poynor-scott-and-kimberly-yvonne-miles-poynor-individually-and-as-next ( 2013 )

AFFIRM; Opinion issued February 21, 2013
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
────────────────────────────
No. 05-10-00724-CV
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SCOTT POYNOR AND KIMBERLY YVONNE MILES POYNOR, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SPENSER ALEXIS MILES, A MINOR, Appellants
V.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC AND BMW (US) HOLDING CORP., Appellees
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 07-05727-F
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OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Bridges
Before the Court is appellants= motion for en banc reconsideration. On the Court=s own
motion, we withdraw our opinion and vacate our judgment of July 31, 2012. We overrule
appellants= motion for en banc reconsideration and affirm the trial court=s judgment. This is now
the opinion of the Court.
Appellants Scott and Kimberly Poynor, Individually and as Next Friend of Spenser Miles,
a Minor, appeal the trial court=s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees BMW of North
America, LLC (ABMW NA@) and BMW (US) Holding Corp. (ABMW US@). In three issues,
appellants contend: (1) the record contains sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to negligent
undertaking by BMW NA; (2) the principles of respondeat superior apply to the relationship
between BMW NA and Classic BMW despite a contractual provision which states Classic BMW
is an independent contractor; and (3) the denial of appellants= motion for continuance was
improper. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In July of 2005, appellants went to Classic BMW to shop for a new car. Christopher
Homer, a salesperson, took appellants for a test drive in a 2006 BMW 325i. Homer explained it
was the dealer=s policy to have a sales person drive the car first to explain the vehicle=s features.
During the test drive, Homer drove recklessly and lost control of the vehicle, crashing the car into
a traffic sign, guardrail, a retaining wall and pillar. 1 Appellants were injured as a result of the
accident.
Appellants filed suit against fourteen defendants. 2 Their third amended petition
specifically asserted the following causes of action against BMW NA and BMW US: 3 (1)
negligence; (2) negligent hiring, training and supervision; (3) negligence per se; (4) intentional
infliction of emotion distress; and (5) respondeat superior, vicarious liability and agency. BMW
NA and BMW US filed separate traditional motions for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted.
In their brief before this Court, appellants claim BMW NA is directly liable because it
1
The investigating officer found that the accident had been caused by Homer=s failure to control his speed and failure to drive in a single
lane. Homer later pled guilty to child endangerment and confessed he drove the vehicle at a greater speed than was reasonable and prudent under
the existing circumstances, thereby causing him to lose control of the vehicle.
2
The fourteen defendants included Homer, Classic BMW, individuals associated with Classic BMW, BMW NA, and BMW US. Only
BMW NA and BMW US are parties to this appeal.
3
BMW NA is Athe sole exclusive authorized distributor of BMW vehicles in North America.@ BMW US, a holding company for BMW
owned companies in the United States, is a Amember@ of BMW NA. On appeal, appellants raise their first and second issues only as to BMW NA.
The third issue is raised as to both appellees.
2
negligently undertook to train Homer. Appellants further contend BMW NA is vicariously liable
for the acts of Homer due to its agency relationship with Classic BMW. Finally, appellants argue
the trial court improperly denied their motion for continuance when appellees failed to produce
evidence subject to an order to compel.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standards for reviewing a traditional summary judgment are well established. The
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v.
Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether a disputed material
fact issue exists, precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be
taken as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. Further, every reasonable inference must be
indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in his favor. Id. A motion for
summary judgment must expressly present the grounds upon which it is made and must stand or
fall on those grounds alone. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.
1993); Espalin v. Children's Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex. App.BDallas 2000, no
pet.).
B. Vicarious Liability
We begin with appellants= second issue in which they argue the principles of respondeat
superior apply to the relationship between BMW NA and Classic BMW despite a contractual
provision which states Classic BMW is an independent contractor. Appellants contend the record
contains sufficient evidence that BMW NA is vicariously liable for the actions of Classic BMW
and Homer, specifically that there is sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to: (1) the negligent
3
training and supervision claims against BMW NA vicariously through Classic BMW; (2) the
negligent entrustment claims against BMW NA vicariously through Classic BMW; and (3) the
negligence per se claims against BMW NA vicariously through Homer.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the
negligence of its agent or employee who was acting within the scope of employment even though
the employer did not personally commit a wrong. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513,
541-42 (Tex. 2002). But a person or entity that hires an independent contractor is generally not
vicariously liable for the tort or negligence of that person. See Baptist Mem=l Hosp. Sys. v.
Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998). The right of control is the Asupreme test@ for
determining whether a master-servant relationship exists. See Golden Spread Council, Inc. No.
562 of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. 1996). In determining whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor, the focus is on who had the right to control the
details of the work. See Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1993). An
independent contractor is one who, in pursuit of an independent business, undertakes specific work
for another using his or her own means and methods without submitting to the control of the other
person as to the details of the work. Farlow v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth Hosp., 284 S.W.3d
903, 911 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
We may consider several factors in determining the extent of the right of control: (1) the
independent nature of the person=s business; (2) the person=s obligation to furnish necessary tools,
supplies, and material to perform the job; (3) the right to control progress of the work, except as to
final results; (4) the time for which the person is employed; and (5) the method of payment,
whether by time or by the job. See Tex. A&M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 584-85 (Tex.
2005). However, to trigger vicarious liability, the right to control must extend to the specific
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activity from which the injury arose. Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 23; Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911-12;
Ely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 927 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 1996, writ denied).
A contract expressly providing that a person is an independent contractor is determinative
of the relationship absent evidence that the contract is a mere sham or subterfuge designed to
conceal the true legal status of the parties or that the contract has been modified by a subsequent
agreement between the parties. See Bell v. VPSI, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 706, 713 (Tex. App.BFort
Worth 2006, no pet.); Id. (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 588-90 (Tex. 1964)).
Evidence that the parties did not intend for an independent contractor relationship can come from
the contract itself or from extrinsic evidence. See Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911.
The right to control is ordinarily a question of fact, but whether a contract gives a right to
control is generally a question of law. See id. at 912. The affidavit of Smerek establishes the
Center Agreement, an agreement between BMW NA and Classic BMW, was in effect at the time
of the accident. The Center agreement states Classic BMW Ais not an agent of BMW NA@ and
that Classic BMW Awill conduct its BMW Vehicle Operations on its own behalf and for its own
account.@ In spite of these statements that no agency relationship existed between BMW NA and
Classic BMW, appellants contend Athe remainder of the terms of the Center Agreement indicate
otherwise.@ See Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911 (despite language describing the relationship as an
independent contractor relationship, other contract language can evidence such a right of control
that the relationship is actually that of employer/employee). Specifically, appellants argue the
Center Agreement gave BMW NA the right to control Classic BMW and its employees by
requiring Classic BMW to:
!Maintain customary business hours and, when necessary, extended hours;
!Give BMW NA the right to approve signs and pylons as it shall reasonably
require;
5
!Make certain its name complied with BMW NA=s policies;
!Ensure its website and domain name complied with BMW NA=s policies;
!Adhere to certain standards with regard to certified pre-owned BMWs;
!Ensure its advertisements complied with certain standards;
!Train their personnel and to use training materials that may be suggested by
BMW NA;
!Comply with the terms and conditions of the Center Agreement and all existing
and subsequently developed or amended policies, procedures, programs, and
guidelines;
!Have available the most current model BMW vehicles;
!Create an annual strategic business plan;
!Deliver to purchasers of BMW vehicles an itemized invoice and disclosure;
!Maintain accurate and current books of account and regularly provide them to
BMW NA;
!Use computer systems compatible with those of BMW NA;
!Allow BMW NA the right to inspect certain records and accounts;
!Maintain a minimum inventory requirement;
!Obtain the consent of BMW NA prior to selling Classic BMW;
!Maintain its operations only at authorized locations; and
!Give BMW NA the right to terminate the Center Agreement.
A similar argument was made by the appellant in the Ely case. See Ely, 927 S.W.2d at 778. In
that case, Ely contended the contract provisions demonstrated control by General Motors such as
to create a fact question for the jury. Id. There, General Motors offered summary judgment
evidence that it had no right to control the test drive; it did not hire him; it did not compensate him;
it did not direct the physical details of his warranty repair work; and it did not have actual control
6
over his test drive. Id. The court determined Ely presented no summary judgment evidence that
General Motors had the right to control the act resulting in the wrongful death, namely the test
drive. Id. at 778-79. The Ely court concluded, ABecause General Motors has established an
absence of [an] essential element of Ely=s vicarious liability cause of action based on an agency
relationship. . . General Motors was entitled to summary judgment on this issue.@ Id. at 779.
Here, like in the Ely decision, the Aactivity@ causing appellants= injuries was the test drive.
See Ely, 927 S.W.2d at 778-79. See also Victoria Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Williams, 100
S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 2002, pet. denied). As we have already noted, to
trigger vicarious liability, the right to control must extend to the specific activity from which the
injury arose. Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 23; Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911-12; Ely, 927 S.W.2d at 778.
