MacK Watson Jr. v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  • Opinion issued June 29, 2023
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-21-00281-CR
    ———————————
    MACK WATSON JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 263rd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1520070
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    Appellant Mack Watson, Jr. appeals his conviction for murder. TEX. PENAL
    CODE § 19.02(b). In three issues, Watson contends the trial court erred by: (1)
    denying his motion to suppress an in-court identification of him as the shooter; (2)
    1
    Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    denying a motion to suppress Watson’s recorded statement to police; and (3) not
    excusing a yawning juror. We affirm.
    Background
    One evening in August 2016, Tyrone Scyrus was working on his car in his
    driveway on Kenny Street. His neighbor was playing kickball with his family when
    he heard gunshots. The neighbor observed Tyrone running away from another
    black male. Tyrone jumped a ditch, fell to the ground, and was shot in the back of
    the head by the second man. The shooter then ran back across the street, got into a
    silver Impala, and left the neighborhood.
    Tyrone’s girlfriend, Lourdes Peña, was inside their home when the shooting
    occurred. After she heard “three pops” that sounded like fireworks, she looked out
    the front door and observed a black female standing next to a silver Impala. She
    then saw a black male, wearing a white muscle shirt and dark shorts, running
    toward the Impala. Peña observed the black male get into the driver’s seat and
    drive off with the female inside the vehicle.
    Tyrone’s son, Trey, and Tyrone’s friend, Jason, were also at Tyrone’s house
    at the time of the murder. Trey was inside when the shooting occurred. After he
    heard gunshots, Trey looked out the window and saw a man with dreadlocks, a
    white T-shirt, and a dark blue bandana around his mouth running toward his dad.
    2
    He looked out another window and saw a man and woman get into a grey car and
    drive away.
    At the time of the murder, Jason was outside with Tyrone. The shooter also
    shot Jason, but he survived. Jason described the shooter as a tall, muscular, black
    male, wearing a white shirt, dark pants, and a mask.
    Shortly thereafter, Deputy Terry Tolleson stopped Watson nearby as he was
    driving his silver Impala. Unrelated to the shooting, a 911 caller had reported a
    black man and woman breaking into a silver Impala at a nearby motel.2 Before
    stopping Watson, Tolleson confirmed that Watson’s license plate closely matched
    the plate number provided by the 911 caller. While Deputy Tolleson was
    attempting to handcuff Watson, the passenger, Laday, fled the scene. As she ran,
    Laday shot a tow truck driver who attempted to pursue her. Officers apprehended
    Laday shortly thereafter.
    After Watson consented to a search of his vehicle, officers located a black
    ski mask and a bandana inside the Impala, items that witnesses said the shooter
    was wearing at the time of Tyrone’s murder. Officers also determined that
    Watson’s clothing and physical appearance fit the descriptions given by witnesses
    at the Kenny Street scene. Watson agreed to accompany officers to the police
    2
    Watson informed officers during the traffic stop that he was the man the caller
    described. Watson and Cormeshia Laday had been staying at the motel, and he
    locked his keys in the car. He attempted for several minutes to break into his
    vehicle before shooting off the door handle and gaining entry.
    3
    station for an interview. Following the interview, police drove Watson back to the
    motel where he had been staying. Peña was shown a photo array on two separate
    occasions within days of the shooting. After Peña identified Watson in the array,
    officers obtained a warrant for Watson’s arrest.
    Following trial, the jury convicted Watson of murder. After finding one
    enhancement paragraph true, the trial court assessed punishment at forty years’
    confinement. Watson appeals.
    In-Court Identification
    In his first issue, Watson argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress Peña’s in-court identification of him as the shooter because it was based
    on an impermissibly suggestive pretrial photo array procedure, which thus gave
    rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification at trial.
