Eric D. Burns v. Fairy Jean Burns ( 2023 )

NO. 12-22-00256-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
ERIC D. BURNS, § APPEAL FROM THE
APPELLANT
V. § COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2
FAIRY JEAN BURNS,
APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Eric Dewayne Burns, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Appellee Fairy Jean Burns. Eric raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Hershell Dewayne Burns was married to Fairy Jean Burns. In January 2008, Hershell
was admitted to hospice care. During his time in hospice care, he was administered, among
other things, morphine. On May 22, Hershell executed his last will and testament. 1 The will
identifies Fairy as Hershell’s wife and Eric as his son. In his will, Hershell states his intention to
bequeath the entirety of his estate to Fairy. He further states, “I have already give my son, ERIC
DEWAYNE BURNS, a 1985 Chevrolet Corvette for his inheritance from my estate.” The will
contains the signatures of two witnesses, as well as an executed, self-proving affidavit. Hershell
died on July 23.
On August 21, Fairy filed an application to probate Hershell’s will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary with the County Court of Smith County, Texas. Hershell’s will was filed
with the trial court that same day. On September 2, the trial court issued the citation by posting.
1
On that same day, Hershell executed a general warranty deed, by which he conveyed the homestead
property, which consisted of a 1.785 acre tract, to Fairy. The deed was recorded on May 29, 2008.
1
On September 9, the trial court signed an order admitting the will to probate and authorizing
letters testamentary. The order set forth, among other things, that the will was proved and
established, that it should be admitted to probate, and that Fairy was appointed to serve as
Independent Executrix without bond. That same day, Fairy received letters testamentary to serve
as Independent Executrix. On September 24, the Publisher’s Affidavit was filed with the trial
court.
In her role as executrix, Fairy filed the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims on
January 14, 2009. On January 22, the trial court signed the order approving the inventory,
appraisement, and list of claims.
On October 18, 2021, Eric, proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit, by which he sought to
contest Hershell’s will and have it set aside as a forgery because it was executed while Hershell
was incapacitated, and subject to Fairy’s undue influence. He further asserted that he was
entitled to receive but did not receive notice of the probate proceedings due to Fairy’s and her
attorney’s fraudulent acts. He also sought an order that the subject homestead property be sold
and that he be awarded two-thirds of the value of the property amounting to $219,000.00. He
further sought to recover legal fees of $1,000.00 associated with hiring a typist, as well as
$2,500.00 previously paid to an attorney he alleged failed to perform legal services on his behalf
other than providing him a copy of Hershell’s will. Eric later amended his petition and further
sought $500,000.00 in exemplary damages. Fairy filed an answer, in which she made a general
denial, asserted the affirmative defense of limitations, and specifically denied that the statute of
limitations was tolled.
Subsequently, Eric filed two requests for declaratory judgment that “the 2007 Version of
§ 128a, f (Tex. Prob. Code) as the law to be applied to the facts of this case[,]” Eric is the “lawful
beneficiary to receive the 1985 Corvette” and a showing that Eric “did, in fact, take possession of
the Corvette as his portion of Decedent’s estate[,]” the limitations period is tolled as a result of
the discovery rule or as a result of fraud, Eric lacked constructive notice of the probate
proceedings, and “the statutory framework that would prevent [Eric] from ever asserting [a]
claim to paternal inheritance [is] unconstitutional.”
On February 7, 2022, Fairy filed a motion for summary judgment. In her motion, she
argued that the statute of limitations had run for Eric’s claims amounting to a will contest or
breach of fiduciary duty. She further asserted that she bore no fiduciary duty to Eric, was not
2
required to notify Eric, who was not a beneficiary under Hershell’s will, of the probate
proceedings, and neither had engaged in fraudulent concealment nor committed theft. Moreover,
she contended that Eric’s constitutional rights were not violated, the County Court of Smith
County had jurisdiction to probate the will, and Eric has no right to the damages he sought. On
February 14, Eric filed a response, in which he first argued that Fairy’s failure to answer his
discovery constituted discovery abuse. Thereafter, he made objections to Fairy’s summary
judgment evidence and argued that the will could be interpreted to name him as a beneficiary,
who was entitled to notice of the proceedings, which he did not receive; that constructive notice
should not apply, and that Fairy’s and her attorney’s failure to provide him notice amounted to
extrinsic fraud, which served to toll the limitations period.
