Omar Montemayor v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                             ACCEPTED
    13-14-00173-cr
    THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
    3/23/2015 1:53:17 PM
    DORIAN RAMIREZ
    CLERK
    CAUSE NO. 13-14-00173-CR
    RECEIVED IN
    13th COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
    3/23/2015 1:53:17 PM
    THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFDORIAN
    TEXAS E. RAMIREZ
    Clerk
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG, TEXAS                          FILED
    IN THE 13TH COURT OF APPEALS
    CORPUS CHRISTI
    03/23/2015
    OMAR MONTEMAYOR,
    DORIAN E. RAMIREZ, CLERK
    Appellant                          BY smata
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    On appeal from the 197th Judicial District Court
    of Cameron County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Number 2013-DCR-00137-C
    STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
    Luis V. Saenz
    Cameron County District Attorney
    René B. González
    Assistant District Attorney
    964 East Harrison Street, 4th Floor
    Brownsville, Texas 78520
    Phone: (956) 544-0849
    Fax:(956) 544-0869
    Attorneys for the State of Texas
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Table of Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
    Index of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
    Salutation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    Summary of the Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    Argument and Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    State’s Response to Appellant’s First Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Second Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Third Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fourth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fifth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Sixth Issue.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Issue. . . . . . . 21
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Ninth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Eleventh Issue.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Twelfth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Thirteenth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fourteenth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fifteenth Issue.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
    -i-
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Sixteenth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Seventeenth Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
    Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
    Certificate of Compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
    Certificate of Service.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
    -ii-
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Alvarado v. State,
    
    912 S.W.2d 199
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 23, 38
    Anderson v. State,
    
    633 S.W.2d 851
    (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    Anderson v. State,
    
    717 S.W.2d 622
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    Angleton v. State,
    
    971 S.W.2d 65
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    Arevalo v. State,
    
    943 S.W.2d 887
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
    Ash v. State,
    
    420 S.W.2d 703
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 31, 32, 34
    Avila v. State,
    
    18 S.W.3d 736
    (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
    Banks v. State,
    
    29 S.W.3d 642
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . 39
    Beck,
    
    922 S.W.2d 181
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    Betancourt v. State,
    
    657 S.W.2d 451
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, pet. ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . 31
    Bignall v. State,
    
    887 S.W.2d 21
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
    -iii-
    Brewer v. State,
    
    572 S.W.2d 719
    (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). . . . . . . . . . . 30, 32, 34
    Briggs v. State,
    
    789 S.W.2d 918
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
    Brooks v. State,
    
    990 S.W.2d 278
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    Chamberlain v. State,
    
    998 S.W.2d 230
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34
    Clark v. State,
    
    365 S.W.3d 333
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
    Cook v. State,
    
    611 S.W.2d 83
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 23, 38
    De La Garza v. State,
    
    650 S.W.2d 870
    (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1983, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . 37
    Delgado v. State,
    
    235 S.W.3d 244
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
    Drake v. State,
    
    65 Tex. Crim. 282
    , 
    143 S.W. 1157
    (1912). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Earley v. State,
    
    855 S.W.2d 260
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
    Edwards v. State,
    
    551 S.W.2d 731
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    Feldman v. State,
    
    71 S.W.3d 738
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    -iv-
    Fielding v. State,
    
    719 S.W.2d 361
    (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
    Flores v. State,
    
    871 S.W.2d 714
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Forest v. State,
    
    989 S.W.2d 365
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
    Franklin v. State,
    
    12 S.W.3d 473
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
    
    411 U.S. 778
    (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
    Garcia v. State,
    
    201 S.W.3d 695
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    Garner v. State,
    
    848 S.W.2d 799
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    Garner v. State,
    
    939 S.W.2d 802
    (Tex. App.--Ft. Worth 1997, pet. ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
    Ghahremani v. State,
    No. 14–06–00729–CR, 
    2007 WL 3146723
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
    Oct. 30, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) .. . . . 27
    Goss v. State,
    
    826 S.W.2d 162
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 29
    Hall v. State,
    
    225 S.W.3d 524
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
    Hegar v. State,
    
    11 S.W.3d 290
    (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . 8
    -v-
    Hopperwood v. State,
    
    39 Tex. Crim. 15
    , 
    44 S.W. 841
    (1898).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
    Jackson v. State,
    
    115 S.W.3d 326
    (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003), .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
    Jackson v. State,
    
    968 S.W.2d 495
    (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    Jenkins v. State,
    
    912 S.W.2d 793
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 28
    Johnson v. State,
    
    967 S.W.2d 410
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    15 Jones v
    . State,
    
    982 S.W.2d 386
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    Kemp v. State,
    
    846 S.W.2d 289
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
    Lagrone v. State,
    
    942 S.W.2d 602
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    Lankston v. State,
    
    827 S.W.2d 907
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    McDonald v. State,
    
    179 S.W.3d 571
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
    Medellin v. State,
    
    617 S.W.2d 229
    (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20
    Mestiza v. State,
    
    923 S.W.2d 720
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . 32
    -vi-
    Mizell v. State,
    
    119 S.W.3d 804
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
    Montgomery v. State,
    
    810 S.W.2d 372
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
    Montoya v. State,
    
    43 S.W.3d 568
    (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, no pet.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
    Moone v. State,
    
    728 S.W.2d 928
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). . . . . . . 19
    Morales v. State,
    
    32 S.W.3d 862
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
    Moreno v. State,
    
    900 S.W.2d 357
    (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1995, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
    Morrison v. State,
    
    845 S.W.2d 882
    n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Munoz v. State,
    
    485 S.W.2d 782
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Mutz v. State,
    
    862 S.W.2d 24
    (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
    Pena,
    
    71 S.W.3d 336
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    Peto v. State,
    
    51 S.W.3d 326
    (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . 25
    Ponce v. State,
    
    68 S.W.3d 718
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . 9
    -vii-
    Pondexter v. State,
    
    942 S.W.2d 577
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19
    Rachal v. State,
    
    917 S.W.2d 799
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
    Resendez v. State,
    
    160 S.W.3d 181
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . 32
    Richardson v. State,
    
    865 S.W.2d 949
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    Roberts v. State,
    
    220 S.W.3d 521
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
    Rousseau v. State,
    
    855 S.W.2d 666
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
    Sandoval v. State,
    
    409 S.W.3d 259
    (Tex. App.--Austin 2013, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    Scales v. State,
    
    380 S.W.3d 780
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 7
    Seidel,
    
    39 S.W.3d 221
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    Shaw v. State,
    
    329 S.W.3d 645
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). . . . . . 28
    Shugars v. State,
    
    814 S.W.2d 897
    (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 22
    Silva v. State,
    
    635 S.W.2d 775
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . 30
    -viii-
    Silva v. State,
    
    989 S.W.2d 64
    (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
    Smith v. State,
    
    450 S.W.2d 92
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    Sneed v. State,
    
    209 S.W.3d 782
    (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 9
    State ex rel. Curry v. Gray,
    
    599 S.W.2d 630
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    State ex rel. Vance v. Hatten,
    
    600 S.W.2d 828
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    State v. Hardy,
    
    963 S.W.2d 516
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    Stone v. State,
    
    794 S.W.2d 868
    (Tex. App.--El Paso 1990, no writ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    20 Taylor v
    . State,
    
