANSWER:
b.
Page 8 of29
If you ans,:vered "Yes" to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not
ans,ver the toll vi question
QUESTION NO. 6
'ona nd necessary attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the
atter ' m eel but not finished by Anthony Griffin.
b. neces · ry attorney's fees and costs incurred to complete the
ut n 1ished by Anthony Griffin.
ANSWER:
Page 9 of29
QUESTION NO. 7
What is a r , sot ' 1e fee for the necessary services of Anthony P. Griffin's attorney in this case,
stated i c ol ' s and cents?
must be considered in detennining the reasonableness of an
•
•
•
•
•
• ""'...,+-..:'. n results obtained or uncertainty of
en ·endered.
A. For preparation
, and trial.
ANSWER:
.~, ( J (} 2., lc/I
-~-J:).-1 / () , ;
B. For an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
-+,'
ANSWER: +ls~ooo
C. For an appeal to the Supreme Comt of Texas
J,
ANSWER: ~) 251 {)00
Page 10 of29
If you ans\vered "Yes'' to Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not
\Vi g question.
QUESTION NO. 8
for each of the following:
a.
b.
c. in the Supreme Court of Texas.
d.
ANSWER: _--~:.r-2\J_,If--'-'/-'-'\_ _ __
e. For representation through oral ar
the Supreme Court ofTexas.
)\11 A
ANSWER: ---------1-------------
Page 11 of29
QUESTION NO. 9
ar , ·a Schlein substantially rely to her detriment on Anthony Griffin's promise, if
1is reliance foreseeable by Anthony Griffin?
Page 12 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 9, then answer the following question. Othenvise, do not
answer the foil v1 ' question.
QUESTION NO. 10
if any, if paid now in cash, \vould fairly and reasonably compensate
ages, if any, that resulted from her reliance on Anthony Griffin's
Do not
a. and cents for damages, if any.
b. and costs incuned to complete the
ny Griffin.
c.
ANSWER: ---'-f'-'-,j +'-j
}.-'-·,_ _ _ __
Page 13 of29
QUESTION NO. 11
ny Griffin fail to comply with his fiduciary duty to Barbara Schlein?
arbara Schlein's attomey, Anthony Grift1n owed Barbara Schlein a fiduciary duty.
fiin failed to comply with his fiduciary duty, Barbara Schlein must
r 1sactions and actions in question were not fair and equitable to
arba1 chlein; or Y
use of the conf1dences that
c.
d.
e. important
~
Answer "Yes" or "~"'L~·~
ANswER: tic;
Page 14 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 11, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not
answer the fo11 ~'1 question.
QUESTION NO. 12
if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct?
In answering
or reduce the amount
a.
ANSWER: _________i_'!J-_
1
;_4------~
b.
ANSWER: _ __.:..:../V+/--A-_ _ _ __
c.
Page 15 of29
d. the difference between the sales price of Barbara Schlein's house located at 1628
·nt '·prise Avenue at foreclosure and the value of the house if repairs had been
e because of the filing of an insurance claim.
" means the emotional pain, torment and suffering
bara Schlein.
Page 16 of29
QUESTION NO. 13
ny Griffin commit fraud against Barbara Schlein?
Fraud occurs when:
a party makes a material misrepresentation, and
the misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or
made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a
positive assertion, and\
the misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be
ted onby the other party, and
1e ther party relies on the misn~presentation and thereby suffers
g.
h. a result of acting without
a.
b.
c.
cl.
Answer "Yes" or{'No.
'• ~'::.~·.,
ANSWER: /VO
Page 17 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question I 3, then answer the follmving question. Otherwise, do not
answer the toll vr g question.
QUESTION NO. 14
. if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
ges, if any, that resulted ti·om such fi·aud'?
n answ .m' uestions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase
1c ans\ver because of your answer to any other question about
ut what any party's ultimate recovery may or may not be. Any
recovery will be le court when it applies the la\v to your answers at the time of
judgment. De ot ' d any amo n for interest on damages, if any.
a.
b.
c. the amount of reasonable and n · ess y at
Barbara Schlein having to hire new
by Anthony Griffin.
' I /,1
ANSWER: /l,; /!
/
d. mental anguish sustained f}·om November 3, 2009 to
"Mental anguish" means the emotional pain, tom1
experienced by Barbara Schlein.
ANSWER: ----'-/_'\;+'/_,_~/'-!_____
I
Page 18 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 13, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not
answer the fall vt g question.
QUESTION NO, 15
if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
ges, if any, that were proximately caused by such fraud?
ANSWER: ------~~~
Nil\.~.-----------
b.
ANSWER: N(A
c. the amount of reasonable and necessary attorn·
Barbara Schlein having to hire new attorneys to co1
by Anthony Griffin.
ANSWER: -----'--f\-'+-J/J._A___.
I
d. mental anguish sustained fi'om November 3, 2009 to date.
" ental anguish" means the emotional pain, tonnent and suffering
experienced by Barbara Schlein.
Page 20 o£29
Answer the following question only if you unanimously ans\:vered "Yes" to Question 11
or Question I 3 1erwise, do not answer the follo-wing question.
o a ver "Yes" to any pmi of fhe following question, your answer must be unanimous.
ay nswer ''No" to any part of the following question only upon a vote of 5 or more jurors.
0 1er •Jse, you must not a , wer that part of the following question.
QUESTION NO. 16
and convincing evidence that the hann to Barbara Schlein resulted
con rin ~ing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that
b ief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be
nt by Anthony Griffin to cause substantial injury or
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
g.
h.
Ans\ver "Yes" or "No."
Page 21 of29
QUESTION NO. 17
nt ny Grift1n engage in any false, misleading) or deceptive act or practice that
·n relied on to her detriment and that was a producing cause of damages to Barbara
b. agreement confers or involves rights that it did not
)
c. s rvices with intent not to sell them as advetiised, or
d.
,/"""__.-~-~- ,\
..
"'--~ v '
Answer "Yes" or~~'tJc::C?:;:'j
ANSWER: No
Page 22 of29
QUESTION NO. 18
1y Griffin engage in any unconscionable action or course of action that was a
·e of damages to Barbara Schlein?
, use" means a cause that was a substantial factor in
bringin .. ab t the damages, if any, and without which the
ould not have occurred. There may be more than one
OWIOH·r D !lULUVAN
GALVESl ON CO , ~
f)·~£)~-h~~!M)?dj
Page 23 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question.
Otherwise, do t , 1swer the following question.
QUESTION NO. 19
engage in any such conduct knowingly or intentionally'?
vin y" means actual awareness of the falsity, unH1irness, or
ce · 'eness of the act or practice on which a claim for damages
ased. ctual awareness may be inferred if objective
ation · dicate that a person acted with actual awareness.
e in any such conduct intentionally?
In answering this question, consider only
of damages
.... to Barbara Schlein .
Answer '(Yes~) or "No."
'~~ ·-''".<"
Page 24 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 17 or Question 18, then answer the following question.
Otherwise, do 1 · , 1swer the following question.
QUESTION NO. 20
a.
ANS\VER:
b.
ANSWER:
c. the amount of reasonable and n
Barbara Schlein having to hire ne\v
by Anthony Griffin.
L,
ANS\VER: - - - -I- ·
Page 25 of29
If you answered "Yes" to Question 19, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not
answer the toll v1 question.
QUESTION NO. 21
Vhat sum of mon" if any, in addition to actual damages, should be awarded to Barbara
G .. 'fin because Anthony Griffin's conduct was committed knowingly
Page 26 of29
If you answered ''Yes" to Question 17, then answer the tbllowing question. Othenvise, do not
QUESTION NO. 22
fee for the necessary services of Barbara Schlein's attorney in this
esentation and representation in the trial court.
b.
c. 11 or review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER:
d.
e. For representation through or 1 ·
the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER: N fl1
I
Page 27 of29
Answer the following question regarding Anthony Griffin only if you unanimously answered
"Yes" to Que o 16 regarding Anthony Griffin. Otherwise, do ncrf..mswer the following
question re rdi Anthony Griffin.
QUESTION NO. 23
that you must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of
any, should be assessed against Anthony Griftin and awarded to
ar :tages for the conduct found in response to Question 16?
1 cans any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of
atory puq)oses. Exemplary damages include punitive damages.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
propriety.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANS WER: _ ____,t'--,}!--{A_·_ _
1
Page 28 of29
Certificate
1e ry, have answered the above and foregoing questions as herein indicated, and
1 the same into court as our verdict.
PRESIDIN JUR · m - - - -
~~~d ~\\~t- ------
Printed Name of the Presiding Juror
Jurors' Printed Names
___.,~~=~;d ~~~~--
Page 29 of29
TAB 3
November 3, 2009
' CONTRACTUAL AG~EEMENT
Parties to Agreement
This is to authorize A GRIFFIN LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
INC., hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act
as lawyers for the undersigned, BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN,
hereinafter and sometimes referred to as CLIENT(S), relative to
.all matters concerning the divorce/family related matter/civil
issues .(tort issues) in a matter styled In the Matter of the
Marriage of Barbara Regina Schlein and Robert Schlein; In the
County Court at Law, No. 2; Galveston County, Texas; Cause No.
08FD2371.
You are Hiring Us to Do What?
1. To investigate your case to determine the viability of
the case.
2. To advise· you as to the viability of same.
3. To work with you wi'th respect to your case including
appearing on your behalf before any corporation,
official, board, department, administrative body or to
ll.l!!l!l!~P~LA~fNTf!!!!!!FP!!S..."
l EXHIBIT
~ l
fiie suit and in any Court (Federal or State), if
necessary and if warranted.
Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't?
.1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be
rendered to client by the said law firm, the cl~ent
agrees to pay $35,000.00 (normal retainer $10,000.00 -
$25,0DO.OO) as a retainer fee. 1
2. The retai?er is based upon the history of the
litigation,, substituting in with a pending matter
{mentioned above) and the firm's obligation to make
sense of the disparate parts of the above matter and
other related matters (amending pleadings, joining
claims), etc.
2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire A GRIFFIN
~AWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, INC., LAWYERS. As stated
in the oral interview, the retainer herein and
attorneys' fees are structured with the reputation of
the firm, the related matters necessary to process the
family matter (tort allegations by Petitioner and/or on
behalf of the minor child), consistent with the
1
Currently Petitioner is under an order of the Court that prevents the
expenditure of funds without the approval of the Court. No payment of fees
will take place unless and until the Court approves the payment of the
retainer amount and/or an order is entered releasing the injunction overbroad
scope (can be interpreted to include separate property of Petitioner) . The
attorneys anticipate filing a motion with the Court to address the broadness
of the order and/or releasing of funds to pay the subject retainer.
concept of reasonable attorney's fees based upon the
complexity of the issues at hand. The retainer is also
based on the consideration for this office not taking
other cases (time spent).
3. Said retainer is non-refundable. This means that once
the fee is paid, it shall be deemed earned. This does
not mean that the retainer represents the total
attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein) .
4. This retainer fee should not be interpreted as
constituting the full reasonable fee to which the
Lawyers may be entitled for services performed pursuant
··. to an award of the Court or settlement.
( •'
Attorney·Fee Determination
The determination of attorneys' fees shall be made as
follows:
1. The attorney will keep time records in this matter and
will not bill for any additional work unless and until
the services rendered exceed the retainer amount.
2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate
ranges from $250.00 to $500.00 an hour in the civil
rights arena. The rate depends on the nature of the
case, the tasks to be performed, the reputation of the
,r-· lawyers, and other factors defined by the relative
(
~--
case law and the civil rights industry/arena/practice.
The hourly rate for Anthony P. Griffin will be billed
at $300.00 an hour; associate attorneys will be billed
at $150.00 an hour.
Cost - We Will Front Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise.
How Do We Get Our Money Back?
Costs are the Client 1 S obligation, but the firm will front
cost and bill for the costs. 2 Costs reimbursement is due and
payable thirty (30) days from any such billing.
Guarantees - None
There are no guarantees held out with respect to the
results of this litigation.
·· .
( •.
(_ 2
Again, this is subject to approval of the Court and/or removal of the
overbroad language affecting one's separate property.
Withdrawal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract
1. Withdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obligation to
represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the
law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when
material representation surfaces or where there is a
breach of the terms of this contract by the Client, to
withdraw from the representation of the Client.
Nothing in this contract guarantees any results,
including whether a suit will or will not be filed or
any other matters that border on guarantees. The only
guarantee relates to the representation within the
confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(zealously within the bounds of the law). It has been
explained orally that the Lawyers' obligation to the
Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and
examination of the facts.
2. Investigation/If No Case: If the facts reveal no case
exists, the Lawyer shall promptly advise the client and
terminate the relationship. The retainer again is non-
·refundable.
3. Investigation/Material Breach: If the investigation
reveals a material breach, lie, or misstatement by the
client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how
(
''-~··
such breach affects the Lawyer's ability to proceed in
the representation. If termination is appropriate, the
Lawyer(s) shall advise the client of her rights and
shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the
Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights.
Again, the retainer shall be deemed non-refundable.
Privilege of Firm
It shall be the exclusive privilege of Lawyers to determine
when and where suits shall be filed. Again, Lawyers retain the
discretion whether to obligate the office in the appeal process.
Compromise
No compromise or settlement of Client's claims will be rnade
·-..·. without the consent of both Client and Lawyers.
( ,.
Power of Attorney
Lawyers are hereby granted full authority to sign all legal
instruments, pleadings, drafts, authorizations and papers that
shall be reasonably necessary to conclude settlement and/or
reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value
due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in
person.
('..
......~
Keeping the Client Informed
Lawyers agree to produce copies of documents as related to
this litigation and to keep the client fully informed.
Venue Lies in Galveston County
All sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston
County, Texas.·
~GCi~D AGREED to on this the ____ day of
--~.~--------L----~~------1 2009.
BARBAR~ REGINA SCHLEIN
2106 PLEASANT PALM CIRCLE
c LEAGUE CITY, TEXAS 77573
832.738.6047
EIYIA.IL: brsChlein@msn. com
SIGNED~ AGREED to on this the~~y of
-id)"---_D~V-----'--}_, 2 oo9 .
~HONY~
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
1115 MOODY
GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102
EMAIL: agriffin@agriffinlawyers.com
c :word. schlein_barbara_retain9r_,cont:ract.
~.1!"-··.. ·
(
NOTICE OF CLIENTS
The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes
professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys .
. Although not every complaint against or dispute with a
lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar
Office of General Counsel will provide you with information
about how to file a complaint.
For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is
a toll-free phone call.
TAB 4
.. ~ .................
A GRIFFIN V. WYERS
Galveston island
Galveston, Texas 77550
November 3, 2009
Barbara Regina Schlein
2106 Pleasant Palm Cixcle
League City, Texas 77573
RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371i IN THE Y~TTER OF THE
MARRIAGE OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT
JOHN .SCHLEINi IN THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW, NO. 2;
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
(EXPLANATION OF CONTRACT AND LETTER AGR.EEMENT)
Ms. Schlein:
. Please find attached the contract b:f employment. This
letter is designed to explain our agreement and course of
action, Please note the following:
• contr-~otrelates to Family Matters but
Contemplates Amending Complaint. The contract
relates to the family matter but contemplates
adding claims and/or amending the pleading to
address the abuse allegations the fraud in the
marriage (forgery and misappropriation of
identification that is the subject of pending
criminal litigation. The retainer is set at an
amount that it is anticipated that no additional
fees will be charged.
• Separate Lawsuits t:h.at will be filed at tlle time
of substitution and/or prior to sUbstitution. :r:t
is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be
brought against the builder at or near the
sW:>stitution. It is my belief the builder should
be placed in a position of. payment for his breach
of contract and that the house. We can bring the
lawsuit and add your spouse and a necessary
P~ltmFF'S
I' EXHI~IT
I _2;;;:;.___
A separate contract will be drawn for this
purpose; no retainer is contemplated (continge~t
fee}.
• Separate Lawsuits that will be filed at the tixne
of substitution and/or prior to substitution. It
is contemplated that a separate lawsuit will be
brought against your spouse for the discovered
abuse of minor child. It is my belief a separate
lawsuit broadens the playing field and makes the
other side defend outside of the divorce and
Dibrell's court. Of course there will be an
attempt to move the matter back to the divorce
court, but it is my belief that the action of
your child is an independent action. A separate
contract will be drawn for this purpose; no
retainer is contemplated (contingent fee}.
• Unsure and will need to research the Reitz. I am
currently unsure on the breach of fiduciary
lawsuit. The grievance matter can be addressed
by obtaining a grievance form. After learning
the file better, I will supplement and advise.
(
'· ·.
.'
....._;.... ..·'
If you have any questions, please inform.
Sincerely,
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Moody
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
Encl. -Contract of Employment
HAND DELIVERED
fr-.. c:wora.schlein_barbara.client_transmittal
~->-·- ...··
TAB 5
A GRIFFIN LA WYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
August 5, 2011
Barbara Regina Schlein
P. o. Box 1061
League City, Texas 77574
RE: CAUSE NUMBER 08FD2371; IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE
OF BARBARA REGINA SCHLEIN AND ROBERT JOHN SCHLEIN; IN
THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2i GALVESTON COUNTY,· TEXAS
BARBARA SCHLEIN V. ROBERT SCHLEIN, BILL DE LA GARZA,
DAVID M. OUALLINE AND BILL DE LA GARZA & ASSOCIATESi
IN THE 212TH JUDICJ:AL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY 1
TEXAS; CASE NO. 10CV0344
CAUSE NO. 10CV1237; BARBARA SCHLEIN V. CENTRE
INTEREST, INC. D/B/A CENTRE BUILDERS V. ROBERT
SCHLEIN; ,IN THE 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; GALVESTON
COUNTY TEXAS
I
(BILLING STATEMENT)
Ms. Schlein:
This· is our billing statement with respect to the family
case. I have exercised billing discretion and have not billed
for telephone conferences, interviews or normal transmittal of
information to the client and postage (this cost under normal
circumstances would add another $30,000.00 to one's bill).