    A.    Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress identification
    under an abuse of discretion standard. See Villareal v. State, 
    935 S.W.2d 134
    , 138
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Under this standard, we give almost total deference to a
    trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially
    when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and
    demeanor of witnesses. Loserth v. State, 
    963 S.W.2d 770
    , 772 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1998). We give the same amount of deference to the trial court’s rulings on
    4
    “application of law to fact questions,” also known as “mixed questions of law and
    fact,” if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and
    demeanor. Guzman v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 85
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (internal
    quotations omitted). We review de novo “mixed questions of law and fact” that do
    not fall within this category. 
    Id.
     When, as in this case, there are no written findings
    of fact in the record, we uphold the trial court’s ruling on any theory of law
    applicable to the case and presume the trial court made implicit findings of fact in
    support of its ruling so long as those findings are supported by the record. State v.
    Ross, 
    32 S.W.3d 853
    , 855–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
    When faced with a challenge to an out-of-court identification, a trial court
    must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification to
    determine if a procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
    irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant was denied due process of
    law. See Webb v. State, 
    760 S.W.2d 263
    , 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). In the first
    step of this analysis, the trial court determines whether the identification procedure
    was impermissibly suggestive. Barley v. State, 
    906 S.W.2d 27
    , 33–34 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1995). If the trial court determines that the identification is impermissibly
    suggestive, the court must then consider the factors enumerated in Neil v. Biggers
    to determine whether the suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood
    of irreparable misidentification. See id; 
    409 U.S. 188
     (1972). Throughout this
    5
    process, the burden is on the movant to show impermissible suggestion and
    substantial likelihood of misidentification by clear and convincing evidence. See
    Barley, 
    906 S.W.2d at
    33–34.
    B.    Analysis
    Watson must first show that the procedure used to obtain Peña’s
    identification was impermissibly suggestive. Suggestiveness may be created by the
    manner the pretrial identification procedure is conducted. 
    Id. at 33
    . For example,
    police may point out the suspect or suggest that a suspect is included in the lineup
    or photo array. 
    Id.
     The content of the lineup or array itself may also show
    suggestiveness if the suspect is the only individual who closely resembles the pre-
    procedure description. 
    Id.
     Furthermore, we must assess whether an individual
    procedure wase suggestive or whether the cumulative effect of the procedures was
    suggestive. 
    Id.
    On appeal, Watson contends the photo array was impermissibly suggestive
    because (1) no one described the shooter as bald, but the array included all bald
    men; and (2) Peña described the shooter as having a “bushy” beard and Watson’s
    photo was the only one depicting an individual with a “bushy” beard.
    As to Watson’s first argument, we disagree with his contention that “none of
    the witnesses described the shooter as bald.” In fact, Tyrone’s neighbor testified
    that he did not see any hair on the shooter’s head and told officers at the scene that
    6
    the man could have been bald. Thus, the inclusion of all bald men in the array does
    not demonstrate that the identification procedure was somehow tainted or
    impermissibly suggestive. While “[a] lineup is considered unduly suggestive if
    other participants are greatly dissimilar in appearance from the suspect,” here, all
    photographs depicted similarly bald, black males with facial hair. See Withers v.
    State, 
    902 S.W.2d 122
    , 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d)
    (emphasis in original). We are likewise unpersuaded by Watson’s second argument
    concerning the amount of facial hair on the men in the photo array. Each photo
    showed a man with some type of facial hair, and because of shadows in the
    photographs, more than one man appears to have a beard. See 
    id.
     (holding that
    “[m]inor discrepancies between lineup participants will not render a lineup unduly
    suggestive”).
    Neither of Watson’s arguments demonstrate that the photo array was
    impermissibly suggestive. See Hasker v. State, 
    725 S.W.2d 443
    , 445 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.) (holding that photo array was not impermissibly
    suggestive where witness described suspect as having a mustache, and several men
    in the array had facial hair resembling a mustache); Davis v. State, 
    649 S.W.2d 380
    , 382 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref’d) (lineup not impermissibly
    suggestive where suspect described as having a little mustache and peach fuzz, but
    lineup photo showed a man with a full beard and afro haircut). As the Court of
    7
    Criminal Appeals has explained in this context, “it is not essential that all the
    individuals be identical and neither due process nor common sense requires such
    exactitude.” Hasker, 
    725 S.W.2d at 445
     (discussing Buxton v. State, 
    699 S.W.2d 212
    , 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)); see also Turner v. State, 
    600 S.W.2d 927
    , 932
    (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (lineup consisting of five persons, two of
    whom had beards and were not physically close to appellant in size and hair color,
    was not impermissibly suggestive).