    268 S.W.3d 571
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
    Thomas v. State,
    
    723 S.W.2d 696
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
    Thomas v. State,
    
    886 S.W.2d 388
    (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . 37
    Turner v. State,
    
    805 S.W.2d 423
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    Villarreal v. State,
    
    590 S.W.2d 938
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
    -ix-
    Wagner v. State,
    
    687 S.W.2d 303
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
    Whitehead v. State,
    
    437 S.W.3d 547
    (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
    7 Wilson v
    . State,
    
    71 S.W.3d 346
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
    Statutes
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.05.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.36.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    Tex. Penal Code §12.31.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
    Rules
    Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
    Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26
    Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
    Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15, 29
    Tex. R. Evid. 103(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
    Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    Tex. R. Evid. 509(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    -x-
    Tex. R. Evid. 602.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 21
    Tex. R. Evid. 705(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 28
    Tex. R. Evid. 705(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
    Tex. R. Evid. 901.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 20
    -xi-
    CAUSE NO. 13-14-00173-CR
    ____________________________________
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG, TEXAS
    ____________________________________
    OMAR MONTEMAYOR, Appellant
    v.
    STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ____________________________________
    STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
    ____________________________________
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    COMES NOW, Appellee, the STATE OF TEXAS, by and through the
    Cameron County District Attorney, the Honorable Luis V. Saenz, and, pursuant to
    Rule 38.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, files this, its Appellate Brief in
    the above-styled and -numbered cause of action, and in support thereof, would show
    this Honorable Court as follows:
    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
    Appellant raises seventeen issues on appeal. In his first issue on appeal,
    Appellant argues that the trial court erred in improperly releasing a juror from service
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 1
    and replacing him with an alternate juror. The State responds by asserting the trial
    court did not err in dismissing the juror from service as he had become disqualified
    or unable to serve; or, in the alternative, even if the trial court did err in dismissing
    said juror, no harm resulted to Appellant. In his second issue, Appellant complains
    that the trial court erred in failing to exclude or limit evidence of extraneous offenses
    or bad acts. The State responds by asserting that Appellant has failed to specify
    where in the record the error occurred, and further, a trial court is not required to
    provide, sua sponte, a limiting instruction. In his third issue, Appellant complains
    that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial upon the introduction of
    extraneous character evidence. The State responds by asserting that the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. In his fourth issue, Appellant
    complains that the 911 audio recording was improperly admitted into evidence,
    thereby resulting in reversible error. The State responds by asserting that the 911
    audio recording was properly admitted into evidence. In his fifth issue, Appellant
    complains that his conviction should be set aside because the trial court allowed the
    introduction of certain photographs without allowing Appellant to voir dire the
    sponsoring witness as to the authenticity of the photos. The State responds by
    asserting that the trial court did not err in refusing Appellant’s request to voir dire the
    sponsoring witness to the authenticity of the photographs. In his sixth issue,
    State’s Brief                                                                       Page 2
    Appellant complains that State’s Exhibit 9 was improperly admitted into evidence,
    because the proper chain of custody was not established. The State responds by
    asserting that said exhibit was properly admitted into evidence. In his seventh, eighth
    and tenth issues, Appellant complains that his conviction should be set aside because
    the trial court allowed the introduction of blood swabs and buccal swabs without
    allowing Appellant to voir dire the sponsoring witness as to the authenticity of said
    swabs. The State responds by asserting that the trial did not err in denying Appellant
    the opportunity to voir dire said witness. In his ninth issue, Appellant complains that
    his conviction should be set aside because the trial court improperly allowed the
    admission of evidence which was not complete. The State responds by asserting that
    Appellant’s complaint is not at all clear from the argument and the record. In his
    eleventh issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing a speech
    pathologist to testify as to a privileged communication. The State responds by
    asserting that there is no privilege protecting the communications between Appellant
    and the witness herein. In his twelfth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court
    erred in not allowing Appellant to conduct a voir dire examination of two expert
    witnesses. The State responds by asserting that Appellant has failed to preserve this
    issue for appellate review. In his thirteenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial
    judge commented on the weight of the evidence and conveyed her opinion of the case
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 3
    to the jury. The State responds by asserting that the trial court did not comment on
    the weight of the evidence nor did the trial judge convey her opinion of the case to
    the jury. In his fourteenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court’s assisting
    the State, by suggesting predicates for the submission of evidence, had sufficient
    cumulative effect to deprive Appellant of his constitutional rights. The State
    responds by asserting that Appellant has failed to demonstrate how non-errors can in
    their cumulative effect cause error. In his fifteenth issue, Appellant complains that
    the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a lesser included charge on the
    offense of aggravated assault. The State responds by asserting that Appellant was not
    entitled to the lesser included charge. In his sixteenth issue, Appellant complains that
    the State committed reversible error by making improper comments during closing
    argument. The State responds by asserting that it is not at all clear what Appellant
    is talking about. In his seventeenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court
    erred in re-sentencing him after he had already been sentenced. The State responds
    by asserting that the trial court was within its authority to pronounce a legal sentence,
    after the court had previously pronounced a sentence that was not authorized by law.
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 4
    ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
    State’s Response to Appellant’s First Issue
    In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
    improperly releasing a juror from service and replacing him with an alternate juror.
    The State responds by asserting the trial court did not err in dismissing the juror from
    service as he had become disqualified or unable to serve; or, in the alternative, even
    if the trial court did err in dismissing said juror, no harm resulted to Appellant.
    The trial court has discretion to determine whether a juror has become disabled
    and to seat an alternate juror. Scales v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 780
    , 783 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2012). In deciding to remove a juror, the trial court must make a finding, sufficiently
    supported by the record, that the juror was disqualified or unable to perform the
    duties of a juror. Id.; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(b). This Court may not
    substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Instead, this Court is to assess
    whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
    ruling, the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. 
    Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 784
    . The
    ruling must be upheld if it is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” 
    Id. Absent an
    abuse of discretion, no reversible error will be found. 
    Id. The record
    demonstrates, and therefore, this Court should presume that the trial
    court concluded that the juror in question was unable or disqualified to perform his
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 5
    duties under Article 33.011(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(b). Article 33.011(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure states that, before a jury renders a verdict regarding a defendant’s guilt or
    innocence, alternate jurors “shall replace jurors who ... become or are found to be
    unable or disqualified to perform their duties... .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
    33.011(b). Although the statute does not define “unable to perform,” appellate courts
    have concluded that “unable” as used in Article 33.011 is indistinguishable from
    “disabled” as used in Article 36.29. See 
    Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 783
    ; Sandoval v.
    State, 
    409 S.W.3d 259
    , 279 (Tex. App.--Austin 2013, no pet.); Sneed v. State, 
    209 S.W.3d 782
    , 786 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (“one must strain to
    recognize real differences in the meaning of the two words in this context”). The
    term “disability,” as utilized in Article 36.29, has been interpreted to require that the
    juror is suffering from a “ ‘physical illness, mental condition, or emotional state that
    would hinder or inhibit the juror from performing his or her duties as a juror,’ or that
    the juror [is] suffering from a condition that inhibit[s] him from ‘fully and fairly
    performing the functions of a juror.’” 
    Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 783
    . To support its
    decision that a juror is disabled, the trial court must make a finding, sufficiently
    supported by the record, that the juror was disqualified or unable to perform the
    duties of a juror. 
    Id. The trial
    court may not dismiss a juror for reasons related to that
    State’s Brief                                                                      Page 6
    juror’s evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
    Id. at 783;
    see also Whitehead
    v. State, 
    437 S.W.3d 547
    , 554-55 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d).
    The trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining if one is biased or
    prejudiced for or against a defendant. Normally, this issue is presented when the trial
    court fails to grant a challenge for cause after a venireperson has presented some
    information that could be considered as more favorable to one side than the other, but
    has not clearly stated that he or she is biased. In the present case, the parties did not
    have the opportunity to question the dismissed juror, as this issue was brought to the
    trial court’s attention after the jury selection process was completed. Nevertheless,
    even if bias or prejudice was not established as a matter of law herein, the trial court
    still retained discretion to determine whether bias or prejudice actually exists to such
    a degree that the juror is disqualified. Anderson v. State, 
    633 S.W.2d 851
    , 853-54
    (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). In Anderson, a venireperson answered that she
    knew the prosecuting witnesses and initially stated that she could serve fairly. Later,
    she admitted that it “would be difficult” and “knowing them I would be more biased.”
    