I am setting out the work performed and then setting our
proposal associated with the fee statement. It has been a
challenge and pleasure to have represented your interest.
Our statement of time and task is as follows:
I' • PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
I 147
r-·-------.------------- -.---------------------.---
Date Task/Function Time Expended
~·3.:1009 Letter addressed to 2.0
client contract of
employment; contract of
employn1ent; discussion
of other lawsuit
11.05.2009 Beck's "sup'f•ll;m.;ntal 2.0
production of documents;
revie1w
Letter to client
-
11.23.2009
tramsmitting mediator
responsive documents;
:aec!k' s supplemental
orc,duct:ion
12.04.2009
!-''-----
:Getter to client ·--·-o-
transmitting Beck's
letter; retrieving file
and De La Garza's
request for new
mediation
12.18.2009
- Lette:c t:o "'Client with -0--
respect to protective
order hearing for
.2.17.2010 and
cancellation of
'·., deposition
( .. ·
~·------
12.20.2009 Work on l?etitioneJ:' s
Motion f<:>:t' Summary
4.0
.rudgment
12. 21.2009 ~ork on Petitioner's 5.0
111otion to Withdraw
Funds; I?et.itioner' s
Second Junended Petition;
tJ:ansmi t tal to court
12.28.2009 Lett.er t:o client; -0-
-· --
transmittal of affidavit
12.31.2009 -- Letter to client; -o ..
mediation date for
:1..27.2010
01.04. 2010 - •rra:nsmittal to -0-
-
d:i.ent/pro!ecti ve order
01.11.2010 -- Letter to client;
hearing on motion to
withdraw funds hearing
set for January 25, 2010
01.10.2010 Work on ll'rit of mandamus 12.0
and mot:lon to stay
01.11.2010 Work on w:ri t of mandamus 10.0
and motion to stay
01.12.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0 --
anq motion to stay
01.13.2010 Work on writ of mandamus 12.0
and m~_!:.ion to st~L_ ____
~-13.2010 Transmitt.al of wr:i.t of
-----
··0··
--------
mandamus to client -
01.19.2010 Work on Petitioner's 5.0
Motion for Summary
Judgment; transmittal to ..
court
02.08.2010 Work on PetitioneJ:' s 3.0
Motion to Disqualify
Counsel; t1·ansmi ttal to
court
03.28.2010 Work on motion in 3 .o
opposition to
appointmer.1t of :~:·eceiver
03.29.2010 Lette:r to client/refund -0-
of Lillian Hardwick;
transmittal hearing date
for de novo hearing and
opposing second amended
motion for appointment
of receiver
04.05.2010 Transmittal of letter to 8,0
client/appointment of
receiver date moved;
preparation of writ of
mandamus/court of
cLppeals
04.06.2010 Preparation of writ of - 10.0
mandamus
·...
Preparation of writ and s.o
( _ ..
04.07.2010
transmittal
04.14.2010 Amendmemt to mandamus 3.0
04.12.2010
- Transmittal of letter to -0-
client/new hea.ring date
on. motion for
enforcement
04.21.2010
·------....
Review and transnli ttal 1.0
of ruling on mandamus
05.04.2010 Preparation and 8.0
transmittal of writ of
- mandamus Supreme court
05.11.2010 Transmittal of inventory -o-
found in the file
05.24.2010 Transmittal to client -o-
copy of order and
respondent's motion to
compel
05.15 . .2010 work on mandamus to s.o
Texas Supreme Court
05.16.2010 Work on mandamus appeal 8.0
to supreme court
05.17.~!010 I
Work on mandamus appeal
to su12reme Court
8.0
05.24. ~lOlO 'l'ransmitta.l to client
- 1----
-0-
copy of order and
respondent's motion to
compel
06.03.2010 Transmittal to client; 4.0
--
3
---- confirmation of. filing;
(~
hearing and preparation
·...... for hearing
07.06.2010 Transmittal to -0-
client/confi:t'mation. of
payment of
vendorjch.ristopher Beck
~-.07.2010 Transmittal of notice ··0-
from SupremE~ Court
-
07.10.2010 Work on supplemental 8.0
diSC!OVery
07.11.2010 -------- Work on supplemental 10.0
----------
discovE!J:'7f response
07.20.2010
-- Letter t,;, 2.0
clie:nt/Schlein' s Motion
:Eor S~t.nctions and Second
Notice of Deposition on
Written Questions to
Custodian of Investment
Center; r-eview of
documents
08.03.2010 - Transmittal of 3.0 --
Responde:n.t 1 s M'otion for
Preferential Settinsr and
c:c,nfirmation of mc,tion
for sanctions; review of
Respondent's Response to
·· .. Motion for Sanctions
( ... ' f
(interim attorney's feE!Sl
issue)
~-09.2010 Transmittal of motion ---- l.O --
for jury trial setting
an~ pcLyment of jury fee
08.13.2010 Transmittal t.o client; -0-
hea:dng trm1script of
06.03.2010
09.27.2010
--------- -----------
Order tra.n.srni t taJ. denial -·0-
--
of Emergency
~~~oti on/Texas Supreme
Court
09.30.2010
-- f-•Transm~tta
' 1 of response 4.0
to mandamus pending
before court of appeals;
:t:"eview o:E J=esponse;
preparation of
Petitioner's Emergency
Motion to Allow
Expenditure Clf Separate
Prope:t:tv F~!!lds _
10.22.2010 Review of suppl-ement 3.0
documents submitte:d by
Respondent; t.ra_TL~Hni t tal
to client
10.26.2010 Supreme COUl"t 1 S order -{)-
denying disqualification
'------------- of cotunsel/Supreme
--------------------- -- ---
4
- Court's decision;
transmittal information
to client
11.24.2010 Transmittal of answer -0-
and cross-claim/Robert
Schlein
12.01.2010 Petitioner's Motion to 3.0
Recuse/preparation and
fil:i.l:lg
01.0'7.20H '!'ransmi t tal letter to -o-
client/ruling and
referral of
Admiliistrative
Judge/motion to recuse
01.20.20U Petitioner's Motion for 4.0
Reconsideration Special
Exceptions to
Petitioner's Second
Amended Petition and
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of
Court's Denial to Allow
Expenditure of Flmds
from the SeparatE~
Property Account b'unds
of Pe1:itionl3r
-- 1-'---·-----------
. --ol-"2 4 . 2 011 Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of
3.0
C·' Interim Attorney's Fees
Award and Motion for
Preferential Setting
01.31.2011 Petitioner's Second 1.5
Amended
Peti~ion/revision
0.2.21.2011 Preparation and amended 1.5
-
petition/Petitioner's
'I'h.ird Amended Petition
------
02.23.2011
~-
Letter to Court -0-
Coordinator with respect
to proposed order
02.25.2011 Letter to client; 1.5
amended motion to
appoint and receiver;
work on amended response
to appointment of
receiver
02.28.2011 Let tel: to client; plBa
of intervention
03.04.2011
- Transmit t:;d of Schlein's
----- -0-
motion t:o continue
03.10.2011 -- 1-· •
NotJ.ce o f h E~ar~ng;
. -0-
transmittal
03.18.2011 !?reparation and 5.0
Hearing/motion to
continue
04.14.2011 Review and transmittal 4.0
------- '--·----------- ----
5
,---------------------- ------------------------
of 9 02 Notice of ll':LlinHEl
------------.----------
of J'J? Morg·an Records
r---
04.25.2011
-----------r-::------
•.rransmi ttal of letter to
---·
-0-
client; reset of
pretrial conference for
5.06.~~011
05.02.2011
---
Transmittal of lE:.tter to
----- -0-
cliemt; :Rule l l
J~greem-.mt/Inventory and
Appraisement;
Respondent's Special
E;,.:ceptions and Notice of
Deposition; Barbara
Re1gi.na Schlein
05.03.2011
- -- Transmittal of -- -0-
Respondent's Amended
Answer to Petitioner's
Third Amended Petition
05.06.2011 Pretrial conference 2.0
5.0.9.2011
- Work on inventory
5.10.2011 Work on inventory; - 3.0
6.0
deposition of Robert
Sc:hlein
Work Oil invtilltory
~·~ ~~~ ~~~~1
2.0
Depe~sition of Barbara 6.0
Regina Schlein; Helen
Stewart 'l'ruscott;
preparation f. or
depositic•n.
f--·-------------
05.13.2011 Trai.lsmit.t'S.ia£___ -0-
Responder~.t' s
Supplemental Answer to
Production and
Re:;rponde:r.t' s Inventory
and Appraisement
05.13.2011
- Preparation for 1:a. o
l?et.J.tione:r" s First.
Amended lV!otion. for
r~:i.mine and Petitioner's
Er..hi.bit List
--- n
---
05. J..4 .20].1
05.15.2011
----------- r-;,
1\
\\
II
\\
8.0
8.0
-
05.17.2011 ?reparation and Hearing 5.0
on Motion for
Appointment of Receiver
-05.18 .2011 Notice of Conflicting -o-
Setting
05.20.2011 I?:r:eparation a."l.d filing 12.0
Petitione:r·r s Fourth
Amended Petition and
preparation for t:dal
Prepar;;ltion fo:c tr.·ial 12.0
05.21.2011
05.22.2011 Pre;earat.!on for trial 15.0 --
- •rrial ].5. 0
05.23.2011
05.24.2011
- ----- •rrial- 12.0
- -----
6
r· '·
05.25.2011
05.26.2011
05.27.2011
Trial
Trial
Trial
-
12.0
12.0
12.0
06.10.2011
---
Petitioner's Motion for 8.0
Entry of Final Judgment
and Propo~ed Division of
_¥roperty
-
06.20.2011 Respondent's Motion to 4.0
Disregard Jury Findingsi
J:eview and transmittal
06.27.2011 Transmittal and review 2.0
of Respondent's Proposed
Division
Total hours work expended= 352.5
Billable hours x $250.00 an hour
'l'otal amount = $88,125.00
Copy costs $18, 000.00 2
Cost ( s) $4,399.29 2
Total bill including attorneys' fees and costs =
···...
$110,524.29
( ~·· '
; Discounted amount of fees $8lr000.00 3
l. Total number of pa.ges 120,000 paHes x.l!'i a page; internal costs billed in-
house.
2
Charles Cannon $75.00
Galveston [Clerk of Court] $37.25
Galveston [Clerk of Court] $200.00
Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 3.00
Galveston [Clerk of Court] $104.00
Galvestcm [Clerk of Court] $ 16.00
Galveston [Clerk of Court] $ 30.00 [jury fee]
Subpoena fees $130.00
First court of Appeals $250.00 [wJ:its]
Supreme Court $250.00
Sandra L. Powell $1,630.00
Sandra L. Powell $ 475.00
Bank of America $528.15
Jl? Morgan $4.77.95
Stephanie Me Clure $192.94
3
The following cases are not being bille:d, to-wit: Civil litigation pending
in the Justice of the Peace Court (Bank of America v. Barbara Schlein (you
prevailed in this litigation) (normal fee ($3,500.00); State of Texas v.
Barbara Schlein, M\mic:lpal Court City of Manvel {you prevailed in this
litigation) (normal fee ($500.00}; State of Texas v. Austin Reed (League
City, Texas) (normal fee ($500. 00}; State of Te:r.:a~ v. Barbara Schlein, County
Criminal Court, Hal:ris Cmmty (n.OJ.."TTIal fee $7,500.00}; County of Galveston, et
7
.,
Total including discounted fees $103,383.29
Total discounted bill (discounting fees and costs)
~ $95,000.00 [amount d'Ue]
The relevant. documents confirming the payment of the
subject fees and/or costs are enclosed. If you have any
questions, please inform.
Sincerely,
/S/ Anthqny P. Griffin
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
Encl (s). - Bills/confirmation of paymEmt, etc.·
EMAIL TR.ZillSMISSION AND REGULAR l\1AIL
c:word.schlein_barbara.billing_statement
(~. or- ----------
al. v. Barbara Schleln (tax suits) (normal fee $5,000 - $10,000.00). This is
roughly $22,000.00- $25,000.()0 in feE~s nc•t billed).
8
TAB 6
Gmatl- demand tor payment/close ofbusmess on Tuesday, November ll LUll rage 1 or t
Anthony Griffin
demand for payment/close of business on Tuesday, November
1,2011
1 message
Anthony Griffin Sat,Oct29,2011 at10;03AM
To: Barbara Schlein
Ms. Schlein:
Please accept this email as confirmation of the termination of our services for non-payment of fees. Your statement
seeking to pay $50,000.00 for our work Is unacceptable. Your actions to hide funds to make them non-accessible for the
payment of fees is intolerable. Your statements challenging my representation are insulting but are consistent with your
previous actions associated with your underlying intent.
Please accept this our demand for payment of attorney's fees and costs ($95,000.00). If we do not receive a cashier's
and/or certified check on or before the close of business Tuesday November 1, 2011 to pay both fees and costs
incurred on your behalf, we will take actions, without future noti~ to protect our interest. Ariy future action taken
will encompass additional fees and costs associated with your non-payment (roughly an additional $75,000.00).
If payment Is not made, please note we anticipate undertaking the following to protect our interest:
1. A motion to the trial court in the family case to set aside the v~rdict; we will do so In the form of a motion for _
Intervention and motion for new tried as an adverse party (allegation fraud on the court and the hiding of assets). We will
work to unwind the agreement (and thus unwind the transactions at the Investment Center; fraud will vitiate any such
transactions undertaken and place the matter before the trial court to start all over again);
2. We will retain and secure the tile in the warehouse until the motion is decided by the Court. We will not release any
property until after the motion is decided by the Court;
3. We will bring on Wednesday of this week a lawsuit In the District Court with respect to our fees and costs. We will
copy all parties in the other litigation in order to put them on notice of our lien and the dispute in question. We will sue for
the non-discounted amount of fees and costs and not the discounted version (see previously billing statement of August
5, 2011 ). You have a copy of that bill and we have discussed the same {roughly $209,399.29 is non-discounted fees and
costs will be the subject of the suit to recover~ due and owing to our firm).
3. We will file motions to withdraw on the following cases, to-wit: i) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein, in the County
Court at Law, No.3, Galveston County, Texas; U) Barbara Schlein v. Robert Schlein and Bill Qe La Garza, in the 212th
Judicial District Court; Galveston County, Texas; iii) Ex Parte Barbara Schlein (expunction proceeding in Houston,
Texas); iv) tax case pending in Galveston County; v) Barbara Schlein v. Centre Bu!!ders!Davjd Flores, in the 10th Judicial
District Court; Galveston County, Texas. The m.otionswlll be on file by Wednesday ofthis week. On the Flores matter
we will appear and obtain a trial setting In April/May 2012. We will file a lien In Flores matter In order to retain our
interest; we will not waive our contingent fee in that case.
I wfll tender your file on or before December 1; 2011. You should make arrangements to travel to Galveston to retrieve
the files. There are approximately thirty boxes of materials, therefore you should have a vehicle large enough to obtain
all materials at one time. Any future interaction will be by fax, email or letter.
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
.
•·1·.·•·__ PLAitmFF'S
EXHIBIT
https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=35e2c7523a&view=Dt&a=barbata%20schlein&as ... 11/4/~11
TAB7
Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 3
0 Health Care Business 0 Chapfor7 0 Chapter IS Petition for
0 IndiVidual (iowludes Joint Debtors) D Single Asset Real Estate as dct.ned In 0 Chaptor9 Recognllion or a Foreign
S"" Exillblt Don pag~ 2 r>ftlrl$form. I 1 U.S.C. § IOl(SlB) li2l Chapter I I Main Proceeding
i!'J Corporation (Includes LLC and LLP) D Railroad 0 Chapter 12 0 Chapter IS Pelition for
0
8 Partne!sh!p
Other (lfdeblftbe Unltcd States § I 0 I (8) as ulncurred by an bi!Siness debts.
aGainst debtor is pending: Code (the lntemnl Revonue Code). Individual prlmarlly for a
personal, family, or
household
Cbe~ko b"Q;:
Pull Filing Fee ottocbed. obtor is a small bualness debtor as deflned In II U.S.C. § 101(51D).
Debtor Is nota small business debtor as deRned In II U.S. C.~ !Ol(SI D).
0 Filing l'ee to be paid lnlnstollmenl$ (•ppllcable to indlviduala only). Mijst attach
signed application for tho oourl's conslderatlon certifYing that the dcbtot· is Qteck If:..-·· _ .....
~nableto pay fee except in installments. Rule 1006(b), See Offlclal Form 3A. IU--'oebtor's aggrcgale noncontlngent liquidated debts (excluding debts owed to
lnslr a longer part of such I BO days. than in any other District.
D There !sa bankruptcy elSe concern In~: debtor's affillate, general partner, or paTtnershlp pending In this District.
D Debtor Is a debtor in a foreign proceeding and has its principal place of business or principal assets in the United States in this District, or has
no prb>4:lpal placo of buslnoss or assets In the United Statos but Is a defendant In an action or proceeding [In 11 ftdernl or state eourl} in this
D1811"1ot, or the Interests ofthe parties will bo served In regard to tho roliefsoughtln this Dlslrlot.
Certification by a DebtOI' Who Resides liS a Tenant or Residential Properly
(Check all appllcablo boxes.)
0 Landlord has a judgment against tho debtor for possession of debtor's resldellco. (lfbox checked, complete tl«o foUowiog.)
(Name of landlord that obtalncdjudgment)
(Address of landlord)
D Debtor claims that UQder applicable nonbankt11ptoy !aw, there a~ clrcumataMIIS under which tho deblor would bo permitted to cure the
elltlre moneta!')' de.filult that gave rise to the judgment for pos!Cssion, after tbc judgment for possession was entered, and
D Debtor has Included with this petition the depoolt with th~ court of any rent that would becotnc due during tho 30-day period after the filing
of tho petition.
0 Debtor certifies that he/she has served tho Landlord with tblsoortiflcotion. (11 U.S.C. § 362(1)). 4'78
Case 12-80185 Document 1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 3 of 3
Pa 3
Name ofDebtor{s):
Anthony P. Gnffin, lnc.