    Having determined that the pretrial photo array was not impermissibly
    suggestive, we need not address the second prong of the analysis, i.e., whether
    under the circumstances it created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. See
    Barley, 
    906 S.W.2d at 34
    .
    We also conclude that even if the pretrial identification procedures were
    unduly suggestive, any error in the admission of Peña’s in-court identification of
    Watson was harmless because, as the State correctly points out, Laday also
    positively identified Watson in court as the shooter, and Watson does not challenge
    her identification of him on appeal. See Williams v. State, 
    402 S.W.3d 425
    , 432
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding it was harmless error
    to permit in-court identification, despite pretrial identification procedures, because
    other witness positively identified appellant as shooter in court); Williams v. State,
    
    477 S.W.2d 885
    , 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (concluding it was harmless error to
    8
    allow in-court identification, despite potentially invalid pretrial lineup, where two
    other witnesses identified appellant as the perpetrator, and appellant did not
    challenge either of those identifications). We overrule Watson’s first point of error.
    Watson’s Statement to Police
    In his second issue, Watson argues that the trial court should have
    suppressed the statements he gave to police following the murder because he was
    effectively in custody at the time the statement was made, but officers did not read
    him the Miranda3 warnings. On appeal, Watson does not challenge the admission
    of any specific statements; however, at trial, he argued that the entirety of his
    statement to Detective Michael Ritchie should be suppressed.
    A.    Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress statements under a
    bifurcated standard. In re J.J., 
    651 S.W.3d 385
    , 389 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (en banc). A trial court’s ultimate “custody” determination
    “presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’” Herrera v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 520
    ,
    526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 
    516 U.S. 99
    , 112–13
    (1995)). Therefore, we afford almost total deference to a trial court’s “custody”
    determination when the questions of historical fact turn on credibility and
    demeanor. Herrera, 
    241 S.W.3d at 527
    . Conversely, when the questions of
    3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    9
    historical fact do not turn on credibility and demeanor, we will review a trial
    judge’s “custody” determination de novo. 
    Id.
     Again, because the trial court denied
    the motion to suppress without entering any findings of fact, we view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the ruling and assume the trial court made implicit
    findings of fact that support its ruling if those findings are supported by the record.
    Wexler v. State, 
    625 S.W.3d 162
    , 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The party that
    prevailed in the trial court is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence,
    and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. 
    Id.
    B.    Miranda and Article 38.22
    Miranda and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure deem
    statements produced by custodial interrogation to be inadmissible unless the
    accused is first warned that he has the right to remain silent, his statement may be
    used against him, and he has the right to hire a lawyer or have a lawyer appointed.
    Miranda, 
    384 U.S. at 479
    ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22. In addition, article
    38.22 requires a warning that the accused has the right to terminate the interview at
    any time. Herrera, 
    241 S.W.3d at 526
    . The warnings are required only when there
    is custodial interrogation. 
    Id.
    A custody determination requires two inquiries: (1) the circumstances
    surrounding the interrogation, and (2) whether a reasonable person in those
    circumstances would have felt that she was not free to leave. 
    Thompson, 516
     U.S.
    10
    at 112. “Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed,
    the court must apply an objective test” to determine whether there was restraint on
    freedom of movement of a degree associated with arrest. 
    Id.
