Roy Alton Shaw v. State ( 2008 )


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  •                                 IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-07-00043-CR
    ROY ALTON SHAW,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 18th District Court
    Johnson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. F40536
    O P I N I O N
    After his eight-year-old niece made an outcry to her mother that her great-uncle,
    Appellant Roy Shaw, had inappropriately touched her, an investigation brought forth
    allegations by three other female relatives that Shaw had committed sexual offenses
    against them as well. Shaw was eventually charged by indictment with nineteen felony
    counts. A jury found him guilty on Counts Two and Nineteen, each of which alleged
    indecency with a child by contact, and not guilty on the remaining counts. The jury
    assessed a three-year prison sentence and a $5,000 fine on Count Two; on Count
    Nineteen, the jury assessed a ten-year sentence and a $10,000 fine but recommended
    that the sentence and fine be probated. Shaw appeals, asserting three issues. We will
    affirm.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    We begin with Shaw’s second and third issues, which respectively challenge the
    factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence on both indecency-by-contact convictions.
    A person commits the offense of indecency with a child “if, with a child younger than
    17 years and not the person’s spouse, . . . the person . . . engages in sexual contact with
    the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
    21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Sexual contact means the following, if committed with the
    intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: “any touching of any part of
    the body of a child, including touching through clothing, with the anus, breast, or any
    part of the genitals of a person.” 
    Id. § 21.11(c)(2).
    Standards of Review
    When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish
    the elements of a penal offense, we must determine whether, after viewing all the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-19, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    (1979). The standard is
    the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 180
    , 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign
    credibility to the witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v.
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 2
    State, 
    4 S.W.3d 735
    , 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Adelman v. State, 
    828 S.W.2d 418
    , 421
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Instead, our duty is to determine if the findings of the trier of
    fact are rational by viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
    favorable to the verdict. 
    Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422
    . In so doing, any inconsistencies in
    the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 394
    , 406 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2000).
    In a factual sufficiency review, we ask whether a neutral review of all the
    evidence, though legally sufficient, demonstrates either that the proof of guilt is so
    weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the factfinder’s verdict clearly
    wrong and manifestly unjust. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d. 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006); Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The court reviews the
    evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in
    dispute and compares it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.” 
    Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7
    (quoting Jones v. State, 
    944 S.W.2d 642
    , 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). The
    appellate court “does not indulge in inferences or confine its view to evidence favoring
    one side of the case. Rather, it looks at all the evidence on both sides and then makes a
    predominantly intuitive judgment. . . .” 
    Id. (quoting William
    Powers and Jack Ratliff,
    Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 TEXAS L. REV. 515, 519
    (1991)).    The nature of a factual sufficiency review authorizes an appellate court,
    although to a very limited degree, to act as the so-called “thirteenth juror” to review the
    factfinder’s weighing of the evidence and disagree with the factfinder’s determination.
    
    Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416-17
    .
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 3
    Count Two Evidence
    In Count Two, Shaw was charged with committing the offense of indecency with
    a child by contact against “JoAnn,”1 Shaw’s grand-niece who was around eight years
    old at the time of the offense. JoAnn, a nine-year-old fourth grader at the time of trial,
    testified that she and her two siblings had previously lived with Roy and Brenda Shaw,
    her aunt and uncle who lived “down the street.” She said that while her brother and
    sister were cleaning a bedroom on the opposite end of the Shaws’ trailer and Brenda
    had gone to the store, Shaw took her into his bedroom and had her take her clothes off
    and get on the bed. Shaw, while holding her down and dressed only in pants, then
    touched her with his hand on the outside of her private parts (her “tee-tee” and her
    “hiney bo”). On that occasion, she was probably in the second grade and it happened
    after Christmas; she was either six, seven, or eight years old. She also said that Shaw
    did the same thing to her “a few more times.” Shaw’s touching her made her feel “bad”
    and he told her that if she told anyone about it, he would whip her. JoAnn repeated
    several times that the things that Shaw had done to her really happened, and she said
    that no one, including her mother, had told her to say things about Shaw that were not
    true.
    JoAnn’s videotaped interview was shown to the jury. JoAnn admitted that in her
    videotaped interview she said that Shaw’s fingers went inside her, but she does not
    remember that happening.
