In Re Thomas Earl Whitfield v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  • Opinion filed April 20, 2023
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-23-00072-CR
    __________
    IN RE THOMAS EARL WHITFIELD
    Original Mandamus Proceeding
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Relator, Thomas Earl Whitfield, filed this original petition for writ of
    mandamus requesting that we order the Honorable Tryon D. Lewis, the trial judge
    presiding over the matter before us by assignment, to dispose of Relator’s Motion
    for Free Access to Public Records. Ostensibly, Relator contends that Judge Lewis
    has refused to rule on the merits of his motion. Because Judge Lewis has denied the
    underlying motion, we deny the petition.
    Background Facts
    Relator was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon following
    a jury trial. See Whitfield v. State, 
    408 S.W.3d 709
    , 713 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013,
    pet. ref’d). After a finding of “true” to the enhancement allegations, the trial court
    assessed Relator’s punishment at fifty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional
    Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 
    Id.
     We affirmed his
    conviction and sentence. 
    Id.
    Relator is a defendant whose postconviction writ of habeas corpus was
    worked on by Ralph Petty, a former assistant district attorney with the Midland
    County District Attorney’s office. Relator asserts that Petty was paid by the Midland
    County district judges to address Relator’s and other defendants’ postconviction
    writs. In Ex parte Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals detailed the facts and
    circumstances surrounding Petty’s unethical dual employment on postconviction
    writs. See Ex parte Young, No. WR-65,137-05, 
    2021 WL 4302528
    , at *3 (Tex.
    Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2021) (not designated for publication) (“The DA’s office . . .
    sent letters to each of the defendants for whom Petty had billed the district court
    judges for work on postconviction writs—some 300 plus defendants—to inform
    them of the ‘ethical situation.’”).1
    After Ex parte Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals has reconsidered
    numerous applications for writs of habeas corpus for defendants whose applications
    were handled by Petty while he was so employed. See, e.g., Ex parte Holmes,
    No. WR-86,764-01, 
    2022 WL 17660556
     (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2022) (not
    designated for publication) (denied based on independent review of the record);
    Ex parte Benavides, No. WR-81,593-01, 
    2022 WL 4360857
     (Tex. Crim. App.
    Sept. 21, 2022) (not designated for publication) (same); Ex parte Marion,
    No. WR 10,924-25, 
    2022 WL 3640517
     (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2022) (not
    1
    We cite to Ex parte Young and the unpublished Court of Criminal Appeals’ cases that follow not
    as authority but for contextual information related to the instant mandamus petition and the motion at issue.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 77.3 (unpublished opinions by the Court of Criminal Appeals “have no precedential
    value and must not be cited as authority by counsel or by a court”).
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    designated for publication) (upholding its previous denial because the court had not
    relied on the trial court’s findings during its prior review).
    This Court’s Jurisdiction
    In January 2023, Relator’s counsel filed a Motion for Free Access to Public
    Records with the 441st District Court. While his counsel’s motion appears to be
    filed in an effort to pursue a second postconviction writ of habeas corpus on
    Relator’s behalf, the motion does not concern a pending application for such relief
    with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to address
    the trial court’s alleged inaction on the motion. Padieu v. Ct. of Appeals of Tex.,
    Fifth Dist., 
    392 S.W.3d 115
    , 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[W]e perceive no
    reason why our exclusive Article 11.07 jurisdiction divests an appellate court of
    jurisdiction to decide the merits of a mandamus petition alleging that a district judge
    is not ruling on a motion when the relator has no Article 11.07 application
    pending.”).
    Relator’s Motion
    Relator’s motion requested, among other things, that the trial court order the
    Midland County District Clerk to provide a free, “complete copy of the electronic
    database for the District and County Courts” and “reimbursement” to counsel in the
    form of “a reasonable fee for the waste of her time by the Midland County Clerk’s
    Office.” While Relator’s counsel stated that “[t]he defendant seeks full access to
    public records that will be used in a future habeas application,” the motion itself
    asked for much more.
