Roberta Benson v. Fred Chalk, Individually, and Steve Chalk, Individually and as Next Friend of Drucilla Henkhaus ( 2017 )

Opinion issued November 21, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00112-CV
———————————
ROBERTA BENSON, Appellant
V.
FRED CHALK, INDIVIDUALLY, AND STEVE CHALK, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF DRUCILLA HENKHAUS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 129th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2011-27959
OPINION
Appellant, Roberta Benson, challenges the trial court’s judgment, entered
after a jury trial, in the suit for negligence and wrongful death1 brought against her
by appellees, Fred Chalk, individually, and Steve Chalk, individually and as next
friend of Drucilla Henkhaus (the “Chalks”). In six issues, Benson contends that the
trial court erred in admitting a video recording of an out-of-court experiment and
excluding impeachment testimony, eyewitness statements contained in a law
enforcement collision report and investigation file, and testimony on causation.
We affirm.
Background
In their third amended petition, the Chalks alleged that on July 7, 2010, a red
Nissan minivan, driven by Mary Herron-Anders (“Anders”),2 collided with a black
Lexus sedan, driven by Benson, at the intersection Apple Tree Road and Wilcrest
Drive (the “intersection”), which was controlled by a traffic signal. Anders’s
passenger, Drusilla Henkhaus (the “decedent”), the mother of Fred and Steve Chalk,
sustained severe internal injuries in the collision and later died. According to the
Chalks, Benson failed to use ordinary care by entering the intersection in disregard
of a red traffic light, not controlling the speed of her car, and not keeping a proper
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001–.012 (Vernon 2008 & Supp.
2016).
2
The Chalks non-suited Anders, who died prior to trial, and the trial court dismissed
her from the case.
2
lookout and timely applying her brakes. And Benson’s failure to use ordinary care
proximately caused the decedent’s death. The Chalks sought actual damages and
damages for their loss of companionship and their mental anguish.
Benson filed an answer, generally denying the allegations and asserting that
the collision was instead caused by the negligence of Anders.
At trial, Benson testified that she lives on Apple Tree and is familiar with the
traffic signal at the intersection. At 7:50 p.m. on July 7, 2010, she drove her Lexus
sedan east down Apple Tree toward the intersection. Benson “remember[ed] seeing
the light green,” but could not recall her location on Apple Tree when she noticed it.
However, she was “near the intersection” when she looked up and saw the green
light and “the light was green when [she] got there.” Benson noted that there was
not another motorist in front of her on Apple Tree and “there were stopped cars” in
the southbound lanes of Wilcrest, although she initially stated that there were no
such cars there. As she entered the intersection, she looked to her left and “glanc[ed]
to her right.” As Benson traveled across Wilcrest, she heard a “bam”; she was
suddenly on a curb, with the passenger side of her car “smashed in.” Although she
initially told a law enforcement officer at the scene that she “thought” she had the
green light, she “24 hours later,” after having “calmed down,” became “certain” that
she had the green light.
3
In her deposition, which was presented to the jury, Anders testified that at
approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 7, 2010, while it was daylight, but rainy, she drove
her Nissan minivan in the left lane of the two northbound lanes of Wilcrest.
Although trees lined the sides of the roadway, “they were not obstructing the light”
and she had a clear view of the traffic signal at the intersection of Apple Tree. As
she approached the intersection, the traffic light was green, and it stayed green. Her
passenger, the decedent, suddenly said, “The car is not stopping.” Anders then saw
Benson’s Lexus sedan for only a “split second,” and she swerved to try to avoid a
crash. After the collision, the decedent said that she smelled smoke, her stomach
hurt, and she felt nauseous. She got out of the minivan, laid on the grass, and was
later transported by ambulance to a hospital.
Dr. Charles Aramburo, a trauma surgeon at Memorial Hermann Hospital,
testified that he was the decedent’s admitting physician. When she arrived at the
hospital, the decedent was unresponsive and never regained consciousness. She
suffered a ruptured spleen and liver, and subsequently died. During Aramburo’s
testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence the decedent’s medical records and
certificate of death, which reflects that she died from “blunt force injuries.”
April Yergin, the Chalks’ expert witness on traffic-collision reconstruction,
testified that she has a bachelor’s degree in aeronautical engineering, attended
classes at Northwest Traffic Institute, has twenty years of experience in
4
traffic-collision reconstruction, and investigates 150 to 200 traffic collisions per
year. In this case, she examined records of the City of Houston Department of Public
Works and Engineering (“the Department”) to determine how the traffic-light
sequence at the intersection was programmed. She then went to the intersection,
observed the flow of traffic and function of the traffic lights, and compared the light
sequencing against the Department’s records. She saw that the traffic lights
controlling Wilcrest at the intersection remain green at all times unless a motorist
approaches on Apple Tree. Sensors mounted on the traffic lights regularly cycle,
periodically looking for changes in pixilation on Apple Tree. When a change is
detected, the traffic signal on Wilcrest begins to cycle to red to allow traffic on Apple
Tree to pass through the intersection.
Yergin conducted an out-of-court “experiment” to depict the sequencing and
timing of the traffic lights at the intersection. Noting that the collision occurred on
July 7, 2010 at 7:55 p.m., she, in January 2013, went to the intersection at
approximately 7:00 p.m., staying until 8:30 p.m. Yergin observed how the traffic
flowed and noted the duration of each signal light. She then had her assistant, from
different directions and speeds, drive through the intersection several times. Yergin
made video recordings of the signal lights controlling traffic eastbound on Apple
Tree, as Benson had traveled at the time of the collision, and northbound on Wilcrest,
as Anders had traveled at the time of the collision. Yergin explained that “[i]n every
5
scenario,” in order to trigger the signal lights controlling Wilcrest to begin cycling
to red, a motorist traveling eastbound on Apple Tree and approaching the
intersection had to “stop or come within a mile per hour” in front of the signal light
on Apple Tree. She noted that while at the intersection, she did not see any motorist
simply “catch a green light” on Apple Tree, unless another motorist happened to be
traveling in front of them.
