Timothy L. Matthews v. Discover Bank ( 2022 )

NUMBER 13-21-00232-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
TIMOTHY L. MATTHEWS, Appellant,
v.
DISCOVER BANK, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
This is an appeal of a no-answer default judgment in a breach of contract suit. By
a single issue, appellant Timothy L. Matthews challenges the trial court’s default judgment
in favor of appellee Discover Bank. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Discover Bank filed its original petition against Matthews on March 4, 2021,
alleging the parties “entered into a credit account agreement,” and Matthews “failed to
repay all of the credit services rendered under the [a]greement.” Discover Bank sought
recoupment of an outstanding debt in the amount of $114,063.23. After successfully
serving Matthews and receiving no response, Discover Bank filed a motion for default
judgment on May 6, 2021. Discover Bank’s motion included several exhibits: an affidavit
of its duly authorized agent, the cardmember agreement between Discover Bank and
Matthews, and Matthews’s statement showing an outstanding balance of $114,063.23.
The trial court subsequently issued a default judgment.
On May 24, 2021, Matthews filed a motion for new trial with an accompanying
affidavit, wherein Matthews claimed his failure to file an answer had been accidental.
Matthews stated he believed “that the paperwork [he] received concerned an ongoing
litigation” brought by his wife’s former employer (employer suit). Matthews raised the
affirmative defenses of estoppel and payment.
At a hearing on Matthews’s motion, the parties’ respective counsel explained the
basis for the employer suit: Matthews’s wife purportedly used her employer’s funds to
make unauthorized payments to various creditors, including Discover Bank. According to
Discover Bank’s counsel, the employer suit “put [Discover Bank] on notice” regarding the
unauthorized payments on Matthews’s credit card; Discover Bank thereafter refunded the
employer, and then Discover Bank brought suit against Matthews. Matthews
acknowledged at the hearing that Discover Bank was not a named party in the employer
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suit and was just one of several creditors allegedly paid via unauthorized means.
Matthews testified that because this suit concerned “the same exact charges,” he
believed “it was all part of the same thing.” Matthews further testified that all payments to
Discover Bank had been made with authorization from his wife’s employer and that his
account had no outstanding balance. Thus, Matthews contended that Discover Bank
should be estopped from seeking a second round of payments from Matthews.
The trial court denied Matthews’s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716, 721 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam). “A trial court
abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or fails
to correctly analyze or apply the law.” XL Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lucio, 551 S.W.3d 894, 898
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, no pet.). “Under Craddock, though, a trial
court’s discretion is limited.” Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d at 721 (citing Craddock v. Sunshine
Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939)). Pursuant to Craddock, a trial court
must set aside a default judgment if it is shown by the movant in a motion for new trial
that:
(1) the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not
intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due
to a mistake or an accident; (2) the motion for a new trial sets up a
meritorious defense; and (3) granting the motion will occasion no delay or
otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.
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Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. 2012)).
When, as here, no findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, the trial court’s denial
of a motion for new trial “must be upheld on any legal theory supported by the evidence.”
Lynch v. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d 107, 121 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied);
see also Schindler v. Schindler, No. 13-16-00483-CV, 2018 WL 3151857, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
B. Analysis
Because it is dispositive, we address only whether Matthews met the first element
of the Craddock test; that is, whether he proved that his failure to file an answer was not
intentional or the result of his conscious indifference. See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126.
A court looks to the knowledge and acts of the defendant to determine whether a failure
to file an answer was intentional or due to conscious indifference. Lucio, 551 S.W.3d at
899 (observing that “[n]ot understanding a citation and then doing nothing following
service does not constitute a mistake of law that is sufficient to meet the Craddock
requirements”). “A defendant satisfies its burden as to the first Craddock element when
its factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct by the
defendant and the factual assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.” Sutherland,
376 S.W.3d at 755. However, where an evidentiary hearing is conducted on a motion for
new trial and the trial court is presented with controverting evidence, “the question of why
the defaulted party failed to answer presents a question of fact,” and the trial court may
believe all, none, or part of a witness’s testimony. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting
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Pekar v. Pekar, No. 09-14-00464-CV, 2016 WL 240761, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan.
21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see also Schindler, 2018 WL 3151857, at *2.
Here, Matthews confirmed that he was served but stated that he did not answer
because he believed the documents concerned separate, pre-existing litigation. However,
Matthews also testified that he knew that Discover Bank was not a named party in the
existing litigation, and apart from vague, conclusory statements observing the existence
of another suit, Matthews provided no explanation regarding how such existence nullified
his responsibility to respond to this suit. 1 See Lucio, 551 S.W.3d at 899; see also Fid. &
Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Const. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(concluding that “a conclusory statement” in an affidavit “must generally be supported by
some explanation”); Maverick Oil Tools, LLC v. Dem Well Head Servs., LLC, No. 13-15-
00588-CV, 2017 WL 6379739, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 14, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (observing that “negotiating a settlement agreement may be a valid
excuse under certain circumstances for a failure to answer” but a defendant’s “vague,
conclusory statements concerning attempts to resolve this lawsuit and discussions
regarding potential solutions” could not survive a Craddock inquiry).
We find guidance in a case from this Court: Pentes Design, Inc. v. Perez, 840
S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied). In Perez, the
defendant’s excuse for failing to timely answer the plaintiff’s petition was based upon its
belief that the petition received was a “duplicate” of an existing “third party action,” which
1 Matthews’s motion indicated that he “assumed that his attorney . . . had received a copy of these
documents.” However, Matthews did not contend at the hearing or in his affidavit that he failed to answer
because he believed his attorney had answered or would answer on his behalf.
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it claimed was already “being ‘resolved on a semi-informal basis.’” Id. at 79. This Court
reasoned that even accepting this belief in earnest, the defendant showed “no indication
of settlement” in the related action or “other excuse for [its] failure to answer as required.”
Id. This Court concluded that, based on these facts, “[t]he trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the first element of the Craddock test was not met.” Id.
We conclude similarly here. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that
Matthews knew when he was served that suit had been initiated against him and that he
was required to appear in court irrespective of an existing suit brought by an unrelated
party elsewhere. See id.; see also Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d at 721. Therefore, Matthews
failed to establish the first Craddock factor, and the trial court did not act unreasonably,
arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules and principles when it denied
Matthews’s motion for new trial. See Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d at 721; Lucio, 551 S.W.3d at
898. We overrule Matthews’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
24th day of March, 2022.
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