    Specifically, the motion presented to the trial court sought to “explore just
    how far . . . misconduct has spread in the Midland County prosecution machinery,”
    stating that counsel “agreed to represent [Whitfield] for the limited purpose of
    conducting an investigation into these issues and advising him of the potential claims
    3
    he might bring.” In addition, the motion sought full and free access to the entirety
    of the databases of the Midland County District Clerk’s and County Clerk’s offices
    in an effort to do a “full evaluation of various civil, criminal and ethical violations
    taking place in Midland County.” The motion further sought access to the databases
    to determine “the question of whether a case for civil damages may be brought . . .
    [,] to advise [Relator] and others . . . [,] [and] identify the class of people affected by
    ‘Petty Misconduct.’” The motion then requested access “to evaluate what [the
    District Attorney] considers to be ‘perjury’ – for example, whether she ever uses her
    power to bring perjury charges against anyone other than a defense witness.”
    After requesting and receiving additional briefing, the trial court denied the
    motion. Relator filed this mandamus petition, requesting that we order the trial court
    to consider and dispose of the motion.
    Analysis
    “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited
    circumstances involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that
    may be addressed by other remedies.” In re Honea, 
    415 S.W.3d 888
    , 890 (Tex.
    App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding) (citing Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    ,
    840 (Tex. 1992)). For mandamus to issue, the relator must show that the trial court
    clearly abused its discretion, and that the relator does not have an adequate remedy
    by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135–36 (Tex.
    2004) (orig. proceeding); Packer, 827 S.W.2d at 840–42. To meet its burden, a
    relator must prove that (1) the trial court had a legal duty to perform a non-
    discretionary act, (2) the relator made a demand for the trial court to act, and (3) the
    trial court refused to act. See In re Perritt, 
    992 S.W.2d 444
    , 446 (Tex. 1999); In re
    Honea, 
    415 S.W.3d at
    890 (citing Stoner v. Massey, 
    586 S.W.2d 843
    , 846 (Tex.
    1979)).
    4
    Relator has not met his burden to prove that mandamus should issue. The
    order appended to the mandamus petition demonstrates that Judge Lewis denied
    Relator’s motion on March 2, 2023. As such, Relator has failed to prove that the
    trial court refused to act. See In re Honea, 
    415 S.W.3d at 890
    . Furthermore, as
    evidenced by the trial court’s request for additional briefing and its denial of the
    motion thereafter, the trial court has provided Relator with the relief he requests from
    this court: the trial court’s consideration and disposition of the motion.
    We note that Relator’s counsel cannot obtain, under the guise of an
    investigation for a postconviction writ of habeas corpus for a specific individual,
    what amounts to pre-suit discovery of sensitive information of the citizens of
    Midland County and beyond. For this, Relator’s counsel must proceed through the
    proper legal and statutory procedures required by federal and state law. See, e.g.,
    
    5 U.S.C. § 552
     (governing Freedom of Information Act requests); FED. R. CIV. P. 27
    (governing pre-suit depositions and discovery for federal claims); TEX. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. §§ 552.001–.353 (West 2020) (governing requests under the Texas Public
    Information Act); TEX. R. CIV. P. 202 (governing pre-suit depositions and discovery
    for state claims); cf. In re CSX Corp., 
    124 S.W.3d 149
    , 152–53 (Tex. 2003) (A “trial
    court abuses its discretion by ordering discovery that exceeds that permitted by the
    rules of procedure. . . . [The relator’s discovery request] qualifies as the kind of
    ‘fishing expedition’ this Court has repeatedly struck down.”). Relator cannot usurp
    these required procedures by merely filing a motion/request for the entirety of the
    clerks’ databases in a criminal case.
    The trial court provided Relator with the very relief that he seeks from this
    court—for the trial court to consider and dispose of Relator’s request and motion.
    The trial court has done so. Accordingly, we deny Relator’s petition for writ of
    mandamus.
    5
    This Court’s Ruling
    We deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
    PER CURIAM
    April 20, 2023
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
    Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
    6