    Id. at 854.
    The defendant argued these statements showed that this venireperson was
    biased and the court erred in failing to excuse her. 
    Id. at 853.
    Here, the juror told the trial court that he discovered that Appellant’s sister is
    a co-worker and a good friend. The juror further stated that Appellant’s sister
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 7
    coaches his daughter and step-daughter in gymnastics. (R.R. Vol. 8, pp. 14-15).
    Based on the friendship, and the level of interconnectedness of the juror with
    Appellant’s sister, there is at least some evidence for the trial court to have concluded
    the juror was biased as a matter of law.
    Further, there is no constitutional impediment in a procedure allowing the
    replacement of one fully qualified juror with another, even without the establishment
    that the first is physically disabled or even unable to serve. This is an issue that
    regularly occurs in courtrooms across the State of Texas. When jurors are summoned
    to serve, they come into an environment that is foreign and intimidating to many. It
    is not uncommon, particularly in smaller counties, for a juror to recognize someone
    involved in the case after he or she sees that person (after being seated on the jury).
    See Franklin v. State, 
    12 S.W.3d 473
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Additionally, family
    emergencies occur, as well as a myriad of events, that may in fact interrupt jury
    service.
    With that said, even were this Court to find that the trial court abused its
    discretion in excusing the juror, said error is not reversable.          To embody a
    constitutional violation, the trial court’s error would have to produce a biased jury.
    Neither the United States nor the Texas Constitution prescribes the manner in which
    juries are selected. See Hegar v. State, 
    11 S.W.3d 290
    , 295 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 8
    Dist.] 1999, no pet.). This error involves the application of a statutory scheme and
    is a nonconstitutional error. Ponce v. State, 
    68 S.W.3d 718
    , 722 (Tex. App.--Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
    provides that any nonconstitutional error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does
    not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). The record
    here does not show any taint from the substituted juror. The juror was subjected to
    the same selection process, was properly sworn, and heard all of the evidence. In an
    analogous situation, if the trial court erroneously grants a challenge for cause for the
    State, reversal only occurs if the defendant shows that he or she was deprived of a
    lawfully constituted jury. Feldman v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 738
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
    Jones v. State, 
    982 S.W.2d 386
    , 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Appellant has not
    shown that he was deprived of a lawfully constituted jury or that any of his
    substantial rights have been affected. Therefore, in accordance with Rule 44.2(b),
    said error, if any, should be disregarded. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); see also 
    Sneed, 209 S.W.3d at 788
    .
    Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Second Issue
    In his second issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 9
    exclude or limit evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts. The State responds by
    asserting that Appellant has failed to specify where in the record the error occurred,
    and further, a trial court is not required to provide, sua sponte, a limiting instruction.
    Appellant complains that the trial court improperly failed to exclude or limit
    certain evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts; however, Appellant has not
    indicated where in the record this alleged error is found. The State asserts that
    Appellant has not complied with Rule 38.1(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
    Procedure by failing to state concisely the facts relating to issue two, supported by
    record references, and by failing to state clearly and concisely the argument with
    citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear
    and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
    authorities and to the record.”); see also Roberts v. State, 
    220 S.W.3d 521
    , 527 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007) (“A party has an obligation to make appropriate citations to the
    record in support of his argument. If the notes [relating to a particular witness] are
    in the record, appellant has failed to include the proper record references. If, as seems
    more likely, the notes are not in the record, then appellant procedurally defaulted
    error by failing to include a matter in the record necessary to evaluate his claim.”);
    Alvarado v. State, 
    912 S.W.2d 199
    , 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“As an appellate
    court, it is not our task to pore through hundreds of pages of record in an attempt to
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 10
    verify an appellant’s claims.”); Cook v. State, 
    611 S.W.2d 83
    , 87 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1981) (“This court with its tremendous caseload should not be expected to leaf
    through a voluminous record hoping to find the matter raised by appellant and then
    speculate whether it is that part of the record to which appellant had reference.”).
    Alternatively, should this Court determine that Appellant has adequately
    briefed his complaint concerning evidence of extraneous bad acts, then the State
    would respond by asserting that the law does not require the trial court to provide, sua
    sponte, a limiting instruction at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. The Court of
    Criminal Appeals has previously held that, if a defendant does not request a limiting
    instruction under Rule 105 at the time that evidence is admitted, then the trial judge
    has no obligation to limit the use of that evidence later in the jury charge. Delgado
    v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 244
    , 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But even when a party
    properly requests a limiting instruction at the time the evidence is first offered, the
    trial judge need not give an instruction on the burden of proof at that time. 
    Id. Instead, a
    trial court must provide a limiting instruction concerning the use of
    extraneous offense evidence in the guilt-stage jury charge only if the defendant
    requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted. 
    Id. In light
    of the foregoing authority, this Court should overrule Appellant’s
    second issue which complains of the trial court’s failure to sua sponte limit the use
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 11
    of extraneous offense evidence.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Third Issue
    In his third issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to
    grant a mistrial upon the introduction of extraneous character evidence. The State
    responds by asserting that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
    grant a mistrial.
    Article 38.36(a) states:
    “In all prosecutions for murder, the state or the defendant shall be
    permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances
    surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between
    the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and
    circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused
    at the time of the offense.”
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.36. The nature of the relationship - such as whether the
    victim and the accused were friends, were co-workers, were married, estranged,
    separated, or divorcing - is clearly admissible under this Article. Further, in some
    situations, prior acts of violence between the victim and the accused may be offered
    to illustrate the nature of the relationship. Garcia v. State, 
    201 S.W.3d 695
    , 702 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2006). The evidence which is the subject of Appellant’s second issue was
    admissible under article 38.36, as it illustrated the nature of the relationship between
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 12
    Appellant and the victim of the murder. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
    admitting this evidence.
    In the present case, Appellant complains that the State questioned Sarah
    Williams concerning the relationship between Appellant and victim Sarah
    Montemayor. Specifically, Williams was asked if Appellant was abusive to Sarah
    Montemayor. It is well established that testimony referring to or implying extraneous
    offenses can be rendered harmless by an instruction to disregard unless it is so clearly
    calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a nature as to suggest the
    impossibility of withdrawing the harmful impression from the jury’s mind. Kemp v.
    State, 
    846 S.W.2d 289
    , 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). This Court should conclude that
    the witness’s unembellished statements concerning the nature of the relationship
    between the victim and Appellant was not so inflammatory as to undermine the
    efficacy of an instruction to disregard, had one been requested. Because the error
    could have been cured by an instruction to disregard had one been requested, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.
    Therefore, Appellant’s third issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fourth Issue
    In his fourth issue, Appellant complains that the 911 audio recording was
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 13
    improperly admitted into evidence, thereby resulting in reversible error. The State
    responds by asserting that the 911 audio recording was properly admitted into
    evidence.
    Appellant argues that this issue is governed by Edwards v. State, 
    551 S.W.2d 731
    , 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Angleton v.
    State, 
    971 S.W.2d 65
    , 68-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled the holding set forth
    in Edwards, and noted that the admission of audio recordings is now governed by
    Rule 901 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
    Rule 901(a) is entitled, “General provision”, and states: “The requirement of
    authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
    by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
    proponent claims.” (Emphasis added).           Furthermore, Rule 901(b), entitled
    “Illustrations.”, provides: “By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
    the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
    requirements of this rule:.. .” (Emphasis added). It is clear that the “illustration”
    contained in (b)(5) of Rule 901 (which allows recordings to be authenticated by voice
    identification) is not to be given talismanic power. Read correctly, illustrations
    contained under 901(b) are by no means exclusive of the methods of proof sufficient
    to authenticate or identify the types of evidence to which they refer. They are
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 14
    illustrations only, and not limitations. See Mutz v. State, 
    862 S.W.2d 24
    , 29 (Tex.
    App.--Beaumont 1993, pet. ref’d).
    In the present case, the witness testified that the 911 audio was an accurate
    recording of her conversation with the 911 operator. (R.R. Vol. 9, p. 62). In other
    words, the witness testified that it was what it purported to be. Further, the audio was
    authenticated by a business records affidavit, which reflected that the recording was
    made in the normal course of business of the City of Brownsville. Therefore, the
    audio was admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, under
    Texas Rule of Evidence 901. See Montoya v. State, 
    43 S.W.3d 568
    , 570-71 (Tex.
    App.--Waco 2001, no pet.) (holding that a 911 tape was properly authenticated and
    admissible when the custodian testified that the tape was made in the ordinary course
    of business and was made at or near the time of the event recorded).
    Further, even assuming that the 911 audio was improperly admitted because
    it contained hearsay, this Court should nevertheless find that it is not reversible error.
    The erroneous admission of hearsay is non-constitutional error. Johnson v. State,
    