The referenced sections of the Center Agreement, however, provide no evidence of BMW NA=s
control of the test drive. Having determined the Center Agreement did not provide an agency
relationship, we turn to appellants= argument that extrinsic evidence demonstrates BMW NA=s
agency relationship with Classic BMW and Homer. See Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911 (evidence
parties did not intend an independent contractor relationship can come from extrinsic evidence).
In their brief, appellants assert that A[i]t is undisputed that [BMW NA] required salesmen
like Homer to submit to its training and that it controlled how many of [Classic BMW=s] salesmen
were trained in particular areas or subjects.@ However, merely making recommendations is no
evidence of a right of control. See Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 294 (Tex. 2004).
Furthermore, although BMW NA required Classic BMW to train its salespeople, the evidence,
similar to that in the Ely case, establishes BMW NA was not responsible for hiring, training, and
supervising Homer. See Ely, 927 S.W.2d at 778. Rather, Classic BMW=s management team was
responsible. In addition, the evidence before us shows BMW NA was not involved in the test
7
drive, the injury-producing event. See Victoria Electric Co., 100 S.W.3d at 327.
Still, in an effort to demonstrate BMW NA=s control, appellants refer us to evidence that
BMW NA representatives would visit Classic BMW, select a topic for the visits, and then require
Classic BMW=s employees to sit down with him and evaluate its performance with relation to that
topic. Our review of the record shows Smerek testified that examples of such topics included:
customer satisfaction, sales, market share, service, service sales, warranty, warranty indexes, parts
sales, and wholesale parts sales. Appellants also argue control was asserted through these visits
when the representative reviewed Classic BMW=s records to ensure it was in compliance with
BMW NA=s requirements under the Center Agreement. However, again, the evidence cited by
appellants fails to establish BMW NA=s control related to the injury-producing activity itself. See
id.
Rather, the evidence shows that: (1) Classic BMW is an independently owned dealership
that is not and has never been owned by BMW NA and (2) BMW NA did not play any role in the
hiring of Homer, in training Homer on how to conduct test drives, or in supervising Homer=s
activities at Classic BMW. Thus, appellants have provided no summary judgment evidence that
BMW NA had the right to control Homer or Classic BMW during the act resulting in appellants=
injuries, namely the test drive. See Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 23; Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911-12; Ely,
927 S.W.2d at 778. Because BMW NA has established the absence of an essential element of
appellants= vicarious liability cause of action based on an agency relationship, BMW NA was
entitled to summary judgment. See Ely, 927 S.W.2d at 779. We overrule appellants= second
issue.
C. Negligent Undertaking
In their first issue, appellants contend the record contains sufficient evidence to raise a fact
8
issue as to negligent undertaking by BMW NA. Specifically, appellants argue because BMW NA
undertook to train Homer on how to conduct demonstration drives, BMW NA is liable.
To sustain their negligence claim, appellants were required to establish that BMW NA
violated a legal duty owed to them. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 837 (Tex.
2000). Whether such a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide based on the facts
surrounding the occurrence in question. See Abdel-Fattah v. Pepsico, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 381, 383
(Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). Texas law generally imposes no duty to take
action to prevent harm to others absent certain special relationships or circumstances. See
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 353 (Tex. 1995). However, one who
voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course of action for the benefit of another has a duty to
exercise reasonable care that the other=s person or property will not be injured thereby. See Fort
Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrush, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395-96 (Tex. 1991) (citing Colonial Sav.
Ass=n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. 1976)). Still, a person=s duty to exercise reasonable
care in performing a voluntarily assumed undertaking is limited to that undertaking alone. See
Sbrush, 818 S.W.2d at 397.
Appellants contend BMW NA assumed a duty toward them under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts '324A:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if (a) his failure to
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or (b) he has undertaken to
perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered
9
because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
See Seay v. Travelers Idem. Co., 730 S.W.2d 774, 776-77 (Tex. App.BDallas 1987, no writ).
We first consider appellants= allegation that BMW NA satisfied the requirements of
subpart (a) by increasing the risk of harm to appellants. Appellants contend BMW NA undertook
to train Homer on how to conduct demonstration drives, but failed to exercise reasonable care in
that undertaking, thereby increasing the risk of harm to appellants. In particular, appellants allege
ABMW taught and encouraged aggressive driving techniques designed to demonstrate the 3 Series=
power and engage its safety featuresBall while continually directing Homer and the participants to
incorporate what they learned into their sales processes and demonstration drives.@ 4
However, Jeff Smerek, area manager of BMW NA, stated in his affidavit as follows:
BMW NA does not dictate the manner in which demonstration drives to
prospective customers should be conducted by dealers. BMW NA does not have
any requirements for its dealers to conduct test drives in any particular manner.
