in the Interest of R. C. and R.C.C., Jr., Children ( 2007 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-06-0444-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    APRIL 25, 2007
    ______________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF R.C. AND R.C.C., JR., MINOR CHILDREN
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 99TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2004-527,727; HONORABLE KEVIN C. HART, ASSOCIATE JUDGE PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    OPINION
    Chetra Fulcher brings this accelerated appeal of the trial court’s order terminating
    her parental rights and appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
    (“DFPS”) as permanent managing conservator. In three issues, Fulcher contends (1) the
    trial court erred when it determined the appeal was frivolous, (2) she was denied effective
    assistance of counsel, and (3) the evidence supporting the termination was not clear and
    convincing. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
    The appeal of a final order rendered under Subchapter E of Chapter 263 of the
    Texas Family Code is governed by the rules of the Supreme Court for accelerated appeals
    in civil cases and by the procedures set forth in that chapter.1 A final order terminating the
    relationship between a parent and child and appointing DFPS as permanent managing
    conservator is an order rendered under Subchapter E of Chapter 263. Therefore, the
    accelerated appeal of the order in this case is governed by the procedures set forth in
    Chapter 263.
    Chapter 263 of the Texas Family Code requires a party intending to appeal a final
    order rendered under Subchapter E to file with the trial court, no later than fifteen days
    after the final order is signed, a statement of points on which the party intends to appeal.2
    The statement of points may be filed separately or it may be combined with a motion for
    new trial.3 The failure to timely file a statement of points does not deprive the appellate
    court of jurisdiction over the appeal; however, it is necessary to preserve a point for review
    on appeal.4
    1
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(a)(Vernon Supp. 2006).
    2
    § 263.405(b).
    3
    
    Id. 4 Coey
    v. Tex. Dep’t. of Family and Protective Services, No. 03-05-0679-CV, 2006
    Tex. App. LEXIS 4325 (Tex.App.–Austin May19, 2006, no pet.)(not designated for
    publication); In re S.E., 
    203 S.W.3d 14
    , 15 (Tex.App.–San Antonio, no pet.)
    2
    In 2005, in response to what it perceived as judicial activism, the Texas Legislature
    enacted § 263.405(i), effective for appeals filed after September 1, 2005, which provides:
    The appellate court may not consider any issue that was not specifically
    presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of the points on which
    the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new
    trial. For purposes of this subsection, a claim that a judicial decision is
    contrary to the evidence or that the evidence is factually or legally insufficient
    is not sufficiently specific to preserve an issue for appeal.
    While several of our sister courts have questioned the practical application and
    constitutional validity of this statute,5 particularly in the context of a claim raising the issue
    of ineffective assistance of court-appointed trial counsel, every appellate court called upon
    to address this question has agreed that the clear language of the statute prohibits
    appellate courts from considering points not properly preserved by the timely filing of a
    statement of points.6 We recognize the application of this statutory limitation to the right
    5
    In re R.M.R., No. 13-06-0351-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2181, *3
    (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi March 22, 2007, no pet.); Pool v. Tex. Dep’t. of Family &
    Protective Services, No. 01-05-1093-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1576, *7
    (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] March 1, 2007, no pet.); In re D.A.R., 
    201 S.W.3d 229
    , 231
    (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); In re E.A.R., 
    201 S.W.3d 813
    , 814 (Tex.App.–Waco
    2006, no pet.)(Vance, J., concurring)
    6
    In re J.W.H., No. 10-06-0083-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2340 (Tex.App.–Waco,
    March 21, 2007, no pet.); In re J.F.R., No. 09-06-0115-CV, Tex. App. LEXIS 1727
    (Tex.App.–Beaumont March 8, 2007, no pet.); In re J.H., No. 12-06-0002-CV, 2007 Tex.
    App. LEXIS 407 (Tex.App.–Tyler January 24, 2007, no pet.)(not designated for
    publication);    In re K.R., No. 09-06-0056-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 300
    (Tex.App.–Beaumont Jan. 18, 2007, no pet.h.); In re C.B.M. No. 08-06-0136-CV, 2006
    Tex. App. LEXIS 10716 (Tex.App.–El Paso Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.); In re H.H.H., No. 06-
    06-0093-CV (Tex.App.–Texarkana October 4, 2006, no pet.)(not designated for
    publication); Coey v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Services, No. 03-05-0679-CV, 2006
    3
    of appeal can have harsh results. Parties seeking review of claims pertaining to the
    ineffective assistance of court-appointed trial counsel may find it particularly difficult to
    preserve those points. We recognize that in such situations a complaining party, unlike
    her criminal counterpart, has no recourse through a statutory writ of habeas corpus.7
    Nevertheless, we do not believe that it is an appropriate function of this Court to create a
    means of recourse by fabricating an interpretation that would expand the legislatively
    created procedures for perfection of a statutorily-created right of appeal. To do so would
    amount to blatant legislating from the bench.8
    The final order in this case was signed on October 6, 2006. Fulcher’s trial counsel
    filed a motion for new trial, which purports to contain a combined statement of points, on
    November 6, 2006. Because Fulcher did not timely file her statement of points, she did not
    preserve those points for appeal. Accordingly, we cannot consider any of the issues
    Fulcher has raised, including the allegation that her counsel was ineffective by failing to
    Tex. App. LEXIS 4325 (Tex.App.–Austin May 19, 2006, no pet.)(not designated for
    publication); In re S.E., 
    203 S.W.3d 14
    (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2006, no pet.); In re C.M.,
    
    208 S.W.3d 89
    (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.], 2006, no pet.); see also In re R.M.R., No.
    13-06-351-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2181, *3 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi March 22, 2007,
    no pet.); Pool v. Tex. Dep’t. of Family & Protective Services, No. 01-05-1093-CV, 2007
    Tex. App. LEXIS 1576, *7 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] March 1, 2007, no pet.); In re
    D.A.R., 
    201 S.W.3d 229
    , 231 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); In re E.A.R., E.A.R.,
    and I.D.A., 
    201 S.W.3d 813
    , 814 (Tex.App.–Waco 2006 no pet.)(Vance, J., concurring).
    7
    In so ruling, we express no opinion as to whether an aggrieved party would be
    entitled to common law relief through a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of error coram nobis.
    8
    See Turner v. Cross, 
    83 Tex. 218
    , 
    18 S.W. 578
    , 579 (1892).
    4
    timely file a statement of points on appeal raising ineffective assistance of counsel. We
    affirm the trial court’s order.
    Patrick A. Pirtle
    Justice
    Quinn, C.J., concurring.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-06-00444-CV

Filed Date: 4/25/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021