Durick Lamont Bynaum v. State ( 2003 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-02-00194-CR
Durick Lamont Bynaum, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY, 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 20,413-CR, HONORABLE EDWARD P. MAGRE, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a jury found appellant Durick Lamont Bynaum guilty of possessing less than one gram
of cocaine, the district court assessed his punishment at two years in a state jail. Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. ' 481.115(a), (b) (West Supp. 2003). Bynaum=s sole point of error is that the evidence is
legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. We will overrule this contention and affirm.
Bynaum was the driver and only occupant of a car stopped by Cameron Police Officer Jeff
Gogolewski for a minor traffic offense. After stopping, Bynaum immediately got out of the car and walked
back to the officer=s vehicle. Bynaum did not have a driver=s license but properly identified himself. A
license check disclosed that Bynaum=s license had been suspended. Gogolewski arrested Bynaum for
driving while license suspended and placed him in the patrol car. Then, over Bynaum=s vociferous
objections, the officer searched Bynaum=s car. Gogolewski found a small, unlabeled bottle in the driver=s
door pocket. Inside the bottle, the officer saw small chips of what proved to be crack cocaine.
Bynaum testified that the car he was driving belonged to his father-in-law, although it had
been purchased by his wife and previously registered in his name. He said that he and his wife regularly
drove the car, which was Aparked in various places.@ He did not know the last time the car was driven by
his father-in-law. He denied knowing that the cocaine was in the car or how it came to be there. He
acknowledged a previous conviction for cocaine possession.
Evidence is legally sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, after viewing all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Griffin v. State,
614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, the State must prove that the accused exercised care, custody, control, or management of the
substance, and that the accused knew the substance was contraband. Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384,
387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Hackleman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. App.CAustin 1996, pet.
ref=d, untimely filed). A shorthand way of expressing the State=s burden of proof is to say that the accused
must be affirmatively linked to the contraband. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). It does not matter whether this link is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.Bynaum points to several possible affirmative links that are not present in this case: he did
not flee from the officer, he was not the only person with access to the car, the cocaine was not in plain
view, his fingerprints were not shown to be on the bottle, he was not shown to be intoxicated, and he did
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not have cocaine on his person. There was, however, considerable evidence linking Bynaum to the cocaine.
He was alone in the car in which the cocaine was found. The bottle containing the cocaine was in the
driver=s side door and easily accessible to him. Although the car was registered to Bynaum=s father-in-law,
it had been purchased by his wife and was regularly used by both of them; indeed, he testified that it was
their sole transportation. When stopped, Bynaum immediately got out of the car and walked to the officer=s
vehicle, from which the jury could infer that he did not want the officer to approach his car. The jury also
heard the testimony regarding Bynaum=s strong objections to the search of the car incident to his arrest, and
knew that he had a previous conviction for possession of cocaine.1 Viewing this evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could find that Bynaum knowingly possessed the
cocaine.
Although he does not bring forward a point of error challenging the factual sufficiency of the
evidence, some of Bynaum=s arguments seem to raise the issue. Viewing the evidence neutrally, and
considering the possibility of alternative hypotheses other than Bynaum=s guilt, we conclude that the proof of
guilt is neither so obviously weak nor so greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to undermine confidence in
the jury=s determination. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
1
No limiting instruction regarding the previous conviction was requested or given.
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We overrule Bynaum=s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and affirm the judgment
of conviction.
Bea Ann Smith, Justice
Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Yeakel
Affirmed
Filed: April 10, 2003
Do Not Publish
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