    1The indictments used pseudonyms for the four victims. We have added a pseudonym for the minor
    victims’ mother, “Brooke,” to further protect their anonymity and also because Brooke alleged at trial that
    Shaw had molested her when she was a child.
    Shaw v. State                                                                                       Page 4
    The first person whom JoAnn told about Shaw’s conduct was her mother,
    “Brooke.” JoAnn admitted that Brenda approached her once and that she told Brenda
    that she was lying about what she had said Shaw had done to her, but JoAnn testified
    that she was lying to Brenda. JoAnn also told her grandmother and another aunt
    (Janice) that she was lying when Brenda had approached her and got her to say that she
    had lied about what Shaw had done. JoAnn denied telling Brenda that Brooke had
    asked her to lie about Shaw: “My mom didn’t tell me to lie about Roy.”
    “Janice,” Brooke’s half-sister, recounted JoAnn’s encounter with Brenda, saying
    that it happened at her mother’s house. Brenda showed up, came storming in without
    knocking, and said she needed to talk to JoAnn. Brenda sat with JoAnn on the couch
    and talked to her and then brought JoAnn in the kitchen. JoAnn was crying, and
    Brenda told her to say to Debbie (Brenda’s sister and Janice’s mother) what she had just
    said. JoAnn said, “I lied.” Brenda said, “Well, that’s all I need. I’m going to talk to my
    lawyer now.” Janice then talked to JoAnn, who was still crying, and told her that Shaw
    had done the same thing to her when she was a child and had spent the night at the
    Shaws’ house. (Shaw’s alleged offenses against Janice were Counts Thirteen, Fourteen,
    and Fifteen, asserting indecency with a child by contact. He was acquitted on those
    counts.) Janice asked JoAnn why she just said that she had lied, and she said that
    Brenda had told her to do so. Janice said that JoAnn then confirmed that Shaw had
    touched her.
    JoAnn told her mother about Shaw’s touching her after she went back to live
    with her. JoAnn testified that she started talking about it because she “just wanted to
    Shaw v. State                                                                       Page 5
    tell [Brooke] it.” Brooke testified that on March 25, 2005, after JoAnn had gotten out of
    the shower and was wrapped in a towel, she told JoAnn: “I love you very much and if
    anyone ever hurts you, I want you to know that I will protect you.” She said that
    JoAnn’s demeanor changed:
    She put her finger in her mouth. I remember this part perfectly. And she
    put her finger in her mouth and she put her head down and her eyes
    started to water. And I said, “What’s wrong?” And she said, “He said if I
    told anyone he would whoop me.” And I said, “Who”? And she said,
    “Roy.”
    Brooke then asked if Shaw touched her, and JoAnn said that he had touched her
    “privates.”     Brooke called the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department and Laura
    McWhorter, a friend, to be with the children while she spoke to the responding officer.
    Brooke wrote a statement for the responding officer that day, and she admitted writing
    in the statement that JoAnn had told her that what Shaw had done had happened “on
    the couch.” She confirmed that JoAnn had said it happened on the couch. She also
    admitted that, in trying to get details from JoAnn, she asked her how many times it had
    happened: “One, two, three, four, five times?” And JoAnn answered, “yeah, four or
    five times.”
    Brooke testified that her three children had been living with the Shaws from
    about November of 2004 to February of 2005. Brooke’s mother Debbie is Brenda’s
    sister. She admitted that she was on probation for forgery and DWI. She also admitted
    that the Shaws had taken care of her children “for free,” that Shaw had tired of her
    “dumping” her kids at his house, and that Shaw disapproved of her lifestyle and that
    she “had dated out of her race.” Brooke also admitted that a motion to adjudicate had
    Shaw v. State                                                                       Page 6
    been filed against her on March 23, 2005, but she said that her report to law enforcement
    about Shaw was not done to curry favor with the State in her probation matter. Rather
    than being revoked, her probation was amended.
    Brooke admitted that while on probation, she committed and pled guilty to
    felony intoxication assault and received probation again, but she also served 120 days in
    jail as “overnights.” While serving that time, she reported that Shaw had penetrated
    her female organ with his fingers and had fondled her when she was a young teenager.