Yergin further testified that the video recordings fairly and accurately depict
the functioning of the traffic signals at the intersection and, based on the
Department’s timing charts, the light sequencing at the time she was at the
intersection was the same as that at the time of the collision. Further, the timing
listed in the charts matched what she observed at the intersection. Although the
collision occurred during daylight hours in the month of July and she conducted her
experiment after dark in the month of January, Yergin noted that the “lighting
conditions [were] not an issue.” Rather, the issue was the timing of the lights, which,
according to the Department’s records, had not changed.
During cross-examination, Yergin explained that the Department’s records do
not differentiate between months; rather, they differentiate between days of the
week. And because the collision occurred on a Wednesday, she visited the
intersection on a Wednesday. Yergin also explained that once triggered, the traffic
light on Apple Tree remained green for only five seconds, then turned yellow for
6
three and one-half seconds, and then turned red. The traffic light on Wilcrest would
then turn green after a one-and-one-half-second lag. Yergin noted that the timing of
the traffic light remained the same regardless of whether it was daytime or nighttime
and its camera detected images within 50 to 150 feet of its sensor. She further
explained that the sensor could not be triggered by headlights alone:
I’m not sure exactly how that particular camera picks up objects. It has
to do with visual pix[i]lization. I would assume at night it’s looking at
lights, but headlights can be seen for a long distance. So, you wouldn’t
want it to trigger when a car is, say, you know, 300 feet away because
then it would have to wait for 10, 15, 20 seconds for that car to get there.
So, I believe it has some sort of visual ability to see at night . . . .
Yergin did note that during her experiment, the reflective vest that she was wearing
appeared to have triggered the traffic light on Apple Tree to change. She also noted,
however, that there was not a cross-walk or pedestrian signals at the intersection, it
was not a pedestrian-friendly area, and there had been no mention in this case of any
pedestrians in the area at the time of the collision.
The Chalks offered as a “demonstrative exhibit” three, thirty-minute video
recordings of Yergin’s out-of-court experiment. Benson objected to the admission
of the video recordings on the ground that they are more prejudicial than probative,
in that the lighting conditions depicted are not substantially similar to those that
occurred at the time of the collision. Benson asserted that Yergin had failed to
explain to the jury how the lighting conditions affected the sensor’s pixel detection
7
and, thus, the triggering of the light. The trial court admitted the video recordings
as “demonstrative exhibit[s]” and portions were played for the jury.3
Prior to trial, Benson had informed the trial court that she intended to present
to the jury the deposition testimony of Cindy Maddox, who witnessed the collision;
Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officer M. Hroch, who was dispatched to the
scene of the collision; and HPD Officer A. Michon, who investigated the collision.
The trial court sustained the Chalks’ objections, discussed below, to the admissibility
of certain portions of the depositions. Benson then presented to the jury excerpts of
the remaining portions of the deposition testimony.
In her videotaped deposition, Maddox testified that “right before the
collision,” she was driving her car on Wilcrest “[a]bout 400 feet” behind Anders’s
red minivan. Maddox was not focused on the minivan or on Benson’s car when it
entered the intersection. She noted that trees along both sides of the street were
“really overgrown” to the point that they obstructed a clear view of the traffic signal
at the intersection. When asked whether she could “say whether it’s more likely
than not that the light controlling [her] lane of traffic was red or green at the time of
the collision,” she responded, “I don’t know.” At the scene, Maddox had given to
Benson an envelope, on which Maddox had written her name and telephone number,
and the trial court admitted it into evidence.
3
These videotape recordings were not made part of the appellate record.
8
In his deposition, which was read into the record, Officer Hroch testified that
at the time of the collision, he had been a law enforcement officer for approximately
three years and had attended a “basic accident course.” On July 7, 2010, he was
dispatched to investigate the collision. He noted that Benson, Anders, and the
decedent were “shaken up” and it would not have been unusual for a driver to use
the word, “thought,” “with regard to the [color of the] light they had.”
In his deposition, which was read into the record, Officer Michon testified that
at the time of the collision, he had been a police officer for approximately one year,
attended two weeks of “accident investigation” training, and been assigned to HPD’s
Vehicular Crimes Division for five weeks. After he was assigned to investigate the
collision, he interviewed both drivers and Maddox. Michon established that Maddox
actually witnessed the collision. When asked his impression of whether Anders had
seen the traffic light, he responded, “I did not believe that she had seen the light. I
believe that she was relying more on her passenger.” The trial court admitted into
evidence redacted versions of the HPD “crash report” and “accident records.”
Before the trial court read its charge to the jury,4 Benson made an offer of
proof regarding the excluded portions of the deposition testimony of Maddox and
Officers Hroch and Michon. In the proffered portion of Maddox’s deposition
testimony, she admitted that she had originally, at the scene, told Officer Hroch that
4
See TEX. R. EVID. 103(c).
9
Anders’s “van ran the red light and caused the accident.” Maddox also admitted that
eight days after the collision, she, in a recorded interview with an insurance adjuster,
had stated:
As I was coming home, . . . I was about three car lengths behind this
red van. I saw the light in front of me, and the light in front of the red
van turned red and I started slowing down and I then, of course—that
we had the red light, I saw the other—the dark car come off of [Apple
Tree] like she would have for a green light, and I saw her coming out
and I didn’t see that red van put on brake lights or anything, and I knew
instantly that the van just didn’t see the red light, and then I just saw
her broadside or hit that dark car coming off of [Apple Tree].
