Third Eye, Inc. v. UST Global Inc. ( 2023 )


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  • AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 4, 2023
    S  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-22-00334-CV
    THIRD EYE, INC., Appellant
    V.
    UST GLOBAL INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-02821
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Garcia
    Opinion by Justice Reichek
    Third Eye, Inc. appeals the trial court’s judgment granting UST Global Inc.’s
    requests for (1) specific performance of Third Eye’s contractual obligation to
    produce documents, (2) a writ of mandamus allowing UST to inspect Third Eye’s
    books and records, and (3) an award of attorney’s fees. Third Eye brings three issues
    generally challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
    court’s rulings and the breadth of the judgment. We affirm.
    Background
    In 2014, UST and Third Eye signed a Subscription Agreement (the
    Agreement) pursuant to which UST acquired 833 shares of Third Eye and became
    the company’s sole minority shareholder. The Agreement included a section entitled
    “Information Rights” that required Third Eye to deliver to UST,
    (a) a quarterly unaudited income statement and statement of cash
    flows, and an unaudited balance sheet at the end of such month,
    prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
    within forty-five days of the end of each fiscal quarter;
    (b) a yearly unaudited balance sheet, statements of income and
    cash flows, and a statement of stockholder’s equity within ninety days
    after the end of each fiscal year; and
    (c) consolidated financial statements for any period Third Eye
    had a subsidiary whose accounts were consolidated with those of Third
    Eye.
    The Agreement additionally required Third Eye to permit UST, subject to applicable
    laws and regulatory approvals, to visit and inspect Third Eye’s books of account and
    records during Third Eye’s normal business hours. Third Eye was not required to
    provide access to information it reasonably considered to be a trade secret or
    confidential unless it was covered by an enforceable confidentiality agreement
    acceptable to Third Eye.
    On October 13, 2020, UST sent a demand letter to Third Eye requesting Third
    Eye make various books and records available for inspection and copying. In
    support of the request, UST cited the Agreement and section 21.218 of the Texas
    Business Organizations Code. UST stated it was making the request “for the
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    purposes of evaluating Third Eye’s financial position and understanding Third Eye’s
    operations and practices, so that UST Global can monitor and protect the value of
    UST Global’s equity in Third Eye.”
    Third Eye responded one month later declining to produce records that
    exceeded “the permissible scope of Section 21.218 records requests.” Third Eye
    further stated that, due to the fact the companies were involved in an arbitration
    proceeding, it was declining to produce any records unless appropriate measures
    were put in place to “protect confidentiality and limit dissemination of sensitive
    company information.”
    UST replied that its rights to information under the Agreement were broader
    than those under section 21.218, and it had never been provided the financial
    disclosures it was contractually entitled to receive. UST noted that its desire to
    evaluate Third Eye’s financial position to determine the value of its equity interest
    was particularly compelling given recent communications indicating Third Eye may
    be insolvent. UST stated it was “amenable to reasonable confidentiality protections
    for the requested documents” and requested that Third Eye provide it with proposed
    measures within a week. The record contains no response to UST’s request for
    proposed confidentiality protections, and Third Eye did not allow UST to access its
    books and records.
    UST brought this suit in March 2021 alleging a claim for breach of contract
    and requesting a writ of mandamus. UST asserted that Third Eye had never provided
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    any of the information required by the Agreement and requested specific
    performance of the Information Rights provision, as well as a writ of mandamus
    ordering Third Eye to provide UST with access to its books and records. UST further
    sought an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
    A trial was conducted before the court without a jury. Vijay Padmanbhan,
    chief corporate officer and head of the investment committee for UST, testified that
    UST never received any of the documents Third Eye was required to deliver pursuant
    to the Information Rights provision. He further testified the company had never
    been allowed to inspect Third Eye’s books and records.
    Shouvik Bhattacharyya, founder and chief executive officer of Third Eye,
    testified that, for a period of time he prepared quarterly and yearly financial
    statements with the help of an accountant, and filed tax returns on behalf of Third
    Eye. He stated he used QuickBooks to prepare balance sheets and profit and loss
    statements and had an electronic folder of accounting and finance matters. With
    respect to informing UST about Third Eye’s financial performance, he said he
    provided informal updates by email from December 2015 to 2017. According to
    Bhattacharyya, UST employees provided the data used to create the financial
    statements. Padmanbhan denied that UST employees prepared financial information
    for Third Eye.
    Beginning in 2017, Bhattacharyya stated UST employees began creating
    separate companies and taking Third Eye’s business. He said UST mentioned there
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    were “rogue employees” and he believed those employees were using Third Eye’s
    confidential information. Bhattacharyya also believed UST had breached a master
    service agreement between the two companies, and it was this claim that was the
    subject of the arbitration proceeding.