    In spite of that allegation, Brooke admitted that she had thought the Shaws’ home was a
    safe place to leave her children and that she had told CPS that as well. She also
    admitted that she did not reveal Shaw’s offenses against her when she reported the
    offenses against JoAnn, saying that she had not mentioned it before because she
    thought the statute of limitations had run, but she had told her grandmother about it
    soon after it happened.
    Don Beeson, a former detective in the crimes-against-children unit of the Johnson
    County Sheriff’s Department, investigated JoAnn’s outcry. He made arrangements for
    her to be interviewed at the advocacy center and for both JoAnn and Debra to be
    interviewed at Cook’s hospital in Fort Worth. In early April, Beeson called Shaw to
    come in and talk to him about an allegation of a sexual offense that Shaw had
    committed. When Shaw came in, Beeson gave Shaw his Miranda rights even though he
    was not in custody and wrote a statement for Shaw that Shaw signed. The statement
    says that he and his wife Brenda have raised Brooke’s three children “on and off” for
    the past twelve years, that he has never touched either girl in a sexual way, and that to
    Shaw v. State                                                                      Page 7
    his memory he has never been left alone with them. During their meeting, Shaw never
    offered Beeson a reason why Brooke would have gotten her two daughters to make
    false allegations against him. Beeson was trained in how to spot false allegations by
    children, and he did not see any in this case.
    Beeson also asked Shaw if he would agree to meet with Bobby Jones, a forensic
    interviewer, and Shaw agreed. Beeson drove Shaw to that interview in July, and on the
    way back Shaw started talking out loud to himself and then volunteered that he had
    had a problem with alcohol and didn’t drive, and that there were times when he would
    drink too much and would not be able to remember the previous evening. In the course
    of Beeson’s investigation, two other female relatives came forward with allegations that
    Shaw had committed sexual offenses against them when they were minors: Janice,
    Shaw’s adult niece, and “Teresa,” Shaw’s adopted daughter.
    Beeson admitted on cross-examination that it appeared that Brooke had elicited
    JoAnn’s outcry, that Brooke’s interrogation of JoAnn was not done under the protocols
    of how law enforcement would have interviewed JoAnn, that he did not investigate
    whether Brooke had a motive or agenda or a bias to have such allegations made against
    Shaw, and that to his knowledge JoAnn and her sister “Debra” were with their mother
    from the time of JoAnn’s outcry to the time of their advocacy center interviews. Beeson
    also acknowledged that he did not investigate the other men whom JoAnn and Debra
    had been around.
    Virginia Caldwell, a registered nurse and trained sexual assault nurse examiner,
    performed sexual assault exams on JoAnn and Debra. JoAnn told Caldwell that Shaw
    Shaw v. State                                                                     Page 8
    (“Roy, my uncle”) had touched her on her genital and anal areas with his hand more
    than one time. Caldwell’s physical exam of those areas was normal, which was not
    surprising. Caldwell said that the relevant literature reports that the percentage of false
    allegations of sexual abuse among all victims is less than one percent. On cross-
    examination, Caldwell admitted that an authority figure such as a parent can induce a
    memory of something that didn’t happen with a child.
    Karen Rayburne, a licensed social worker and CPS investigator with the
    Department of Family and Protective Services, specializes in child sexual abuse. She
    testified that outcries by children generally are not spontaneous and usually something
    triggers an outcry, such as questioning by a parent about touching. Both Rayburne and
    Caldwell said that it is common for children to initially disclose only part of the abuse
    and to provide more or different information over time and to different people.
    Rayburne said that it is common for children to recant, that recantation is most common
    in a family setting, that family conflict and pressure can cause recantation, and that
    spontaneous recantations are different than recantations upon questioning. As a result
    of the allegations against Shaw, a CPS safety plan was implemented that prevented
    Shaw from having contact with Brooke’s children, so she could no longer leave them
    with the Shaws.