     The ultimate inquiry is
    whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that
    her freedom of movement was restricted to the degree associated with a formal
    arrest. See Stansbury v. California, 
    511 U.S. 318
    , 322 (1994); Dowthitt v. State,
    
    931 S.W.2d 244
    , 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The “reasonable person” standard
    presupposes an innocent person. Dowthitt, 
    931 S.W.2d at
    254 (citing Florida v.
    Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
    , 438 (1991)).
    Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop does
    not generally constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes, “subsequent events may
    cause a noncustodial encounter to escalate into custodial interrogation.” State v.
    Stevenson, 
    958 S.W.2d 824
    , 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Berkemer v.
    McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 440 (1984), and Dowthitt, 
    931 S.W.2d at
    254–55).
    Dowthitt outlined four general situations that may constitute custody: (1) the
    suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) a
    law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) law enforcement
    officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his
    freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, or (4) there is probable
    11
    cause to arrest, and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free
    to leave. 
    931 S.W.2d at 255
    .
    For the first three situations, the restriction upon freedom of movement must
    amount to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative
    detention. 
    Id.
     For the fourth situation, the officer’s knowledge of probable cause
    must be manifested to the suspect, and custody is established only if the
    manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a
    reasonable person to believe she is under restraint to a degree associated with an
    arrest. Id.; Stansbury, 
    511 U.S. at 325
    . An officer’s subjective intent to arrest the
    suspect is irrelevant unless that intent is communicated or otherwise manifested to
    the suspect. Dowthitt, 
    931 S.W.2d at
    254 (citing Stansbury, 
    511 U.S. at
    324–25
    (police knowledge or beliefs bear on the custody issue only if they are conveyed to
    the suspect)).
    To evaluate whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would
    have felt that there was a restraint on his freedom to a degree associated with
    arrest, the record must establish the circumstances manifested to and experienced
    by him. State v. Ortiz, 
    382 S.W.3d 367
    , 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“only the
    objective circumstances known to the detainee should be considered in deciding
    what a reasonable person in his position would believe.”). See also 
    Thompson, 516
    U.S. at 113 (“if encountered by a ‘reasonable person,’ would the identified
    12
    circumstances add up to custody”); Berkemer, 
    468 U.S. at 442
     (“[T]he only
    relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
    understood his situation.”).
    C.    Analysis
    Admittedly, Detective Ritchie did not give Watson any Miranda warnings
    before recording his statement. Therefore, we only need to decide if Watson was in
    custody at the time that he gave his statement to determine the admissibility of the
    statement. See Herrera, 
    241 S.W.3d at 526
    . If Watson was in custody, the
    warnings were required, and denying the motion to suppress was erroneous. See 
    id.
    Because the determination of custody requires the application of law to the facts,
    we review the trial court’s determination de novo. Guzman, 
    955 S.W.2d at 89
    .
    Watson argues that the third Dowthitt scenario applies here—that officers
    created a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom
    of movement had been significantly restricted. It is undisputed that Watson was at
    least detained during the time that he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car
    during the traffic stop. Officers acknowledged as much to Watson at various stages
    of the roadside investigation. “Both detention and arrest involve a restraint on
    one’s freedom of movement; the difference is in the degree.” Ortiz v. State, 
    421 S.W.3d 887
    , 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). When called
    upon to make that determination, courts examine several factors, including
    13
    the amount of force displayed, the duration of a
    detention, the efficiency of the investigative process and
    whether it is conducted at the original location or the
    person is transported to another location, the officer’s
    expressed intent–that is, whether he told the detained
    person that he was under arrest or was being detained
    only for a temporary investigation, and any other relevant
    factors.
    State v. Sheppard, 
    271 S.W.3d 281
    , 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    The State urges us to consider the chaotic nature of the events on the night in
    question when evaluating the amount of force displayed at the traffic stop. Deputy
    Tolleson stopped Watson’s vehicle based on the reported theft of a silver Impala.