    967 S.W.2d 410
    , 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).                This Court must disregard
    non-constitutional errors that do not affect a criminal defendant’s “substantial rights.”
    See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Under this standard, an error is reversible only when it
    had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.
    State’s Brief                                                                      Page 
    15 Taylor v
    . State, 
    268 S.W.3d 571
    , 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). This Court should not
    overturn a conviction if the Court has fair assurance from an examination of the
    record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect. 
    Id. Additionally, erroneous
    admission of evidence is not reversible error if the same or
    similar facts are proved by other properly admitted evidence. Brooks v. State, 
    990 S.W.2d 278
    , 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Anderson v. State, 
    717 S.W.2d 622
    , 627
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
    In the present case, the sponsoring witness also testified as to what she told the
    911 operator at the time that she called. (R.R. Vol. 9, p. 57). Therefore, the
    statements contained on the 911 audio were also admitted into evidence through the
    testimony of witness Sarah Williams. Accordingly, the error herein, if any, is not
    reversible, and Appellant’s fourth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fifth Issue
    In his fifth issue, Appellant complains that his conviction should be set aside
    because the trial court allowed the introduction of certain photographs without
    allowing Appellant to voir dire the sponsoring witness as to the authenticity of the
    photos. The State responds by asserting that the trial court did not err in refusing
    Appellant’s request to voir dire the sponsoring witness to the authenticity of the
    State’s Brief                                                                      Page 16
    photographs.
    Appellant fails to cite to any legal authority to support his argument that the
    trial court erred in failing to allow Appellant to take the sponsoring witness on voir
    dire. Accordingly, this issue should be overruled as it is inadequately briefed. Tex.
    R. App. P. 38.1(i).
    Alternatively, the State acknowledges that all testimony must be based on the
    personal knowledge of the witness. Tex. R. Evid. 602. When there is some reason
    to doubt whether the witness possesses the requisite personal knowledge, it may be
    appropriate for the court to afford the opposing party a chance to take the witness on
    voir dire. But it is neither reasonable nor practical to permit such voir dire when there
    is no apparent reason for doubting that the witness is testifying from personal
    knowledge. Shugars v. State, 
    814 S.W.2d 897
    , 898 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no
    pet.).
    In the instant cause, counsel did not object that the witness lacked personal
    knowledge nor did he state any basis for doubting that the witness had personal
    knowledge. Appellant’s brief does not refer this Court to anything in the record that
    suggests a want of personal knowledge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by overruling the apparently baseless request to voir dire the witness.
    Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 17
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Sixth Issue
    In his sixth issue, Appellant complains that State’s Exhibit 9 was improperly
    admitted into evidence, because the proper chain of custody was not established. The
    State responds by asserting that said exhibit was properly admitted into evidence.
    The admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
    See Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)(opinion on
    reh’g). Accordingly, the trial court’s admission of evidence is reviewed under an
    abuse of discretion standard. See 
    id. at 379–80.
    As long as the trial court’s ruling
    was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion and
    the trial court’s ruling will be upheld. See Rachal v. State, 
    917 S.W.2d 799
    , 807 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1996); 
    Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391
    . The trial judge does not abuse
    his discretion when he admits evidence based on the belief that a reasonable juror
    could find that the evidence has been authenticated or identified. See Pondexter v.
    State, 
    942 S.W.2d 577
    , 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
    Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a buccal
    swab that was submitted to the D.P.S. Lab for forensic testing. He specifically
    complains that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody.
    Texas Rule of Evidence 901 governs authentication. See Tex. R. Evid. 901.
    As a predicate to admissibility, Rule 901 requires a party who offers an item into
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 18
    evidence to establish to the trial judge’s satisfaction that the item is what the party
    represents it to be. See 
    id. When the
    evidence being introduced does not have any
    unique characteristics, a chain of custody may be required to prove that the item
    presented in trial is the same one involved in the events at issue. See Jackson v. State,
    