....
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the light was red because
I thought—because when I saw that dark car, I said, oh, my God, she’s
going to—that van is going to hit that car because I never saw any brake
lights on the van, so I knew that the van just did not, somehow, for some
reason, did not see, did not pay attention to that red light. I mean, it
was red. You know, I saw it red and that’s—I was shocked that the van
didn’t stop.
Maddox further admitted that several weeks after the collision, she told Officer
Michon that she was “about four car lengths behind the red van” and there was “no
doubt that the van had the red light and ran the red light.”
In the proffered portion of his deposition testimony, Officer Hroch noted that
he had arrived at the scene approximately ten minutes after the collision. He
described the positions of automobiles, the drivers, and a passenger. Hroch blocked
off the street from other motorists, gathered information from the drivers, summoned
tow trucks, observed the functioning of the signal light, and confirmed that it was
10
functioning properly, “as red and green opposite.” He noted that there was nothing
obscuring the views of the traffic signals. And Hroch explained that “closer to the
beginning of [his] arriving on scene,” Maddox walked up to him, stated that she saw
the collision, and provided a statement, which Hroch recorded in the collision report.
Maddox told Hroch:
I was driving north on Wilcrest and I was behind the red van. I began
to slow down because we had a red light and the van just drove right
through the intersection and did not even slow down. The van ran the
red light and caused the accident.
Hroch noted that Maddox was the sole independent witness at the scene and “seemed
sure.” Based on her statement, Hroch opined that Anders had caused the collision.
In the proffered portion of his deposition testimony, Officer Michon noted
that on September 30, 2010, he met with Maddox, who provided a handwritten
statement as follows:
As I was nearing the Apple Tree intersection I saw the light was red
and started putting on my brakes. I was about four car lengths behind
the red van and saw that the driver wasn’t braking. I saw a dark car pull
out into the intersection and said to myself, “Oh no the van is going to
hit that car.” That is what happened. I grabbed my cell and called 911
as I was parking my car to assist. There is no doubt that the van had
the red light and ran the red light.
Based on Maddox’s statement, Michon opined that Anders ran a red light and caused
the collision.
The jury found that the negligence of both Benson and Anders proximately
caused the collision. It attributed eighty percent of the liability to Benson and twenty
11
percent to Anders. It awarded Fred and Steve Chalk each damages in the amount of
$300,000 for past and future loss of companionship and mental anguish. And the
jury awarded the decedent damages in the amount of $25,000 for physical pain,
$10,000 for mental anguish, and $5,000 for funeral and burial expenses. The trial
court entered a judgment on the verdict.
Standard of Review
The decision to admit or exclude evidence lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234
(Tex. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner or without reference to guiding rules or principles. Bowie
Mem. Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). We will uphold a trial court’s
evidentiary ruling if any legitimate ground supports the ruling, even if the ground
was not raised in the trial court. Hooper v. Chittaluru, 222 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tex.
App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). And we will not reverse an erroneous
evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment or prevented a proper presentation of the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1(a); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 966 S.W.2d 467, 474 (Tex.
1998). In determining if the excluded evidence probably resulted in the rendition of
an improper judgment, we review the entire record, and, “[t]ypically, a successful
challenge to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings requires the complaining party to
12
demonstrate that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or
admitted.” Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex.
2001). Ordinarily, we will not reverse a judgment because a trial court erroneously
excluded evidence if the evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a
material issue dispositive to the case. Id.Statements in Collision Report and Investigation File
In her first and fourth issues, Benson argues that the trial court erred in
excluding from evidence Maddox’s statements, contained in the HPD collision
report and investigation file, that Anders ran the red light because the statements are
admissible under the exceptions to the hearsay rule for prior witness statements and
present sense impressions. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1), 803(1).
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the
rules of evidence or some other statute. TEX. R. EVID. 802. The proponent of
hearsay has the burden of showing that the testimony fits within an exception to the
general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.
v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 908 n.5 (Tex. 2004).
The parties do not dispute that the collision report and investigation file meet
the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(8).
13
However, they dispute the admissibility of Maddox’s statements contained within
the report and file. Hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the general rule excluding
hearsay. See TEX. R. EVID. 805; Case Corp. v. Hi-Class Bus. Sys. of Am., Inc., 184
S.W.3d 760, 782 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied); Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d
40, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). When a police report
contains a hearsay statement, the statement must fall under some hearsay exception
of its own because neither the public records and reports exception, nor the records
of regularly conducted activities exception, protects hearsay within hearsay. See
Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no pet.).
Benson first asserts that Maddox’s statements, contained in both the collision
report and investigation file, are admissible as a declarant-witness’s prior statement.
See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(A). Rule 801(e)(1)(A) provides an exemption to the
hearsay rule providing, in pertinent part, as follows: A declarant’s prior statement
is not hearsay if she “testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement . . . is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony,
and . . . was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or
in a deposition.” Id. Here, Maddox’s statements at issue, which are those contained
in the collision report and investigation file, were made at the scene to Officer Hroch
14
and during a subsequent interview with Officer Michon. Because her statements to
the officers were not made under oath, the exception does not apply. See id.Benson next asserts that Maddox’s statement, contained in the collision
report,5 is admissible as a present sense impression. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(1). A
present sense impression is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.” Id. Present sense impressions possess the following
safeguards which make them likely to be true and thus admissible: (1) the report at
the moment of the thing then heard, seen, etc. is safe from any error from defect of
memory of the declarant; (2) there is little or no time for calculated misstatement;
and (3) the statement will usually be made to another—the witness who reports it—
who would have equal opportunity to observe and check a misstatement. First Sw.