    Knowing that the individual seen breaking into the Impala had a gun, he conducted
    a felony stop4. While attempting to secure Watson and Laday, Laday fled the
    scene. Shortly thereafter, shots were fired, and the tow truck driver ran to Tolleson
    with a gunshot wound, reporting Laday had shot him. Tolleson was without
    backup at the time. Considering this, it was not unreasonable for Deputy Tolleson
    to keep Watson in the patrol car in handcuffs, for both his and Watson’s safety.
    This display of force did not transform the investigative detention into an arrest.
    See 
    id. at 290
     (concluding officer’s handcuffing of defendant was temporary
    detention, not an arrest, because it was done, in part, to enable officer to make
    4
    At trial, Tolleson explained that a felony stop is a high-risk traffic stop used in
    situations where the officer has information that the person may be armed or a
    threat to officers or civilians. Instead of approaching the vehicle, Tolleson used his
    loudspeaker to give instructions to Watson, and only got out of the police car once
    Watson was kneeling on the ground with his hands in the air.
    14
    protective sweep of scene); Rhodes v. State, 
    945 S.W. 2d 115
    , 117–18 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1997) (holding that removing suspect from car, handcuffing him, and
    walking him back to patrol car was reasonable to protect officer safety and did not
    constitute an arrest); Hauer v. State, 
    466 S.W.3d 886
    , 891–92 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (determining that appellant was not in custody
    for purposes of Miranda, even though officer handcuffed him and placed him in
    patrol car during DWI investigation; court noted officer was alone at scene and
    waiting for backup to assist with investigation); Mount v. State, 
    217 S.W.3d 716
    ,
    726–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding no arrest where
    officers drew weapons for safety reasons during felony stop of possibly stolen
    vehicle).
    Watson points to the length of the traffic stop, roughly four and a half hours,
    as a basis for determining he was in custody. Watson was handcuffed for
    approximately four hours during the stop. While we acknowledge that this is not an
    insignificant length of time, we note that Watson has never argued, either here or
    below, that any statements made during this period should have been suppressed.
    Rather, he only argues that his statements to Detective Ritchie, made after
    handcuffs were removed and his freedom of movement was far less restricted,
    should have been suppressed. Watson went to the police station for the interview
    voluntarily. Before he agreed to go, Watson asked Officer Cook whether he could
    15
    say no, and Cook acknowledged that he could. Cook also confirmed that Watson
    was not being charged at that time. While en route to the station with Deputy
    Tolleson, Tolleson reiterated that Watson was detained but not under arrest. At the
    station, Detective Ritchie told Watson on more than one occasion that he was “not
    in custody” and “[t]here voluntarily.” He was allowed to purchase a drink and a
    snack and was not handcuffed during the interview.
    Given these facts, the case of Maxwell v. State, No. 01-00-00708-CR, 
    2002 WL 356530
     (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not
    designated for publication) is most instructive. There, appellant called 911 to report
    the shooting of his parents at their home. 
    2002 WL 356530
     at *2. After
    determining appellant was the only witness, officers bagged his hands to preserve
    them for subsequent testing, secured the bags with handcuffs, and put him in the
    police car for approximately two hours until testing could be conducted. 
    Id.
     at *2–
    3. Appellant was not questioned during this period. Id. at *2. After testing
    appellant’s hands and removing his handcuffs, officers continued investigating at
    the scene. Id. at *3. No one ever told appellant that he was a suspect or under
    arrest. Id. at *4. A few hours after he was taken out of the handcuffs, appellant
    gave a recorded statement to police. Id. at *3–4. He subsequently agreed to go to
    the station with police to provide fingerprints and have photos taken. Id. at *3.
    While there, he consented to providing a second, written statement. Id. Appellant
    16
    was given food and drink. Id. Officers did not provide Miranda warnings because
    they considered appellant to be a witness, not a suspect. Id. The officers did not
    threaten appellant, promise him leniency, or tell him that he was under arrest. Id. at
    *4. At trial, appellant moved to suppress both statements, and the trial court denied
    his motion. Id. at *1.