    968 S.W.2d 495
    , 500 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, pet. ref’d). Likewise, to admit the
    results of scientific testing, a proper chain of custody must be established. See, e.g.,
    Smith v. State, 
    450 S.W.2d 92
    , 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Garner v. State, 
    848 S.W.2d 799
    , 803 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); Moone v. State, 
    728 S.W.2d 928
    , 930 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
    The chain of custody is conclusively established if an officer testifies that he
    seized the item of physical evidence, tagged it, placed an identifying mark on it,
    placed it in evidence storage, and retrieved the item for trial. Lagrone v. State, 
    942 S.W.2d 602
    , 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Similarly, when evidence is sent to a
    laboratory for analysis, to conclusively establish the chain of custody, the proponent
    must introduce testimony showing the laboratory handled the evidence the same way.
    See Medellin v. State, 
    617 S.W.2d 229
    , 232 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
    However, when the State completes the chain of custody from the initial collection
    of the evidence to inside the laboratory, most questions concerning care and custody,
    including gaps and minor theoretical breaches, go to the weight of the evidence, not
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 19
    its admissibility. See 
    Medellin, 617 S.W.2d at 232
    ; Silva v. State, 
    989 S.W.2d 64
    , 68
    (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d); Stone v. State, 
    794 S.W.2d 868
    , 870 (Tex.
    App.--El Paso 1990, no writ).
    This Court has before it the following evidence concerning the chain of
    custody of the Appellant’s buccal swab:
    1)       Officer Yanes obtained a buccal swab from the Appellant at Valley
    Baptist Medical Center and placed it in a sealed envelope;
    2)       Officer Yanes submitted the swab to the Texas Department of Public
    Safety laboratory in Weslaco;
    3)       It was retrieved and brought to court by Harlingen Police Department
    evidence technician Rick Vela. (R.R. Vol. 12, pp. 112-116).
    In this regard, Appellant essentially asserts that the State did not prove the all
    the links in the chain of custody and therefore the trial judge abused his discretion in
    admitting the results of the analysis. However, the witness did testify to a complete
    chain of custody, from initial collection to inside the laboratory. Further, Rule 901
    only requires a showing that satisfies the trial judge that the item in question is what
    the State claims. See Tex. R. Evid. 901; Garner v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 802
    , 805 (Tex.
    App.--Ft. Worth 1997, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, this Court should conclude the
    information elicited from the State was sufficient for the trial judge to have found that
    the items the State’s expert relied upon in drawing his conclusions about the DNA
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 20
    evidence were what they purported them to be. See Avila v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 736
    ,
    739-40 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Because there is no abuse of
    discretion, this Court should overrule Appellant’s sixth issue.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Issues
    In his seventh, eighth and tenth issues, Appellant complains that his conviction
    should be set aside because the trial court allowed the introduction of blood swabs
    and buccal swabs without allowing Appellant to voir dire the sponsoring witness as
    to the authenticity of said swabs. The State responds by asserting that the trial did not
    err in denying Appellant the opportunity to voir dire said witness.
    Appellant fails to cite to any legal authority to support his argument that the
    trial court erred in failing to allow Appellant to take the sponsoring witness on voir
    dire. Accordingly, this issue should be overruled as it is inadequately briefed. Tex.
    R. App. P. 38.1(i).
    Alternatively, the State acknowledges that all testimony must be based on the
    personal knowledge of the witness. Tex. R. Evid. 602. When there is some reason
    to doubt whether the witness possesses the requisite personal knowledge, it may be
    appropriate for the court to afford the opposing party a chance to take the witness on
    voir dire. But it is neither reasonable nor practical to permit such voir dire when there
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 21
    is no apparent reason for doubting that the witness is testifying from personal
    knowledge. Shugars v. State, 
    814 S.W.2d 897
    , 898 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no
    pet.).
    In the instant cause, counsel did not object that the witness lacked personal
    knowledge nor did he state any basis for doubting that the witness had personal
    knowledge. Appellant’s brief does not refer this Court to anything in the record that
    suggests a want of personal knowledge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by overruling the apparently baseless request to voir dire the witness.
    Accordingly, Appellant’s seventh, eighth, and tenth issues should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Ninth Issue
    In his ninth issue, Appellant complains that his conviction should be set aside
    because the trial court improperly allowed the admission of evidence which was not
    complete. The State responds by asserting that Appellant’s complaint is not at all
    clear from the argument and the record.
    Appellant complains that at the time the State offered text messages, the trial
    court did not allow into evidence additional text messages under the rule of optional
    completeness; however, Appellant has not indicated where in the record this alleged
    error is found. The State asserts that Appellant has not complied with Rule 38.1(i)
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 22
    of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure by failing to state concisely the facts
    relating to issue two, supported by record references, and by failing to state clearly
    and concisely the argument with citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i)
    (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
    appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); see also 
    Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210
    (“As an appellate court, it is not our task to pore through hundreds of
    pages of record in an attempt to verify an appellant's claims.”); 
    Cook, 611 S.W.2d at 87
    (“This court with its tremendous caseload should not be expected to leaf through
    a voluminous record hoping to find the matter raised by appellant and then speculate
    whether it is that part of the record to which appellant had reference.”).
    Alternatively, the State notes that at the time the State offered the record of the
    text messages into evidence, Appellant’s counsel was allowed to take the State’s
    witness on voir dire, and then objected to the admission of the evidence pursuant to
    Rule 107, arguing that all text messages should be offered. The trial court overruled
    the objection, but noted that she would consider the admission of the rest of the text
    messages at a later time. (R.R. Vol. 11, pp. 220-24). Appellant did indeed recall the
    State’s sponsoring witness and did move to admit the missing text messages, and said
    messages were admitted by the trial court, without objection. (R.R. Vol. 14, p. 17).
    Accordingly, the “missing” text messages were, in fact, considered by the jury, and
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 23
    they are a part of the appellate record herein. (R.R. Vol. 18, DX 2).
    Because the trial court did admit the text messages offered by Appellant, there
    is nothing to review on appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s ninth issue should be
    overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Eleventh Issue
    In his eleventh issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing
    a speech pathologist to testify as to a privileged communication. The State responds
    by asserting that there is no privilege protecting the communications between
    Appellant and the witness herein.
    In the present case, the State called speech pathologist Lorie Ann Watson to
    testify concerning certain communications made by Appellant to Ms. Watson.
    Appellant objected on the grounds that these communications were privileged under
    the physician-patient privilege. (R.R. Vol. 12, p. 251). The trial court overruled
    Appellant’s objection and allowed the speech pathologist to testify.
    Appellant urges that the physician-patient privilege was violated. There is,
    however, no physician-patient privilege in Texas criminal proceedings except under
    limited circumstances not here applicable. See Tex. R. Evid. 509(b). See also State
    v. Hardy, 
    963 S.W.2d 516
    , 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Richardson v. State, 865
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 
    24 S.W.2d 949
    , 953 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Peto v. State, 
    51 S.W.3d 326
    , 327
    (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Thus, there is no physician-patient
    privilege in Texas criminal cases upon which Appellant may rely to support his
    contention on appeal.
    Appellant further argues that the testimony of the speech pathologist should
    have been excluded because Appellant was never given his Miranda warnings prior
    to communicating with her. However, Appellant did not object in the trial court on
    these grounds.
    To preserve error for appellate review, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
    require that the record show that the objection “stated the grounds for the ruling that
    the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make
    the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from
    the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The point of error on appeal must
    comport with the objection made at trial. Clark v. State, 
    365 S.W.3d 333
    , 339 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2012); Thomas v. State, 
    723 S.W.2d 696
    , 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
    Therefore, if a party fails to properly object at trial, even constitutional errors can be
    forfeited. Briggs v. State, 
    789 S.W.2d 918
    , 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
    Because these grounds on appeal do not comport with the objection made at
    trial, these grounds were not preserved for appellate review.              Accordingly,
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 25
    Appellant’s eleventh issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Twelfth Issue
    In his twelfth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in not
    allowing Appellant to conduct a voir dire examination of two expert witnesses. The
    State responds by asserting that Appellant has failed to preserve this issue for
    appellate review.
    To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that the party
    made a specific objection on the record and received an adverse ruling on that
    objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Turner v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 423
    , 431 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1991). To make a specific objection, a party must “let the trial judge
    know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and ... do so clearly enough
    for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position
    to do something about it.” Lankston v. State, 
    827 S.W.2d 907
    , 909 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1992). Notwithstanding a party’s failure to make a specific objection, error will be
    preserved if a specific objection was apparent from the context. See Tex. R. App. P.
    33.1(a)(1)(A); see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
    A party in a criminal case has a procedural right to voir dire an expert under
    Rule 705(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Under this rule, a trial court must grant
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 26
    a party’s “request to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts
    or data upon which the opinion is based,” and this examination is conducted outside
    the presence of the jury. Tex. R. Evid. 705(b). The purpose of this examination is
    twofold: (1) it allows the defendant to determine the foundation of the expert’s
    opinion without the fear of eliciting inadmissible evidence in the jury's presence, and
    (2) it may supply the defendant with “sufficient ammunition to make a timely
    objection to the expert’s testimony on the ground that it lacks a sufficient basis for
    admissibility.” Goss v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 162
    , 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also
    Tex. R. Evid. 705(c) (“If the court determines that the underlying facts or data do not
    provide a sufficient basis for the expert’s opinion under Rule 702 or 703, the opinion
    is inadmissible.”).
    A party’s argument that the trial court failed to conduct a properly requested
    Rule 705(b) hearing is a distinct argument from one challenging the qualifications of
    an expert. See Jenkins v. State, 
    912 S.W.2d 793
    , 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see
    also Ghahremani v. State, No. 14–06–00729–CR, 
    2007 WL 3146723
    , at *5, *8 (Tex.
    App.--Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 30, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication) (addressing separately the issues of whether the expert was qualified and
    whether the court improperly denied appellant’s request for a Rule 705(b) hearing).
    Thus, an objection based on an expert’s lack of qualifications does not preserve for
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 27
    our review the issue of whether the court erred in denying a proper request for a Rule
    705(b) hearing. 
    Jenkins, 912 S.W.2d at 814
    ; Shaw v. State, 
    329 S.W.3d 645
    , 655-56
    (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).
    In the present case, while the State’s pathologist Dr. Elizabeth Miller was
    testifying, Appellant objected and complained that she was not qualified to testify as
    an expert in ballistics or ammunition. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 30, 37-38, 45-46). However,
    nowhere in these sections of the record (which Appellant cites in his brief) does
    Appellant request a Rule 705(b) hearing; and therefore, Appellant has not preserved
    this issue for appellate review. 
    Jenkins, 912 S.W.2d at 814
    . Moreover, while the
    State’s expert witness on gun residue was testifying, Appellant objected to the
    witness’s testimony concerning certain exhibits, but did not state the basis of his
    objection. (R.R. Vol. 11, 110). Appellant then asked to voir dire the witness,
    apparently to question him concerning the exhibits. Said request was denied. (R.R.
    Vol. 11, 110). At no time did Appellant “request to conduct a voir dire examination
    directed to the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based,” outside the
    presence of the jury. Tex. R. Evid. 705(b). Therefore, this Court should find that
    Appellant has failed to preserve his request to voir dire said witness under Rule
    705(b).
    Assuming, however, that the trial court did err in denying Appellant’s voir dire
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 28
    request, this Court must then determine whether the error was “so harmful as to
    require reversal.” Goss v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 162
    , 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
    Because the error is not constitutional, this Court should only reverse if it affected
    Appellant’s substantial rights; otherwise, the error must be disregarded. Tex. R. App.
    P. 44.2(b); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a). In making this determination, this Court should
    consider the entire record to decide whether the error had a substantial or injurious
    effect on the verdict of guilt. Morales v. State, 
    32 S.W.3d 862
    , 867 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2000). Where the reviewing court has fair assurance that the error did not influence
    the jury or had but a slight effect, the conviction will stand. Id.; McDonald v. State,
    