    The arbitration proceeding was still in process when UST sent the demand
    letter requesting access to Third Eye’s books and records. Bhattacharyya testified
    he refused to comply with the demand because he was trying to “protect the
    company.” He further stated that all documents responsive to UST’s demand had
    been turned over in discovery. In support of this assertion, Third Eye submitted a
    one-page summary showing various categories of Third Eye’s income and expenses
    for the period of January 2014 through May 2021. Bhattacharyya stated he had
    records of the payroll, rent, and other expenses reflected in the document, but he
    believed those records were “not the books and records requested by UST.”
    After hearing the evidence, the trial court found “UST had a proper purpose
    for demanding to examine and copy Third Eye’s books, records of account, minutes,
    and share transfer records; and Third Eye did not permit, and still refuses to permit,
    UST to access, examine, and copy its books, records of account, minutes, and share
    transfer records.” Accordingly, the judgment ordered Third Eye to permit UST to
    examine its books and records at Third Eye’s offices. The trial court additionally
    found UST was entitled to specific performance on its breach-of-contract claim, and
    ordered Third Eye to produce the documents required to be delivered under the
    –5–
    Information Rights provision of the Agreement. Finally, the trial court awarded UST
    its attorney’s fees.
    Analysis
    In its first two issues, Third Eye contends the evidence is factually insufficient
    to support the trial court’s judgment. To evaluate a factual sufficiency challenge,
    we consider and weigh all the evidence presented. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 
    46 S.W.3d 237
    , 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). We can set aside a verdict only if the
    evidence supporting it is so weak, or the findings so against the great weight and
    preponderance of the evidence, that it is clearly wrong and unjust. 
    Id.
     We must not
    substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder, and should remain cognizant that
    the factfinder is the sole judge of witness credibility. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v.
    Jackson, 
    116 S.W.3d 757
    , 761 (Tex. 2003).
    Third Eye’s primary challenge is to the trial court’s finding that UST had a
    proper purpose in requesting to inspect Third Eye’s books and records. An improper
    purpose is a defense to a books-and-records request. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
    § 21.222(b)(4). To show an improper purpose, the party invoking the defense must
    establish by proof “a state of facts sufficient to convince the court the stockholder is
    not seeking the information which might be revealed by the desired inspection for
    the protection of his interest as a stockholder, or that of the corporation, but that he
    is actuated by corrupt or unlawful motives.” Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 
    59 S.W.2d 815
    , 818 (Tex. 1933).
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    Third Eye argues it presented unrebutted evidence of its concern that UST
    would take the information obtained through the inspection and use it to harm Third
    Eye.   As facts supporting this concern, Third Eye points to Bhattacharyya’s
    testimony that UST was misappropriating Third Eye’s information and assets. But
    Bhattacharyya specifically testified that UST employees were starting new, separate
    companies and taking Third Eye’s business. There was no evidence that UST, itself,
    was seeking to harm the company in which it had invested. See Moore, 59 S.W.2d
    at 819 (wholly incredible that stockholders made demand to depress market value of
    their own stock). Indeed, UST stated it was willing to work with Third Eye to put
    in place reasonable confidentiality protections for Third Eye’s information.
    Third Eye additionally points to the fact that the parties were involved in an
    arbitration proceeding, and the inspection request “stemmed from information
    obtained during all the arbitration procedures.” The information to which Third Eye
    refers concerned the company’s potential insolvency. Third Eye does not explain
    why the fact that UST learned of Third Eye’s potential insolvency during an
    arbitration proceeding renders its concern about the company as a shareholder
    improper. Nor does Third Eye explain how information obtained through a books-
    and-records inspection would have been harmful to Third Eye in the arbitration
    instituted to resolve a master service agreement dispute.       The mere fact that
    stockholders seeking access to a company’s books and records are on unfriendly
    terms with the company is not a ground for denying mandamus relief. Id. at 818.
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    Third Eye cites several cases for the proposition that its concerns regarding
    UST’s potential misuse of its financial information should have compelled the trial
    court to deny UST’s request. In those cases, however, the court did not hold the
    company’s alleged concerns were conclusive, but rather were sufficient to raise a
    fact issue on whether the shareholder had a proper purpose for requesting the
    inspection. See Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Loughridge, 
    425 S.W.2d 818
    , 820–21
    (Tex. 1968) (orig. proceeding); In re Elusive Holdings, Inc., 
    641 S.W.3d 498
    , 504
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, orig. proceeding); In re Dyer Custom Installation, Inc.,
    
    133 S.W.3d 878
    , 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, orig. proceeding); Guar. Old Line
    Life Co. v. McCallum, 
    97 S.W.2d 966
    , 968 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1936, orig.
    proceeding). Here, the fact issue was presented to the trial court for resolution.