    On appeal, this court affirmed, concluding that appellant was not in custody
    at the time either statement was made. Id. at *4–5. Regarding the oral statement,
    the court noted that
    a reasonable person could have believed he was under
    restraint tantamount to arrest when he was placed in the
    back of a locked police car for two hours and was
    handcuffed behind his back for three-quarters of that
    time, regardless of the officers’ subjective intent or
    standard procedure. However, the officers did not then
    interrogate appellant. Rather, the evidence supporting the
    judge’s ruling shows that, at the end of this two hours,
    [the detective] told appellant he was a witness; the
    handcuffs were removed for good; the car door was left
    open for most of the time; and appellant sometimes
    walked around with the officers. No one ever told
    appellant he was a suspect or was under arrest. It was at
    this point that appellant gave his oral statement. A
    reasonable person would not have believed he was then
    restrained to the extent of being arrested.
    Id. at *4. Similarly, here, Watson’s cuffs “were removed for good” after
    approximately four hours. At that point, he consented to a ride to the station for
    further questioning. Before going, Watson confirmed that he understood doing so
    was optional. Likewise, officers did not threaten or coerce Watson to go to the
    17
    station or give a statement. See Anderson v. State, 
    932 S.W.2d 502
    , 505 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1996) (one who voluntarily accompanies officer to police station upon
    request, whether doing so for the investigation or to exonerate himself, is not in
    custody if circumstances show there were no express or implied threats of being
    taken forcibly); Ogg v. State, No. 14-18-01028-CR, 
    2020 WL 1855286
    , at *4–5
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (“Generally, when a person voluntarily accompanies
    law enforcement to a certain location, even though he knows or should know that
    law enforcement suspects that he may have committed or may be implicated in
    committing a crime, that person is not restrained or ‘in custody.’”).
    Officers never told Watson he was a suspect or was under arrest. In fact,
    Ritchie reminded Watson that he was “[t]here voluntarily,” “not in custody,” and
    “free to go.” Further, at the station, Watson bought a snack and a drink, and
    appeared eager to assist with the investigation. Watson repeatedly offered to help
    Detective Ritchie, not only with information regarding Laday, but also as a
    confidential informant in future cases. See Maxwell, 
    2002 WL 356530
    , at *5
    (affirming denial of motion to suppress written statement at station where appellant
    was told he was a witness before going to station, was never told he was a suspect
    or under arrest, appellant consented to going to the station, no one threatened or
    enticed appellant to do so, and appellant was eager to help).
    18
    At the end of the interview, an officer drove Watson back to the motel where
    he had been staying. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine
    that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Watson was not in custody
    when he made the challenged statements. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 
    429 U.S. 492
    , 495 (1977) (holding person not in custody when he came voluntarily to police
    station, was immediately informed he was not under arrest, participated in
    interview, and left police station without hindrance); Meek v. State, 
    790 S.W.2d 618
    , 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding person was not in custody when he
    came to station voluntarily at time of his own choosing, was allowed to step
    outside building and go unaccompanied to his car during interviews, and “a few
    hours” later was allowed to leave unhindered after statements were completed);
    Nelson v. State, 
    405 S.W.3d 113
    , 129–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
    pet. ref’d) (concluding defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation
    where she met officer at police station, acknowledged in recorded statement that
    she was there voluntarily and was making statement voluntarily, and officer told
    defendant he was going to let her go home at end of interview); Ervin v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 187
    , 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (finding no
    custody when suspect voluntarily went to station, was told she could leave, was not
    handcuffed, was at station for four hours, and went home after making
    19
    incriminating statements). We affirm the trial court’s denial of Watson’s motion to
    suppress.
    D.    Harmless Error
    Even if we were to find that Watson was in custody at the time he gave a
    recorded statement to Ritchie, and thus, the motion to suppress was erroneously
    denied, we determine that any error in doing so was harmless. In a criminal case,
    the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress a statement taken in violation of
    Miranda is constitutional error subject to review under the standard set forth in
    Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Under
    Rule 44.2(a), “[i]f the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional
    error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a
    judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.”