Sl
S~unl(l) of Debtor{&) (lndivldoai/Joillt) Signature ora Foreign llepresenmtlve
I deoiare undcl· penalty of porjury t'hal the ill formation provided in this pel!!ion is truo I declero under penally of perjmy that the Information provided in this petl1ion Is true
and correot. and ComlCI, thai I am the foreign representative of a dobtor in a fol·ofgn proceeding,
(If pcMhioMI' Is an i~dlvldual whoso dclm aro primarily consumer dobts and hos and that I am authorized to me Ibis petition.
ohoacn to file undcrclulpter7) I am awaro that I may proceed under chapter 7, II, 12
(Ckeck only on~ boK.)
or 13 of title II, United States Coda, undel'81and tho rollefavaUable undor each such
chapter, and cbooso to proceed under chapter 7. D I request relief in accordance wltb cbap!er IS of title II, United Stales Code.
[If no llltorney repreoonts me and no bankruptcy petition preparer signs the petition) I Cerilned copies of tho documents requbod b,v II u.s.c. §ISIS aro attaQhed.
have obtllined and read th0 notlco r<:qulrcd by J1 U.S.C. § 342(b).
D Pursuant toll U.S.C. § 1511, [request relief in a<:cordanocwith th~
I request relief in accordance with the chapter of tltlo 11, United States Code, chapler of title 11 specified 111 this pelllion. Aocrtiflcd copy of the
specified In this petllion. o1·der granting recognition of the foreig11 main procoodlnt~ls attached.
x lSI Anthon • Glrffln x N/A
(Signature ofi'orel!ln Representative)
X NIA
Signature of Joint Debtor (Printed Nameof'f'orelgn Representotive)
Telophono Number (If not represented by atlomey)
Date
Date
Slgn9ture of Non-Attorney Ilankmpwy hlltloll Preparer
x /siAN I declare under penally of perjury that: (I) I am a bankruptcy petition prcparcr as
Slenattll' torney for Debtor(s) defined In 11 U.S.C. ~ II 0; (2) I prepared this document for compensation and have
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN provided the debtor with e copy of Ibis document and the notlocs and lnfontlatfon
required under 11 U.S.C. §§ IIO(b), !IO(h), and 342(b); and, (3) if rules or
guidelines havo been promulgated pursuant to t I U.S.C. § liO(h) setting a maxlmu1n
Firm Namo fee for smiccs chargeable by bankruptcy pelltlon prcparers, I have given the debtor
notice of the 1n11XImum amount botoro preparing any dccumcnl fur filing for a debtor
1115 21ST STREET, GALVESTON, TEXAS 77650 or accepting any fee from tbe debtor, as required In that section. Off'lcial Form l91s
attached.
Addre5S
409.763.0386 N/a
TelcJlhono NUinber Printed Name and title, if any, ofBankn!ptcy Petition Proparer
04104/2012
Date
Social-Security number (If the bankruptcy pe~tion preparer 1$ not an individual,
•In a case in which§ 707(b)(4XD) applies, this stgnaturc also constitutes a ~ate tho Socfai·Securlty number of the oCtlcer, prlnelpal, responsible person or
certification that theattomey has no knowledge after an Inquiry that the lnfonnatlon parln~r .,fthe bankruptcy pelfticm proparor.) (Required by II U.S.C.§ II 0.)
in the schedules is Incorrect.
Slgn~t11rc of Debtor (Corporatlon/Parbtonhlp)
I declare under penalty of perjury tbat the Information provided in this petition 1s true Address
and correct, and that I have been autl101'lzed to tuc this petition on behalf of the
dobtor.
X
Slgnatllfll
X /S/ Y P. GRIFFIN Dato
Signature of Authodzed Indf vidual
ANIHQ['jV p, @BYfFIN Signaturo of bankruptcy petition preporer or officer, princlP!II, responl$1ble per$on, or
Printed Name of Autho•·lzed Jndlvidual partner whose Soclai..Security number is provided above.
Presld$nt
Title or Autllorizcd Individual Names and Social-Security numbors of all other Individuals who prepared or assisted
04104/2012
Date lr1 preparing this document unless the bankruptcy petition preparer Is nol nn
!ndMdual.
If 111ore than one person prepared this document, attach additional sheets conforming
to the appropriate official form tbr each person.
A baukn1ptcy petlllon prdpm-er's f«ilrwe to comply wlliiiM provM~1s oftitle II and
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pl'ocedlll'e may result In fines or lmprlsonmem or
both, ll (].S.C. 110; Ill U.S.C. 156.
479
Case 12-80185 Document 1-1 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1
B IA (Official Fonn I, E~hlblt A) (9/97)
i.to ftl~,/Je.l'i(Jcltct.tt/lfJPf$ (e.g.;lalto.~ toKcm.d 100) wifh the p~urlties tmd Exchange Commission pJmmanJ to
'1},1/f'i/ 'e¢Ut1fi£'1:1!!:?i~ftmM..Il!:t;6JlJtMil.!Od Is requestmg relutJ under chapter 11 o; rhe Bankruptcy UJae, this
·comp etM?)JI({ a(fMIIillJ..fo· flleptarl!of.I;J
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Southern District of Texas - Galveston
Inre Aritl'lob}! P. 9riffin, Ina. ) Case No.
Debtor )
)
) Chapter 11
EXHIBIT "A" TO VOLUNTARY PETITION
1. If any of the debtor•s securities are registered under Section 12 of the Seomitles Exchange Act of 1934, the
SEC tile number is .;.N.:.:;IA;.;..._ _ _ _ _ _..,........,
2. The folloWing fmancial data is the latest avallable infonnation and refers to the debtor's condition on
Q4.!):1.2012
a. Total assets $ _ _..._.~·9~87'-'!
.• 6~3~3.~00
b. Total debts (including debts listed in 2.c., below) $ _ _ _1~,2~0~0:.z::.O~OO~.O~O
c. Debt securities held by more than SOP holders:
$ _ _ _ __
secured CJ unsecured 0 subordinated 0
$_..._ _...__ _
secured 0 unsecmed 0 subordinated 0
$ _ _ _ _ __
seemed CJ unseCW"ed 0 subordinated CJ s _____
secW'Cd CJ unsecmed CJ subordinated CJ
secured 0 unseCW"ed 0 subordinated 0 s ___"'"""..,...._
d. Number of shares ofprefened stock
e. Number of shares COJumon stock }PDQ
Comments. ifanv: -·-·--'"'·-·---~".. ---,·-'-'-'-'-....:...-~-~---
Small business, closely held; 1000 shares all owned by Anthony P. Griffin.
3. Brief descrintion of debtor's business:
Law practice/pre-development work In context of property acquisitions
4. Libi the names of any pt:rson who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 5% or
more of the votilU!: securities of debtor:
Anthony P. Griffin
480
Case 12-80185 Documen11-2 Filed in TXSB on 04/04/12 Page 1 of 1
aJl\l(Ol'fio.li!lJ!.Qrh!t, l'lthmit:<}){mflt)
[lfito.t1IIi b~l i}fffie ilebtl)l;"s JvnowJtidgrSoll_iil.pt:qpiiJ!lY -uw.neil•hy flt' ill :p~$esstou,l)l''th.ed~btar :lbat, tQ ~he b~t 9f:thG
,\ill~Jw;l:;;itnc:>wl.~g9J,;p<>.~~~H>.r l~~~~~g_~i{:!p J!Osea_\hr<;lllllf •lm)JJ!nii!nlllndldDntitia'ble harm.i'llfhe-;pubtio health onsafo(y·(llijacli
.addltionill sheets: if i\~0$81\ey):.
:None;
. i. Wlth resp®H() -·ea® f)lll'OOI. ·ol':~ai propetfy odtwn af;'jlemnalpropetly 1drmll'fied ln
=
You have fired your attomey but are having problems gett1ng your file back fi·om ~ 5;
the attorney. · ~0
..........
c:n ~...
,.....,
~~ = ~
You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program i ~
'
(CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.
C!\..AP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of
issues with attomeys quickly, without the filing of a fonnal grievance.
CAAP can resolve many problems without a g1ievance being filed by providmg
information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by
contacting the attomey either by telephone or letter.
I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program.
II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU -- PLEASE KEEP CURRE}'I'T
@
1. TDCJ/SID # - - - ' 'rJ /;c.,
-"---------
t'v1s. Name:
Address:
-----------------------------------------------------
City: -~---------------- State: _ _ Zip Code: _______
Employer and address _____!_!NL.'_citc.::1~--------------------------------------------
3. Telephone number: Residence _ _ _ _ _ __ Work: __N~'/.:_;__I>:.c___ _ __
0709
Other: ____________________
4. Drivers L1cense # Date of Birih
-----------------
5. N:.1me, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.
Name --"'-----------~--------------- Address .
I' Telephone _____________________~---
6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -------~-"·-<.£_ _,_·-____________
If no, what is your pnrnary language? _______
Wl1o helped you prepare ibis fonn? __L.:_"~·---'---":>'--v--'--'-'--'-/~_... _______________________
Vi'ill they be available to translate future conespondence during this process? )1.1/77
7. Are you a member of the judiciary? ____::_N_!L_~v_-___________
If yes, please provide Comi, Com1ty, City, State:
III. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY
Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the
attomey against whom you are complaining. A separate gnevance fonn must be
completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining.
State: -~ y_- ,, ,.
Telephone number: Work L/D'i -7~5 --CJir/... Home _______________
3_ Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attomey previously?
Yes_ No v If "yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. /V/4
4 Please check one of the following:
/ This attorney \vas hired to represent me.
Th1s attorney was appointed to represent me.
This attomey was hired to represent someone else.
Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed and what the attorney was hired
or appointed to do.
3 t'J c 7 #-z oo F
0709 2
5. What was your fee arrangement with the attomey? -+·._,__>:......• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If you signed a contract and have a ~' please attach.
If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach.
Do not send originals.
6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly
·-:t h :""-<. ~ /.rl-!o rz. N"' · ·
'"7
I. Are you cmTently represented by an attorney? ~-L.,tl/,..!:....:t.J=-·-------
lf yes, please provide information about your cuuent attomey: _ _LN"'--"-f~"'l'----------
8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment such as depression or a substance use
disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations of the attomey
such as sluned speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence
etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location).
9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that
·would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment such as depression
or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.
IV. INFORMATION ABO liT YOUR GRIEVANCE
1. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur?
City: /~ ,.4 l VI? do rJ
2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the followmg, if known:
a. Name of court --~------------------------------
0709 3
b Title of the suit £4 c/c; i ,'). >(..Jl:,..,_?.....:.:·'.N=--·;:..:d_.'....:.'....:.'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
c Case number and date suit was filed
---------------------
d. If you are not a party to this suit, wl1at is your connection with it? Explain briefly.
r.J/.;
U you have~ of court documents, please attach.
3. Explain in detail why you think this attomc:y bas done something improper or has failed
to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if
necessaty.
If you have~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your
grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.
Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who know
something about your grievance.
Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the
at'tomey named in yom· grievance.
0709 4
V. HOW DID YOU LEAR.N ABOlJT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTOR.N"EY
GRIEVANCE PROCESS?
Yellow Pages
Internet
/ Other
VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER
I hereby expressly v,:a1ve any attomey-client p1ivilege as to the attomey, the subject of
this grievcmc.e, and authorize such attorney to reYeal any inforrnation in the professional
relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Cmmsel of the State Bar of Texas.
I understand that the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel mamtains as confidential the
processing of Grievances.
1 / i
1
.
Signature: )
~frv-JJV1,.. hJ< \/-.,
v r Vi......L-0"-\_ D ate: "';'•!·J/
,.... I/ ""-'lY"'/.
,- . '
TO ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTION, THE GRJ.EVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:
THE OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
P.O. Box 13287
Austin, Texas 78711
0709 5
·~-
......·~-t"!,,'
-~- •••.,.... . . :,.,.,
......... . · -
1 . ! .' ) ..
A GRIFFIN LA WYERS
October 3, 2008 Gah'eston Island
Gah'esron. Texas 17550
Cea.c::.,_r Vereen
'I
RE: CONTRAcT OF EMPLOYMENT
Mr. Vereen:
Please find enclosed the contract of emploYment.
Please retain the original for reoords. ~ur
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lawyers
llls Moody
Galveston, Texas 77sso
409-763- 0386
l.8oo.7so.soJ4
APG; Facsimile No_ 409.763.4102
files
Encl. -Contract of EmploYment
c =worrJ. ve reen. Ceasar. client. t J. gram
Program Director 1-800-')32-1 900
December 29, 2010
[Vlr. Ceasar W. Vereen
RE: Mr. Anthony P. Griffin, Attorney at Law
Record: #482965
Dear Mr. Vereen:
Thank you for contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP) for assistance in resolving a
problem you are experiencing with your attorney. CAAP is a statewide dispute resolution progrnm of the
State Bar of Texas. lts objective is to assist the public in resolving concerns, disputes, or
misunderstandings with Texas lawyers and to facilitate and improve communications betv.-'een clie!lts and
their lawyers.
The attorney gnevance process extsts to address lavv·yer misconduct or unethical behavior according to the
Texas Disctp!Jnary Rules of Professional Conduct.
The enclosed Jetter was mailed to Mr. Griffin. This is a formal but friendly effort intended to facilitate
communications and to prompt an effective and positive solution.
Please allow a reasonable time for Mr. Griffin to respond to our letter. However, should you not hear
from him, please contact me at 1-800-204-2222, ext. 1768 to discuss other options that may bring about
resolution. If! do not hear from you in thirty (30) days, I will assume matters have been resolved and
close your file.
Yours truly,
Program Associate
Enclosure
P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 787ll-24S7
Grievance Information Hotline: 1-800-932-1900
CAAP Fax: 512-427-41.22
CAAP E-mail: c:lap@texasbar.co)!!
From: Vereen, Ceasar W.
Dear Anthony P. Griffin {Attorney},
I Ceasar W. Vereen regret to alert you under these circumstances in regards to
my civil rights case. On or around the 21 September 2008 I enlisted your
services in regards to an unfair act committed against me whenever I inquired
about acquiring a bail bonds license. The following events led to this notification:
1. Before we even spoke on the fees of your services, I presented my case to
you in which at that time you assured me we had a valid case. I gave you all
required documents and credentials regarding this case. Once that was done we
agreed on your cost of $10,000.00 to begin the process of alleviating this matter.
. 2. Mr. Griffin, It has been 26 months and no progression has been made on this
case. You fail to notify me of our standings in resolving this matter. I have
contacted your office over 21 different occasions on contaCting you to speak on-
this case.
3. I have even spoken with you and your secretaries as well and have constantly
received rescheduled appointments in which your party failed to comply with. I as
one of your customers feel t_hat your services are not sufficient considering the
seriousness of this matter.
4. Lastly, on 18 November 201 0, I called your office and your secretary put me
on hold. She went to consult with you in which she returned and told me to call
you at one o' clock. I called at one and you, yourself told me to call you back at
five o' clock. I complied with that and then at that time, you then told me that you
were leaving for the day and to call you Monday. That same Monday I called you
back and you told me to call you at seven o'clock. It greatly upsets me of the
level of professionalism portrayed on behalf of this case; therefore I feel, it is best
for you to refund my $10,000.00 fee. I expect a reply at least within the next ten
working days.
Thank~Y
Signe
Ceasa W. e
--"--
A GRIFFIN LA WYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
August 13, 2008
Ceasar VerPAr.
RE: THANK YOU
Mr. Vereen:
1Thank you for visiting with our firm on August 11,
2008. Good luck in obtaining your retainer. 2 Thank you
for considering our firm.
Sincerely/
Griffin
1
We would be required to show either the Board improperly and
arbitrarily denied the permit after granting same (thus bringing the
suit under state law/arbitrary act) and/or by bringing suit under
2federal law (racial discrimination in violation of federal law) .
The retainer is $10,000.00 and is deemed earned upon payment. The
retainer would be non-refundable. In context of additional attorneys,
no such attorneys' fees would be due and owing unless we are the
prevailing party and would be on contingent basis. Any costs
associated with the. litigation will be incurred by the firm and will
not be reimbursed unless we are the prevailing party and/or the case
settles.
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Moody
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
c:word.miscel27.vereen.ceasar.interviewedbutnotretained
NOTICE OF CLIENTS
The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes
professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys.
Although not every complaint against or dispute with a
lawyer involves professional misconduct, the State Bar
Office of General Counsel will provide you with information
about how to file a complaint.
For more information, please call 1.800.932.1900. This is
a toll-free phone call.
BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE
STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, H0021132504
PETITIONER, [CEASAR W. VEREEN]
v.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
RESPONDENT.
RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER
TO THE HONORABLE ~JIDENTIARY PlL~L:
Respondent, Jl...nthony P. Griffin, submits this his original
answer to the Original Evidentiary Petition and would answer as
follows:
Response to Factual Allegations
1. Respondent admits that Complainant paid a retainer of
ten thousand dollars ($10, 000. 00) a..11.d would assert that
the retainer was non-refQT1.dable:
2. Respondent would admit that the Complainant called the
office on a number of occasions and left messages with
staff. Respondent denied that he did not make attempts
to contact the client and call the Complainant.
Respondent also denied that he didn't have time to talk
with the Complainant/Client and that he answered the
client's questions.
3. Respondent denies not working on the
Cowplainant's/Client's file and denies that the only
action taken was the making of an open records request.
4. Respondent denied paragraph B in that relationship was
terminated prior to the letter from the client.
Response to Rule Violations
5. Respondent denies neglecting the client's matters and
violating Rule ~Ol(b) (l). Respondent will admit to not
working at his usual efficiency and such state had
existed during the restructuring related to the
h1.1.rricane.
6. Respondent denies keeping the client informed, denied
comply with respect and any violation of 1.03(a).
7. Respondent denies taking steps to protect the client's
interest and any violation of Rule l.lS(d). The time
line associated with the facts prevent a violation of
1.15 (d) and is inconsistent >'lith the oral request of
the client.