    179 S.W.3d 571
    , 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    In the present case, Appellant has failed to make any argument as to how the
    error (if any) had a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict of guilt. Therefore,
    this Court should find that Appellant has failed to adequately brief this issue of harm.
    Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
    Accordingly, Appellant’s twelfth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Thirteenth Issue on Appeal
    In his thirteenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial judge commented on
    the weight of the evidence and conveyed her opinion of the case to the jury. The
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 29
    State responds by asserting that the trial court did not comment on the weight of the
    evidence nor did the trial judge convey her opinion of the case to the jury.
    Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer. Gagnon
    v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 786 (1973). The Texas Constitution requires no less.
    Earley v. State, 
    855 S.W.2d 260
    , 262 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism’d,
    improvidently granted, 
    872 S.W.2d 758
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). This Court should
    presume the trial court was neutral and detached absent a clear showing to the
    contrary. See id.; Fielding v. State, 
    719 S.W.2d 361
    , 366 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986,
    pet. ref’d). Trial courts have the right to manage the trial, including the order of
    proof. Silva v. State, 
    635 S.W.2d 775
    , 778 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, pet.
    ref’d). When courts ask witnesses questions during jury trials, they must avoid
    conveying their opinion on the facts to the jury and becoming an advocate for a
    particular position. Moreno v. State, 
    900 S.W.2d 357
    , 359 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
    1995, no pet.).
    A trial judge is permitted to question a witness when seeking information only,
    to clarify a point, or to get the witness to repeat something that the judge could not
    hear. See Brewer v. State, 
    572 S.W.2d 719
    , 721 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978);
    Ash v. State, 
    420 S.W.2d 703
    , 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Hopperwood v. State, 
    39 Tex. Crim. 15
    , 
    44 S.W. 841
    , 842 (1898). There are two dangers when the judge goes
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 30
    beyond this permissible questioning: (1) the judge may somehow convey his or her
    opinion of the case to the jury and ultimately influence the jury’s decision (Morrison
    v. State, 
    845 S.W.2d 882
    , 886 n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)); and (2) the judge in the
    zeal of his or her active participation may become an advocate in the adversarial
    process and lose the neutral and detached role required for the fact finder and the
    judge.
    There are numerous Texas cases dealing with the first danger. Munoz v. State,
    