BMW NA does not control the details of test drives conducted by its dealers, nor
does BMW NA tell dealers what requirements the dealers should have for test
drives. . . . Dealers are responsible for the conduct of their sales associates on test
drives and BMW NA did not have any program in place to monitor the manner in
which sales associates conducted test drives. . . . [T]he sales associate determines
the details of the test drive and sales presentation made to the customer. The
dealer is responsible for monitoring the sales associate.
Smerek further testified, through his deposition, that BMW NA does not provide any tips and
suggestions for test drives. 5
In addition, Homer testified he did not receive any training Aabout how to conduct the test
drive.@ With respect to the test drive in question, Homer testified he established the route of the
test drive and was free to establish the length of the test drive within a reasonable limit of time.
He also agreed that Ain practice, [he] decided what to do on the test drive.@
4
Homer attended an April 2005 Ride and Drive event, approximately three months prior to the accident at issue.
5
During the deposition, the terms Atest drives@ and Ademonstration drives@ were used interchangeably.
10
J.T. Bryant, Homer=s supervisor at Classic BMW, confirmed Classic BMW=s management
team was responsible for hiring, training, and supervising Homer. In his deposition, Homer
testified Classic had a racing team and, with the approval of Classic, Homer attended racing school
in August 2004 to become qualified as a race car driver. Homer was hired to be the team=s driver.
Bryant testified he was concerned that Homer=s participation on the racing team made Homer a
more aggressive driver.
Bryant also explained that the Ride and Drive events did not show people how to
demonstrate the vehicle but showed Athe features of the car and what it would do.@ Bryant
affirmed that BMW NA was not involved in the test drives, and testified as follows:
Q: So theyBdid BMW, to your knowledge, ever show the salespeople how to
perform an actual test drive?
A: No, not with the customer.
...
Q: Did BMW ever work with Classic to make sure there was a procedure to teach
the salespeople how to perform actual test drives?
A: No.
Appellants, on the other hand, contend the evidence raises a fact issue concerning whether
BMW NA trained Homer on how to conduct demonstration drives and cites this Court to 38
excerpts from BMW Ride and Drive Event training materials (AMaterials@). We conclude the
Materials, taken as a whole, fail to demonstrate BMW NA negligently undertook to train Homer.
In their motion for reconsideration, appellants list the following excerpts from the
Materials as evidence BMW NA would Aexplicitly tell participants how to conduct test drives@:
!Learning Objectives. . . . Participants will learn how to: Incorporate key 3 Series
characteristics into demonstration drives and test-drives.
!Walkaround Script (Product Specialist): 3 2 minutes. . . . You=ll also learn how
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you=ll be able to create great product demonstrations around these benefit
categories [Power and Performance, Safety and Security, Comfort and
Convenience, and Cost of Ownership] and conduct memorable demonstration
drives.
!Learning Objectives. . . . Participants also learn by actual experience that Active
Steering=s Yawing Moment Control feature of can [sic] correct the E90's path when
braking on split traction surfaces. Participants determine how they can
demonstrate and communicate these key 3 Series Safety and Security features in
their presentations and demonstration drives.
!Learning Objectives. . . . Participants determine how they can fit their experiences
[assessing the differences between the 325i, Audi A4 2.0T and Mercedes-Benz
C230 Kompressor] into sales demonstration drives and service test drives.
!How to demonstrate: On the showroom floor, show how to set the [cruise control]
system and activate it during the test drive.
!Learning Objectives. . . . Participants determine how they can fit their experiences
[assessing the differences between the 330i, the Infiniti G35 and the Acura TL] into
sales demonstration drives.
!Explain (Professional Driver): . . . So our challenge to you is to take the
information you=ve gathered here [testing your product against its main
competition Ain a high-performance >laboratory= setting] in our Alab@ and use it on
your demonstration drives.
!Objectives. . . . Participants also leave the event knowing how to incorporate 3
Series technology and benefit explanations (and demonstrations) into vehicle
presentations, demonstrations drives and deliveries.
