In the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Children v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00082-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF K.W. AND K.W., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 324th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 324-707636-21
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant R.W. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her children K.W. and K.W.1 The trial court also terminated the parental
rights of the children’s fathers, but neither father appealed.
The trial court found that the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) had proved four conduct-based grounds for termination.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P). Additionally, the trial
court found that the Department had proved that Mother had an inability to care for
the children. See id. § 161.003(a)(2). Finally, the trial court found that termination was
in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2), .003(a)(5).
The trial court awarded permanent managing conservatorship of the children
to the Department and possessory conservatorship to the intervenors, the foster
parents.
II. BACKGROUND
Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that “the appeal
is frivolous and without merit.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct.
1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1
We use aliases for the children and identify R.W. by her relationship to the
children, that is, as “Mother.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App.
P. 9.8(b)(2).
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2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination
cases). Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record and showing why there are no arguable grounds to advance
on appeal.
We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record
and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so. The Department has responded
that it agrees with Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous.
III. DISCUSSION
When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate
record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-
00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also
consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-
18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
We have carefully reviewed appointed appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the
appellate record. Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this
appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship
between Mother and the children.
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Mother’s counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not
show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,
501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly,
Mother’s counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas Supreme
Court unless otherwise relieved. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; see also Tex. Fam.
Code. Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).
IV. CONCLUSION
We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the
trial court’s termination order.
/s/ Dana Womack
23082CV – K.W. (180) DMW/Dean
Dana Womack
Justice
Delivered: June 30, 2023
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