Lloyds Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 958–59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1989, writ denied).
Again, the proponent of hearsay has the burden of showing that the
complained-of statement fits within an exception to the general rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay evidence. See Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 908 n.5. To preserve
error for our review, an appellant’s complaint on appeal must comport with her
5
We treat this portion of Benson’s issue as applying only to Maddox’s statement
contained in the collision report because the record shows that she made the
statement contained in the investigation file several weeks after the collision.
15
objection in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Taylor v. Am. Fabritech,
Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 621 & n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
denied). Benson does not direct us to any point in the record in which she asserted
in the trial court that Maddox’s statement, contained in the collision report,
constitutes a present sense impression. Thus, her stated ground for admission in the
trial court does not comport with her ground raised on appeal, and error, if any, is
waived. See Taylor, 132 S.W.3d 613, 621 & n.21; see, e.g., McKee v. McNeir, 151
S.W.3d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (proponent of evidence
waived complaint trial court erred in excluding evidence because proponent’s stated
ground for admission at trial failed to comport with ground raised on appeal); Butler
v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 928 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1996, no writ) (argument trial court erred in excluding hearsay testimony on ground
witness’s response went to state of mind waived because defendant did not urge
“state of mind” hearsay exception at trial).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding from
evidence Maddox statements contained in the HPD collision report and investigation
file.
We overrule Benson’s first and fourth issues.
16
Prior Inconsistent Statements
In her third issue, Benson argues that the trial court erred in excluding from
evidence the portions of Maddox’s deposition testimony in which she admitted
making prior inconsistent statements to Officers Hroch and Michon and to the
insurance adjuster, i.e., that Anders drove through a red light, because the rule that
a witness may not be called solely for purposes of impeachment applies only in
criminal, and not in civil, cases. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). She further asserts that
Maddox’s prior inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence.
“Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the
witness’s credibility.” TEX. R. EVID. 607. A party may impeach a witness with
evidence of prior inconsistent statements. TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). However, only
those prior inconsistent statements made under the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, are considered non-hearsay and may
be used. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(A)(i). Because “most prior inconsistent statements
are . . . classified as hearsay, the danger remains that a litigant will call a witness[,]
whom it knows (or strongly suspects) will testify unfavorably,” and impeach the
witness with a prior inconsistent statement, “with the hope that the jury will
improperly use the prior statement for its truth.” 1 Steven Goode, et al., Texas
Practice Series: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 607.2
(4th ed. 2016). Thus, with “near unanimity,” courts have held that “some restrictions
17
must be placed on a party’s ability to impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent
statements.” Id. (“[C]ourts have wrestled with the task of reconciling the terms of
Rule 607, which seems to abandon all restrictions on impeaching one’s own witness,
and the continued hearsay status of most prior inconsistent statements.”).
“Regardless of their analytical approach,” courts have reached the same conclusion:
“[A] party may not impeach its own witness if its primary purpose is merely to the
get the witness’s prior inconsistent statement before the jury.” Id.; see also Barley
v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27, 37 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“[T]he majority of
jurisdictions still do not allow prior inconsistent statements to be used under the
guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing substantive evidence
before the jury which is not otherwise admissible.”).
Although the language of rule 607 is the same for both civil and criminal
cases, civil cases interpreting rule 607 in the instant context are limited. Thus, we
look to analogous criminal cases for guidance in interpreting rule 607. See TEX. R.
EVID. 101(b) (“These rules apply to proceedings in Texas courts . . . .”); Heckman v.
Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 (Tex. 2012) (“More than a century ago, this
Court noted that ‘there are criminal cases which may incidentally involve a question
of civil law, and civil cases in which in like manner points of criminal law call for
solution.’” (quoting Comm’rs’ Court v. Beall, 98 Tex. 104, 81 S.W. 526, 528
(1904))); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pate, 170 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. App.—
18
Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (applying criminal cases in construing Texas Rule of
Evidence 607); see also McNeel v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 526 S.W.3d 750, 756
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“[W]hen there is no binding
precedent, Texas courts also look to federal law and federal cases for guidance in
situations . . . in which the language of the [state statute] and the analogous federal
statute contain the same or substantially similar language.”); cf. McQuarrie v. State,
380 S.W.3d 145, 152–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (considering civil cases
interpreting former rules of civil evidence as persuasive authority for interpreting
rules of evidence in criminal case); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 234 n.3 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (because Texas Rule of Evidence 702 is “equally
applicable to both Texas civil and criminal cases,” “Texas civil cases . . . may be
looked to for guidance” in “a Texas criminal case”).
In Hughes v. State, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) investigators stated that
the defendant’s wife had told them that the defendant had admitted to having
sexually abused his step-daughter. 4 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Subsequently, at a pre-trial hearing, the wife denied having told the investigators
about any such admission by the defendant. Id. at 2–3. At trial, the State called the
wife, who again denied having made such statements to the investigators. Id. at 3.
The State then called one of the CPS investigators to impeach the wife’s testimony.
Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the
19
impeachment testimony because the State called his wife for the sole purpose of
impeaching her with otherwise inadmissible hearsay, knowing prior to calling his
wife to testify that she would deny having told the investigators about his admission.
Id. at 2, 4–5. The defendant asserted that the State’s right to impeach its own witness
under rule 607 did not “extend to employment of such impeachment as a mere
subterfuge to get otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence before the jury.” Id. at 3.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that in Barley v. State it had
observed that although a showing of “surprise” or “injury” is no longer required for
a party to impeach its own witness under rule 607, there did appear to be “a growing
distinction” among the courts as to whether the State was aware, prior to calling its
witness at trial, that the witness would testify unfavorably. Id. at 4 (citing 906
S.W.2d 27, 38 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Specifically, in those cases in which
courts had refused to admit prior inconsistent statements under the guise of
impeachment, “it was obvious the State’s primary intent in calling the witness was
to introduce inadmissible hearsay.” Id. (citing Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 38 n.11).
