in Re Rudy Melchor ( 2021 )

NUMBER 13-21-00247-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE RUDY MELCHOR
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras1
On August 9, 2021, relator Rudy Melchor filed a petition for writ of mandamus
asserting that the trial court erred in denying relator’s motion for continuance because
“the State of Texas refused to disclose the credentials and expert opinions of the State of
Texas’ designated medical and forensic expert witnesses sufficiently before the beginning
of trial.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (detailing the scope of discovery
available to a defendant in a criminal case). Relator also filed a first amended motion for
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
emergency stay through which he seeks to stay all trial court proceedings, including the
trial of this matter which is currently set for August 16, 2021, pending resolution of this
original proceeding. Finally, relator filed the reporter’s record from the hearing held on
August 9, 2021, concerning relator’s motion for continuance.
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish both that he has no
adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and that what he seeks to compel
is a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. In re Harris, 491
S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d
701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If the relator fails to meet both
requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied State ex rel. Young
v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus
relief. See State ex rel. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210; In re Pena, 619 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding).
Under normal circumstances, “a trial court’s decision to refuse a continuance is
reversible only for an abuse of discretion,” and thus, the court’s ruling on a motion for
continuance is discretionary rather than ministerial. Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470,
478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 346 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (en banc) (stating that “as a general rule the determination
of whether to grant a continuance lies with the sound discretion of the court”).
Nevertheless, such decisions may be ministerial when, for instance, a statute renders the
granting of a motion for continuance to be a ministerial duty. See Collier, 732 S.W.2d at
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346 (discussing the legislative continuance embodied in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 30.003); Ojeda v. State, 916 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, pet.
ref’d) (stating that, if properly requested, “a legislative continuance is mandatory,” and the
“trial court lacks any discretion in such a circumstance; instead, it serves a merely
ministerial function”). Similarly, a trial court’s rulings involving discovery under article
39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are typically discretionary. See Dickens
v. Ct. of Apps. for the Second Supreme Jud. Dist. of Tex., 727 S.W.2d 542, 552 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (concluding that “appeal is an adequate remedy in
criminal cases for determination of the correctness of a trial judge’s pretrial discovery
orders”). Nevertheless, again, this general rule is subject to exception when there is a
“right” to the requested discovery. See Dickens, 727 S.W.2d at 551–52 (discussing the
right to discovery regarding exculpatory or mitigating evidence); In re Hartman, 429
S.W.3d 680, 682 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2014, orig. proceeding) (stating that “decisions
involving pretrial discovery of evidence that is exculpatory, mitigating, or privileged are
not discretionary”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (a), (h) (requiring the
production of evidence “material to any matter involved in the action” and “any
exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item, or information in the
possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant
or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged”); Watkins v. State, 619
S.W.3d 265, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (construing whether evidence is “material” under
art. 39.14).
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The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,
the limited record provided, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that the relator has
not established his entitlement to the relief sought. Accordingly, we deny the petition for
writ of mandamus and the first amended motion for emergency stay.
DORI CONTRERAS
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
12th day of August, 2021.
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