Prayer for Relief
8. It is prayed that the relief requested be denied in all
parts.
DATE: August 29, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
ANTHO~i P. GRIFFIN
A GRIFFIN LAWY~~S
11J.5 TWENTY FIRST STREET
GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102
STATE BAR NO. 08455300
CERTIFI~~TE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this the 30th day of August,
20ll, a true and correct copy of Respondent's Original Answer
was forwarded to opposing counsel by facsimile transmission and
regular mail, to-wit:
Sa~ON BREAUX SAUCEDA
ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
600 JEFFERSON, SUITE lOOO
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002
--
c, word. grei vancef i l.e_ [ varr;!en_ ceasar] _original_ ans>~er
STATE BAR OF TE-XAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
July 31,2012 RECEIVED AUG - 2 201Z
DISTR1C SB EVIDENTIARY PANEL
Lindsa Glover, Chair Tim Beeton
Mere th J. Duncan Kelly M. Haas
Je William B. Harvey
RE: NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Case No. H0021132504 [Ceasar Vereen], Commission for Lawyer Discipline v.
Anthony P. Griffin, Before the Evidentiary Panel of the State Bar District 5B
Grievance Committee
Dear Panel Members:
Attached please find Petitioner's Original Evidentiary Petition, Respondent's Original Answer,
and the Notice ofEvidentiary Hearing (08/13/12) for the hearing scheduled on Monday, August
1
13, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the Galveston County Justice Center, 600 59 h, 2nd Floor, Room
2100, Galveston, Texas 77551.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you will not be able to attend the hearing, please
contact Rosie Solis, Docket Coordinator, as soon as possible.
Shannon Breaux Sauceda
,,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
SBS/sml
Endosures
Anthony P. Griffm
1115 21 51 Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
Via Certified Mail No. 7005 2570 0000 1445 3047~
Return Receipt Requested
g:\gencral\gri !lin .a_sbs\504 _ vereen\correspondence\08!312_hearing_packets_panel_respondenl 073 l 12. do ex
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292
~
.~
BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE
STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. 5B GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § H0021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN]
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, ~ RECEIVED ,C..UG - 2 lOl2.- FILED
§
Respondent. § AUG D9 2011
ORIGINAL EVIDENTIARY PETITION STATE BAR OF TEXAS
HOUST~OC /1
COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, V ~
committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Evidentiary Panel
as follows:
I. PARTIES
Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to
CJS "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.
Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"),
Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Petitioner brings this disciplinary proceeding pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS
GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The
Complaint that fom1s the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004.
/
III. VENUE
Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is
appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 2.11B of the TEXAS RULES OF
·DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at 1115 21st Street, Galveston, Texas
77550, or any place he may be found.
IV. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional
misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06Vofthe TEXAS RULES OFDISCIPLlNARY PROCEDURE.
V. CAUSE OF ACTION
I. On or about October 3, 2008, CEASAR W. VEREEN (hereinafter referred to as
"VEREEN") hired Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated
with the revocation and/or denial of VEREEN'S bail bonding license.
2. VEREEN paid Respondent Ten Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the
representation.
3. During the course of the representation, VEREEN made numerous attempts to contact
Respondent to ascertain the status of the case.
4. Upon calling Respondent's office, VEREEN was usually informed that Respondent
would have to answer his questions; but that Respondent was not available at that time.
5. Respondent did not return VEREEN'S calls.
6. On a few occasions VEREEN reached Respondent directly and during these brief calls,
Respondent indicated that he did not have time to speak and told VEREEN to call back.
7. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue VEREEN'S case, other than
.to make an open records request.
Originnl Evidenrimy PelitiOIIIAnthony P. Griffin Page 2
( ·,:IGENERALiGR IFFlN.A_SBS\504 _ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD _RFD.docx
;
)
. '
8. By letter dated December 2, 2010, VEREEN effectively terminated the representation
and requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned
fees.
VI. RULE VIOLATIONS
The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation
of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
• l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter;
• 1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information; and
• l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of
fee that has not been earned.
VII.
The Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of
the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by CEASAR W.
VEREEN'S filing of a grievance on or about February 18, 2011.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Evidentiary Panel discipline Respondent,
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the f.acts shall warrant;
order restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at
law or in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without
limitation, costs and attorneys' fees.
Original E••ir!emimJ' Pernion!Anthony P. Grinin Page 3
l i:'tiENER.AL'.GRlFFlN.A_SBS\504_ Vereen\PLEADINGS\EP_COD_RFD.docx
Respectfully submitted,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
LINDA A. ACEVKPO
Chief Discip 1· ·· ounsel
s
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
State Bar No. 24002896
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 758-8200
Fax: (713) 758-8292
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER,
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August Cj, 2011, a true and correct copy of the Original
Evidentiary Petition was delivered to the ~wing:
Via Certified Mail
No. 7004 0750 0000 6728 4477
Anthony P. Griffin
1115 21st Street /
Galveston, Texas 77550 /
£J.<
s
/
Page 4
Origin<1/ E1·ide111iary Petition/Anthony P Griffin
G:\GEN ERALIGRJFFJN.A_S BS\504_Vereen\PLEADlNGS\EP _COD _RFD.docx
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
April 26, 2011
Jai L. Jones
Assistant D~sciplinary Counsel
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
State Bar of Texas
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
P.E: H002ll3250-1 CEASAR WILLIAM VEREEN - ANTHONY P.
GRIFFIN
{P~SPONSE TO GRIEVP~CE ~IT APOLOGY)
Ms. Jones:
Please acc~flt tl~1is letter as rr~y· response to tb.e
g-rievance. !'1y apology for the delay in transmitting; the
response wa.s due in part to my being in trial during the
relevant period. In addition, in context of the above, I
spoke with the State Bar Investigator on Good Friday and
informed him that I i-.rould this response done post haste.
My trial in Dallas scheduled for Wednesday has just been
non-suited and thus my ability to complete this response.
J>,gain, r.he Bar's consideration of t.his delay in responding
would be appreciated.
In context of Mr. Vereen's case, I am attaching a copy
of my file with this submission. The file materials are
under Attachment Ai my notes as attached under .t>Lttachrnent
B; materials reviewed and tendered by the client are
attached under at.tachment C.
I'4:r. Vareen hired our firm on or about October 3, 2008.
We v.rere hired to explore whet.her Mr. vareen had a claim of
discrimination associated with the revocation and/or denial
of his bail bonding license. It was the client's position
that he had done all things required by the County of
Brazoria to allow him to obtain his bonding license. In
fact the record reveals that lVJ.r. Vareen v-1as granted a
license (see J>,ger,da records for 3uly 3, 2008) , but the
license was ul.t imat.;:;ol y· :cescinde,::t by ·the Ba.il Bond Board.
I have no reco:cd c. E. the client contacting our firm
tv-1enty one times during our period of representation, I
re.r:1ernber t-hat t"he.re was an extended pe!:iod of time bet\,.ree:n
our hiring and :r-tr:·. Vereen's next contact. with our firm. He
preceded his termination of our firm with two phone calls
(one E!Xplaining that his ·long period of non-contacti
approximat.ely one year) ; the other seeking an update of my
reviei•J of t.he :~:·ecords (I requested that he come in for an
interview to e)..--plain the pro's and con's of the litigation.
I explained that I needed have all the information at
present (we 'i'JeJ~e st:Lll within r.:.he statutory period), but
would have the :l.r,fonnat ion -vir.cen he caine in for an
appointment. t'Ir. Vereen also expressed his lack of desire
not proceed. His 1etter reque;;ting a f:ull refund is
reflective of this position. The next request was through
the bar for a fee refLmd.
Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract.
The time expended Ciri his case was approximately twenty five
(25) hours, If you desire a time and accou...Tlting record I
can provide t.he same. t"'ly billable rate in cases such as
this is $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the
money issue, vJe '~JiLl refund ~E},g_Q_Cl__~-(~_g on or before June 1,
I haoo:Je r1crt !';:r.. e.ac~i.l-:..:;ci. by,.. relationship ~.rith ttte cli7.-rlt:.r
Because of int:e:cvening cir::::umstances, a lawsuit was not
filed but the non- filing· 1111ere not. the fault of this firm.
Thank you for your attention to same.
Sincere).¥;
~_/ - . ;,
// / / ~-
/ ~---- "-
'·~---- ~
Anthony P. Griffi'IT,
A Griffin I ..awvers ~'
- '-..
lJ.15 Twent.y First Street
Galvest.on, Texas 77550""'
'·
409.763.0386 '
1.800.750.5034 '
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/.
files
license (see ?.geLda records for ,July 3,. 2008), but th·.::
licer1se was ultirna.tel.)r :cescir1ded. t>)l the Ba.il Bc)n.d Board.
I have no rec;.~·rd 0f the cJ.:lent contacting our fi:t'm
tvJenty one i::imes during our period of representatic·n. I
remember that there was an extended period of time bet'i•teen
our hiring and }1r. Vereen's 1-:ext contact with our firm. He
preceded his termination of our fiL~ with two phone calls
(one explaining that his.long period of non-contact;
approximately one year) ; t.h€: other seeking an update of my
revie1...- of t.he record.s (I requ.ested that he come in for an
interview to explain the p:n.)'S and con's of the litigation.
I explained that I need..3d have all the infm."1nat.ion at
present (we we1~e still within c:he st.atutory period), but
would hav.e the info:cmat ion when he came in for cUl.
appointment. lV.i:r. Vereen a.lso expressed his lack of desire
not proceed. His Jetter reqv.esting a full refund is
reflective of this position. The next request was through
the bar for a fee refund.
Mr. Vereen signed a non-refundable retainer contract.
The time expended on his case was approximately twenty five
(25) hours. If you desire a. time and accounting record I
can provide t.he same, !Jly billable rate in
cases such as
this iB $350.00 an hour. In context of resolution of the
money issue, 'iile wiLl refund ~?t_QQ_Q_-_c~g on or before June 1,
I ll.a:\.re not. b!~e.ache.cl b}'" rc:l2:.::ionshi_p v~rit.h ttu:; client:~
Because of intJ2~l.-vening cir:::·umstances, a lawsuit was not
filed but the non-filing were not the fault of this firm.
Thank you for your attention to same.
Bin·:en~].y;.
/~ ./'-
L·---~-----.// "" "-.,
Anthony P. Griffii'h,
J._ Griffin Law-yers ',,"-..
ll.l5 T·v.1ent:y First Street
'\.
Gal·v·est.(::.n, Texas 77550 ·,·,.
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
xc: Ceasar Vereen
l92 Cou...Tlty Road 69BB
.P-..r1gleton ~
~re;:eaEJ 7rl515
Interoffice - Rita Westerman
(please note docket)
BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY PANEL OF THE
STATE BAR DISTRICT NO. SB GRIEVANCE COMMITI'EE
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § 80021132504 [CEASAR W. VEREEN]
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
§
ANmONY P. GRIFFIN, §
§
Respondent. §
JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Parties and Appearance
On AugUst 13, 20 12, came to be heard the above-styled and numbeted cause. Petitioner, the
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, appeared by and through its attorney of record,
Shannon Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and announced ready. Respondent,
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent''), Texas Bar Number08455300,
appeared in person and through attorney of record, Norma Venso, and announced ready.
Jurisdiction and Venue
The Evidentiary Panel SB having been duly appointed to hear this complaint by the chair of
the: Grievance Committee for STAiE BAR OF TEXAS District 5, finds that it has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of this action and that venue is proper.
Professional Misconduct
The Evidentiary Panel, having considered all of the pleadii:J.gs, evidence, stipuhitions, and
argument, finds Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of
the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Judgment of Ppblls Reori.mwnd
Pqe tor4
Findings of Fact
The Evidentiary Panel, having considered the pleadings, evidence aqd argument of counsel,
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. Respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas and is a member of THE
STATE BAR OF TEXAS.
2. Respondent resides in and maintains his principal place ofpractice in Galveston County,
Texas.
3. On or about October 3, 2008, Ceasar Vereen (hereinafter referred to as "Vereen") hired
Respondent for representation in a discrimination claim associated with the revocation
and/or denial of his bail bonding license. Vereen paid Respondent Ten Thousand and
Noll 00 Dollars ($1 0,000.00) for the represem.tion.
4. During the course of the representation, Vereen madenumerous attempts to contact
Respondent to ascertain the status of the case, but was usually informed that Respondent
was not available at that time. Respondent did not return Vereen's calls. On a few
occasions Vereen reached Respondent directly and during_these brief calls, Respondent
indicated that he did not have time to speak and told Vereen to call back..
5. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to take any action to pursue Vereen's case, other than to
make an open records request
6. By letter dated December 2, 20 I0, Vereen effectively terminated the representation and
requested a refund of his fees; however, Respondent failed to return any unearned. fees.
7. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS has incurred reasonable
attorneys' fees and direct expenses associated with this Disciplinaiy Proceeding in the
amount ofThree Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Nine and 48/100 Dollars ($3,979.48)
8. Respondent owes restitution in the amount of Nine Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($9,000.00) payable to Ceasar Vereen.
Conclusions of Law
The Evidentiary Panel concludes that, based on foregoing findings of fact, the following
TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf have been violated: l.Ol(b)(l) [in
representing a cl.ient, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter]; 1.03{a) [a lawyer shall keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
CFI.-13 Judgment of Publjs Beprimand
P~t~:elof4
information}; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client.
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
is entitled and refunding any advance payments of fee that bas not been earned].
Sanction
The Evidentiary Panel, having found Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct,
heard and considered additional evidence regarding th~ appropriate sanction to.be imposed against
Respondent After hearing all evidence and argument and after having considered the factors in Rule
2.18 of the TEXAS RULE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, the Evidentiary Panel finds that the proper
discipline of the Respondent for each act of Professional Misconduct is a Public Reprimand.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a Public Reprimand be
imposed against Respondent in accor(jace with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE..
The Evidentiary Panel finds that the sanction imposed against Respondent is the appropriate sanction
for each of the violations set forth in this Judgment.
Restitution, Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
It is further 0 RDERED Respandent shall pay restitution on or before September 14, 2012, to
Cell:lar Vereen in the amount ofNine Thousand and No/ I 00 Dollars ($9,000.00). Respondent shall
pay the restitution by certified or cashier' s.check or money order made payable to Ceasar Vereen and
delivered to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDiscipliruuyCounsel's Office, P.O. Box.l2487, Austin.
Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701).
It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees
and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of Three Thousand Nine Hundred
Seventy-Nine and 48/l 00 Dollars ($3,979.48). The payment shall be due and payable on or before
Cf6·13 Judgment or Public RePrimand
PllfleJ of4
..
September 14, 2012, and shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent
shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAs, to the Chief Disciplinmy
Counsel's Office. P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St, Austin, Texas
78701).
It is further ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of
Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y) of the TExAs
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the maximum
legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post-
j udgrnent remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amowtts.
Publication
This reprimand shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance
with the TEXAS RULES OF DISC!PLINAR V PROCEDURE.
Other Relief
All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED.
SIGNED this ~day of~uat. '2012.
EVIDENTIARY PANEL
DISTRICT NO. SB
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Judgment of Public Re.primand
Pqe4of4
TABlO
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the ChiefDisciplinalJ' Counsel
RECEIVED MAR I 0 ~e~@
March 19, 2012
Via Certified Mail No. 7004 1350 0002 6835 5366,
Return Receipt Requested
Anthony P. Griffin
1115 21st Street
Galveston, Texas 77550-4624
RE: Case No. H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony P. Griffin
Dear Mr. Griffin:
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced
Complaint and determined on March 6, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have
committed· one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE (TRDP).
In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS
DlSCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends
are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows:
On or about May 12, 2010, Kristina Guzman (hereinafter referred to as
"Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffin (hereinafter referred to as
"Respondent") for representation in an employment retaliation matter.
Respondent's tee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00).
Complainant paid Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred
and No/100 Dollars ($4,100.00), with an agreement to pay the remaining
balance in installments. Respondent and Complainant did not execute an
employment contract.
Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on Complainant's part except
for preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April20 11.
During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts
to contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent
failed to communicate with Complainant.· ·
g.\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_guzman\correspondence\election letter.docx
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002
EXHIBIT
Phone: (713) 758:-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292
l :b-Ji
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
Anthony P. Griffin
March 19, 2012
RE: Case No. Hllll-34143
Page2
On or about July 11, 2011, Complainant left a message for Respondent notifying
him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund
of unearned fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not
refund her money, but would look at her file and call her back. Respondent
failed to call Complainant as promised. As such, on or about August 24, 2011,
Complainant sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated Respondent's
representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as
well as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide Complainant
with an accounting and further failed to return her client file.
These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT:
l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to the lawyer;
1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information;
1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or
collect an illegal fee or unconscionable fee;
1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the
method by which the fee is to be determined;
1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property upon request; and
l.lS(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property
to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payments of fee that has not been earned.
Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint
heard by an Evidentiary Panel of the District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper
venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this
g:\general\griffin. a_sbs\ !43_guWJan\correspondence\election Jetter .docx
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary CoullSel
Anthony P. Griffin
March 19,2012
RE: Case No. H111134143
Page 3
notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to
proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18.
Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be
mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this letter. In making your
election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a
public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an
Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an
available sanction.
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the undersigned at the phone number listed
below.
annon Breaux Sauceda
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Enclosure: Respondent's Election and Principal Place of Practice Certification
CF8-IB
g:\general\gri ffin. a_sbs\ 14 3___.,ouzman \correspondence\election letter .do ex
COMPLAINT AGAINST §
§
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H0111134143 [KRISTINA GUZMAN]
§
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS §
RESPONDENT'S ELECTION &
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION
I, Anthony P. Griff"m, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following)
_ _ _ _ District Court
_ _ _ _ Evidentiary Hearing - District Grievance Committee
I, Anthony P. Griffm, hereby certify that:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _(Physical Address- no P.O. Box)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ _(County),
Texas, is my principal place of practice.