On March 10, the trial court conducted a hearing on the matter. On March 16, the trial
court signed an order granting Fairy’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that all relief
sought by Eric was untimely under the applicable statutes of limitations and ordering that Eric
take nothing by his suit. Eric filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled. This appeal
followed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The movant for traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(c); 2 Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A defendant
who conclusively negates at least one essential element of the nonmovant’s cause of action is
entitled to summary judgment as to that cause of action. See Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v.
Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Likewise, a defendant who conclusively establishes
each element of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment. Id. Once the movant
establishes a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion
and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. See City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979). The only question
is whether an issue of material fact is presented. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).
2
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to probate proceedings only to the extent they do not differ
from the procedure established by the Probate Code (now Estates Code). See Wojcik v. Wesolick, 97 S.W.3d 335,
338 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The parties do not argue the existence of any provision of the
Estates Code, nor is this Court aware of any such provision, which negates the application of the Texas Code of
Civil Procedure to the summary judgment proceedings in the instant case.
3
When reviewing summary judgments, we perform a de novo review of the entire record
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving
any doubts against the motion. See Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006); KPMG
Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). We are not
required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or to determine the weight of evidence in the
affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and other summary judgment proof. See Gulbenkian v. Penn,
252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1952); Palestine Herald-Press Co. v. Zimmer, 257 S.W.3d 504, 508
(Tex. App.–Tyler 2008, pet. denied).
Further, all theories in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must be presented in writing to the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the trial court’s
order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied on for its ruling, we will
affirm it if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S.,
858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993). Thus, when an appellant fails to negate each ground on which
the judgment could have been granted, we must affirm. Flores v. Hull Assocs. N., LP, 657
S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2022, no pet.).
LIMITATIONS
In his third issue, Eric argues that he was entitled to statutory notice of the 2008 probate
proceedings and that his failure to receive such notice resulted from fraud committed by Fairy
and her attorney, which fraud serves to toll the applicable limitations period. 3
The primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of
action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while
witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh in their minds. LaGloria Oil and Gas Co. v.
Carboline Co., 84 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2001, pet. denied). It is in society’s best
3
We have construed Eric’s issues and supporting arguments liberally in the interest of justice. See Walker
v. Thornton, 67 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2002, no pet.). However, we hold a pro se litigant to the
same standards as a licensed attorney, and he must, therefore, comply with all applicable laws and rules of
procedure. See Zavala v. Franco, 622 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2021, pet. denied); Serrano v.
Pellicano Park, L.L.C., 441 S.W.3d 517, 520 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2014, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); see also Wheeler v.
Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of
procedure). If pro se litigants were not required to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure, they would
be given an unfair advantage over parties represented by counsel. Zavala, 622 S.W.3d at 617; see also Mansfield
State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. 1978). And, as the Texas Supreme Court has recognized, “[h]aving
two sets of rules––a strict set for attorneys and a lenient set for pro se parties––might encourage litigants to discard
their valuable right to the advice and assistance of counsel.” Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 444.
4
interest to grant repose by requiring that disputes be settled or barred within a reasonable time.
Id.
In his pleadings, Eric makes allegations giving rise to causes of action for a will contest,
as well as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty related to Fairy’s alleged failure to give him notice
of the probate proceedings. 4 See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 256.204 (West 2020) (TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 93) 5 (providing two-year limitations period from date will admitted to probate for
interested person to file will contest); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004(4),
(5) (West 2002) (providing four-year limitations period for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
actions).
Will Contest
After a will is admitted to probate, an interested person may commence a suit to contest
the validity thereof not later than the second anniversary of the date the will was admitted to
probate, except that an interested person may commence a suit to cancel a will for forgery or
other fraud not later than the second anniversary of the date the forgery or fraud was discovered.
TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 256.204(a). An “interested person” includes “heirs, devisees,
spouses, creditors, or any others having a property right in, or claim against, the estate being
administered.” Id. § 22.018(1) (West 2020) (TEX. PROB. CODE § 3(r)). “Heir” means a person
who is entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to a part of the estate of a decedent
who dies intestate, including the decedent’s surviving spouse. See id. § 22.015 (West 2020)
4
We note that Eric requested declaratory relief in the trial court. Because a declaratory judgment action is
a procedural device used to determine substantive rights, we must look to the legal remedy underlying the cause of
action to determine the applicable limitations period. Ammerman v. Ranches of Clear Creek Cmty. Ass’n, Inc.,
562 S.W.3d 622, 636 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Thus, if Eric’s causes of action for a will
contest, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty are barred by limitations, the declaratory relief he seeks likewise is time
barred. See id.5
We rely on the Probate Code provisions in effect at the time of Decedent’s death unless later enacted
legislation is expressly made applicable to the proceeding. See Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 12,
2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512, 1732 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (repealing and recodifying Probate Code as Estates Code,
effective January 1, 2014); see also, e.g., Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 62, 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2737, 2754 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (applying specified substantive amendments to Estates Code to proceedings
pending or initiated on or after January 1, 2014). All citations to the Probate Code refer to the version of the Code in
effect on July 23, 2008. However, where the Estates Code provisions are substantively similar to the predecessor
Probate Code provisions, and absent a savings clause making the Probate Code the only applicable provision, we
will cite to the Estates Code and, after the initial citation, provide a parenthetical setting forth the corresponding
section of the Probate Code for reference. See Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 11, 2009 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1512, 1732 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (providing recodification was intended to be nonsubstantive); see also In re
Estate of Harris, No. 02-19-00333-CV, 2021 WL 832721, at *2 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth Mar. 4, 2021, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
5
(TEX. PROB. CODE § 3(o)). Here, in his will, Hershell states that Eric is his son. Thus, because
the record supports the existence of only one will in the probate proceeding at issue, were Eric to
successfully challenge the will due to Hershell’s incapacity, he potentially would be entitled to
inherit as Hershell’s heir under intestate succession. See id. § 201.003(c) (West 2020) (TEX.
PROB. CODE § 45); see also In re Estate of Adams, No. 14-12-00064-CV, 2013 WL 84925, at *4
(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we conclude that Eric is
an “interested person” under Section 256.204.
Generally, Texas courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of
probate proceedings, even in cases involving allegations of fraud. 6 See Little v. Smith, 943
S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex.1997); Evans v. Allen, 358 S.W.3d 358, 365 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, no pet.). “A person is charged with constructive notice of the actual knowledge that
could have been acquired by examining public records.” Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85
(Tex. 1981). Constructive notice creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice. Id.“Persons interested in an estate admitted to probate are charged with notice of the contents of
the probate records.” Id.; see Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420 (“Such claims [arising out of probate
proceedings] are barred by limitations because the claimant has constructive notice of the
probate proceedings.”); In re Estate of McGarr, 10 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi
1999, pet. denied) (“Even in probate cases involving allegations of fraud, Texas courts have
refused to apply the discovery rule because of the doctrine of constructive notice and the strong
public interest in according finality to probate proceedings”). Thus, at the time a will is admitted
to probate, a potential contestant has constructive knowledge of the date the testator executed the
will and the fact that the contestant is not a beneficiary named in the will. See Mooney, 622
S.W.2d at 85; Evans, 358 S.W.3d at 365. In such a case, the statute of limitations begins to run
6
We note that the plain language of Section 256.204 provides an exception to the general two-year statute
of limitations only in cases of “forgery or other fraud.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 256.204(a) (West 2020) (TEX PROB.
CODE § 93). The statute does not refer to testamentary capacity. When interpreting a statute, we begin with the
plain language of the statute because “it is a fair assumption that the Legislature tries to say what it means, and
therefore the words it chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent.” Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine
Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999). Eric does not argue and cites no authority for the proposition
that Hershell’s purported lack of testamentary capacity constitutes “other fraud” such that this issue falls within the
limitations exception. See Neill v. Yett, 746 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tex. App.–Austin 1988, writ denied) (“The type of fraud
that invalidates a probate judgment upon attack pursuant to [Section] 93 is extrinsic fraud, not intrinsic fraud. Fraud
is considered ‘intrinsic’ when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue that was, or could have been, litigated in the
original suit. On the other hand, fraud is ‘extrinsic’ when the fraudulent acts prevent a party from either having a
trial or prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case”). Thus, we focus only on Eric’s claims that
Fairy’s failure to notify him of the probate proceedings constituted fraud.
6
on the date the will was admitted to probate. See Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85; Evans, 358
S.W.3d at 365.
Here, on September 2, 2008, the trial court issued the citation by posting. 7 See TEX.
ESTATES CODE ANN. §§ 258.001(b), 303.001 (West 2020) (TEX. PROB. CODE § 128(a)).
Hershell’s will was admitted to probate on September 9. Eric is charged with constructive notice
of the will’s admission to probate. See Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85; Evans, 358 S.W.3d at 365.
Therefore, Eric’s suit seeking to contest the will filed more than thirteen years later is untimely.