In their response to BMW NA and BMW US=s motion for summary judgment, appellants
categorize the Materials as Alargely scripts and outlines for the >Facilitators= and >Professional
Drivers= to follow while instructing the dealer salespeople.@ However, we have not been cited to
any evidence that Homer was a AFacilitator@ or a AProfessional Driver@ who would have been
provided all or part of the Materials. There is no evidence the Materials were provided to Homer
at all, much less as a AHow-To Guide@ on how to conduct a test drive with prospective customers.
Although there is evidence Homer attended a Ride and Drive event to which the Materials Arelate,@
there is no evidence the relationship between the Materials and Homer=s participation in the event
12
caused the accident in question.
In addition, we note the excerpts cited by appellants are only a small part of hundreds of
pages of Materials that had been provided to the Facilitators and/or Professional Drivers. We
have again reviewed the Materials and conclude, as a whole, they show the Ride and Drive events
were conducted in a controlled environment where safety was emphasized:
!Specifically, these two independent drives will include a first impression drive
around a coned course with a slalom. . . and a drive on a split traction surface where
the Active Steering feature and Yawing Moment Control engages . . . Before the
groups split, the Professional Driver discusses and re-emphasizes the safety
measures to adhere to while on the tracks, then dismisses the participants to their
first assigned location.
!The Professional Driver provides a detailed description of the course (with visual
support) so participants have an idea of what is in store. He/She discusses and
re-emphasizes the safety measures to adhere to while on the track.
!The Professional Driver discusses and re-emphasizes the safety measures to
adhere to while in the vehicle, participants receive helmets and are assigned to a
vehicle.
!Driving Assistants Astage@ participants in waiting vehicles as the Professional
Drivers take participants around the track. The Driving Assistants ensure that
helmets and safety belts are used.
!We want you to have fun out there, but please conduct yourselves in a safe
manner at all times.
!Any recklessness will result in the loss of your driving privileges for the rest of
the day.
!I do need to emphasize that anyone who chooses not to listen or drives recklessly
will be pulled off the course and not permitted to continue.
!In addition to lost driving privileges, your dealership will be notified of your
reckless driving. 6
In light of these statements and the record as a whole, we conclude the Materials do not provide
6
These are only a sampling of the many instances in which the Materials indicate the Ride and Drive events are conducted in a controlled
environment where safety is emphasized.
13
evidence BMW NA increased the risk of harm to appellants.
Appellants next refer us to the testimony of Homer, indicating he believed BMW=s training
was intended to show him how BMW believed a salesman should demonstrate its cars to
customers. Our review of the record shows Homer agreed Athis is what they undertook in terms of
their training to show [me] how they thought the tryBthe car could be demonstrated.@ (emphasis
added). The cited reference; however, is only one page from a series of non-contiguous excerpts
from the deposition of Homer. Therefore, we are unable to ascertain from the context whether
they, as used in the quoted portion, refers to BMW NA, Classic BMW, or another entity.
Reviewing all evidence in favor of the non-movant, we conclude Homer=s statement does not
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BMW NA increased the risk of harm to
appellants. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548.
We also consider appellants= argument BMW NA increased the risk of harm to them by
training Homer and supplying him with aggressive techniques that BMW represented as proven
successful by other salesmen during demonstration drives. However, in the referenced portion of
Smerek=s deposition, Smerek explained the tips for test drives Adon=t come from BMW of North
America,@ but from the participants themselves and the salesmen Acan incorporate them in their
test drives or they can not incorporate them in their test drives, if they offer test drives.@
Therefore, based on the evidence before us, we conclude the trial court properly determined there
was not a fact question as to whether BMW NA increased the risk of harm to appellants. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
We next consider appellants= argument that BMW NA fulfilled the requirement of subpart
(b) of the Restatement by performing a duty owed by Classic BMW to appellants. Appellants
contend BMW NA trained its dealerships= salespeople regarding how to conduct successful
14
demonstration drives. Therefore, appellants conclude the evidence raises a fact issue regarding
whether BMW NA undertook to perform a duty owed by Classic BMW.
An employer has a duty to adequately hire, train, and supervise employees. See Patino v.
Complete Tire, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.BDallas 2005, pet. denied). Thus, Classic
BMW had a duty to train and supervise its employees, including Homer. J.T. Bryant, Homer=s
supervisor, confirmed Classic BMW=s management team was responsible for hiring, training, and
supervising Homer. Furthermore, Smerek testified as follows:
Classic is an independently owned dealership that is not and has never been owned
by BMW NA. Classic is an independent business with its own management.