However, in cases in which there was not a “clear showing that the State was aware
[that its] witness would testify unfavorably, the trend seemed to be ‘an analysis
conducted in the context of a Rule 403 balancing approach.’” Id. Some courts of
appeals, however, had interpreted Barley as creating an exception to rule 607 where
20
the State was aware, or should have been, that its witness would testify unfavorably.
Id.In Hughes, the court of criminal appeals concluded that “the State’s
knowledge that its own witness will testify unfavorably is a factor the trial court
must consider when determining whether the evidence is admissible under Rule
403.” Id. at *5. Under a rule 403 balancing test, the impeachment evidence “must
be excluded” where the State “profits from the witness’s testimony only if the jury
misuses the evidence by considering it for its truth.” Id. Under such circumstances,
“any probative value the impeachment testimony may have is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”6 Id.
Further in Hughes, the court of criminal appeals concluded that, in the case
before it, the State had not offered any explanation as to why it had expected the
wife to testify differently at trial than she had during the pretrial hearing. Id. at 7.
6
When a party calls a witness knowing that the witness will provide no
useful testimony and then adduces a prior inconsistent statement, it
must be doing so in the hope that the jury will make substantive use
of the prior statement. If the jury used the evidence properly (that is,
for impeachment purposes only), the best the party can do is to
neutralize the witness’s testimony. . . . The party can profit from
calling the witness only if the jury misuses the evidence by
considering it for the truth of the matter asserted. In this situation, the
prejudicial value of adducing the prior inconsistent statement must
outweigh its probative value.
Ramirez v. State, 987 S.W.2d 938, 944 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (quoting
1 Steven Goode, et al., Texas Practice Series: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence:
Civil and Criminal § 607.2 (4th ed. 2016)).
21
And an examination of the record revealed that, during trial, the State elicited “no
favorable testimony” from the wife. Id. The court concluded that the “lack of
favorable testimony suggest[ed] that the State was attempting to use [the wife’s]
prior inconsistent statements under the guise of impeachment, for the primary
purpose of placing before the jury evidence which was not otherwise admissible.”
Id. And the State had “little, if any, legitimate purpose in admitting [the wife’s] prior
inconsistent statements to impeach her testimony.” Id. “[D]ue to the highly
prejudicial nature” of the defendant’s confession, “any probative value it may have
had [as impeachment evidence] was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.” Id. Thus, the trial court erred in “failing to exclude the impeachment
evidence under rule 403.” Id.
Similarly, in Aguilar v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred
in admitting impeachment testimony because its probative value was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. No. 14-07-00362-CR, 2008 WL 5058974, at
*1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 2, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). There, a police officer stated that a witness told him
that the defendant had admitted to shooting the complainant. Id. at *1.
Subsequently, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the witness testified that
he did not remember giving a statement to the officer. Id. The witness also later
testified before the jury that he did not remember giving a statement to the officer.
22
Id. at *2. The State then impeached the witness with the officer’s testimony. Id. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the impeachment
testimony because the State’s sole purpose in calling the witness was to impeach
him with inadmissible hearsay. Id. at *1–2. The court noted that although the
witness’s statement was admissible for impeachment purposes, the State “cannot call
a witness that it knows will testify unfavorably for the sole purpose of impeaching
that witness with otherwise inadmissible hearsay.” Id. The court, applying a rule
403 balancing analysis, noted that the “key issue” was the State’s prior knowledge
that the witness would not testify favorably. Id. at *2 (citing Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at
3). The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the officer’s testimony about
the content of the witness’s prior statement because the record showed that the State
had learned prior to the witness testifying at trial that he did not remember giving
the statement, the witness’s testimony at trial was not favorable to the State, and the
State did not expect that the witness would give favorable testimony. Id.In contrast, this Court, in Flores v. State, held that a trial court did not err in
admitting impeachment testimony. No. 01-10-00531-CR, 2013 WL 709100, at *22
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication). There, the State knew in advance of trial that the witness would
testify unfavorably about whether she had heard police officers announce their
presence and the witness, who was the only civilian witness to the events other than
23
the defendant, provided substantial evidence regarding the defendant’s links to
narcotics, firearms, and the events; however, the substance of the impeachment
evidence, i.e., that the witness had, in fact, heard someone yell, “police,” was also
presented through the testimony of other witnesses. Id. at *21 (citing Kelly v. State,
60 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (because several other
witnesses testified to substance of hearsay testimony used for impeachment, less risk
testimony “would be misused by the jury”)).
Similarly, in Kelly, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not
err in admitting impeachment testimony because the prejudicial nature of the
testimony did not substantially outweigh its probative value. 60 S.W.3d at 302.
There, a State’s witness testified that he did not see the defendant with a firearm on
the day of the shooting and denied that he had previously told a detective otherwise.
Id. at 300. The State then called the detective, who testified that the witness had said
that he saw the defendant in possession of the firearm. Id. On appeal, the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony because the
State improperly called the witness for the sole purpose of impeaching him with
otherwise inadmissible hearsay. Id. The court noted that the court of criminal
appeals, in Hughes, had addressed “the problem of the State’s calling a witness
knowing full well she would not repeat her earlier incriminating statements and then
following her with a State’s witness who would provide the desired evidence via
24
hearsay.” Id. at 301 (citing Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 5). Applying a rule 403 balancing
analysis, the court in Kelly concluded that the State had elicited no favorable
testimony from the witness. Id. at 302. At most, the witness “merely confirmed that
he denied” saying “anything helpful” to the detective. Id. However, other sources
provided the critical evidence by means other than hearsay testimony; several other
witnesses identified appellant as the shooter. Id. More important, nothing in the
record suggested that the State knew that the witness would recant. Id. (“Hughes
teaches us that prior knowledge is key.”).
