George Jones v. Ellen Copeland ( 2012 )

NO. 07-11-00437-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
AUGUST 16, 2012
GEORGE JONES, APPELLANT
v.
ELLEN COPELAND, APPELLEE
FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY;
NO. 36,648; HONORABLE LEE WATERS, JUDGE
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, George Jones, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s
dismissal of his suit filed against Ellen Copeland. Jones contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by dismissing his suit as frivolous. We will affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Jones filed grievances against Copeland in association with his claims that
Copeland, property officer at the Jordan Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, wrongfully confiscated some of Jones’s personal property and mishandled his
legal materials. He claimed that, by mishandling his legal materials, Copeland
destroyed the folders housing those materials and, consequently, “absolutely disrupted
[Jones’s] legal materials.”
Jones had been transferred from the Segovia Unit and arrived at the Jordan Unit
in May 2011, at which time he claims Copeland confiscated his property, including legal
papers, pens, carbon paper, coffee, envelopes, and a padlock, that he had been
stocking up on since 2008 in anticipation of his release. Apparently, twenty-two hours
later, prison officials returned his legal materials, both the unbound papers and the
accordion folders. He was displeased, however, with the condition of his returned
materials and maintained that Copeland had damaged his storage folders and taken
fourteen pieces of carbon paper. In connection with these complaints, he filed a
grievance. Jones also sought the return of his non-legal property by way of I-60s, but,
when he says he got no response to his several requests, he also filed a grievance in
connection with the handling of his non-legal property.
In grievance no. 2011172110, Jones claimed that Copeland denied him his
constitutional right of access to the courts by dumping his active legal papers into a
property bag, causing damage to his storage folders and causing his papers to become
disorganized. He also claimed that Copeland scanned through his legal materials. He
sought replacement of his folders and fourteen pieces of carbon paper he also alleged
were taken or destroyed in the process. In its response, the prison grievance system
maintained that the accordion folders were already in “unusable condition” and that it is
within prison system guidelines to inventory all inmate property upon arrival at a unit.
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Copeland denied having read Jones’s legal materials and denied having confiscated or
destroyed fourteen pieces of carbon paper.
In grievance no. 2011172103, Jones claimed that Copeland wrongfully
confiscated non-legal property, including five pens, two and one-half bags of coffee, and
a padlock for her own personal use. The response to this grievance concluded that the
coffee and padlock were confiscated because ownership or legitimate possession of
those items was in question. The response further noted that five pens were taken from
Jones per TDCJ policy but further noted that Jones was left with two pens.
Jones then sought review of the prison system’s grievance responses by way of
his petition which he timely filed in the 223rd District Court of Gray County on
September 1, 2011. Jones complains that, although prison officials did return his legal
materials, the materials were not returned in the condition in which Copeland took them.
He complains that papers relating to active legal matters were “in total disarray” and
that, as a result, he had to spend “a vast amount of time attempting to reorganize his
legal papers,” time he would have otherwise spent preparing for his federal trial. He
claims to never have received his remaining, non-legal property. He sought $3,000.00
in punitive damages from Copeland as a result of her mishandling of his legal materials.
He appears to have sought the return of or compensation for his other, non-legal
property.
The trial court dismissed Jones’s suit as frivolous, concluding that Jones’s claim
had no arguable basis in law or in fact and that his realistic chances of ultimate success
were slight. In his brief, Jones takes issue with the trial court’s conclusions and
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contends his claims relating to both legal materials and non-legal property are
meritorious.
Dismissal under Chapter 14
Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to an
inmate’s suit in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs is filed
by the inmate. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002 (West Supp. 2011).
Among the several grounds on which a trial court may dismiss a suit subject to Chapter
14, either before or after service of process, is the finding that the inmate’s suit is
frivolous or malicious. See id. § 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002). In determining whether a
claim is frivolous, the trial court may consider whether the following circumstances are
present: (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has
no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in
support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by
the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b).
The trial court has broad discretion to dismiss an inmate’s claim as frivolous.
Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 736 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
Generally, we review a trial court’s dismissal of a lawsuit subject to Chapter 14 for an
abuse of discretion. In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273, 293 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied).
The trial court concluded that Jones’s claims had no arguable basis in law or fact.
However, when a trial court dismisses a claim without a hearing, as it did here, the issue
on appeal is limited to whether the claim had no arguable basis in law. Moreland v.
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Johnson, 95 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). The issue
of whether a claim has an arguable basis in law is a legal question that we review de
novo. Id.; Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex.App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). To determine whether there is an arguable
basis in law, we examine the types of relief and causes of action pleaded in the petition
to determine whether the petition states a cause of action that would authorize relief.
See Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.
denied); Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 736. We review and evaluate pro se pleadings by
standards less stringent than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See
Minix v. Gonzales, 162 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)
(calling on courts to view pro se petition with “liberality and patience” and citing Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980)). In reviewing the trial
court’s dismissal in this particular context, we must take as true the allegations in
Jones’s petition. See Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Courts may consider a claim as one having no arguable basis in
law when either the legal theory on which the claim is based is indisputably meritless or
the factual allegations on which it is based are wholly incredible or irrational. Nabelek v.
Dist. Att’y of Harris Cnty., 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied). An inmate’s cause of action may not be dismissed, however, merely
because the court considers the allegations “unlikely.” Minix, 162 S.W.3d at 637.
With the applicable law and standards of review in mind, we turn to the two
primary claims Jones presented to the trial court.
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Access to Courts Claim
Taking as true Jones’s allegations that Copeland mishandled his legal material
so badly that he had to spend a good deal of time reorganizing and regrouping his legal
materials, we must determine whether his petition stated a cause of action that could
authorize relief. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 339. Jones specifically complains that
Copeland’s mishandling of his legal materials amounted to an intentional interference
with his constitutional right of access to courts because he was forced to spend a good
deal of time regrouping his materials after prison officials returned them to him. This
time, he claims, would have otherwise been spent preparing for his upcoming federal
trial.
An inmate has a constitutional right of access to courts. Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d
41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). To establish a denial of access to the courts, however, an
inmate must demonstrate “actual injury” as a result of the alleged violative conduct.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–51, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996);
McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 230–31 (5th Cir. 1998); Brewer v. Simental, 268
S.W.3d 763, 771 n.2 (Tex.App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). That is, he must establish that
“his position as a litigant was prejudiced by his denial of access to the courts.” See
McDonald, 132 F.3d at 230–31; see also Hamilton v. Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 815
(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (concluding that inmate could not prevail on
access-to-courts claim when he failed to allege how the claimed destruction of his legal
documents impacted his position as litigant).
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Even taking as true the factual allegations that Copeland’s less than careful
handling of Jones’s folders caused his legal documents to be in disarray and that,
consequently, Jones had to spend a great deal of time reorganizing the papers in
preparation for federal trial, such an inconvenience or expenditure of time is not
sufficient under the law to constitute a denial of access to courts. See Hamilton, 319
S.W.3d at 815; see also Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982)
(concluding inmate was not denied access to courts when “he submitted the document
later than he would have liked but prior to the date it was due”). Jones indicated that he
was, in fact, able to pursue his claims in federal court. Any effect that having to
reorganize would have caused in his preparation for trial is speculative, at best, and not
an actual injury recognized by the law. In his grievance addressing the matter, Jones’s
own allegations demonstrate the speculative nature of his injury by explaining that
Copeland’s mishandling of the papers “may have caused legal injury by setting me back
several days at such a critical moment.” He goes on to explain that it “took [him] 22
hours to get [his] active legal materials in some type of similar order.” We add that
Copeland’s alleged mishandling of Jones’s materials occurred nearly one month prior to
the date he identified as his federal court date. Because Jones fails to allege an actual
injury as recognized by law, his stated claim does not authorize relief as requested.
Therefore, his access-to-courts claim has no arguable basis in law. Based on the law
as applied to the allegations before it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so
concluding. We overrule Jones’s first issue.
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Wrongful Confiscation of Coffee, Pens, and Padlock
Jones also complains that he was denied due process when Copeland wrongfully
confiscated five of his ink pens, two and one-half bags of coffee, and a padlock.
However, “[d]eprivations of property caused by the misconduct of state officials do not
infringe constitutional due process provided adequate state post-deprivation remedies
exist.” Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994); see Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 534–35, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984); Aguilar v. Chastain, 923
S.W.2d 740, 743–44 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied).
In the context of wrongful confiscation or destruction of inmate property, the
Legislature has provided an administrative remedy to pay inmates’ claims for property
lost or damaged by the TDCJ. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 501.007, .008 (West
2004); Aguilar, 923 S.W.2d at 744. Further, Jones has a state-law cause of action to
remedy the wrongs he alleges. See Murphy, 26 F.3d at 543 (observing that
deprivations of property caused by the misconduct of state officials do not infringe upon
notions of constitutional due process if adequate state post-deprivation remedies exist
and, in Texas, the tort of conversion is such a remedy); see also Hammonds v. Camp,
No. 07-03-00496-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3293, at *3 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Apr. 12,
2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that inmate’s complaints “do not evince a denial
of due process, as a matter of law,” “[b]ecause he has available to him both a common
law remedy for conversion and an administrative remedy”).