SIGNED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
**RETURN TillS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE**
g:\general\griffin.a_ sbs\143_gu zman\correspondence\election lerter.docx
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
January 27, 2012
Jai Collier
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
State Bar of Texas
600 Jefferson{ Suite 1000
Houston/ Texas 77002
RE: H0111134143 - KRISTINA GUZMP~ - ANTHONY PAUL
GRIFFIN
(RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCEj
Ms . Collier:
Please find enclosed the hard copy of the above
referenced documents. Thank you for.your attention to
same.
Sincerely,
n hony P. Griffin
A. Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile ~o. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
Encls. - Response & Attachments 1 - 4
91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562
fACSIMILE TRANSMISSION AND REGULAR MAIL
xc: Kristina L. Guzman
CER'l'IF'IED MAIL, RRB. NO. 91. 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562
c: wc.rd. grievancefile_ [guzrnan_kristina]_oppcsingco·llllsels_t.ransmi ttal
A GRIFFIN LA WYERS
Galveston island
Galveston, Texas 77550
January 27, 2012
Jai Collier
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Office of the Chief Disciplinaly Counsel
State Bar of Texas
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000.
Houston, Texas 77002
RE: H0111134143 - k'RISTINA GUZMll..N - Al~THONY P.
GRIFFIN
(RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE}
Ms. Collier:
Please accept this letter as our response to the
grievance filed by tbe above person. Please note as
follows:
" We were hired on May 10, 2010 by Ms. Guzman. The
client was referred by Barbara Smith, a former
client.
11 We were hired to look at an employment
discrimination case and a tortious interference
claim. 2 A copy of my file materials are enclosed
under herein (attachment 1} .
" There is in the file a copy of a letter dated May
10, 2010, confirming the payment of a retainer
$5,000.00 and one-third of the recovery. I have
searched my computer and have not found that I
followed through and provided a contract. of
employment, but I am willing to provide
1
The problem with the client's EEOC charge related to her not being an
employee of BP. This was axplained to her; she was not capable of
bringing an employment discrimination claim against a uon-employer.
xc: Kristina Guzman
CERTIFIED MAIL, RP$ NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8562
c: word. grievancefil.e_gu:;man_krist:\.J::a. 20~1. 3314.
CAUSE NO. 12CV1732
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Petitioner, §
§
vs. § GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAs
§
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, §
§
Respondent. § lOth JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION
Parties and Appearance
On this day, came to be heard the above-styled and numbered cause. Petitioner, the
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, by and through its attorney of record, Shannon
Breaux Sauceda, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Respondent, ANlliONY P. GRIFFIN
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent), Texas Bar Number 08455300, by and through his attorney
of record, Norma Venso, announce that an agreement has been reached in the above-styled matter.
Jurisdiction and Venue
On the 18th day of July, 2012, pursuant to Rule 3.02 of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURE, the SUPREME CoURT OF TEXAS appointed the Honorable Darlene Byrne to preside over
this disciplinary action. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this action, and that venue is proper. Both Parties waived their rights to trial by jury.
Professional Misconduct
The Court, hav1ng considered the pleadings and the agreement of the parties, finds that
Respondent has committed Professional Misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) ofthe TEXAs RuLEs
OF DJsC!PLlNARY PROCEDURE. Respondent has committed professional misconduct as de.fined by
AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION
Pa~te) ort
Rule 1.06V of the TExAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE and in violation of Rules 1.03(a) [a
lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status ofa matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information]; 1.04{d) [a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined]; and 1.15(d) [upon termination of
representation. a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client. allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payments of fee that has not been earned], of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES Of PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT; Article X, Section 9, of the STATE BAR RULES.
Sanction
It is AGREED and ORDERED that the sanction of a Probated Suspension shall be imposed
against Respondent in accordance with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with the suspension being fully probated
pursuant to the tenns stated below. The period of probated suspension shall begin on August 30,
2013, and shall end on August 29, 2014.
Terms of Probation
It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that during all periods ofsuspensio~ Respondent
shall be under the following terms and conditions:
1. Respondent shall not violate any term of thls Judgment.
2. Respondent shalt not engage in professional misconduct as defined by Rule l.06(V) of
the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION
Ptge:Z orz
3. Respondent shall not violate any state or ferleral criminal statutes.
4. Respondent shall keep the STATE aAR. OF TEXAs membership department notified of
current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone .numbers.
5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Continuing Legal Education requirements.
6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account(IOLTA) requirements.
7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of
professional misconduct.
8. Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and direct expenses as
ordered in this Judgment.
9. Respondent shall pay restitution as ordered in this Judgment.
Prob2tion Revocation
Upon determination that Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment, the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motion to revoke
probation with the Court and serve a photocopy of the motio~ on Respondent pursuant to
Tcx.R.Civ.P, 21a. Revocation will not be invoked on the basis of grievance matters pending
against Respondent at the time that this Judgment is executed.
The Court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Court shall determine by
a preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgmenl. If the
Court finds grounds for revocation, the Court shall enter an order revoking probation and imposing
an active suspension upon Respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
commencing on or after the date of revocation. Respondent shall not be given credit for any term of·
probation served prior to revocation.
AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION
Pagel of .3
It is further AGREED AND ORDERED that any conduct on the part ofRespondent which
serves as the basis for a motion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for
discipline as allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Restitution, Attornevs' Fees and Expenses
It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Kristina Guzman
in the amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty and No/1{}0 Dollars ($2,350.00). The
restitution payment shall be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to
Kristina Guzman. The payment shall be submitted to the ChiefDisciplioary Counsel's Office, P.O.
Box 12487, Austin. Texas 7871 l-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), on or before
March 5, 2013.
It is further AGREED and ORDERED Respondent shall pay all reasonable and necessary
attorneys' fees and direct ex,penses to the STATE BAR Of TEXAS in the amount ofTwo Thousand Five
Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($2,500.00) . The payment or attorneys' fees and direct expenses shall
be made by certified or cashier's check or money order and made payable to the STATE BAR OF
TEXAS. The payment shall be submitted to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box
12487,Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), onorbeforeMarch5,
2013.
It is further AGREED and ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the
misconduct ofRespondent and are assessed as o part of the sanction in accordance with Rule 1.06(Y)
of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accrue interest at the
maximum legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF.TEXAS shall have all writs and other
AGREED JUDCMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSION
.!'ate 4of4
post-judgment remedies against Respondent in order to collect all unpaid amoun.ts.
Publication
This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance
with the TEXAS RL'LES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Other Relief
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk ofthis Court shall forward a certified copy of
the cvrrent Disciplinary Petition on file in this case, along with a copy of this Judgment to the
following: (1) CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, Supreme Court Building, Austin, Texas
78711; (2) The STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, P. 0. Box 12487,
Austin. Texas 7&711; and (3) Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, Norma Venso, 83 0
Apollo SL, Houston, Texas 77058.
IT IS ORDERED that all costs of court incurred in the prosecution ohhis lawsuit shall be
taxed against Respondent, for which the Clerk may have execution if they are not timely paid.
AU'"'""""' relief not oxpress!y gmctod horein1 exp=dy DENIED.
SIGNED this _gQ_ day of Ha' f( '2013.
......
AGREED JUDGMENT OF PROBATED SUSPENSlON
Page SofS
AGREED AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chid Disciplinary Counsel
LINDA A. ACEVEDO
SAUCEDA
~IJ.· ~
N VENSO
jl,\lfYJl
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Attorney at Law
State Bar No. 24002896 State Bar No. 20545250
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 &30 Apollo Street
Houston, Texas 71002 Houston, Texas 77058
Phone: (713) 758-&200 Phone: (409) 789-8661
Fax: (7l3) 758-8292 Fax: {281) 286-9990
ATIORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, AITORNEY FOR RESPONDENT,
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
State Bar No. 08455300
AGREED JUDGMENT 0 F PROBATED SUSPENSION
Page 6 of6
CITATION ~'ROFESS!ONAl Cl\/ll PROCESS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. ANTHONY P. Cause No.: 12-CV-1732
GRIFFIN lOth District Court of Galveston County
TO: Anthony P. Griffin,lllS 21st Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any other place he may be found.
GREETINGS: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED. You may employ an attorney.lf you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the Clerk
who issued this citation by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days from the date you were served this
citation and petition/motion, a default judgment may be taken against you.
Said written answer may be filed by mailing same to: District Clerk's Office, 600 59th Street, Suite4001, Galveston, Texas 77551-2388.
The case is presently pending before the lOt\District Court of Galveston County sitting in Galveston, Texas, and the; Original Petition-
DCA was filed; July 30, 2012. It bears cause number 12-CV-1732 and see the attached petition/motion for named parties to the suit.
Issued and given under my hand and the seal of said court at Galveston, Texas, on this the 30th day of July, 2012.
Issued at the request of: Doryn Danner Glenn, District Clerk
Shannon Breaux Sauceda Galveston County, Texas
State Bar of Texas
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel By:
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
SEE AlTACHED FORM
NOTE: Status Conference set: 11/01/2012 at 10:00am
OFFICER/AUTHORIZED RETURN
Came to hand on the ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ __, 20_ at o'clock_. M. and executed at._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ in __________County,Texas,on
the _ _ day of 20_ at ___ o'clock _m, by delivering to in
person a true copy of this Citation together with the accompanying _ _ copy(ies} of the ; Original Petition -DCA attached thereto
and I endorsed on said copy of the Citation the date of delivery. To certify which I affix my hand officially this the ___ day of
- - - - - - - - - ' 20_.
Fee-Serving: _ _ __
Sheriff/Constabie
Amount: _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ County, Texas
BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Authorized Person/Deputy Signature
On this day personally appeared known to me to be the person whose signature appears on the
foregoing return, personally appeared. After being duly sworn by me, he/she stated that this citation was executed by him/her in the
exact manner recited on the return. ·
Sworn to and subscribed before me, on this dayof 20
------ --------------------------
Notary Public
CAUSE NO.
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE,
Petitioner,
vs.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, a
committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, and would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:
I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.3 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Petitioner
intends discovery in this case to be conducted under the Level2 Discovery Control Plan.
II. PARTIES
Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (hereinafter referred to
as "Petitioner"), a committee of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.
Respondent is ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent"),
Texas Bar Card No. 08455300, a licensed attorney and a member of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS.
III. NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Petitioner brings this disciplinary action pursuant to the STATE BAR AcT, TEXAS
GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (Vernon 2003); the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. The
Complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was filed on or after January 1, 2004.
IV. VENUE
Respondent's principal place of practice is Galveston County, Texas; therefore, venue is
appropriate in Galveston County, Texas, pursuant to Rule 3.03 of the TEXAS RULES OF
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Respondent may be served at his business address, 1115 21st
Street, Galveston, Texas 77550, or any place he may be found.
V. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
The acts and omissions of Respondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professional
misconduct as defmed by Rule 1.06V of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION
1. On or about May 12, 2010, KRISTINA GUZMAN (hereinafter referred to as
"GUZMAN") hired Respondent for representation in an employment retaliation matter.
Respondent's fee was Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). GUZMAN paid
Respondent a total amount of Four Thousand One Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($4, 100.00),
with an agreement to pay the remaining balance in installments. Respondent and GUZMAN did
not execute an employment contract.
2. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on GUZMAN'S part except for
preparing a rough draft of the petition in or around April2011.
3. During the course of the representation, GUZMAN made numerous attempts to
contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed to
communicate with GUZMAN.
4. On or about July 11, 2011, GUZMAN left a message for Respondent notifying
him that she might be moving out of state and therefore, was requesting a refund of unearned
fees. Minutes later, Respondent finally responded that he would not refund her money, but
Original Disciplinary Peliliow"Anlhony P. Gnffin Page 2
g:\litdocs\gri ffin .a. p_sbs\ 143 _,ouzman _lit\pleadings\dp.docx
would look at her file and call her back. Respondent failed to call GUZMAN as promised. As
such, on or about August 24, 2011, GUZMAN sent Respondent a letter whereby she terminated
Respondent's representation and requested a detailed invoice of the services he provided, as well
as the return of her client file. Respondent failed to provide GUZMAN with an accounting and
further failed to return her client file.
VII. RULE VIOLATIONS
The acts and/or omissions of Respondent described above constitute conduct in violation
of the following Rules of the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to the lawyer;
1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
1.04(a) a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an
illegal fee or unconscionable fee;
1.04(d) a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method
by which the fee is to be determined;
1.14(b) upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, a
lawyer shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property
upon request; and
1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled
and refunding any advance payments of fee that has not been earned.
VIII.
The Complaint that forms tl1e basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of
the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the STATE BAR OF TEXAS by KRISTINA
GUZMAN'S filing of a grievance on or about November 28, 2011.
Original Disciplinary PetlliDIVAnthony P. Griffin Page 3
g.:\litdocs\griffin. a.p_sbs\ 143 _guzman _I it\pleadings\dp.docx
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner, the COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINE, respectfully prays that this Court discipline Respondent, ANTHONY
P. GRIFFIN, by reprimand, suspension or disbarment, as the facts shall warrant; order
restitution to Complainant, if applicable; and grant all other relief, general or specific, at law or
in equity, to which Petitioner may show itself to be justly entitled including, without limitation,
expenses, costs of court, and attorneys' fees.
Respectfully submitted,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Clrief Disciplinary Counsel
LINDA A. ACEVEDO
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
State Bar No. 24002896
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 758-8200
Fax: (713) 758-8292
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER,
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
Original Disciplinary Pet ilion/Anthony P. Gritlin Page4
g \litdocs\griffin.a.p_sbs\143 _guzman_lit\pleadings\dp.docx
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF GALVESTON COUNTY
CIVIL CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT
The case Information Statement is for administrative purposes only. It shall be filed with the Parties
Original Pleadings and shall be served upon all other parties to the action. All Status Conferences will
be set for Thursdays following 90 days from the date of filing according to each Courts scheduled times
10m District Court- 10:00 A.M. 212m District Court- 9:00 A.M.
56tll District Court- 9:30 A.M. 405Ut District Court - 9:30 A.M.
122na District Court-9:30A.M.
Notice of Status Conference Setting: Please calendar this event
Date 11101/2012 set in the lOth District Court
12-CV-1732- lOth District Court
Commission For Lawyer Discipline vs. Anthony P Griffin
Nameofp· 11ng t h"IS t orm
nmary_ Attorney fT Name of Opposrng Attorney, if known
Attorney Name Attorney Name
Attorney Bar No. Attorney Bar No.
Attorney Address Attorney Address
Attorney Phone No. Attorney Phone No.
Attorney Fax No. Attorney Fax No.
Briefly describe the case, including special characteristics that may warrant extended discovery or
accelerated disposition.
If discovery LEVEL 3 is requested, explain why. Attach additional sheets, if necessary.
Estimated time for discovery Estimated trial time
Do you presently anticipate adding any parties? If so when?
Level Assignment Preferred: (please check one)
Level1 Level2 Level3
$50,000 or less All Other Cases Court Order Only
Is this case suitable for ADR? (yes or no) _ _ _ _ _ __ ADR M e t h o d ? - - - - - - - - -
Signature of Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date signed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Printed Name of Attorney: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
Misc. Docket No. 12-9119
Appointment of a District Judge to Preside
in a State Bar Disciplinary Action
The Supreme Court of Texas hereby appoints the Honorable Darlene Byrne, Judge ofthe
126th District Court, Austin, Texas, to preside in the Disciplinary Action styled:
The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Anthony P. Griffin
to be filed in a District Court of Galveston County, Texas.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall promptly forward to the District Clerk of Galveston
County, Texas, a copy of the Disciplinary Petition and this Order for filing pursuant to Rule 3.03,
Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
As ordered by the Supreme Court of Texas, in chambers,
With the Seal thereof affixed at the City
of Austin, this JB:I:..da-y of July, 2012.
~~-~
BLAKE HAWTHORNE, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
This assigrunent, made by Misc. Docket No. 12-9119, is also an assignment by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to Texas Government Code,§ 74.057.
fL
Signed this {~ day of July, 2012.
Wallace B. Jefferson
Chief Justice
Misc. Docket No. 12-9119 Page2
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Ojfzce of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
December 21, 2011
CMRRR#: 70101870000315035500
Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin
1115 21st Street
Galveston, Texas 77550-4624
Re: H0111134143 Kristina Guzman- Anthony Paul Griffin
Dear Mr. Griffin:
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy
of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined
that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint.
Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney.
You must furnish to this office a written response to the- Complaint within thirty (30) days of
receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the
Complaint, and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a
determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant
to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a
copy of your response directly to the Complainant.
·Pursuant to Rules 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Ru1es of Professional
Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes
Professional Misconduct.
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings,
except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be
disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the
Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary
Counsel may provide appropriate infonnation, including the response, to law enforcement
agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter.
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292
s· erely,
1 1.
~euVt\L~
L. Collier
stant Disciplinary Counsel
Office ofthe Chief Disciplinary Counsel
State Bar of Texas
JLC/ra
Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint)
CF2-3.
RECEIVED
DEC 20 2611
STAlE BAR OFTEXASOFFICE OF THE CHJEF))ISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
HOUSTONCDC . STATEBAROFTEXAS RETU NING
GRIEVANCE FORM lt ender
/
I. GENERALINFORMATION ~QV} 0 20!1
Before you fill out thi~ pap~nvork, there may be a.faste:r way to resolve the iss
are currently having with aii attorney.
If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the f,
reasons:
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
You believe your attorney is neglecting your case. · State Bar of Texa~/
Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the statuS'~~-··..-·
of your case. ·
You have fired your attorney l:lut are having problems getting your file back from
the attorney. ' ·
You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program
(CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.
CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of
issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievan9e.
CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing
information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by
contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter.
I have L_ I have not ___ contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program.
NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section
blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know."
. ' .
I!. INFORM:ATION ABOUT YOU-- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT
I. TDCJ/SID #
PIMr.
-f\lf-V-L..!..llA--L--.,---- r¢ Ms. Name:.