    Rayburne investigated Shaw’s alleged sexual abuse of JoAnn and Debra,
    including interviewing Brooke and Brenda, and she did not discover any reason why
    Brooke would be lying about her children’s allegations or that they had been pressured
    to make false allegations. She interviewed “Dale,” the girls’ older brother, who was
    Shaw v. State                                                                        Page 9
    with them when they stayed with the Shaws, and he had no knowledge of any sexual
    abuse against the girls.    Rayburne admitted that a parent or authority figure can
    pressure a child to make a false allegation, that a parent with a motive can be behind the
    false allegation, that sometimes an investigation will not uncover that motive, but that
    usually the motive is discovered.
    The defense presented numerous witnesses (relatives and neighbors) who
    testified about Brooke’s reputation for dishonesty and bad lifestyle and about Shaw’s
    good character. Brenda testified that her relationship with Brooke initially was good
    but that once Brooke started having children, she would dump her kids on the Shaws
    and not return for several days. Brenda said that Brooke accused Shaw of molesting
    JoAnn when she was two years old when Brooke was angry after Shaw had made
    Brooke’s boyfriend leave the Shaw’s pool.
    Brenda said that Brooke’s children began staying with them in November of 2004
    because Brooke was in jail for two weeks, and when she got out of jail, she did not get
    them back, although she would drop by to visit. The girls were never left alone with
    Shaw because he did not want to babysit them, and if Brenda went to the store, the girls
    always went with her. She testified about her numerous back surgeries, back pain and
    use of pain medication, and the related difficulties with caring for children.
    She and Shaw got “fed up” with Brooke’s leaving her kids with them while she
    got to “run around” while they had to care for her kids, and in January they sent the
    children to Brooke’s mother’s (Debbie’s) house, where Brooke was staying. The Shaws
    told Debbie and Brooke that they would no longer keep Brooke’s three kids. Brenda
    Shaw v. State                                                                      Page 10
    recounted that after JoAnn’s outcry, she ran into JoAnn and Debra with their
    grandmother Debbie at Wal-Mart, and while JoAnn was alone with her, she asked her if
    Shaw had “messed with her,” and JoAnn put her head down. Brenda then recounted
    the occasion at Debbie’s house where she asked JoAnn to tell Debbie what JoAnn had
    told her at Wal-Mart.
    Shaw testified; he denied all the allegations against him, including Brooke’s
    allegation that he had molested JoAnn when she was two. He related his problems
    with Brooke’s boyfriends’ stealing things and her leaving her kids with them. He
    denied ever being alone with JoAnn or Debra, and he explained that the children were a
    difficulty on Brenda because of her back problems. He confirmed that Brooke’s three
    kids stayed with them from November of 2004 to January of 2005, and he was never
    alone with JoAnn or Debra in that time frame either. In January he told Brooke that he
    “was tired of her dumping the kids off on us.”
    Shaw said he freely went to talk to Beeson without a lawyer because he had not
    done anything wrong. When he talked to Jones, he was nervous and scared and that
    Jones asked him if a lot of things were “possible.” He denied drinking so much that he
    could not remember the day before, but he said he told Jones it was “possible,” but it
    had never happened. He admitted to telling Beeson that he had sometimes drank too
    much, but he did not remember telling him that he drank so much he couldn’t
    remember what had happened. Shaw also admitted that he did not tell Beeson about
    Brooke’s first false allegation or about telling Brooke that he wouldn’t keep her kids
    anymore and she thus “had an ax to grind” with him. Shaw also admitted telling Jones
    Shaw v. State                                                                   Page 11
    that it was possible that he may have accidentally touched the girls while bathing them
    or playing with them. Jones asked him if it was possible that he got so drunk that he
    touched JoAnn’s genital area, and Shaw said he told Jones it was “possible,” but he did
    not do it.
    In the State’s rebuttal, Lauren McWhorter, a social worker and Brooke’s friend
    since grade school, confirmed that Brooke had called her the day of JoAnn’s outcry. She
    received a call from Brooke, who was very upset and crying and told her the situation
    that had just occurred with JoAnn’s outcry. McWhorter said to call the police and she
    immediately went to Brooke, who was at Debbie’s house. When she arrived Brooke
    was crying and upset. McWhorter stayed outside with the kids while Brooke spoke
    with the responding officer, whose patrol car was parked in front of Debbie’s house.
