Charles Wade Briggs v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00057-CR
CHARLES WADE BRIGGS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 336th District Court
Fannin County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-20-27898
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On the night of July 21, 2017, at least three men forced their way into the home of Gina
and Johnnie Jones, and while one of the men subdued Gina, the other men subdued Johnnie and
shot him at close range in the back of his head. As a result, a Fannin County jury convicted
Charles Wade Briggs of attempted1 murder,2 burglary of a habitation with intent to commit
aggravated assault,3 and engaging in organized criminal activity.4 In this appeal,5 Briggs
challenges his conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault.
He contends (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that he
committed burglary of a habitation, (2) that the trial court erred when it failed to give an
accomplice witness instruction, (3) that the evidence does not corroborate the testimony of the
accomplice witness, (4) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s deadly weapon
finding, and (5) that he did not receive notice of the State’s intent to seek a deadly weapon
finding. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
Regarding Briggs’s second, third, and fourth issues, Briggs raised identical issues and
made virtually identical arguments in the appeal of his attempted murder conviction. Because
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01.
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). Briggs was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for attempted
murder.
3
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1), (d)(2). Briggs was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for burglary of
a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault.
4
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a) (Supp.). Briggs was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment for
engaging in organized criminal activity.
5
In his appeal in our cause number 06-22-00056-CR, Briggs appeals his conviction for attempted murder, and in his
appeal in our cause number 06-22-00058-CR, Briggs appeals his conviction for engaging in organized criminal
activity.
2
these issues are identical to those addressed in our opinion dated this date in Briggs v. State,
cause number 06-22-00056-CR, we overrule these issues for the reasons stated in that opinion.
Further, because we have fully set forth the evidence presented at trial in our opinion in cause
number 06-22-00058-CR, we will not repeat it here.
I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Verdict
In his first issue, Briggs contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict that he was guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated
assault. Briggs argues that there was no evidence that he entered Johnnie’s house, that he knew
or anticipated that a burglary and aggravated assault would be committed, that he solicited or
aided others to commit the offense, or that he conspired with others to do so.
A. Standard of Review
“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010)). “Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence
presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine
legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the
responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
3
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that
each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a
defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Paroline v. State, 532
S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d
805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the evidence
admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at
297–98 (quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d in
part by 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
4
The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”
Id. at 297 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is
based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
B. Analysis
Briggs was charged with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated
assault. Because the evidence supported the theory that Briggs might be liable as a party, the
court’s charge included instructions that allowed the jury to convict Briggs either as a primary
actor or as a party.6 Under the statute and the indictment, in order to convict Briggs, as a primary
actor, of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault, the State had to show,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Briggs (1) entered a habitation (2) without the effective consent
of the owner thereof, Johnnie,7 (3) with the intent to commit aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 30.02(a), (d); Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 164 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016,
pet. ref’d). A person commits an “aggravated assault if the person commits an assault and
(1) causes serious bodily injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the
commission of the assault.” McDonald v. State, No. 06-21-00059-CR, 2022 WL 23822, at *2,
n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
6
See Tate v. State, 811 S.W.2d 607, 607 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“[I]f the evidence supports a charge on the law
of parties, the court may charge on the law of parties even though there is no such allegation in the indictment.”).
7
Briggs does not contest that Johnnie’s house was a habitation or that Johnnie was the owner of the habitation, as
those terms are defined under the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(35)(A), 30.01(1).
5
(citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (Supp.)). “A person commits an [assault if he]
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.01(a)(1) (Supp.).
The State tried the case, and the jury was charged, on the alternative theory that Briggs
was liable as a party. Under that theory, “[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an
offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is
criminally responsible, or by both.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01. As applicable to this case, a
person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another person in two ways. First,
the person is responsible for the conduct of another person if, “acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the
other person to commit the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2). Second, the person is
responsible for the conduct of another person if,
in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is
committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony
actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was
committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have
been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b).