\)
'f\.YI5fl (/\.?!
6uzm:::u1
Imiriigration # _ _ _ _ _ __
Address:
City:~·~~----.-- State: _ _ _ _ Zip Code: ---~-.--
0411
2. Employer:_
Employer's Address:
---------------------------------------------
3. Telephone number: Residence e-·. I • I' •. Work: -----~-----~
Other: - - - - - - - -
4. Drivers License # Date of Birth '
--------
5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.
Name Address
Telephone.
6. Do you understand and write in the English language? -·--".~"+-'-e~5_,_______~_
If no, what is your primary language? ·
Who helped you prepare this form?----------:---:-:----....._-
Will they be.available to transla'te future correspondence during this process? - - - -
7. Are you a Judge? :-'-b>.::::.-!!0"------.,.-,-------
If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
III. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY
Note: Grievances are not accepted against law firms. You must specifically name the
attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be
completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining.
1. Attorney name: \\(')\='nOb~ 0ri.f-.fi V1 Address: ! I (6 Moody fu;oe:
City: Gu \ves\o Y\ State:_U~--- Zip Code: :r'l S&o
2. Telephone number: Work tfotl ·J !f3· o 32>11 Home _ _ _ _ _ __
3. Have you or a me!)l'l:fer of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously?
Yes_ No _../_1lff'"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __
0411 2
Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals about this attorney?
Yes __ No L If"yes," please state its approximate date and outcome.
4. Please _9heck one of the following:
_L_ This attorney was hired to represent me.
This attorney was appointed to represent me.
This attorney was hired to represent someone else.
Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. Malj \ 1.. 12Dl 0
Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. IZ..tpr.e~i
5. What was your fee arrangement with .the attorney? __,$.___5"""+1....
()""0--"0"'-------·-·_·_ _ _ _ __
How much did you pay the attorney? ~~~'--~.Yf'-'-\4.QPO-L----------------
If you signed a contract and have a~' please attach.
If you have~ of checks and/or receipts, please attach.
Do not send originals.
6. If you didcr;ot hir~ the attomey;what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly
7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? __N-'--"'-'l"")_ _ _ _ __
If yes, please provide information about your current a t t o r n e y : - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use
disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney
0411 3
such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence
etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and lJ)Cation).
(J ·.
9. -Did the attorney ever make any statem-ents or admissions to you or·in your presence that
would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression
or a substarice:use disorder?':Jfso, please prov1de.details. -.. --
IV. INF.ORMATION ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE
I. Where did the activity you are complaining about occur? · .·
2. If ymlr grie_vance is. about a ·lawsuit, ariswer the following, if known: ..
a: Name ofcourt
--------------------------------~-----------------
b. Title of the suit·-
------------------~------~-----------------------
c. Case number and date suit was· filed_-____c,__...:,..__ _ _ __.:.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connecti-on with it? Explain briefly .
....~ ...
:...::-. :.... ' .
3. .··Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done ·something improp~r or has fa lied
to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if
. : . . . • ' ·,j:' \ .• '
necessary.
If you have copies of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your
grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.
Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of all persons who k'~ow
something about your grievance. -
0411 4
Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance will be forwarded to the
attorney named in your grievance.
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t{.-\-o.llo..:haf\ c..o.s-e ll1jlLlf\51: mlj pr'E-v,oas .emplnr:jPY, &i&hno -vs-12e ~ fwif'fi, ~tiN
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V. HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE PROCESS?
Yellow Pages
Internet
Other
0411 5
VI. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WAIVER
I hereby expressly waive any attorney-client privilege as to the attorney, the subject of
this grievance, and authorize such attorney to reveal any information in the professional
relationship to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas.
I understand that the Office o( Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential the
processing ofGrievances. · ·
Sighatur~~ ~·· _!_f..LI·_,3~·-=-'l.L/~~~~-
·Date: ·.....
To ENSURE PROMPT ATTENTiON; THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE MAILED TO:
THE OFFICE OF' CHIEF DISCIPUNARY COUNSEL
P.O. Box 13287
· ·Austin:, Texas 78711
.. -·;
. :··
.'(' .
0411 6
On July 30, 2011 at 10:30am I contacted Griffin law firm and spoke with a male assistant
who answered the phone and advised that Griffin was out of the office and wouldn't be
returning until later that week. I stated to the individual that I've been calling for weeks
and months and was tired of leaving a voicemail message and would never receive a call
back. The individual suggest that I call Griffin on a direct cell phone line, and the number
he gave me was {713} 408-1346. At 10:32 am I contacted Griffin who didn't answer so I
left him a voice message stating that I had made many calls inquiring the status of the
case and had not received a call back and that I was possibly moving out of the states
and was requesting my refund of money back due to the false agreement we·;held from
the May 12, 20:!.0. Griffin returned my phone call back and at approximately 10:36am
and replied that "it didn't work like that, and give him a couple of days to look over my
files". He stated that he would contact me within a couple of days. I never received a call
from Griffin like he said from the previous phone conversation we held. So on August
24,20111 sent Griffin a certified letter through the USPS letting. him know that I wanted
all work to be stopped, I wanted a bill receipt of all the work he have done, and to turn
over all files. In return Griffin sent in the mail a letter stating NO REFUND/ CLOSING FILE.
He had stated in his letter that "We have performed consistent with our contract,"
which was a false statement. No work other than the rough draft he typed was done
which took place on April17, 2011. Mr. Griffin had confirmed that the lawsuit would not
take longer than a year to finalize. After our meeting we held on April17, 2011 he stated
that from that date it would be one month exactly and everything would be finalized.
- ')
2. 010
-~I
P::~eas-:=
accep-c t::h.is let t>=-r o_s c-.::-.::lfirTnat.i.c)n c>f ~-~~=
~-?ayTnerlt: :>f $3,00C~OO on yot:r :ceta.ine.r:- c~f $5,..00C~O·~; Coal2:-1.c~2
·r~.:~ 11 be. p-3.ya!.:·J_e o-\p:::-~ 9 0 · da~:.. fJ~=.r:!. o6.) _ Pl ea.se: :-:: ·:: t.e t 11-=~ t. -.~Je
will prepare a contract and forward ~nder ssparate ccve~­
Th;.:mk yc.-cJ. for coE.sid·;:,ring our finn.
Si11ce:cely,
----
-------
/_..........-
__ ..-····'
· .•.. _
·~----AII-:.:~iC;ny Griffi-r1 P.
A Griffi_n Lawyers
11~'--~i ~~()Cd~{
Galvescon, Texas 7'7550
4t)9. 75~:.: _ 03BE-
i. SOli .. 750- 5(!:!4
Facsimile No. 409.763_4102
E~.PG/
files
::; : ··1o.r:d g:.l7.m-=.n __ kr.ist.i:::1..3._ clie::-}t:_G0::Jfirr:l<::t: i.o-:-,;,
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN. INC.
A Projessiona l C01poratioH
Lawyers
Galveston Is land
Galveston, Texas 77550
,_7uly 6 r 2C:O
Tc: K~istina Guzman
~~':::-orr:: 1-'..nthony P. GriffiD. 1 ::.inc.
CAUSE NO.
KRISTINA - GUZMAN IN THE.
v. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
E? CORPORATION - USA
~~u MICHAEL CASTANEDA GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFF, KRISTINA L. GUZMAN'S, ORIGINAL PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COUIRT:
This lawsuit is brought by Kristina L. Guzman, J
hereinafter and sometimes referred to as Plaintiff, against
BP Corporation and Michael Castaneda, hereinafter referred
to as Defendants. Plaintiff brings this suit complaining
that her rights under Texas law have been violated.
Plaintiff sues for damages:
I.
This matter is a schedule 2 matter as that term is
defined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.
At all times material to this action, Plaintiff has
been a resident of the County of Galveston.
Defendant, BP Corporation, can be served with process
by serving its registered agent, to-wit:
Defendant, Michael Castaneda, can be served with
process by serving him at
III.
Plaintiff began employment with Wackenhunt Security on
November 3, 2009 as a Patrol Officer at the BP, Texas City,
Texas site. Plaintiff worked the site without incident or
complaint.
On or about September 27, 2009, Plaintiff was called
in office, based on a complaint from Ben Weir, Security
j
Operations Center. Plaintiff told that Weir complained
with respect to her having a tongue ring. Plaintiff denied
having a ring and a picture was taken of her tongue.
During the process of taking the picture, Plaintiff was
informed as to who made the complaint and was informed by
Reza Ahwazi, Wackenhut BP Project Manager, that Ben Weir
wanted her out of the plant.
On or about September 25 1 2009, Ben Weir, approached
Plaintiff and inquired whether she changed her hair for
him. Plaintiff didn't know what to say·to the comment.
Plaintiff then went to her management Reza Ahwazi and
reported the comment. She informed her management she
didn't know Mr. Weir and did not know why the comment was
being made (a good faith complaint). Mr. Ahwazi stated he
would investigate the matter.
IV.
In Ahwazi's investigative report he explains that he
presented the complaint to Ben Weir and Castaneda. The
following information is found in the report:
I immediately proceeded to SOC to communicate the
incident with Ben Weir first and ask him If he was
involved in these inappropriate comments. I brought
the matter to Officer Ben Weir attention. He answered
its bunch of B.S. and asked to bring this matter to
Michael Castaneda's attention. Officer Ben Weir and I
walked to Mr. Castaneda's office and I handed over the
statement by Officer Guzman to Mr. Castaneda, after a
very brief look at the statement Mr. Castaneda aia,
(this is stupid) and that nothing makes sense, moments
later Mr. Castaneda turned over the statement hack to
me and said (forget about it) and there's no merit to
this and no one needs to know about this. Although I
believed that this matter should be investigated by BP
further, I decided that for the sake of our contract
and of our officers, I thought it would be best that I
closed the case with no fault on Officer Ben Weir's
side.
Wackenut's contract and existence ln the BP ended
February 12, 2010. The new contract was taken over by
Securitas Security. Securitas hired all of the other
patrol personnel that were under the contract with
Wackenhut, but did not hire Plaintiff. ' When Plaint.iff
inquired of Securitas why she was not hired, Plaintiff was
informed that BP did not want her out at the facility. It
is Plaintiff's belief that she was denied employment with
Securitas because of her good faith complaint that she
reported about Weir's comments.
v.
,-",nthony Gdfin
M:r. Griffin per ou:.- conversation '\Ve held on 07-30-2011 at
2.?proximately l032am. I am requesting that all vwrk on the case
Kristin2. Guzman -vs. - BP be stopped. I ru'TI also requesting that you
provide a detailed bill receipt and tunwver all files. I have made previocs
phone calls a week after-talking with you about requesting my funds of
$4. 100 dollars back that \Vas advised b:,: yourself.
Thank You
Kristina L. Guzman
' ~--
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. ,.. !·L_.. i·;__ _c__ .·
•.-
; ·-''··./
A GRIFFIN LA WYERS
Galvesron Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
August 29, 2011
Kristina L. Guzman
J
RE: NO REFUND/CLOSING FILE
Ms. Guzman:
Please note that I am acknowledging that you have a
desire to terminate t.he processing of your case because of
your movin9 from the area. Please note that there will be
:no refund. We have· performed consistent with our contract.
Good luck in the future and on your move.
Sincerely, ___
::.--:-- ' '
(/
------
__________
./"'
~
---_.-/- /~--- -·
.................
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lavryers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
xc: Interoffice -Rita Westerman
(close file)
c: word-guzman_J-:ristina_cli6nt3_transrni ttal
CAUSE NO. 12-CXV-1732
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN THE lOTH
V. JUDICIAL DISTR~;,, ~C§!JRT
\% tin, Texas
78701).
Judgmcn1 ofPlll1:ially Prob9ted Suspension
Page 4 of9
Respondent shall pay restitu1jon to Polly Reddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00
Dollars ($5,000.00). In July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to Polly Reddin in the amount of
Five Thousand aud Noll 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore satisfied this condition of the
Judgment.
Respondent shall complete the Law Office Management Program by January 14,2014, and
provide proof of completion to the STATEBAROFTEXAS, ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O.
Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), by January 14,
2014.
It is further 0 RD ERED that during the term of active suspension ordered herein, or that may
be imposed upon Respondent by the BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS (hereinafter referred to as
"BODA") as a result of a probation revocation proceeding, Respondent shall be prohibited from
practicing law in Texas; holding lumself out as an attorney at law; performing any legal services for
others; accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services; appearing as counsel or in any
representative capacity in any proceeding in any Texas or Federal court or before any administrative
body; or holding himself out to others or using his name, in any mmmer, in conjunction with the
words "attorney at law,'' "attorney,." "counselor at law," or "lawyer."
It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately notify each of Respondent's
current clients and opposing counsel in writing of this suspension.
in addition to such notification, it is fmther ORDERED that Respondent shall return any
files, papers, unearned monies and other prope1ty belonging to current clients in Respondent's
possession to the respective clients or to another attorney at the client's request.
:It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief
Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711~2487 (1414 Colorado St.,
Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension
Page 5 of9
Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty (30) days after the date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit
stating all current clients and opposing counsel have been notified of Respondent's suspension and
· that all files, papers, morues and other property belonging to all current clients have been returned as
ordered herein.
It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall, immediately, notifY in writing each and every
justice of the peace, judge, magistrate, administxative judge or officer and chief justice of each and
every court or tribunal in which Respondent has any matter pe!iding of the tenus of this Judgment,
the style and cause number of the pending matter(s ), and the name, address and telephone number of
the client(s) Respondent is representing.
It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall file with the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Chief
Disciplinary Counsel's Office, P.O. Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St.,
Austin, Texas 78701) on or before thirty(30) days aflerthe date this Judgment is signed, an affidavit
stating Respondent has notified in writing each and every jmtice of the peace, judge, magistxate, and
chiefj mstice of each and every court in which Respondent has any matter pending of the terms ofthis
judgment, the style and cause number of the pending matter(s), and the name, address and telephone
number of the client(s) Respondent is representing in Court.
It is further ORDERED that Respondent shall immediately surrender his law license fu'1d
permanent State Bar Card to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ChiefDisciplinMy Counsel's Office, P.O.
Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado St., Austin, Texas 78701), to be forwarded to
the SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS.
Terms of Probation
It is furt..'ter ORDERED that during all periods of suspension, Respondent shall be under the
following terms and conditions:
Judgment of Partially P1·o bated Suspwsion
Page 6 of9
1. Respondent shall not violate any term of this Judgment.
2. Respondent shall not engage :in professionai misconduct as defined by Rule 1.06(V) of
the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLTI-.!ARY PROCEDURE.
3. Respondent shall not violate any state or federal criminal statutes.
4. Respondent shall keep the STATE BAR OF TEXAS membership department notified of
current mailing, residence and business addresses and telephone numbers.
5. Respondent shall comply with Minimum Contin.uing Legal Education requirements.
6. Respondent shall comply with Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements.
7. Respondent shall promptly respond to any request for information from the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel in connection with any investigation of any allegations of
professional misconduct.
Probation Revocation
Upon information that Respondent has violated a term of this Judgment, the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel may, in addition to all other remedies available, file a motiori to revoke
probation pursuant to Rule 2.23 of the TEXAS RULES OF DJSCIPLINAR Y PROCEDURE with the Board of
Disciplinary Appeals (hereinafter refened to as "BODA") and serve a copy of the motion on
Respondent pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 21 a.
BODA shall conduct an evidentiary hea.ring. At tl1e hearing, BODA shall determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether Respondent has violated any term of this Judgment. If
BODA finds grounds for revocation, BODA shall enter an order revoking probation and placing
Respondent on active suspension from the date of such revocation order. Respondent shall not be
given credit for any term of probation served prior to revocation.
It is further ORDERED that any conduct on the part of Respondent which serves as the basis
for.a ~notion to revoke probation may also be brought as independent grounds for discipline as
Judgment of Partially Probated Suspr.nsion
Page 7 of 9
allowed under the TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and TEXAS RULES OF
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Restitution. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
It is fwther ORDERED Respondent shall pay restitution to Polly Reddin in the amount of
Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00). 1".1 July 2013, Respondent tendered payment to
PollyReddin in the amount of Five Thousand and No/1 00 Dollars ($5,000.00), and has therefore
satisfied this condition of the Judgment.
It is further ORDERED Respondent shall pay aU reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees
and direct expenses to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS in the amount of One Thousand Six Hundred Ten
and No/100 Dollars ($1 ,61 0.00). In July 2013, Respon~cnt made a payment to the STATE BAR OF
TEXAS in the amount of Five Hundred and No/1 00 Dollars ($500.00). The remaining payment One
Thousand One Hundred Ten and Noll 00 Dollars ($1, 11 0.00) shall be due and payable on or beJore
January 14, 2014, and shaH be made by certified or cashier's check or money order. Respondent
shall forward the funds, made payable to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS, to the STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ChiefDisciplinary Counsel's Office, p_Q_ Box 12487, Austin, Texas 78711-2487 (1414 Colorado
St., Austin, Texas 78701).
It is fw.ther ORDERED that all amounts ordered herein are due to the misconduct of
Respondent, are assessed as a part of the sanction in accordance with Rule l.06(Y) of the TEXAS
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE. Any amount not paid shall accme interest at the maximum
legal rate per annum until paid and the STATE BAR OF TEXAS shall have all writs and other post-
judgment remedies against Respondent in order to r.ollect all unpaid amounts.
Judgm~.nt of Partially Probated Snspcnsinn
Page 8 of9
Publ.ication
This suspension shall be made a matter of record and appropriately published in accordance
with the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.
Other Relief
All requested relief not expressly granted herein is expressly DENIED.
siGNED this 22nd.dayof Ocrobey '2013.