    
    Id.
    The emphasis of the harm analysis under Rule 44.2(a) should not be on the
    propriety of the outcome of the trial. Scott v. State, 
    227 S.W.3d 670
    , 690 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007). Specifically, “the question for the reviewing court is not
    whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence. Instead, the question is the
    likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a contributing factor in the
    jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict.” 
    Id.
     In reaching that decision, we
    20
    may consider (1) whether the recorded statement was cumulative of other
    evidence, (2) the importance of the recorded statement to the State’s case, (3) the
    probable weight a juror would place upon the recorded statement, (4) the presence
    or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the recorded statement on
    material points, and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. See id.;
    Jones v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 766
    , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
    Analyzing the substance of Watson’s statement to Ritchie, Watson never
    admitted any involvement in the murder or otherwise incriminated himself.
    Throughout the hour-long interview, Watson maintained that he did not make any
    stops after leaving the motel before he was pulled over. Even when Detective
    Ritchie told Watson that Laday had confessed to being at the scene, and witnesses
    observed someone who could fit Watson’s description, Watson did not waiver.
    The jury found Watson guilty of murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b).
    Accordingly, to reach its verdict, the jury must have disbelieved Watson’s
    statements to Detective Ritchie and given more weight to the other evidence
    implicating Watson. See Foyt v. State, 
    602 S.W.3d 23
    , 45 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (concluding that, “although appellant’s falsehoods
    tend to incriminate him,” error in admitting statements was not harmful in light of
    other evidence); Olivarez v. State, No. 14-21-00491-CR, 
    2023 WL 139224
    , at *5–
    6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
    21
    designated for publication) (citing Foyt and determining admission of statement
    was harmless error where jury obviously disbelieved appellant’s statement that
    shooting was accidental and convicted him of murder). Finding nothing
    incriminating about Watson’s statement to Officer Ritchie, we hold that any error
    in its admission was harmless. We overrule Watson’s second issue.
    Juror Qualifications
    In his third issue, Watson argues that the trial court should have removed a
    juror who was seen yawning at various points during trial. At trial, Watson’s
    attorney alerted the judge to the yawning juror and another who had been seen
    sleeping at least once. Counsel asked the judge to excuse both jurors, but because
    doing so would result in a jury of less than twelve, he moved for a mistrial.
    Following the motion, the court heard testimony from the bailiff concerning both
    jurors. The trial court ultimately excused the sleeping juror after the bailiff testified
    that she had awoken that juror on more than one occasion. However, there was no
    evidence or testimony that the yawning juror ever fell asleep or missed any portion
    of the trial. The judge did not excuse that juror and overruled Watson’s motion.
    We have not located, and Watson has not pointed us to, any case law
    suggesting that yawning alone is enough to disqualify a juror. Further, in the
    context of a sleeping juror, we have stated that “a court is not invariably required
    to remove sleeping jurors, and a court has considerable discretion in deciding how
    22
    to handle a sleeping juror.” Menard v. State, 
    193 S.W.3d 55
    , 60 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (quoting United States v. Freitag, 
    230 F.3d 1019
    , 1023 (7th Cir. 2000)). The relevant inquiry is “whether the sleeping juror
    missed large portions of the trial or whether the portions missed were particularly
    critical.” Menard, 
    193 S.W.3d at 60
     (internal quotations omitted).
    Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of Watson’s motion was
    not an abuse of discretion. See id.; see also Ryser v. State, 
    453 S.W.3d 17
    , 38–39
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (no abuse of discretion in
    denying mistrial where evidence conflicted as to whether juror was sleeping); Lee
    v. State, No. 01-03-00655-CR, 
    2004 WL 2903508
    , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] Dec. 16, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to remove juror who
    repeatedly nodded off for five-second intervals because juror did not miss large
    portions of trial). We overrule Watson’s third point of error.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled all three of Watson’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Amparo Guerra
    Justice
    Panel Consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.
    23