BMW NA does not play any role in the hiring of employees by Classic. Classic is
responsible for the hiring, retention and supervision of its own employees. . . .
Christopher Homer was not employed by BMW NA. BMW NA did not play any
role in the hiring of Homer, in training Homer on how to conduct test drives, in
supervising Homer=s activities at Classic, or Homer=s eventual dismissal after the
accident.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly found there was no question of fact regarding
whether BMW NA undertook to perform a duty owed by Classic BMW to appellants. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 166a(c).
Finally, we turn to appellants= argument that the requirement of subpart (c) of the
Restatement was fulfilled because appellants relied on BMW NA=s undertaking to train Homer.
As we have already noted; however, BMW NA did not undertake to perform a duty owed by
Classic BMW to appellants. Thus, there can be no reliance by appellants on the alleged
undertaking. See Steward v. Costello, No. 05-02-00679-CV, 2003 WL 115453, at *2 (Tex.
App.BDallas Jan. 14, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (party assumed a
duty to third parties to ensure pipe was properly loaded, secured, and flagged); Seay, 730 S.W.2d
at 778-80 (Travelers undertook inspection of insured=s boilers and court found reliance).
Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly found no fact issue with regard to appellants=
15
reliance. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). We overrule appellants= first issue.
D. Motion for Continuance
In their third issue, appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion by denying their
renewed motion for continuance because BMW NA and BMW US failed to produce a
considerable amount of evidence that the trial court ordered compelled and, thus, erred in granting
summary judgment in their favor. As a part of their response to BMW NA and BMW US=s
motions for summary judgment, appellants asked the trial court Ato consider granting a short
continuance in the event that it believes there is any lack of evidence for [appellants=] claims,
particularly against BMW US.@
We review a trial court=s decision whether to grant a party additional time for discovery
before a summary judgment hearing for an abuse of discretion. Cooper v. Circle Ten Council Boy
Scouts of Am., 254 S.W.3d 689, 696 (Tex. App.BDallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Tenneco, Inc. v.
Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996)). A party contending he has not had an
adequate opportunity for discovery before a summary judgment hearing must file either an
affidavit explaining his need for additional discovery or a verified motion for continuance. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g). In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider
such factors as the length of time the case had been on file before the hearing, the materiality of the
discovery sought, whether the party seeking the continuance exercised due diligence in obtaining
the discovery, and what the party expects to prove. Cooper, 254 S.W.3d at 696.
Appellants filed their original petition on June 18, 2007. On March 17, 2008, the trial
court issued an order on appellant=s motion to compel discovery from BMW NA and BMW US,
primarily granting appellants= requests. The record reflects the parties continued to engage in
discovery following the trial court=s order on appellant=s motion to compel.
16
Over 19 months after the filing of the original petition, BMW NA and BMW US filed their
motions for summary judgment on January 27, 2009. On March 6, 2009, appellants filed their
verified motion for continuance as a part of their response to BMW NA and BMW US=s motions
for summary judgment. The summary judgment hearing took place on March 13, 2009, 45 days
after the motions were filed. Generally, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for
continuance when the party has received the 21 days= notice required by rule 166a(c). See id. at
697.
Furthermore, appellants provided no information in their motion regarding diligence on
their part in attempting to obtain another BMW NA representative for deposition or the additional
documents. See Lee v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., 129 S.W.3d 192, 198 (Tex. App.BDallas 2004,
pet. denied). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion
by denying appellants= motion for continuance. See Cooper, 254 S.W.3d at 696-97; Lee, 129
S.W.3d at 198; Carter v. MacFadyen, 93 S.W.3d 307, 310-11 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.]
2002, pet. denied). We overrule appellant=s third issue.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellants= motion for en banc reconsideration. Having overruled appellants=
three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
100724F.P05
17
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
SCOTT POYNOR AND KIMBERLY Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court
YVONNE MILES POYNOR, of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No.
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND 07-05727-F).
OF SPENSER ALEXIS MILES, A MINOR, Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges,
Appellants Justices FitzGerald and Lang.
No. 05-10-00724-CV V.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC AND
BMW (US) HOLDING CORP., Appellees
We vacate our judgment of July 31, 2012. This is now the judgment of the Court.
In accordance with this Court=s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellees BMW of North America, LLC and BMW (US)
Holding Corp. recover their costs of this appeal from appellants Scott Poynor and Kimberly
Yvonee Miles Poynor, Individually and as Next Friend of Spenser Alexis Miles, a Minor.
Judgment entered February 21, 2013.
/David L. Bridges/
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
18