EVIDENTIARY PANEL
DISTRICT NO. 5-2
STATE DAR OF TEX...\.S
Judgment of Partially Probated Suspensioo
Page 9of9
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
I RECEIVED JUL .L 8 201 ~
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
July 16, 2012
Via Certified Mail No. 7010 1870 0003 1503 6200,
Return Receipt Requested
Anthony P. Griffin
1115 21 51 Street
Galveston, Texas 77550-4624
RE: Case No. H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony P. Griffin
Dear Mr. Griffin:
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has completed its investigation of the above-referenced
Complaint and deterrriined on July 5, 2012, that there is Just Cause to believe that you have
committed one or more acts of Professional Misconduct, as defined by the TEXAS RULES OF
DlSCIPLfNARY PROCEDURE (TRDP).
In accordance with TRDP 2.14D, a statement of your acts and/or omissions and the TEXAS
DlSClPLfNARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel contends
are violated by the alleged acts and/or omissions follows:
On or about October 4, 2011, Polly Reddin (hereinafter refened to as
"Complainant") hired Anthony P. Griffm (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent")
to file a civil suit related to the payment of a debt. Complainant paid Respondent
Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) for the representation with the
understanding from Respondent that he would file suit on her behalf.
During the course of the representation, Complainant made numerous attempts to
contact Respondent to ascertain the status of her case; however, Respondent failed
to communicate with Complainant. Complainant made an appointment to meet
with Respondent on February 24, 2012, which was later canceled. When
Complainant met with Respondent on February 27, 2012, Respondent presented
Complainant with a petition that contained several enors. Complainant made
another appointment to meet with Respondent on March 2, 2012, but that
appointment was also canceled. At the next appointment scheduled on March 5,
g: \general\griffin. a_sbs\73 B_red dm\corres pondencc\el ecti on letter docx
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 758-8200 Toll Free: (866) 224-5999 Fax: (713) 758-8292
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
Anthony P. Griffin
July 16,2012
RE: Case No. H0031234738
Page2
2012, Complainant was informed that the corrected paperwork was not ready and
to come back the next day. On March 6, 2012, Complainant called Respondent's
office before she made the trip and was told that Respondent was out of town and
her corrected paperwork still was not ready. As a result, on March 6, 2012,
Complainant sent Respondent an email whereby she terminated his representation
and requested a refund of her retainer. Respondent failed to refund any unearned
portion of the retainer.
These alleged acts violate the following TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT:
l.Ol(b)(l) in representing a client, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to the lawyer;
1.03(a) a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information; and
1.15(d) upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payments of
fee that has not been earned.
Pursuant to TRDP 2.15, you must notify this office whether you elect to have the Complaint
heard by an Evidentiary Panel ofthe District Grievance Committee or in a district court of proper
venue, with or without a jury. The election must be in writing and served upon the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel's Office no later than twenty (20) days after your receipt of this
notice. Failure to file a timely election shall conclusively be deemed an affirmative election to
proceed before an Evidentiary Panel in accordance with TRDP 2.17 and 2.18.
Enclosed is a form in which to indicate your election and principal place of practice. It should be
mailed to the undersigned at the address shown at the bottom of this Jetter. In making your
election, you should be aware than an Evidentiary Panel proceeding is confidential unless a
public sanction is entered and that a private reprimand is only available before an
Evidentiary Panel. District court proceedings are public and a private reprimand is not an
available sanction.
g:\general\griffin.a_sbs\738_reddin\correspondence\election Jetter.docx
COMPLAINT AGAINST §
§
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN § H000031234738 [POLLY REDDING]
§
GALVESTON, TEXAS §
RESPONDENT'S ELECTION &
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF PRACTICE CERTIFICATION
I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby elect: (Choose one of the following)
- - - - District Court
_ _ _ _ Evidentiary Hearing - District Grievance Committee
I, Anthony P. Griffin, hereby certify that:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Physical Address- no P.O. Box)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _(City), _ _ _ _ _ _ (County),
Texas, is my principal place of practice.
SIGNED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2012.
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
**RETURN THIS FORM WITHIN 20 DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ELECTION NOTICE**
g:\general\gri ffin .a_sbs\73 8_red din \correspondence\election letter. do ex
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
April10,2012
CMRRR#: 70101870000315040597
Mr. Anthony Paul Griffin
11 15 21st Street
Galveston, Texas 77550-4624
Re: H0031234738 Polly Reddin- Anthony Paul Griffin
Dear Mr. Griffin:
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel has received the above-referenced Grievance, a copy
of which is enclosed with this notice. This office has examined the Grievance and determined
that the information provided alleges Professional Misconduct. Pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure, this matter has been classified as a Complaint.
Please advise this office immediately if you are represented in this matter by an attorney.
You must furnish to this office a written response to the Complaint within thirty (30) days of
receipt of this notice. The response should address specifically each allegation contained in the
Complaint; and should further provide all information and documentation necessary for a
determination of Just Cause as defmed in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Pursuant
to Rule 2.10 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, you are required to provide a
copy of your response directly to the Complainant.
Pursuant to Rules 8.0l(b) and 8.04(a)(8) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, failure or refusal to timely furnish a response or other information requested by
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, without timely asserting legal grounds to do so, constitutes
Professional Misconduct.
The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel maintains as confidential Disciplinary Proceedings,
except that the pendency, subject matter, and status of a Disciplinary Proceeding may be
disclosed by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel if the Respondent has waived confidentiality or the
Disciplinary Proceeding is based upon conviction of a serious crime. The Chief Disciplinary
Counsel may provide appropriate information, including the response, to law enforcement
agencies, under Rule 6.08 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
You will be notified in writing of further proceedings in this matter.
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000 Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: 713-758-8200 Fax: 713-758-8292
Enclosure(s): Grievance (Copy of Complaint)
CF2-J.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF TEXAS RECEIVED
GRIEVANCE FORM
APR 02 2012
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Before you fill out this paperwork, there may be a faste~~e£~ the issue you
are currently having with an attorney.
If you are considering filing a grievance against a Texas attorney for any of the following
reasons:
You believe your attorney is neglecting your case.
Your attorney does not return phone calls or keep you informed about the status
of your case.
You have fired your attorney but are having problems getting your file back from
.the attorney.
You may want to consider contacting the Client-Attorney Assistance Program
(CAAP) at 1-800-932-1900.
CAAP was established by the State Bar of Texas to help people resolve these kinds of
. issues with attorneys quickly, without the filing of a formal grievance.
CAAP can resolve many problems without a grievance being filed by providing
information, by suggesting various self-help options for dealing with the situation, or by
contacting the attorney either by telephone or letter.
I have ___ I have not V contacted the Client-Attorney Assistance Program.
NOTE: Please be sure to fill out each section completely. Do not leave any section
blank. If you do not know the answer to any question, write "I don't know."
II. INFORMATION ABOUT YOU- PLEASE KEEP CURRENT
1. TDCJ/SID# _ _ _ _ _ ~:. Name: flJI~KcJJin
Immigration# _ _ _ _ _ __
Address:
State: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip Code:-~----
0411
2. Employer:_
Employer's Address:_··
3. Telephone number: Residence Work:
Other: - - - - - - - -
4. Drivers License # _ _ Date of Birth___,~~~.:::....._.:::.....___
5. Name, address, and telephone number of person who can always reach you.
Name _______________ Address.....:_______________~~-=---
Telephone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
6. Do you understand and write in the English language? ---'k\"4-.~...t'_SL......._ _ _ __
lf no, what is your primary language? ·
Who helped you prepare this form? _....!N...!.·~o=--~o:.Lr.J..:.ceO::::...._______________
Will they be available to translate future correspondence during this process? _____
7. Are you a Judge? _ _....~.rJ:...!....!:o=--._ _ _ __
If yes, please provide Court, County, City, State: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ffi. INFORMATION ABOUT ATTORNEY
Note: Grievances are not accepted against law fmns. You must specifically name the
attorney against whom you are complaining. A separate grievance form must be
completed for each attorney against whom you are complaining. ·
Address: .//IS . (Y)ooal'-1
City: C-rc. lves +t>11 State: lex 'i .s Zip Code: ""]I s-s- D
2. Telephone number: Work 4o1- ·7 &3-· o381..Jlome _ _ _ _ _ __ Other 'gOO-').S'D-'5o:Jf
3. Have you or a member of your family filed a grievance about this attorney previously?
Yes~ No V If"yes", please state its approximate date and outcome. _ _ _ _ __
0411 2
Have you or a member of your family ever filed an appeal with the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals about this attorney?
Yes _ _ No JL If''yes," please state its approximate date and outcome.
4. Please check one of the following:
V This attorney was hired to represent me.
This attorney was appointed to represent me.
This attorney was hired to represent someone else.
Please give the date the attorney was hired or appointed. _ __._f....:O=-----=~J_---.:..1-'1:..___ _ __
Please state what the attorney was hired or appointed to do. X bi reJ hiM +6
reprebe,J- fhe C1ar11:xl {!h tr:.a'jt> Utle C:C~td /(e/sA..,..__'>
5. What was your fee arrangement with the attorney? JJ5·DOD. qp re--+a ,·tfl er "'f
How much did you pay the attorney? _.ff_--"S~~"""a"""m~'-'----C?_P___________~-
If you signed a contract and have a ~ please attach.
If you have~ of checks and/or rec~ipts, please attach.
Do not send originals.
6. If you did not hire the attorney, what is your connection with the attorney? Explain briefly
7. Are you currently represented by an attorney? ___,f'l'--.o_______
If yes, please provide information about your current attorney:
--------------------
8. Do you claim the attorney has an impairment, such as depression or a substance use
disorder? If yes, please provide specifics (your personal observations ofthe attorney
0411 3
such as slurred speech, odor of alcohol, ingestion of alcohol or drugs in your presence
etc., including the date you observed this, the time of day, and location).
9. Did the attorney ever make any statements or admissions to you or in your presence that
would indicate that the attorney may be experiencing an impairment, such as depression
or a substance use disorder? If so, please provide details.
IV. INFORMATION .ABOUT YOUR GRIEVANCE
1. Wbere did the activity you are complaining about occur?
County: ~u.\ves-ton
2. If your grievance is about a lawsuit, answer the following, if known:
a. Name of court
--------------------------------------------------
c. Case number and date suit was filed ------'N'-'-'e=---"-oJ--"e"---'--r__......[__,,'-·.u.lc_.'""'J'---------
d. If you are not a party to this suit, what is your connection with it? Explain briefly.
If you have~ of court documents, please attach.
3. Explain in detail why you think this attorney has done something improper or has failed
to do something which should have been done. Attach additional sheets of paper if
necessary. A He.. c 1\e cl
If you have ~ of letters or other documents you believe are relevant to your
grievance, please attach. Do not send originals.
Include the names, addresses, and telephone number of aU persons who know
something about your grievance.
0411 4
Also, please be advised that a copy of your grievance wiD be forwarded to the
attorney named in your grievance.
on 1o · 011 - w ,f-L-
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·lo,J. because o+ J)1e A~lidc:y nD-J{;;t 7 W bee"~ do~~e.k..-hr<-<.c.y
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+o Gu.. /ve:fo-1 +o £ce 1£ h;2 o{{/ce c.va.s s+i;t +here_. /-Ji:5
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wcc.s --/it~ rO(_.t)J/lcr Dl-{;.:1- JL.,~" {/he '6e.-i- u_p ari thff'C1/A l /1'1~1>/ t~r
me heca .... .se T 1Je74~ fo fork.{)tain czJ;~~-1 /f httal heert.
V. HOW DID YOU LEARN ABOUT THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS' ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE PROCESS?
Yellow Pages
Internet
v Other
0411 5
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To: anthonypgriffin
Subject: re:fund of retainer
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2012 12:24 pm
Dear Mr. Griffin, I am writing this letter to end our client I Lawyer
relationship. I am requesting a refund of my retainer for the following
reasons: I came in and spoke to you about my situation and you agreed
to take the case. At that time you told me our best bet was to file
suit against the title compa.ny because they had neglected to do there
jobs to protect me and included First Step Learning Center also. You
told me you would be filing suit the followng week so you needed a
$5000.00 retainer. I agreed to this and rushed to come up with the
money. Here we are 5 months later and nothing has been done. I have
e-rnailed you and recieved no response to e-mails I have called on
several occasions and dont even get the courtesy of a returned call. I
finally drove to Galveston to see if your office was even still there
to be told by the secretary you werent there you were out getting rid
of junk. She set me up an appointment for February 24th 2012 and it was
cancelled by your office. I was told to come in on Monday the 27th when
I got there I felt like some papers had been thrown together to shut me
up. When I asked about the lawsuit against the title company you asked
me why would I sue them? I then reminded you it was your idea. I then
had to refresh your memory on that. Which just proves my point Ive been
pushed to the side and its been to long since my file has even been
looked at. I then got another appointment to come back on March 2nd
2012. I explained to you we have wasted to much time and needed to move
on this. So March 2nd comes and again your office cancelled my
appointment. When I asked for my money back your response to me was to
calm down you would have everything together for me Monday March 5th
2012 so I again drove to Galveston to collect my paperwork and I was
again informed they werent ready to come in the morning .So March 6th
is here I thought I better call before making another wasted trip to
Galveston I was then told by your office that you were in Lousianna and
my stuff was still not ready and you had e-mailed me. I checked my
e-mail and never recieved anything from you. When I questioned her the
response I get is all I can do is tell you what he said. Well I think
Ive been patient enough and clearly not treated in a professional
manner. I am very disppointed in the way things have been handled. I
would like to recieve my retainer back ASAP so we can move forward.
Thank You, Polly Reddin
http://mail.aol.com/35683-lll/aol-6/en-us!Lite/PrintMessage.aspx?user=Z2Clj5wR86&fol... 3/6/2012
AOL Mail - Print Message Page 1 of 1
From: Polly<
To: anthonypgri:ffin
Subject: Suit for First Step Daycare or Polly World Inc .
. Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 3:55pm
--i Mr. Griffin, I was trying to follow up on the suit. I looked on my
books and I paid the retainer in october. I thought by now we might
have started something but I still havent heard anything from your
office. Do You --now when we might get things started? Please call and
let me know something. Thank You Polly Reddin 409-771-1854
http://mail.aol.com/3 5683-llllaol-6/en-us!Lite/PrinL\.1essage.aspx?user=Z2C 1j 5wR86&fol... 3/6/2012
- ..,
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' 20111006005500626455 3475
I •
0:
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
October 4, 2011
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
Parties to Agr~ement
This is to authorize A GRIFFIN LAWYERS/ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN,
INC. , hereinafter and sometimes referred to as LAWYERS, to act
as lawyers for the undersigned, POLLY REDDIN, hereinafter and
sometimes referred to as CLIENT{S), relative to all matters
concerning breach of contract, deceptive trade, etc ..
You are Hiring Us to Do What?
1. To investigate your case to determine the viability of
the case.
2. To advise you as to the viability of same.
3. To work with you wit.h respect to your case including
appearing on your behalf b~fore any corporat~on,
official, board, department, administrative body or to
file suit and in any Court {Federal or State), if
necessary and if v.rarranted.
Retainer/What is it?/What does It Mean?/What It Isn't?
1. In consideration of the services rendered and to be
rendered to client by the said law firm, the client
agrees to pay $5,000.00.
2. Your retainer is the consideration to hire ANTHONY P.
GRIFFIN, INC., h~wfZRS.
3. Sa.id retainer is no:.1-refundable. This means that once
the fee is paid, it shall be deemed earned. This does
not mean that the retainer represents the total
attorney fees due the firm (see 4 herein}.
4. This retainer fee should not be interpreted as
cor:stituting the full reasonable fee to which the
loav..ryers may be entitled for services performed pursuant
to an award of the Court or settlement.
Att.orney Fee Determination
The determina.tioD of attorneys' fees shall be made as
follow~::
1. The attorney ~J.as the right to petition the Court, in
the event the plaintiff prevails in this litigation,
for reasonable attorneys' fees, consistent with the
Texas la·;.,;. If -::t~e lawyer elects to receive the fee
award from the Court, then any such fees awarded by
1:he Court shall noi: be paid by the client or out of
1:he client's portion. This paragraph contemplates the
attorney petitioning the Court for additional fees.
'I'his does not take place unless you are the prevailing
2
party in the litigation.
2. The client is informed that the attorneys' hourly rate
ranges from $250.00 to $500.00 an hour in the civil
rights arena. '.rhe rate depends on the nature of the
case, ·the tasks t:o be performed, the reputation of the
lawyers, and other factors defined by the relat.i ve
case la·w and the civil litigation and/or area of
practice.
3. 'I'he lawyers are entitled to thirty three and third (33
1/3%) of any and all recovery obtained on behalf of
the client (gross recovery) which may be obtained by
virtue of compromise settlement/trial/verdict.
4. This provision allowing a contingent basis for
recovery of attorneys' fees does not prevent the
attorney from applying for the collecting at.torney
fees under the Texas law.
5. .P.ny fee awarded by the Court shall be applied dollar
for dollar to offset the contingent fee set out above
(by way of example - if the client recovers $100.00,
the attorney fee award shall derive off the top of the
3~~"
$100.00 ~~d forty percent (~) shall be deducted.
leaving the client a recovery of $60.00). If on
application for reasonable attorney fees the Court
3
awards $35.00 in lawyer fees, the client's obligation
shall be $25.00 (a dollar for dollar application).
6. In the ev-ent the reasonable attorney fee award exceeds
the contingent fee a~ffird, there shall be no deduction
of fees from th~ Clientrs portion and the fee award
will be the attor:neyrs sole recovery of fees. No
excess over the contingent fee amount shall be applied
to the Client's recovery.
7. In· the event the contingent fee, or vice versa, award
exceeds the award by the Court, the Lawyers are
awarded the greater of the two sums.
Cost - We Will Front Litigation Cost, Unless Agreed Otherwise.
Hm..• Do We Get Our Money Back?
Cost associated 'I'Tit:h this litigation shall be deducted from
the client's portion .. By way of example-
If recov-ery is :;noo. 00 (by compromise settlement)
and
3\\:J~C)
Attorney fees deducted at~= $60.00
Then costs would be deducted-from the client's
balance. ThE!r•afore,
If costs associated with the suit was $10.00, then
the client's recovery would be $60.00 minus $10,00
$50.00.