    While they were outside, Brenda drove up and the first thing she said to McWhorter
    was “did somebody touch the girls?,” which McWhorter found curious. McWhorter
    confirmed Brooke’s bad qualities and poor choice in men and that she did not have a
    good opinion of Brooke’s truthfulness.
    Bobby Jones, the forensic interviewer, testified in rebuttal about his interview
    with Shaw, stating that Shaw admitted that he had changed JoAnn’s diapers when she
    was an infant and he had touched her genital area then and when he had bathed her,
    but not sexually. He also told Jones that, about six months before their interview,
    JoAnn had slipped and fallen in the bathtub and he was in the bathroom and when he
    grabbed her, it was possible he may have touched her genital area. Shaw also brought
    up to Jones that it was “very possible” that, while playing with JoAnn and tossing her
    Shaw v. State                                                                    Page 12
    in the air, his hand slipped into her underwear and he touched her genital area, and he
    also indicated that he played a game with JoAnn where he flipped her over and his
    hand may have gone up her shirt and touched her breast. Shaw told Jones about a time
    when both girls were taking a bath and a mouse got in the tub, and in trying to get the
    mouse, Shaw might have touched JoAnn’s genital area. While he admitted possibly
    touching JoAnn, he denied that he ever touched her sexually.
    Finally, Jones said that Shaw told him it was possible he had drank too much and
    touched JoAnn and didn’t remember because “a time or two” he had gotten drunk and
    couldn’t remember what he had done. Shaw gave Jones an example of being drunk and
    waking up the next day to learn that a taco he had put in the refrigerator was gone
    because he had eaten it the night before but did not remember eating it.
    Count Two Disposition
    With respect to the jury’s guilty verdict on Count Two involving JoAnn, a minor
    complainant’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a
    child. See Abbott v. State, 
    196 S.W.3d 334
    , 341 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet ref’d). In
    addition to JoAnn’s testimony and her videotape, the jury heard the outcry testimony
    from Brooke and Caldwell’s similar testimony. JoAnn’s versions of the offenses were
    inconsistent, but Caldwell and Rayburne said that was normal and common for child
    victims.    And while JoAnn recanted to Brenda, she immediately claimed that her
    recantation was a lie. Also, while Brooke’s reputation for truthfulness was impugned,
    JoAnn’s was not. Shaw denied the allegations and had numerous character witnesses
    testify on his behalf, but he made near-incriminating statements to Jones.
    Shaw v. State                                                                     Page 13
    On Shaw’s legal sufficiency complaint on Count Two, our duty is to determine if
    the jury’s guilt finding is rational by viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the
    light most favorable to the verdict. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are
    resolved in favor of the verdict, and we do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign
    credibility to the witnesses, as this was the jury’s function. Viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Shaw committed the offense alleged in Count Two.
    In our factual sufficiency review of the jury’s guilt finding on Count Two, we
    conduct a neutral review of all the evidence to determine if the proof of guilt is so weak
    or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong and
    manifestly unjust. Shaw primarily posits that the jury’s acquittal on seventeen of the
    nineteen counts is an integral factor in our factual sufficiency review. We disagree. The
    jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to
    be given to the witnesses’ testimony. Jaggers v. State, 
    125 S.W.3d 661
    , 670 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (citing Penagraph v. State, 
    623 S.W.2d 341
    , 343 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1981)). The jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony.
    Sharp v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); 
    Jaggers, 125 S.W.3d at 670
    .
    Furthermore, most of the seventeen acquittals were the counts pertaining to Janice and
    Teresa, who were adults whose allegations against Shaw were made many years after
    the alleged offenses occurred, whereas JoAnn’s and Debra’s allegations were made
    within a couple of months.        Under those plainly different circumstances, a jury
    rationally could have found that JoAnn’s and Debra’s allegations pertaining to Counts
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 14
    Two and Nineteen were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, while the allegations
    involving Janice and Teresa were not.
    The jury was faced with conflicting evidence.        As the reviewing court, we
    “should not substantially intrude upon the jury’s role as the sole judge of the weight
    and credibility of witness testimony.” Vasquez v. State, 
    67 S.W.3d 229
    , 236 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2002); see also 
    Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614
    ; 
    Jaggers, 125 S.W.3d at 670
    .