In Texas Department of Transportation v. Pate, one of the few civil cases to
consider rule 607 in the present context, the court, although deciding the issue on the
basis of waiver, noted, relying on Barley and Hughes, that “a party may not call a
witness primarily for the purpose of impeaching him or her with evidence that would
otherwise be admissible.” 170 S.W.3d 840, 850 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet.
denied).
In Truco Properties, Inc. v. Charlton, a case that pre-dates Barley and Hughes,
a defendant-employer asserted that the trial court erred in not admitting witness
testimony about possible alternative causes of the plaintiff-employee’s alleged
on-the-job injury. 749 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
There, the employee’s daughter testified outside the presence of the jury that she was
unaware of any possible alternative causes of the alleged injury. Id. Subsequently,
25
although the employer had no expectation that the daughter would testify favorably,
the employer attempted to call the daughter as a witness at trial. Id. The trial court,
however, did not allow the employer to present the daughter’s testimony. Id.On appeal in Truco, the employer argued that because the trial court did not
allow it to call the daughter as a witness at trial, it was unable to impeach her
testimony with that of another witness, who would have testified that the daughter
had told her that her mother, the employee, had fallen out of bed while drunk and
hurt her back. Id. The court noted that the “question raised” by the employer was
“whether the [daughter] may be called solely for the purpose of later impeachment
by the use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay.” Id. The court concluded that the trial
court did not err in excluding the testimony because the employer was attempting to
present inadmissible testimony “through the back door.” Id.Turning to the instant case, we again note that the decision to admit or exclude
evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Bay Area Healthcare
Grp., Ltd., 239 S.W.3d at 234. We will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if
any legitimate ground supports the ruling. See Hooper, 222 S.W.3d at 107. Relevant
evidence is generally admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 402. A trial court may exclude
relevant evidence, however, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403; Farmers
26
Texas Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pagan, 453 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Thus, a trial court balances the probative value of admitting a
prior inconsistent statement for its legitimate impeachment purposes against the
danger of unfair prejudice created by the jury misusing the statement for substantive
purposes. Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 5.
Here, Benson first presented to the jury the portion of Maddox’s deposition in
which she testified that before the collision, she was driving “[a]bout 400 feet”
behind Anders’s red minivan; the trees lining the roadway were overgrown to the
point that they obstructed a clear view of the traffic signal at the intersection; and
she did not know whether the light controlling her lane of traffic was red or green at
the time of the collision. Benson then sought to present the portion of Maddox’s
deposition testimony in which she admitted to making the prior inconsistent
statements contained in the HPD collision report and investigation file, and in her
interview with the insurance adjuster, i.e., that before the collision, she was only
three or four car lengths “behind the red van and saw that the driver wasn’t braking”;
“the van just drove right through the intersection and did not even slow down”;
“[t]here [was] no doubt that the van had the red light”; and “the van ran the red light
and caused the accident.”
The Chalks objected to Benson presenting evidence of Maddox’s prior
inconsistent statements to the officers and insurance adjuster on the ground that
27
Benson had improperly called Maddox to testify by deposition for the sole purpose
of impeaching her with otherwise inadmissible hearsay. They asserted that Benson
“ultimately want[ed] to get into evidence” Maddox’s prior inconsistent statements,
which constituted hearsay, to the officers and insurance adjuster that Anders had run
a red light. The Chalks further asserted that Benson could not use prior inconsistent
statements under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing
substantive evidence before the jury which constituted hearsay and was not
admissible. The trial court sustained the objection and excluded the testimony.
The record shows that Maddox was the only eyewitness, other than the parties
and the decedent, to the collision, and, thus, there were no other witnesses to offer
an independent accounting of the events. Where there is “no other possible
independent source of critical evidence, . . . admitting it for impeachment purposes
pose[s] a significant risk [that] the information [will] be misused by the jury.” See
Kelly, 60 S.W.3d at 302.
The record also shows that at the time of trial, Benson already knew that
Maddox, during her prior deposition, had recanted under oath her previously made
statements to the HPD officers and the insurance adjuster that Anders had driven
through a red light. Maddox did not appear and testify live at trial. Rather, Benson
simply presented to the jury specific portions of Maddox’s videotaped deposition
testimony. Benson then attempted to impeach that testimony with other portions of
28
Maddox’s deposition testimony. Thus, this is not a case in which Benson could have
expected that Maddox might give favorable testimony at trial or in which Benson
could have tested at trial whether Maddox would adhere under oath to her prior
recantation. See Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 3 (“key issue” in analysis is proponent’s prior
knowledge witness would testify unfavorably); see also Kelly, 60 S.W.3d at 302(“Hughes teaches that prior knowledge is key.”).
Further, as expected, the substance of Maddox’s testimony at trial was not
favorable to Benson’s case. Maddox testified that before the collision, she was
“[a]bout 400 feet” behind Anders’s red minivan, the trees lining the roadway were
overgrown to the point that they obstructed a clear view of the traffic signal, and she
did not know whether the light controlling her lane of traffic was red or green at the
time of the collision. See Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 7 (“[L]ack of favorable testimony
suggest[ed] [that] the [proponent] was attempting to use [the witness’s] prior
inconsistent statements under the guise of impeachment, for the primary purpose of
placing before the jury evidence which was not otherwise admissible” and proponent
had “little, if any, legitimate purpose in admitting [the witness’s] prior inconsistent
statements to impeach her testimony”).