    485 S.W.2d 782
    , 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); 
    Ash, 420 S.W.2d at 705
    ; Drake v.
    State, 
    65 Tex. Crim. 282
    , 
    143 S.W. 1157
    , 1158 (1912); Betancourt v. State, 
    657 S.W.2d 451
    (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, pet. ref’d).
    Appellant complains in his brief about two instances in which the trial court
    made comments from the bench. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 67, 75-76). Appellant claims that
    these comments violate article 38.05, which reads in part, “the judge shall not ... make
    any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case.” Tex. Code Crim.
    Proc. art. 38.05. The trial record demonstrates Appellant’s counsel failed to object
    specifically to these comments, in connection with the first incident. (R.R. Vol. 13,
    p. 67). In order to preserve an error for appellate review, a party must make an
    objection to the court and the court must explicitly or implicitly make an adverse
    ruling or refuse to rule on that objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see Flores v. State,
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 31
    
    871 S.W.2d 714
    , 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Thus, Appellant has waived this
    complaint by not stating his objection with specificity and preserving it for appeal.
    See Resendez v. State, 
    160 S.W.3d 181
    , 189-90 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2005, no
    pet.) (holding that without a specific objection, a defendant waives his complaint that
    a judge has conveyed his opinion about the case to the jury); see also Mestiza v. State,
    