Under the first of these ways, § 7.02(a)(2), “[t]he words ‘acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense’ clearly mean, at a minimum, that a defendant must act
intentionally with respect to the result elements of a result-oriented offense.” Nava v. State, 415
S.W.3d 289, 298–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
6
The first variant of aggravated assault—by causing serious bodily injury—is a result-
oriented offense. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Consequently, for the offense of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated
assault by causing bodily injury, the intent to promote or assist includes not only the commission
of the burglary of a habitation, but also the result of the aggravated assault, i.e., the serious
bodily injury of Johnnie. See Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 300.
“The second variant of aggravated assault—assault while using a deadly weapon—is a
‘nature of the conduct offense.’” Hall v. State, 145 S.W.3d 754, 758 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2004, no pet.) (citing Guzman v. State, 988 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1999, no pet.)). “This is because the Texas Legislature has proscribed the method in
which the actor commits the assault, regardless of the outcome of that conduct.” Id. “A person
acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct . . . when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). As a
result, the offense of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault by
using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault requires that the intent
to promote or assist include not only the intent to commit the burglary of a habitation, but also
the intent that a deadly weapon be used or exhibited during the commission of the assault.
To prove party liability, “[t]he necessary specific intent can be proven through
circumstantial evidence, and we may rely on events that took place before, during, or after the
commission of the offense.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). “The jury may infer the requisite
7
mental state from (1) the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant, (2) the extent of the injuries
to the victim, (3) the method used to produce the injuries, and (4) the relative size and strength of
the parties.” Rhymes v. State, 536 S.W.3d 85, 95 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. ref’d)
(citing Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Further, “the jury may
. . . infer intent from any facts in evidence which it determines prove[] the existence of [an]
intent to kill, such as the use of a deadly weapon.” Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794,
800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). Indeed, when a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, it is
not only reasonable to infer an intent to kill, the inference of intent to kill is well-nigh
conclusive. Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
“In determining whether an appellant is a party to an offense, we may consider ‘events
before, during, and after the commission of the offense.’” Rhymes, 536 S.W.3d at 94 (quoting
Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). We may also consider
circumstantial evidence to determine party status. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (citing Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
“Without evidence of intentional participation by the accused, an accused may not be convicted
under the law of parties.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Acy v. State, 618 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). For that reason, “mere
presence of a person at the scene of a crime, or even flight from the scene, without more, is
insufficient to support a conviction as a party to the offense.” Gross, 380 S.W.3d at 186.
In this case, the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
showed that the night before the attack on Johnnie, Briggs called Johnnie and threatened to send
8
someone over to take care of him because he believed Johnnie was selling drugs to his son, Josh.
The next day, Briggs called his brother, Shane, whom Briggs knew to be in a violent biker gang,
and Shane met him at his house within hours of the call, along with several fellow gang
members. After Shane and his friends arrived, they conversed with Briggs and Josh in the
driveway, where they prepared their weapons, including several firearms. The group then
proceeded to Johnnie’s house and used Josh, who was familiar to Gina8 and Johnnie, to gain
entrance to the house. After Josh gained entry, Shane, Briggs, and other members of the group
incapacitated Gina and rushed to attack Johnnie at the back of the house. According to Johnnie,
three men attacked him, one of whom he identified as Josh’s dad, who told him, “I called you
and I told you that I was going to send somebody to take care of you,” immediately before
Johnnie was shot point-blank in the back of his head.
Afterward, Briggs emphasized to his family that Shane was not kidding when he
threatened to kill them if they disclosed his involvement, and Briggs immediately formulated an
alibi that the family was instructed to use. Over the next three years, when the incident came up
in conversation, Briggs bragged that they got away with it. Also, when Sapphire9 threatened to
leave Josh, Briggs reminded her that she knew too much and told her that they knew how to kill
a person and that the same could happen to her.
The jury, as the trier of fact, was “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony,” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 297, and could resolve any
8
Gina is Johnnie’s wife.