We conclude that based on the highly prejudicial nature of the portion of
Maddox’s deposition containing her prior inconsistent statements to the HPD
officers and the insurance adjuster, any probative value it may have had as
29
impeachment evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See
id. at 3–5; Pate, 170 S.W.3d at 850; cf. Aguilar, 2008 WL 5058974, at *1–2 (trial
court erred in admitting prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes
where witness’s testimony at trial not favorable to proponent and proponent did not
expect witness would give favorable testimony).
Benson further argues that the trial court erred in not admitting Maddox’s
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence because the jury had an
opportunity to observe Maddox’s demeanor in her videotaped deposition, Maddox
admitted to having made the prior statements, and the “inherent reliability of the
earlier statements’ proximity in time to the accident, justify full admissibility.”
“It is the well-settled rule in this State, and elsewhere, that prior inconsistent
statements are usable only for impeachment purposes and are not substantive
evidence of the facts stated.” Fultz v. First Nat. Bank in Graham, 388 S.W.2d 405,
408 (Tex. 1965); Spring Branch Bank v. Wright, 404 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“It is well settled that such prior
inconsistent statements cannot be used as substantive evidence of the truth of the
facts stated.”); see also Anthony Pools, a Div. of Anthony Indus., Inc. v. Charles &
David, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 666, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied) (jury may not consider prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence).
We are bound by the precedent of the Texas Supreme Court and this Court.
30
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding from
evidence the portions of Maddox’s deposition in which she testified about her prior
inconsistent statements to Officers Hroch and Michon and to the insurance adjuster
that Anders drove through a red light and caused the collision.
We overrule Benson’s third issue.
Causation
In her second issue, Benson argues that the trial court erred in excluding from
evidence Officer Hroch’s narrative in the HPD collision report and portions of both
his and Officer Michon’s deposition testimony, in which they opined that Anders
caused the collision by entering the intersection against a red light, because “both
officers were adequately qualified as experts on accident investigation and their
opinions were reliable.”
To establish causation in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant’s conduct caused an event and the event caused the plaintiff to suffer
compensable injuries. Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591,
603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Causation cannot be
established by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. McClure v. Allied Stores of
Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980). However, proximate cause may be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence. Id. at 903–04.
31
Generally, police officers, based on their position as police officers alone, are
not qualified to render opinions regarding causation in collision cases. Pyle v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 774 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1989, writ denied); see also Lopez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 847 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). Police officers are qualified to testify about collision
reconstruction if they are trained in the science and possess the high degree of
knowledge sufficient to qualify as an expert. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Smoak, 134
S.W.3d 880, 891 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
For an expert’s testimony to be admissible, the expert witness must be
qualified to testify about “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” and
the testimony must be relevant and based upon a reliable foundation. TXI Transp.
Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2010); see also TEX. R. EVID. 702.
An expert’s testimony is relevant when it assists the jury in determining an issue or
in understanding other evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 702. However, expert testimony
based on an unreliable foundation or flawed methodology is unreliable and does not
satisfy the relevancy requirement. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d at 234–35 (citing E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556–57 (Tex. 1995)).
Expert testimony is not required to establish negligence in a traffic-collision
case if the question is not complex and not beyond the competence of an average
juror. See Smoak, 134 S.W.3d at 893–94 (holding officer’s lay opinion collision
32
caused by defendant’s unsafe lane change legally sufficient to support jury’s finding
defendant seventy-five percent at fault for collision); see also Ten Hagen
Excavating, Inc. v. Castro-Lopez, 503 S.W.3d 463, 485 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016,
pet. denied). “[N]ot every motor vehicle accident requires expert testimony to
understand how it took place and who is at fault.” See Smoak, 134 S.W.3d at 892.
Lay evidence may establish causation “in those cases in which general experience
and common sense will enable a layman to determine, with reasonable probability,
the causal relationship between the event and the condition.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328
S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010). Lay testimony is admissible if it is “(a) rationally
based on the witness’s perception and (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 701.
Here, Officer Hroch, in his deposition, testified that his “ultimate conclusion”
that Anders drove through a red light was “based off of an independent witness that
had no connection to either driver,” i.e., Maddox, the sole surviving, independent
witness. He explained that given Maddox’s later statement, both in her affidavit and
at her deposition, that she “really doesn’t recall” whether Anders had the red light,
his conclusion “would have been . . . no fault because [he] really couldn’t tell who
ran the red light.” And “[s]ince he was not there, [he] would not be able to know if
one [light] was green or red.”
33
Officer Michon, in his deposition, testified that his conclusion that Anders
drove through a red light and caused the collision was based “entirely upon the
statement of [Maddox].” He explained that because the statements of Benson and
Anders were conflicting as to which of them had the green light, he just “canceled
those out.” Because Michon was not there and did not see any “physical evidence
that indicated which car ran the red light,” he was unable to opine as to which driver,
more likely than not, had caused the collision. He noted that given Maddox’s later
statement that she did not see the light on Wilcrest, he would have reported the cause
of the collision as “undetermined.”
Thus, even were we to conclude that Officers Hroch and Michon were
qualified as experts to opine as to which driver drove through a red light at the
intersection and caused the collision, the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that their “opinions,” which were not based on their own perceptions, but based
entirely on Maddox’s statement that Anders ran a red light and caused the collision,
were without a reliable foundation. See TXI Transp. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 234–35; see
also TEX. R. EVID. 702.
Further, even were we to conclude, which we do not,7 that the question of
which driver ran the red light in this case was not complex and not beyond the
7
See, e.g., Harris v. State, 866 S.W.2d 316, 327 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, pet.
ref’d) (admitting expert testimony regarding which driver ran red light).