    Given (1) UST’s undisputed evidence that Third Eye never provided it with the
    financial information it was contractually obligated to deliver, (2) UST’s stated
    concern regarding its investment in Third Eye, and (3) Third Eye’s own evidence
    that it began losing substantial business beginning in 2017, we conclude the evidence
    was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that UST had a proper
    purpose in requesting to inspect Third Eye’s books and records.
    With respect to the trial court’s order that Third Eye produce documents,
    Third Eye argues the evidence shows it already produced all the documents in its
    possession. But the evidence regarding what information had been given to UST
    was conflicting, and the court was free to disbelieve Bhattacharyya’s testimony that
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    Third Eye was not withholding information. Golden Eagle, 116 S.W.3d at 761.
    Bhattacharyya conceded that, even though he had prepared quarterly and yearly
    financial statements for Third Eye, he never provided them to UST as required by
    the Agreement. Instead, Bhattacharyya stated he gave UST informal reports via
    emails. This alone is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
    Third Eye was in breach of the Agreement. Although Bhattacharyya also stated that
    employees of UST provided the financial information on which Third Eye’s
    financial disclosures would have been based, Padmanbahn disputed this and said
    UST’s employees never prepared financial information for Third Eye.
    Third Eye submitted only a single, one-page document into evidence to
    support its assertion that it had turned over all the requisite financial information in
    its possession to UST. The document was a summary created by Bhattacharyya for
    the arbitration proceeding to show Third Eye’s profits and losses over a seven-year
    period. Bhattacharyya stated he had in his possession the underlying records to
    support the information in the summary, but indicated these documents were not
    given to UST because he believed that they were not responsive to UST’s books-
    and-records request. But Third Eye provided no evidence to show the records would
    not be part of the information it was required to deliver under the Agreement.
    Furthermore, Bhattacharyya stated he had some of Third Eye’s financial information
    on his computer in a file called “accounting and finance matters.” Bhattacharyya
    did not specify what types of documents were in the computer file, and the trial court
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    could have concluded that at least some of that information would fall under the
    disclosure requirements of the Agreement.
    Finally, Third Eye argues the mandamus relief awarded to UST is overly
    broad. Third Eye argues that section 21.218(b) of the Texas Business Organizations
    Code limits the right to inspect a company’s books and records to only those books
    and records relating to the stated purpose for the inspection. See TEX. BUS. ORGS.
    CODE ANN. § 21.218(b). Because the trial court’s judgment does not limit the books
    and records Third Eye must make available, Third Eye contends the relief awarded
    exceeds the relief to which UST was entitled.
    UST’s stated purpose for its request to examine Third Eye’s books and records
    was to determine Third Eye’s financial soundness and monitor the value of UST’s
    investment. Third Eye fails to identify any books or records that would not relate to
    this broad purpose, and we may presume the trial court concluded that all the books
    and records in Third Eye’s possession were properly within the scope of what UST
    was entitled to examine. See Pulley v. Milberger, 
    198 S.W.3d 418
    , 427 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (we presume trial court made all findings to support
    judgment).
    Third Eye further argues the trial court’s order requiring it to make its books
    and records available for inspection at its offices is not supported by either section
    21.218 or UST’s pleadings. The Agreement states, however, that Third Eye must
    allow UST to “visit and inspect Third Eye’s properties, [and] examine its books of
    –10–
    account and records, during normal business hours of [Third Eye] . . . .” UST
    referenced this provision in its petition. Nothing in section 21.218 prevents a trial
    court from ordering that a books-and-records inspection take place at the subject
    company’s offices. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.218. Accordingly, we
    conclude the trial court’s judgment is not erroneously overbroad or unsupported by
    the pleadings. We resolve Third Eye’s first two issues against it.
    Because of our resolution of the first two issues, it is unnecessary for us to
    address Third Eye’s remaining issue concerning attorney’s fees.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Amanda L. Reichek/
    AMANDA L. REICHEK
    JUSTICE
    220334F.P05
    –11–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    THIRD EYE, INC., Appellant                     On Appeal from the 101st Judicial
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-22-00334-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-02821.
    Opinion delivered by Justice
    UST GLOBAL INC., Appellee                      Reichek. Justices Nowell and Garcia
    participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellee UST GLOBAL INC. recover its costs of this
    appeal from appellant THIRD EYE, INC.
    Judgment entered May 4, 2023
    –12–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-22-00334-CV

Filed Date: 5/4/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/10/2023