Thus, Jones has no arguable due process claim. He makes no allegation that
the post-deprivation remedies are inadequate; rather, he merely expresses his
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dissatisfaction with the responses to his grievance filed in connection with the
confiscation. Accordingly, we conclude Jones’s due process claim had no arguable
basis in law. See Aguilar, 923 S.W.2d at 744. Based on the law and the allegations
before it, the trial court could have come to the same conclusion and therefore did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing Jones’s due process claim as frivolous.
If, reading Jones’s allegations with “liberality and patience,” we treat his
allegations as ones advancing his state-law remedy of a cause of action in conversion,
we first note that such allegations are rather vague and conclude that such claims have
no arguable basis in law. To establish conversion of personal property, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) the plaintiff owned or had legal possession of the property or entitlement
to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and without authorization assumed and
exercised dominion and control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent
with the plaintiff's rights as an owner; (3) the plaintiff demanded return of the property;
and (4) the defendant refused to return the property. Apple Imps. v. Koole, 945 S.W.2d
895, 899 (Tex.App.—Austin 1997, writ denied).
Here, the grievance response indicated that “ownership/legitimate possession is
questioned” with respect to the coffee, pens, and padlock. As to the five ink pens
specifically, the grievance response concluded that Jones was not permitted by TDCJ
rules to possess as many pens as he did.1 That said, Jones cannot show that (1) he
1
“[P]rison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage and lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of
protected liberty interests.” Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d 936, 938–39 (Tex.App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); see Thompson v. Mannix, 814 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Tex.App.—Waco 1991, no writ).
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owned or had legal possession of the property or (2) Copeland wrongfully deprived him
of that property. His claim for conversion of an impermissible number of pens fails
because he cannot establish the requisite elements, and his claim therefore had no
arguable basis in law.
Similarly, with respect to the coffee and padlock, the grievance response
indicated that “ownership/legitimate possession” was in question. The record before
both the trial court and this Court demonstrate that, per TDCJ policy and as was
documented, prison officials confiscated property the ownership or legitimate
possession of which was questioned. The response concluded that reviewed “[r]ecords
. . . cannot sustain that you had authorized possession of the items” at issue. With that,
Jones’s claim regarding wrongful confiscation of two and one-half bags of coffee and a
padlock fails as a result of his failure to allege that, despite the grievance system’s
conclusions regarding authorized possession and implementation of TDCJ policy, he
did legally possess those items. He does allege that he had them at the unit at which
he was previously incarcerated. In light of the broad authority the TDCJ holds to
confiscate unauthorized items within the prison system and the grievance system’s
conclusion that Jones was not authorized to have the coffee, padlock, and extra pens,
Jones could not arguably prove the legal or authorized possession element of a
conversion cause of action. Based on the record before it and the law applicable to
Jones’s claims, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Jones’s
claim requesting compensation for wrongfully confiscated property had no arguable
basis in law.
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As an additional basis for concluding that Jones’s claims have no arguable basis
in law, we add that this Court, among several others, has employed the doctrine of de
minimis non curat lex–that is, “[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles”–to affirm the
dismissal as frivolous of suits brought by inmates over the claimed confiscation by
prison employees of property having insignificant value. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496
(9th ed. 2009); see Brown v. Cockrell, No. 07-03-00139-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS
2131, at *5–6 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Mar. 21, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding doctrine
applicable when inmate sought recovery for confiscation of postage stamps);
Hammonds, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3293, at *5 (applying doctrine when inmate sued to
recover for loss of two shower shoes, two chess sets, and a sweatshirt); Pennington v.
Peterson, No. 13-96-00344-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 573, at *5–6 (Tex.App.—Corpus
Christi Jan. 29, 1998, pet. denied) (concluding the law did not concern itself with
inmate’s claim seeking recovery of $3.15 for property confiscated upon arrival at new
prison unit); Smith v. Stevens, 822 S.W.2d 152, 152 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1991, writ denied) (concluding that the law was not concerned with claims involving the
confiscation of a coffee bag and two packs of cigarettes); Thompson, 814 S.W.2d at
812 (finding trial court could have invoked doctrine when inmate sought recovery for the
conversion of five highlighters, an extension cord, four small wooden picture frames, a
stainless steel pen and pencil set, a mirror, three hospital bracelets, and a fan). Any
error associated with the dismissal would be harmless because the amount of damages
sought is insignificant. See Hammonds, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3293, at *5–6; Smith,
822 S.W.2d at 152.
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The trial court could have concluded that, based on the same doctrine, Jones’s
claims seeking compensation for or the return of two and one-half bags of coffee, five
pens, and a padlock were de minimus and therefore lacked an arguable basis in the law
when the law does not concern itself with such a trifling matter. Further, because
Jones’s claims lacked an arguable basis in the law, a natural consequence of their lack
of basis is that their “realistic chance of ultimate success is slight.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing as frivolous Jones’s claims of wrongful confiscation of his non-legal property.
Conclusion
Having overruled Jones’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
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