34
competence of an average juror and thus that expert testimony was not required to
establish negligence, lay testimony is admissible only if it is rationally based on the
witness’s perception. See TEX. R. EVID. 701; Smoak, 134 S.W.3d at 893–94; see
also Ten Hagen Excavating, Inc., 503 S.W.3d at 485. Here, Officers Hroch and
Michon testified that they based their stated opinions as to causation not on their
own perceptions, but “entirely” on Maddox’s statement that Anders had the red light.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding from
evidence the portions of Officer Hroch’s narrative in the collision report and portions
of both his and Officer Michon’s deposition testimony in which they opined that
Anders drove through a red light and caused the collision.
We overrule Benson’s second issue.
Out-of-Court Experiment
In her fifth issue, Benson argues that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence video recordings of an out-of-court “experiment” because they were
“simply not a true depiction of the actual conditions at the time of the accident.” See
Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 281–82 (Tex. 1964).
She further argues that the video recordings lack probative value because they were
not necessary to help the jury understand the traffic-light cycle. And Benson argues
that the video recordings were prejudicial because they “most likely confused the
35
jury” and resulted in the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1.
“When an experiment is conducted out-of-court and in the absence of
opposing counsel, there must be a substantial similarity between the conditions
existing at the time of the experiment and the actual event that is the subject of
litigation.” Lincoln v. Clark Freight Lines, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Williams, 375 S.W.2d at 281–82).
However, the conditions need not be identical. Id. Where there exists a dissimilarity
in the conditions, if the differences are minor or are explained to the jury, the
admission of the experiment is within the trial court’s discretion to determine
whether the dissimilarity would cause the evidence to confuse rather than aid the
jury and, thus, whether the evidence should be excluded. Williams, 375 S.W.2d at
282; see also Sosa v. Koshy, 961 S.W.2d 420, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, pet. denied) (no abuse of discretion where expert testified video substantially
similar to conditions existing at time of collision and cross-examined about
differences between video and actual event); Garza v. Cole, 753 S.W.2d 245, 247
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (no abuse of discretion
where testimony explained differences between video and actual event); cf. Lopez v.
Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ
dism’d) (trial court erred in admitting video where it could have been perceived as
36
simulated re-enactment of collision and no explanation to jury of differences
between experiment and actual events).
Again, an appellant, to obtain a reversal based on an error in the admission of
evidence, must show that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and the error was
calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220. The
excluded evidence must be controlling on a material issue and not cumulative of
other evidence. See Williams Distrib. Co. v. Franklin, 898 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex.
1995).
In Garza, a car driven by the defendant struck a car driven by the plaintiff at
an intersection. 753 S.W.2d at 246. At trial, the jury viewed a videotape recording,
presented by the defendant, of an out-of-court experiment depicting what the
plaintiff “could have seen as she approached the intersection” where the collision
occurred. Id. at 247. The defendant’s videotape technician also testified in narrative
form about the contents of the videotape recording. Id. On appeal, the
plaintiff-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the videotape
recording because what it depicted was not substantially similar to the actual scene
of the collision. Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that even had it
concluded that the trial court had erred in admitting the videotape recording, the
error would have been harmless because the videotape recording was cumulative of
37
other testimony and evidence presented at trial. Id. at 248 (when trial court errs in
“admit[ting] evidence of a nature that is largely repetitious” of other testimony, error
is harmless).
Here, the material issue presented was whether the light was green when
Benson entered the intersection. Benson testified that there was not another car
ahead of her on Apple Tree and “the light was green when [she] got there.” Yergin
testified that based on her research of the signal lights controlling the intersection,
“[i]n every scenario,” in order to trigger the signal lights controlling Wilcrest to
begin cycling to red, a motorist traveling eastbound on Apple Tree and approaching
the intersection had to “stop or come within a mile per hour” in front of the signal
light on Apple Tree. She noted that while at the intersection, she did not see any
motorist simply “catch a green light” on Apple Tree, unless another motorist
happened to be traveling in front of them. The trial court also admitted into evidence
videotape recordings of Yergin’s experiment, and Yergin further testified in detail
about the contents of the videotape recordings as they were played to the jury.
The material evidence displayed in the videotape recordings, i.e., that in order
to trigger the signal light controlling Wilcrest to begin cycling to red, a motorist
traveling eastbound on Apple Tree and approaching the intersection had to stop or
slow in front of the signal light, was cumulative of Yergin’s testimony. Although
38
Benson objected to the admission of the videotape recordings, she did not object to
Yergin’s testimony about her experiment or the contents of the videotape recordings.
Thus, even were we to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the
videotape recordings, the error was harmless as the videotape recordings were
cumulative of other testimony presented at trial. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v.
Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 906–07 (Tex. 2004) (any error in admission of videotape
recording harmless where defendant did not object to other evidence, i.e., live
testimony of witness about contents of videotape recording); Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (“The erroneous admission of evidence that
is merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence is harmless.”); Garza, 753
S.W.2d at 248 (where trial court errs in “admit[ting] evidence of a nature that is
largely repetitious” of other testimony, error harmless); see also Gardner Oil, Inc.
v. Chavez, No. 12-10-00274-CV, 2012 WL 1623420, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Tyler
May 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (any error in admitting video recording of
out-of-court experiment harmless where plaintiff objected to admission of video
recording, but not to expert’s testimony, which was cumulative of evidence in
recording).
We overrule Benson’s fifth issue.
39
Having concluded that the trial court did not err in making its evidentiary
rulings, we do not reach Benson’s sixth issue, in which she asserts that the “trial
court’s errors, independently or cumulatively, require reversal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
40