4
The srune type of deduction of costs takes place under
circumstances where contingent fees do not apply.
Guarantees - None
There are no guarantees held cut lfli th respect to the
results of this litigation.
Withdra\ltal, Malfeasance, Breach of Contract
1. Wit:hdrawal: Lawyers have an ethical obli•:ration to
represent the Client zealously within the bounds of the
law, but the Lawyers also have an obligation, when
material repr·O!sentation surfaces or where there is a
breach of '·:he terms of this contract by the Client, to
'\Ti'!:hdraw from the represe·ntation of the Client.
No;:hing in this contract guarantees any results,
including whether a suit will or will not be filed or
;;my other rr,atters t.hat border on guarantees. The only
guarantee re1:5tt:es to the repr:eHentation within the
confines of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(ze3.lously within the bounds of the law) . It has been
e.Arplained orally tbat the Lawyers' obligation to the
Court and the rules of ethics require investigation and
examination of the facts.
2. Investig.::Lt:i.on/If No Case: If t:he facts reveal no case
5
exists, the La\\ryer shall promptly advise the client and
tenninate ·the relationship. The retainer again is non-
refundable.
3. Investigat.ion/I'iaterial Breach: If the investigation
reveals a material breach 1 lie, or misstatement by the
client, the Lawyer will advise the Client as to how
such breach affect.s the J:.awyer' s ability to proceed in
the representation. 'lf termination is appropriate, the
La.1ryer (s) shall advise the client of her rights and
shall promptly take any necessary acts to protect the
Client (advise as to action) and the firm's rights.
A9ain, the :cetainer E~hall be deE>.nled non-r·efundable.
It shall be the exclusive privilege of Lawyers to determine
when and where sui:.s shall be filed. Agc-.in, Lawyers retain the
discretion whether i:o obligate the office in the appeal process ..
Compromise
No compromise Ol:- settlement of Client's claims will be made
without the consent of both Client and r.awyers.
I
6
Power of Atto~~eY.
Lawyers are hereby granted full authority to sign all legal
instruments, plead.ings,. drafts, aut.hori_zations and papers that
shall be J:easonably ner::essary to conclude settlement and/or
reduce to possession any and all monies or other things of value
due to Client under this claim as fully as Client could so do in
person.
~.
'
Keeping__ the Client Inf.:>rmed
Lawyers agree to produce copies of documents as related to
this litigation .and to keep the client fully informed.
Venue Lies in Galveston County
-~11 sums due and payable at Lawyers' office in Galveston
County, Texas. -~
SIGNED AND AGREED to on this the ___ .day of
---~-' 2011.
d14.~~~__:___
POLLY REDDIN
. >REED ~ef2~
2011.
liNTH·ClNY P. GRIFFIN
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
11.15 MOODY
GAL"i?ESTON, 'rEXP..s 77550
409.763.0385
1.800.750.5034
FACBilvfiLB N:::>. 409.753.43.02
agr.iffin@agriffinlawyers. com
anthonypgriffin@grnail.com
c:: \'iord. redd.iJl_L:-olJ.y. con.t::ract_ernploym·:mt
8
NOTICE OF CLIENTS
The Stat.e Bar of Texas investigate::; and prosecutes
professional misconduct c-Jr~mitted by Texas attorneys.
Although not every complaint against. or dispute with a
la:wyer involves professi.::mal misconduct, the State Bar 1
Office of G-eneral Counsel w:ill provide you with information
aJxmt how to file a complaint:. j
For more information, plea.se call 1.800.932.1900.
a toll-free phone call.
'!'his ·l·
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9
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, TexaS 77550
February 27, 2012
Polly Reddin
RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. RERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC.
AND DEBBIE KERSHAWr IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT; GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO.
(PLAINTIFf'' S ORIGINAL PE'riTION) {ROUGH DRAFT)
{DEMAND LETTER)
(NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS)
Ms. Reddin:
A rough draft of the lawsuit is attached. I need the
total amount due on the note as of March 1, 2012. I am
also enclosing a new demand letter, to perfect the recovery
of attorneys' fees.· The lis pendens will be filed once the
lawsuit is filed.
If you have any questions, please inform.
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
l.B00.750.5034
Facsiwile No. 409.763.4102
-----·---· ···--- - ·~-·-- --·----·--- -----
APG/
files
Encls.
c: word. reddin_yolly. client~_tr-~nsmittal. 2011_334€'
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston Island
Galveston, Texas 77550
February 27, 2012
Debbie Kershaw
Kershaw Enterprises, Inc.
2910 Mary Moody Northern Boulevard
Galveston, Texas 77551
RE: DEMAND ON NOTE - CONTRACT ON LOAN AGREEMENT DATED
FEBRUA.In, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
l.B00.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
Encl. - Contract
CERTIFIED MAIL, RRR NO. 91 7108 2133 3934 9976 8494
AND REGULAR MAIL
c:word.r~ddin_polly.kershaw_demand_letter.201133~8
2012-03-08 14:36 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 1/3
A GRIFFIN lAWYERS
Gah•e.'>TOII lslatld
Galvestml, Te.>::as 77550
March 8 , 2 0 12 ·· 1 0 : D11 ,tL • M •
TO: POLLY REDDIN
. --·--:::;.>
-- ~
FROl"': AN'l'HONY P. GRIFFIN
A GR IFFH1 T.JAWYKr~S
1.1.1.5 MOODY
GALVES'I'O::N' I TEX..ll.S
~
775<;:,0~ ..-
409.763.4102
RE: P"JLLY WO~D, r;.-.c_ \/. KKRSJ-tr..W ENTER??.J:S.E::S, HJC.
AND DEBBI8 KER.SH,'\.W; :tN 'I'HE JUDICil'J.J DISTRTCT
!:'OUR'l'; GAl.V.E~:"l-;-(~1\f COi.l1-ITY 'J'EXA.S j C'l-!lj 0:;£ NO.
I
{Cm.JFim•·1A·;:ION ·r-m~·r RELA'flOUSHIP 'I'BRi~IIDl.TED)
NO. OF PAGES FAXED ~clu!;'ive of cov;::;r.)
If you have difficult:y receivin~J l:his t.ransmission or any
part thereof, please call 409.76~.038£.
2012~03-QS 14:37 X544 014097634102 » 409 948 9901 p 2/3
A GRIFFIN lAWYERS
Call'e.ttcm /sltmd
Gal1•esto11. Texas 77550
March 7, 2012
Polly Redd5.IJ
RE:: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHP~W m.TTERPRISF:S 1 INC.
AND DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN TilE JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT i GALVERJ'Ol'i crmN"'l'Y, TRXAS; ('AuSE NO.
(CONFIRMATION THAT Rll!I.Ll',TICNSHIP 'rEID-UN"Al'.f.W)
{CO:NFIF.MATION TEAT C0NTPACT Ol'' RMPLOYNMENT Cil.LIJS
!i'<~R A NObT-RRI<'OND.P.B!:.~ Rf-:'~'J;l:t~E.P..}
FJ!s . Reddin :
Please note tha·:: t;hi.s r::c-nfirrns the t:eTir'.ination of our
relationship. If you need atld::.t:.io.na:: copies of t.he
mat:e·cials fJ~om yo:rr· file, ple::~He i:nfoJ.J:fi. '1"11e ~cpy and/or
documents in my fi::i..e are copies of .jocuruEnts tende~·ea to me
by you. This also confirms tlm.t our retainer is non·
refundable. If yc-u d.::!sire us 1·o provide you a des(!r:ipL.ion
of the scope and :ur..tu!·e of the wut:·k pe:1:formed, ple<.=tSI.!
inform.
2012-03-08 14:38 )(544 014097634102 » . 409 948 9901 p 3/3
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
-409.763.0386
1.. 800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman
\please close file)
c 'word. r.edLl:iH_polly. client3_trar-.sml ttal. 2011_3348
A GRIFFIN lAWYERS
Galveston lsland
Galveston, Texas 77550
March 7, 2012
Polly Reddin
RE: POLLY WORLD, INC. V. KERSHAW ENTERJ?RISES, INC.
AND.DEBBIE KERSHAW; IN THE ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT; GALVESTON CO~ITY, TEXAS; CAUSE NO.
(CONFIRMATION THAT RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED)
(CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRACT OF EMPLOYNMENT CALI...S
FOR A NON-REFUNDABLE RETAINER)
Ms. Reddin;
Please note that this confirms the terwination of our
relationship. If you need additional copies of the
materials from your file, please inform. 'The copy and/or
documents in my file are copies of documents tendered to me
by you. This also confirms that our retainer is non-
refundable. If you desire us toprovide you a description
of the scope and nature of the work performed, please · ·
inform.
A Griffin Lawyers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas 77550
409.763.0386
1..800.750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
files
xc: Interoffice - Rita Westerman
(please close file)
c:word.reddin_polly.client3_transmittal.2011_3348
CAUSE NO.
POLLy WORLD I INC. IN THE
v. JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT
KERSHAW ENTERPRISES, INC. ,
AND DEBBIE KERSHAW GALVESTON COONTY, TEXAS}
PLAINTIFF, POLLY WORLD, INC.'S, ORIGINAL PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
This lawsuit is brought by Polly World, Inc., herein
after and sometimes referred to as Plaintiffr against
Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and Debbie Kershaw, hereinafter
and sometimes referred to a.s Defendants. Plaintiff would
show unto the Court as follows;
I.
This matter is a Schedule 2 matter as that terin is
defined by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 190.3.
II.
Plaintiff, Polly World, Inc. is a corporation doing
business in the State of Texas. ..
Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. is an entity incorporated in
the State of Texas and be served with process by serving
its registered agent, to-wit:
Debbie Kershaw can be served with process by serving
her at 2910 53ru Street, Galveston, Texas.
III.
On or about Jl,pril 15, 2008, the parties entered into
agreements associated with property described as Abstract
628, Page 101, M. Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres),
City of Galveston, Galveston County, Texas. The agreements
included Contract of Loan Agreement in which Kershaw
Enterprises, Inc., and Polly World, Inc. acknowledged
documentation of· agreement between the Buyer (Kershaw) and
Seller {Polly World) surrounding the sell of the subject
property, with all existing and proposed improvements,
including personal property. The written agreement
provided that Lender (Polly World) agrees to a secondary
lien on said property subject to Borrower's lender {Moody
Bank) haYing the first lien on the subject property. The
Contract of Loan Agreement evidencing "the loan a.'llount of
$170,000.00 being evidenced by a promissory note to Seller
bearing interest at the rate of nine (5%) per annum payable.
in monthly installments of $1,200.00 per month. The note
shall be payable at any time prior to maturity without
penalty" ·- (a copy of t:he Cor'•Lract of Loa..J. Agreement is
attached herein) . The parties also entered into a Purchase
and Sale Agreement (attached and incorporated for all
purposes) . Polly World also executed a Warranty Deed with
Vendor's Lien and a General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill
···- --------·-·-------..---·-------
of Sale {attached and incorporated for all purposes
herein) .
IV.
DAMAGES AND PRAYER
Defendant has failed to pay ~~d has defaulted on the
subject due. Defendant's r.Jutstanding debts on said note is
$ , for which Plaintiff brings this claim.
Plaintiff also prays -for prejudgnient and post-judgment
interest, costs ·:>f court and. all matters under law and
equity that Plaintiff may be entitled.
Plaint:iff sues for reasonable and attorneys fees.
Plaintiff prays for trial by jury.
DATE: February 27, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
1115 T~ FIRST STREET
GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102
STATE BAR NO. 08455300
ATI'OR..Y'iEY FOR PLAINTIFF
POLLY WORLD, INC.
c:word.reddin_polly.plaintiff_crigio~l-l,e~ition.20ll·334a
------~-----·--- -·- . - -·- .. --- -·---
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF GAL'i.lESTON
Consistent with § 12.007, Texas Property Code, this
Notice of Lis Pendens is filed in order to encumber real
property described as follows: Abstract 628, Page 101, M.
Menard Surface of Tract 83 (542 Acres), City of Galveston,
Galveston County, Texas. This lis pendens pertains to the
establishment of an interest in renl propert.y, or the enforcement
of an encumbrance against real property. An action has
been filed in the district court with respect to same,
styled Polly World, Inc .. ..:~.: Kershaw Enterprises, Inc. and
Debbie Kershaw, in the Judicial District Court,
Galveston County, Texa.s, Cause No.
Affiant so swears and affirms on this the
day-· _ _ _ , 2012.
POLLY REDDIN
SUBSCRIBED P~ SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this the
day of _ _ _ , 2012.
·NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR
STATE OF TEXAS
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
c;wo~d.reddin_pally_lis_peodeae
---· ··--· ---· ---·--- ·-· -- ··- - -- -------
BEFORE THE EVIDENTIARY P~~EL OF THE
STA.TE BAR DISTRICT NO. 58 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
CO~n~ISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE,
PETITIONER,
v. H0031234738 [POLLY REDDIN]
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
RESPONDENT.
RESPONDENT'S ORIGINAL ANSWER
TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:
Respondent files this his response to the original
evidentiary petition and asserts as follows:
1. Respondent asserts a general denial and prays that the
Commission proves the allegations by the strictest proof allowed
under law.
2. Respondent admits in part and denies in part the
allegations contained in paragraph 1. Plaintiff was hired by
the client to advise and consult. The client does not have the
right under the Code/Disciplinary Rules to dictate when and
where the lawsuit is filed as long as the cause ls filed timely.
3. Respondent admits and denies paragraph 2. The
Respondent admits that appointments were made and sometimes
canceled. During one particular appointment, . Respondent did
tender a "rough draft" to the client to make corrections. A
rough draft is what is connotes - and the notion that the same
represents malfeasance is consistent with the practice of law.
In addition, Respondent would show that a lawyer's schedule oft-
times is controlled by the lawyer's trial docket and the
cancellation of an appointment (with notice) is a proper
practice and not a violation of the Disciplinary Rules.
4. With respect to the rule violations, Respondent denies
violating with respect to neglect. The facts set out by the
Commission do not support same as a matter of law. In addition,
the client was informed as to the status of her case and the
client was tendered her paperwork in a timely fashion. The
Respondent contends that the retainer was non-refundable and the
work having been performed.
Prayer for Relief
5. It is prayed that the requested relief be denied herein.
DATE: October 26, 2012.
ubmitted,
ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
1115 TWENTY FIRST STREET
GALVESTON, TEXAS 77550
409.763.0386
1.800.750.5034
FACSIMILE NO. 409.763.4102
STATE BAR NO. 08455300
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing answer was
forwarded to opposing counsel on this the 26th day of
October, 2012 by email transmission/facsimile transmission
and/or by regular mail, confirmation copy, to-wit:
SHANNON BREAUX SAUCEDA
ASSISTANT DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
600 JEFFERSON, SUITE 1000
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002
/S/ ANTHONY P.
ANTHONY
c:word.grievancefile_reddin_polly_original_answer
A GRIFFIN LAWYERS
Galveston island
Galveston, Texas 77550
May 22, 2012
Robert Nelson
Chief Investigator
Office of the Chief Disciplin~ry Counsel
State Bar of Texas
600 Jefferson, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77002
RE: H0031234738 POLLY REDDIN - ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN
(RESPONSE TO GRIEVANCE}
Mr. Nelson:
Please accept this as our response to tbe subject
grievance. Please note that it is our position that we
have not violated any rights and/or duties due and owing to
the client. In context of background, please note as
follows:
• The initial interview took place on September 29,
2011. The client was referred by a former
client, Kenny Childs.
• A copy of the contract of employment is attached.
The retainer was $5,000.00, nonrefundable.
• The client came to this office conce.:cned with
respect to a debt that was due and. ow:i.ng to her
from a Debbie Kershaw, and Kershaw Enterprises,
Inc. The debt originated out of the purchase of
a property from the client the note was
1
$170,000.00 and was signed on or about February
2008. The client was conc<2:rned that Kershaw
Enterprises, Inc./Debbie.Kershaw d/b/a First Step
had violated the terms of the Loan Agreement .
. The client's ar~urnent related to the title
company related to the client's feelings that the
title company did not prepare the appropriate
paperwork to protect their interest.
~ Attached under Tab B are copies of the
contractual documents prepared by the title
company
"' The client had previous counsel in the form of
Lyons & Plackemeir, P.L.L.C. This firm wrote a
letter dated December 23, 2010 providing notice
of the debt (Tab C) .
m Under Tab 4 is the work performed for the client,
to-wit: (i) letter dated October 4 2011
1
transmitting the contract of employment; ii)
demand letter to Kershaw adding "reasonable an.d
necessary at·torneys fees"; letter from former
counsel did not have this language and thus this
would have p1:ecluded the client recovering
attorneys' fee; iii) the rough draft of Notice of
lis pendens prepared for the client; iv) our
letter dated February 27, 2012 to the client
transmitting the rough draft of the lawsuit, the
lis pendens and the demand letter; v) the rough
draft of the lawsuit; vi) our letter dated March
7 1 2012 making clear the relationship between
this office and the client is now terminated.
My disagreement with the client is one related to
time-line and the decisions that the lawyer traditionally
makes (when and where file suit) . Plea.se note that the
language contained in the contract is borrowed from the
Disciplinary Code and case law. The then followed her
time-line with an e}::plicit threat - if the lawsuit is not
filed by a. certain date and/or the rough completed by a
certain date, then our relationship will be terminated. I
agreed - the relationship should be terminated. My letter
followed this agreement.
The client also inquired with respect to refund of
part and/or all of the non-refundable retainer. I informed
the client that I had performed work and this would not
occur; our letter followed.
2
If any additional information is needed, please
inform; my apology for the delay in transmitting this
information.
Anthony P. Griffin
A Griffin Le.vfYers
1115 Twenty First Street
Galveston, Texas · 77550
409.763.0386
l . BOO. 750.5034
Facsimile No. 409.763.4102
APG/
·files
FACSH1ILE TR.I:illSMISSION AND REGULAR J.V1.~IL
XC: .Polly Reddin
c:word.grievancc_folder_reddin.polly_respcnse_grieva.nce
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