    The degree of deference a reviewing court provides must be proportionate
    with the facts it can accurately glean from the trial record. A factual
    sufficiency analysis can consider only those few matters bearing on
    credibility that can be fully determined from a cold appellate record. Such
    an approach occasionally permits some credibility assessment but usually
    requires deference to the jury’s conclusion based on matters beyond the
    scope of the appellate court’s legitimate concern. See GEORGE E. DIX &
    ROBERT O. DAWSON, 42 TEXAS PRACTICE—CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
    PROCEDURE § 36.69 (Supp. 1999). Unless the available record clearly
    reveals a different result is appropriate, an appellate court must defer to
    the jury’s determination concerning what weight to give contradictory
    testimonial evidence because resolution often turns on an evaluation of
    credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in attendance when the
    testimony was delivered.
    
    Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8
    .
    We must defer to the jury’s determination concerning what weight to give the
    contradictory testimonial evidence. See, e.g., In re A.B., 
    133 S.W.3d 869
    , 873-74 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.); Scugoza v. State, 
    949 S.W.2d 360
    , 362-63 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 1997, no pet.); Fetterolf v. State, 
    782 S.W.2d 927
    , 933 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d); see also 
    Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7
    -8. Considering all of the evidence
    in a neutral light, we find that the jury was justified in finding Shaw guilty on Count
    Two because the evidence is factually sufficient: The proof of guilt is not so weak and
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 15
    the conflicting evidence is not so strong as to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong
    and manifestly unjust.
    Count Nineteen Evidence
    In Count Nineteen, Shaw was charged with committing the offense of indecency
    with a child by contact against Debra, Shaw’s grand-niece who was around six years
    old at the time of the offense. In addition to the above evidence, the evidence showed
    that at the time of trial, Debra was an eight-year-old second grader, and she testified
    that she had previously lived with the Shaws. She said that when she lived with the
    Shaws, Shaw touched her private parts under her clothing (a nightgown) and
    underwear—her “tee-tee,” “hiney bo,” and “boobies,” and his fingers went inside of
    her. He did it while she and Shaw were lying on the living-room couch on their sides
    (with Shaw behind her) under a blanket, and they were watching the “Grinch,” a
    Christmas movie, around Christmastime. JoAnn was there, but she was sitting on the
    floor in front of the television, and Brenda was there but was either cooking in the
    kitchen or cleaning the bathroom.
    Debra said that the first person she told about it was her mother on the next day,
    and JoAnn was there when she told her mother about it. She later said she didn’t
    remember telling her mother what Shaw had done. Debra’s videotaped interview was
    shown to the jury. Like JoAnn, Debra’s versions of her allegations against Shaw were
    inconsistent.
    Brooke said that after JoAnn’s outcry, she asked Debra if anything had happened
    to her, and she said, “no, I don’t want to talk about it.” When Brooke took JoAnn to the
    Shaw v. State                                                                      Page 16
    advocacy center to be interviewed, Debra went with them. While they were there,
    Brooke told Debra that if she needed to say anything, “now is the perfect time for it,”
    and Debra hesitantly said that Shaw had touched her breasts in the Shaws’ living room
    while Brenda was in bed or not there. She also told Brooke that Shaw often would lay
    on the couch with her. Brooke then told an advocacy center employee that Debra had
    something to say.
    Brooke admitted that when she brought up the subject with Debra, she asked her
    if Shaw had touched her. She denied telling Debra to say that they were watching the
    “Grinch” when it happened.
    Debra told Caldwell that “Roy” touched her private part by putting his hand in
    her panties, that he did it lot, and that sometimes it hurt. Caldwell’s genital/anal exam
    of Debra was normal. Caldwell did not think that Brooke’s initial questioning of Debra
    by asking if Shaw had done anything to her was inappropriate because JoAnn had
    already alleged that he had touched her. Debra did not report to her that Shaw had
    touched her breasts.
    Count Nineteen Disposition
    We find that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient on the jury’s guilt
    finding on Count Nineteen for essentially the same reasons set forth in our discussion
    on Count Two.
    Shaw’s second and third issues are overruled.