    923 S.W.2d 720
    , 724 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.) (“[a] timely proper
    objection is necessary to preserve error concerning a trial judge’s comment”).
    Further, it is clear from the record that the comments made in connection with the
    second incident do not violate this section of the code of criminal procedure, as they
    do not convey the judge’s opinion about the case. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 75-76). The
    question asked by the trial judge was merely seeking clarification as to whether the
    witness’s training or education qualified her to answer a question about gunshot
    wounds and the trajectory of such wounds. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 75-76). This type of
    questioning is permissible, as the judge was merely seeking information only, or
    clarification of her training, or to get the witness to repeat a summary of her training,
    which the judge did not hear. 
    Brewer, 572 S.W.2d at 721
    ; 
    Ash, 420 S.W.2d at 705
    .
    Accordingly, Appellant’s thirteenth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 32
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fourteenth Issue
    In his fourteenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court’s assisting the
    State, by suggesting predicates for the submission of evidence, had sufficient
    cumulative effect to deprive Appellant of his constitutional rights. The State
    responds by asserting that Appellant has failed to demonstrate how non-errors can in
    their cumulative effect cause error.
    Although Appellant does not specify the incidents which are the basis of his
    complaint in issue fourteen, the State would assume that Appellant complains of the
    same incidents which are the basis of issue thirteen. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 67, 75-76).
    Appellant complains that the cumulative effect of these incidents constitute error. In
    support of this issue, Appellant cites two cases, Wilson v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 346
    (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2002), and Chamberlain v. State, 
    998 S.W.2d 230
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    1999). Neither of these cases support the relief that Appellant seeks through this
    issue. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Wilson noted that “in order to preserve error
    for appellate review, the complaining party must make a specific objection and obtain
    a ruling on the objection.” 
    Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at 349
    . As previously noted, Appellant
    failed to object to the first incident. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 67).
    Further, the Court in Chamberlain stated that it is conceivable that a number
    of errors may be found harmful in their cumulative effect; however, the Court went
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 33
    on to state, “we are aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their
    cumulative effect cause error.” 
    Chamberlain, 998 S.W.2d at 238
    . As previously
    noted, the comments made by the trial judge in connection with the second incident
    do not violate this section of the code of criminal procedure, as they do not convey
    the judge’s opinion about the case. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 75-76). The question asked by
    the trial judge was merely seeking clarification as to whether the witness’s training
    or education qualified her to answer a question about gunshot wounds and the
    trajectory of such wounds. (R.R. Vol. 13, pp. 75-76). This type of questioning is
    permissible, as the judge was merely seeking information only, or clarification of her
    training, or to get the witness to repeat a summary of her training, which the judge did
    not hear. 
    Brewer, 572 S.W.2d at 721
    ; 
    Ash, 420 S.W.2d at 705
    . Accordingly, the
    cumulative effect of this non-error cannot cause error. 
    Chamberlain, 998 S.W.2d at 238
    .
    Accordingly, Appellant’s fourteenth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Fifteenth Issue
    In his fifteenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by failing
    to provide the jury with a lesser included charge on the offense of aggravated assault.
    The State responds by asserting that Appellant was not entitled to the lesser included
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 34
    charge.
    In determining whether a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser included
    offense, the Court of Criminal Appeals set forth a two-step test in Hall v. State, 
    225 S.W.3d 524
    , 535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).                    The first step in the
    lesser-included-offense analysis, determining whether an offense is a lesser-included
    offense of the alleged offense, is a question of law. It does not depend on the
    evidence to be produced at the trial. It may be, and to provide notice to the defendant
    must be, capable of being performed before trial by comparing the elements of the
    offense as they are alleged in the indictment or information with the elements of the
    potential lesser-included offense. 
    Id. The second
    step in the analysis should ask whether there is evidence that
    supports giving the instruction to the jury. “A defendant is entitled to an instruction
    on a lesser-included offense where the proof for the offense charged includes the
    proof necessary to establish the lesser-included offense and there is some evidence
    in the record that would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty,
    he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.” Bignall v. State, 
    887 S.W.2d 21
    , 23
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Rousseau v. State, 
    855 S.W.2d 666
    , 673 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1993). In this step of the analysis, anything more than a scintilla of evidence
    may be sufficient to entitle a defendant to a lesser charge. 
    Bignall, 887 S.W.2d at 23
    .
    State’s Brief                                                                     Page 35
    In other words, the evidence must establish the lesser-included offense as “a valid,
    rational alternative to the charged offense.” Forest v. State, 
    989 S.W.2d 365
    , 367
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Arevalo v. State, 
    943 S.W.2d 887
    , 889 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1997, overruled on other grounds Grey v. State, 
    298 S.W.3d 644
    (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2009)).
    Without conceding that the first step of this two-step test, the State would note
    that Appellant has not cited to anywhere in the record that would demonstrate that the
    jury heard some evidence that would have permitted a rational jury to find that if
    Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the lesser-included offense.
    Alternatively, the State would argue that Appellant presented evidence that he
    blacked out and had not recollection of having murdered the two victims. (R.R. Vol.
    14, pp. 80-82). Appellant argues that based on this evidence a jury could have
    concluded that he did not have the intent to kill the victims, but rather only injure
    them. (R.R. Vol. 15, pp. 5-6). The State responds by noting that the Texas Court of
    Criminal Appeals has held that a defendant’s “lack of normal impulse control is
    simply not a circumstance recognized by the Legislature to diminish the criminal
    responsibility of an accused or reduce his crime to a lesser included offense.”
    Wagner v. State, 
    687 S.W.2d 303
    , 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). It is
    clear that there is no “diminished capacity” defense to defeat the element of mens rea
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 36
    during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Id.; Jackson v. State, 
    115 S.W.3d 326
    , 330
    (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003), aff’d, 
    160 S.W.3d 568
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Thomas v.
    State, 
    886 S.W.2d 388
    , 391 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d); De La
    Garza v. State, 
    650 S.W.2d 870
    , 876 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1983, pet. ref’d).
    Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish that he was entitled to a charge on the
    lesser included offense of aggravated assault.
    Appellant’s fifteenth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Sixteenth Issue
    In his sixteenth issue, Appellant complains that the State committed reversible
    error by making improper comments during closing argument. The State responds
    by asserting that it is not at all clear what Appellant is talking about.
    Appellant complains of certain statements made by counsel for the State during
    closing argument. Specifically, Appellant alleges that counsel for the State made
    reference to the Appellant being away for three and one-half years, and that he was
    helped by his family. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 67). Appellant argues that these
    statements are a comment on Appellant’s failure to testify or offer evidence.
    (Appellant’s Brief, p. 68). It is not at all clear what Appellant means by these
    arguments, because Appellant did testify! (R.R. Vol. 14, pp. 58-153). Further,
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 37
    Appellant makes reference to these statements supposedly made by the State during
    closing argument; however, Appellant provide record cites which are to voir dire
    proceedings. (See Appellant’s Brief, p. 67-68, citing R.R. Vol. 7, pp. 66, 76).
    Without the proper citation to the record, it is impossible to determine the context of
    these statements, and therefore, it is impossible to determine whether Appellant’s
    complaint has any merit. Because Appellant has failed to include proper record cites,
    this issue should be overruled. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a
    clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
    authorities and to the record.”); see also 
    Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210
    (“As an
    appellate court, it is not our task to pore through hundreds of pages of record in an
    attempt to verify an appellant's claims.”); 
    Cook, 611 S.W.2d at 87
    (“This court with
    its tremendous caseload should not be expected to leaf through a voluminous record
    hoping to find the matter raised by appellant and then speculate whether it is that part
    of the record to which appellant had reference.”).
    Accordingly, Appellant’s sixteenth issue should be overruled.
    State’s Response to Appellant’s Seventeenth Issue
    In his seventeenth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in re-
    sentencing him after he had already been sentenced. The State responds by asserting
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 38
    that the trial court was within its authority to pronounce a legal sentence, after the
    court had previously pronounced a sentence that was not authorized by law.
    A sentence that is outside the maximum or minimum range of punishment is
    unauthorized by law and therefore illegal. Ex parte Pena, 
    71 S.W.3d 336
    n. 2 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2002) (“[a] ‘void’ or ‘illegal’ sentence is one that is not authorized by
    law”); Ex parte Seidel, 
    39 S.W.3d 221
    , 225 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“this Court
    has long held that a sentence is void when the punishment is unauthorized”); Ex parte
    Beck, 
    922 S.W.2d 181
    , 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A defendant may obtain relief
    from an unauthorized sentence on direct appeal or by a writ of habeas corpus. See Ex
    parte 
    Pena, 71 S.W.3d at 337
    n. 4, 338. Traditionally, the State could seek
    mandamus relief to rectify an illegal or unauthorized sentence. See State ex rel.
    Vance v. Hatten, 
    600 S.W.2d 828
    , 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State ex rel. Curry
    v. Gray, 
    599 S.W.2d 630
    , 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). In these instances, the State
    could even seek a resentencing by filing a motion to reopen punishment in the trial
    court, long after that court had lost plenary jurisdiction over the case. See Villarreal
    v. State, 
    590 S.W.2d 938
    , 938-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Banks v. State, 
    29 S.W.3d 642
    , 645 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that State was
    entitled to file a motion for resentencing in trial court because defendant’s original
    sentence was “illegal and void”). There has never been anything in Texas law that
    State’s Brief                                                                   Page 39
    prevented any court with jurisdiction over a criminal case from noticing and
    correcting an illegal sentence. Mizell v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 804
    , 806 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2003).
    In the present case, Appellant was found guilty of the offense of capital murder
    and was initially sentenced to a life sentence. (R.R. Vol. 15, p. 64). The Texas Penal
    Code requires that Appellant be sentenced to a life sentence, without the possibility
    of parole. Tex. Penal Code §12.31. On February 24, 2014, ten days after Appellant’s
    sentence was initially pronounced in open court, Appellant was brought back into
    court and the trial judge clarified that Appellant was sentenced to a life sentence,
    without parole. (R.R. Vol. 16, p. 4). In light of the foregoing authorities, the trial
    court did not err in bringing Appellant back to pronounce the sentence required by
    law.
    Accordingly, Appellant’s seventeenth issue should be overruled.
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State of Texas prays that
    this Court will overrule Appellant’s issues on appeal, and affirm both the judgment
    of conviction and the sentence herein.
    State’s Brief                                                                  Page 40
    Respectfully Submitted,
    LUIS V. SAENZ
    Cameron County District Attorney
    964 East Harrison Street, 4th Floor
    Brownsville, Texas 78520
    Phone: (956) 544-0849
    Fax: (956) 544-0869
    By:   /s/ René B. González
    René B. González
    Assistant District Attorney
    State Bar No. 08131380
    rgonzalez1@co.cameron.tx.us
    Attorneys for the State of Texas
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that this document contains 9,546 words (excluding the cover, table
    of contents and table of authorities). The body text is in 14 point font, and the
    footnote text is in 12 point font.
    /s/ René B. González
    René B. González
    State’s Brief                                                                    Page 41
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that a copy of the foregoing State’s Appellate Brief was e-mailed to
    Mr. Alfredo Padilla, Attorney at Law, 777 East Harrison Street, Brownsville, Texas
    78520, at apad130478@aol.com on the 23th day of March, 2015.
    /s/ René B. González
    René B. González
    State’s Brief                                                                 Page 42