Eric argues, however, that Fairy and her attorney committed extrinsic fraud by failing to
give him notice of the probate proceedings and, thus, the limitations period should be tolled until
he discovered that the probate of his father’s estate had taken place. See TEX. ESTATES CODE
§ 256.204(a). His argument is based on the notion that he is, in fact, a beneficiary of Hershell’s
will, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
DISPOSITION OF ESTATE
A. If my wife, FAIRY JEAN BURNS, survives me, I give, devise and bequeath all
of my estate of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situated to my wife, FAIRY JEAN BURNS. I
have already give my son, ERIC DEWAYNE BURNS, a 1985 Chevrolet Corvette for his
inheritance from my estate.
According to Eric’s interpretation of this clause, the use of the word “give” demonstrates
Hershell’s present intention to transfer the 1985 Corvette as part of the estate, thereby making
Eric a beneficiary, who is entitled to notice by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested. See id. §§ 308.002(a), (d), 308.003 (West 2020) (TEX PROB. CODE § 128A). We
disagree.
We review a trial court’s construction of unambiguous language in a will de novo.
Jinkins v. Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
When interpreting a will, courts focus on the testator’s intent as reflected in the instrument as a
whole. San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000); see Welch v.
Straach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1975) (concluding that “all parts of the testamentary
7
The record reflects that Hershell’s will was offered for probate within four years after the date of his death
and that Fairy produced the will to the probate court, not a copy. Accordingly, Hershell’s “heirs” were not entitled
to the same notice as they would have been had the will been offered for probate after the four-year period or had no
will been produced in court. See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. §§ 258.002, 258.051 (West 2020) (TEX. PROB. CODE
§§ 128(b), 128B). Because neither of these conditions was present, there was no legal reason for Fairy to send such
notice to Eric.
7
writings . . . are to be harmonized and given effect”). The court must ascertain the testator’s
intent from the language expressed within the four corners of the will. Shriner’s Hosp. for
Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. 1980); Rosen v. Wells Fargo
Bank Tex., N.A., 114 S.W.3d 145, 158 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, no pet.). Thus, the court must
scrutinize the words actually used by the testator instead of the words he may have intended to
write. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2016). “In this light, courts must not redraft
wills to vary or add provisions ‘under the guise of construction of the language of the will’ to
reach a presumed intent.” Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 639 (quoting Stahl, 610 S.W.2d at 151). When a
trial court’s construction of an unambiguous will is erroneous, an appellate court will reverse the
trial court’s judgment and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered. Brewer v.
Fountain, 583 S.W.3d 871, 876 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
The phrase “have given” is in the present perfect tense and is formed by using “have”
with the past participle of the verb “give.” See present perfect, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY (2nd College ed. 1982). The present perfect tense describes an action that
happened or began at an indefinite time in the past. See id.; see, e.g., JOHN E. WARRINER,
WARRINER’S ENGLISH GRAMMAR AND COMPOSITION: COMPLETE COURSE 201 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., Liberty ed. 1986). In this context, the word “already” means “previously.”
Already, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2nd College ed. 1982). And as far as we are
aware, the phrase “have give” is not indicative of a known tense or phrase common in the
English language. Nonetheless, despite this quite apparent typographical error, we are bound to
scrutinize the words actually used. See Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d at 7. Based on our reading of the
entirety of the will, and our interpretation of its language, we conclude that Hershell intended to
leave his entire estate to Fairy. His statement, “I have already give my son . . . a 1985 Corvette
for his inheritance” reasonably can be interpreted to mean, “I previously have given my son a
1985 Corvette for his inheritance.”
In sum, under the terms of Hershell’s will, Eric was an “interested person,” not a
“beneficiary.” See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 22.018(1). Accordingly, he was not entitled to
receive notice in accordance with Section 308.002. Rather, as an “interested” person, he was
entitled to receive notice by posting, which the record supports was undertaken. See id.
§§ 258.001(b), 303.001. Therefore, based on our review of the record, we hold that there is no
summary judgment evidence which supports Eric’s claim that Fairy and her attorney committed
8
extrinsic fraud. Accordingly, the record does not support his argument that the limitations period
should be tolled under Section 256.204.
Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As set forth above, Eric had constructive notice of the probate proceedings, and nothing
served to toll the claims which arose from those proceedings. Therefore, his causes of action for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are untimely. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.004(4), (5). Moreover, even if these causes of action somehow were filed timely, we have
held that Fairy acted in accordance with the rules governing service of “interested persons.”
Thus, there is no basis for Eric’s claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, both of which
stem from his argument that Fairy was required to serve him as if he were a beneficiary in
accordance with Section 308.002. Eric’s third issue is overruled.