    Exclusion of Evidence
    Shaw’s first issue complains about the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that a
    Shaw v. State                                                                     Page 17
    boyfriend of the victims’ mother was a registered sex offender. We review a trial
    court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. McDonald v. State,
    
    179 S.W.3d 571
    , 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Questions of relevance should be left
    largely to the trial court, relying on its own observations and experience, and will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Moreno v. State, 
    858 S.W.2d 453
    , 463 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1993). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is so clearly wrong as
    to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” 
    Id. Various witnesses,
    including Brooke and her two daughters, testified about the
    various men whom Brooke had been involved with or lived with and her children had
    thus been exposed to. One was Glen Walker, a registered sex offender. The jury heard
    evidence from the two girls that they had been around Walker and, with their mother
    and brother, had stayed overnight some at Walker’s residence, and several witnesses
    said that the girls should not have been around Walker. But the trial court excluded
    evidence that Walker was a registered sex offender on the State’s objections that it was
    not relevant and, if relevant, was more prejudicial than probative and was confusing.
    In an offer of proof, Shaw’s counsel elicited evidence from Rayburne that Walker was a
    registered sex offender.
    Shaw’s brief does not explicitly explain the relevance of Walker’s registered-sex-
    offender status.   He argues that “there is little doubt that the probative value of
    Walker’s contact with the children in this case could have undermined the State’s case,”
    but his brief does not explain why. Moreover, the jury heard numerous witnesses say
    that JoAnn and Debra were around Walker. We therefore assume that Shaw’s relevance
    Shaw v. State                                                                       Page 18
    argument is premised on Walker’s being an alternative perpetrator of the offenses
    alleged by the children.
    “Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible.” TEX. R. EVID. 402. Relevant
    evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
    consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
    would be without the evidence.” 
    Id. 401. “A
    defendant has a fundamental right to
    present evidence of a defense as long as the evidence is relevant and is not excluded by
    an established evidentiary rule.” Miller v. State, 
    36 S.W.3d 503
    , 507 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2001) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 
    410 U.S. 284
    , 302, 
    93 S. Ct. 1038
    , 1049, 
    35 L. Ed. 2d 297
    (1973)). Evidence is considered relevant if it is material and probative. 
    Id. To be
    material, the evidence “must be shown to be addressed to the proof of a material
    proposition, i.e., ‘any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’” 
    Id. (quoting 1
    STEVEN GOODE       ET AL.,   TEXAS PRACTICE: GUIDE     TO THE   TEXAS RULES    OF
    EVIDENCE § 401.1). Evidence is considered probative if it “tend[s] to make the existence
    of the fact ‘more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” 
    Id. It is
    axiomatic that in a criminal prosecution, the State must prove each element
    of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and those elements are material
    issues in the prosecution. See Soffar v. State, 
    742 S.W.2d 371
    , 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
    (“The material issues in a criminal prosecution always consist of the elements of the
    offense.”). But the identity of the accused is not an issue in every prosecution; the main
    issue can be whether an offense was committed at all. See, e.g., Eubanks v. State, 
    113 S.W.3d 562
    , 566 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Morris v. State, 
    110 S.W.3d 100
    ,
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 19
    103 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. ref’d). In this case, the identity of the perpetrator of
    the sexual offenses allegedly committed against JoAnn and Debra was not an issue.
    They both knew Shaw very well and unequivocally and consistently said that he
    committed the charged offenses against them. The main issue on the charges against
    Shaw was whether the offenses occurred at all.
    Evidence of Walker’s registered-sex-offender status would only have been
    relevant if the identity of the alleged perpetrator of the offenses was an issue in the case.
    But in this case, evidence of an alternative perpetrator, such as Walker, is not relevant,
    i.e., is immaterial, to the determination of whether the alleged offenses occurred. Cf.
    Turner v. State, 
    600 S.W.2d 927
    , 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Therefore, we cannot say
    that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Walker’s sex-offender
    status on relevance grounds. We overrule Shaw’s first issue.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled all of Shaw’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s two judgments
    of conviction.
    BILL VANCE
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Vance, and
    Justice Reyna
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed December 3, 2008
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Shaw v. State                                                                         Page 20