9
Sapphire is Josh’s ex-wife.
9
conflicts in witnesses’ testimony. Consequently, they could have found Sapphire’s and
Logan’s10 testimony regarding what Josh told them happened at Johnnie’s house credible. That
testimony established that Briggs entered Johnnie’s house without Johnnie’s consent. Further,
based on the evidence of Briggs’s threats, his soliciting the assistance of a violent gang, his
active participation in the events leading up to, during, and after the shooting, and the use of a
deadly weapon fired point-blank into the back of Johnnie’s head, the jury could have reasonably
inferred that Briggs had the intent to assist or promote the burglary of Johnnie’s house with the
intent to commit aggravated assault and that he had the intent to either cause serious bodily
injury to Johnnie or that a deadly weapon be used or exhibited in assaulting Johnnie. This same
evidence showed that Briggs was an active participant in the planning, preparation, and
execution of the burglary of Johnnie’s house.
For those reasons, we find that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that
Briggs was a party to the burglary of Johnnie’s habitation with the intent to commit aggravated
assault.11 We overrule this issue.
II. Briggs Had Notice of the State’s Intent to Seek a Deadly Weapon Finding
Briggs also complains that he was not given notice that the State would seek a deadly
weapon finding. Although he acknowledges that an indictment’s allegations may be sufficient to
provide such notice, he argues that the indictment in this case was not sufficient to give him
adequate notice.
10
Logan is Josh’s sister.
Because we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict under the promote-or-assist theory
11
of party liability, we do not address the evidence supporting the conspiracy theory of party liability.
10
“When the State seeks a deadly-weapon finding against a defendant, it must provide
notice of that fact to the defendant before trial.” Vickers v. State, 467 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989)). “However, under certain circumstances, a defendant may receive adequate notice of a
deadly-weapon issue based simply on the offense charged.” Id. (citing Blount v. State, 257
S.W.3d 712, 713–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
In Blount v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that an indictment that
alleged that the defendant committed burglary of a habitation in which he committed or
attempted to commit aggravated assault was adequate notice that a deadly weapon finding would
be sought. The court explained:
Aggravated assault may be committed in only two ways: (1) by “caus[ing]
serious bodily injury” or (2) by “us[ing] or exhibit[ing] a deadly weapon during
the commission of the assault.” Each of these involves the use of a deadly
weapon. The first way necessarily implies the use of a deadly weapon, which is
“anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury.” The second way specifies the use of a deadly weapon.
Therefore an allegation that a defendant committed aggravated assault gives him
notice that the deadly nature of the weapon alleged in the indictment would be an
issue at trial and that the State may seek an affirmative finding on the use of the
weapon.
Blount v. State, 257 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citations omitted).
In Vickers, we applied the reasoning in Blount when “[t]he indictment charge[d the
defendant] with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and aggravated
kidnapping. Vickers, 467 S.W.3d at 96. We reasoned that even if aggravated kidnapping can be
committed without using a deadly weapon, because aggravated assault “cannot be committed
11
without either using a deadly weapon or causing serious bodily injury, then Blount applies, and
Vickers was on notice that the State would seek a deadly-weapon finding in this case.” Id.In this case, the indictment charged Briggs with burglary of a habitation with intent to
commit aggravated assault. For that reason, Blount and Vickers apply, and we find Briggs had
sufficient notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding in this case.12 We overrule
this issue.
III. Disposition
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: January 27, 2023
Date Decided: April 21, 2023
Do Not Publish
12
Briggs also had notice that a deadly weapon finding would be sought because, in a separate indictment arising out
of the same criminal episode, he was charged with attempted murder by shooting Johnnie in the head with a firearm.
See Brooks v. State, 847 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (holding that,
when defendant knew of the charges alleged against him, knew that they arose out of the same criminal episode, and
knew that the State alleged use of a deadly weapon during the course of the criminal episode in a separate
indictment, the defendant had actual notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding).
12