JURISDICTION
In his second issue, Eric argues that because he was not notified of the probate
proceedings, the probate court lacked in personum jurisdiction over him and, as a result, its
admittance of Hershell’s will to probate was the equivalent of a default judgment. We reiterate
that Eric received constructive notice of the proceedings in accordance with the law. See TEX.
ESTATES CODE ANN. §§ 258.001(b), 303.001. And, as noted previously, constructive notice in
law creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice. See Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85.
Furthermore, probate proceedings are actions in rem and bind all persons unless set aside in the
manner provided by law. See id. Thus, we hold that Eric’s argument that the probate court
lacked in personum jurisdiction over him is baseless. 8 Eric’s second issue is overruled.
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
8
Eric also asserts that the notice-by-posting-of-citation procedure in probate cases is unconstitutional. In
support of his contention, he relies on Sgitovich v. Sgitovich, 241 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1951). Once again, probate
proceedings are actions in rem, not in personam. See Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981). The
posting of citation in probate cases, which occurred in the subject probate proceeding, is the proper and authorized
method by which the public and “interested persons” are notified of the filing of the application for probate. See
TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. §§ 258.001(b), 303.001 (West 2020) (TEX. PROB. CODE § 128(a)). Sgitovich does not
involve a probate case, but rather pertains to substituted service of a party under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106,
which the supreme court upheld. See Sgitovich, 241 S.W.2d at 147–48. We conclude that Eric’s reliance on
Sgitovich is misplaced in his constitutional attack on the underlying, in rem, probate proceeding.
9
In his first issue, Eric contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
admit medical records he offered at the hearing on Fairy’s motion for summary judgment. 9
We review a trial court’s ruling concerning the admission or exclusion of summary
judgment evidence for an abuse of discretion. First State Bank of Mesquite v. Bellinger &
Dewolf, LLP, 342 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2011, no pet.). A trial court abuses its
discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules
or principles. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). When reviewing
matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, we may not substitute our own judgment for
that of the trial court. See id. The trial court’s evidentiary ruling will be upheld if there is any
legitimate basis for the ruling. In re Estate of Miller, 243 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. App.–Dallas
2008, no pet.) (citing Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex.
1998)).
Here, Eric offered the medical records at issue at the hearing on Fairy’s motion for
summary judgment. Except on leave of court, the party responding to summary judgment must
serve its response and supporting evidence not later than seven days prior to the day of the
hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Because Eric offered the evidence at issue during the
hearing on Fairy’s motion for summary judgment, the offer was untimely. 10 See id. But even
had Eric timely offered the medical records, the trial court’s exclusion of them would not amount
to an abuse of discretion.
Evidence is relevant, and, therefore, admissible, if it has any tendency to “make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402; Serv. Corp. Int’l
v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 237–38 (Tex. 2011). To determine relevancy, the court must look at
the purpose for offering the evidence. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d 816, 822
(Tex. App.–Dallas 1993, no writ). There must be some logical connection, either directly or by
inference, between the evidence offered and the fact to be proved. See Rhey v. Redic, 408
S.W.3d 440, 460 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Martin, 855 S.W.2d at 822).
9
The evidence appears in the record by way of Eric’s bill of exception.
At trial, Eric claimed that he did not receive the medical records until the day of the hearing. However,
10
he did not seek a continuance of the proceedings or otherwise request leave to introduce the evidence. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(c) (providing opportunity for responding party, upon leave of court, to file and serve opposing evidence
or other written response).
10
In the instant case, the evidence at issue consisted of Hershell’s medical records from his
time in hospice care––the period during which he executed the will. These records indicate that,
among other medications, Hershell was administered morphine during that time period. At trial,
Eric argued that these records are relevant to his claim because they support that Hershell
“lacked testamentary capacity to execute important documents while under the influence of his
prescribed pain medications, which made him legally intoxicated as a matter of law.” What Eric
misperceives in making this argument is that the basis of Fairy’s motion for summary judgment
is that Eric’s will contest is untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore,
because the excluded evidence did not make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the issue of limitations more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence, we conclude that it was not relevant and, therefore, inadmissible. See TEX.
R. EVID. 401, 402. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence,
we overrule Eric’s first issue. See TEX. R. EVID. 402.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Eric’s first, second, and third issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
GREG NEELEY
Justice
Opinion delivered April 20, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
11
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
APRIL 20, 2023
NO. 12-22-00256-CV
ERIC D. BURNS,
Appellant
V.
FAIRY JEAN BURNS,
Appellee
Appeal from the County Court at Law No 2
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 73576-A)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, all costs of this appeal are assessed against
Appellant, ERIC D. BURNS, and that this decision be certified to the court below for
observance.
Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
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