Thomas Ray Mahon v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00097-CR
THOMAS RAY MAHON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 5th District Court
Cass County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2021F00075
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Cass County jury convicted Thomas Ray Mahon of aggravated sexual assault with a
deadly weapon, a first degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021. In accordance with
the jury’s assessment, the trial court sentenced Mahon to sixty-five years’ imprisonment and
ordered him to pay a $3,000.00 fine. On appeal,1 Mahon argues that he was egregiously harmed
by the portions of the trial court’s jury charge related to the deadly weapon issue. Because we
find that Mahon was not egregiously harmed by any alleged jury charge error, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. The Evidence at Trial2
The victim in this case, Haley Clark, testified that she had been dating Mahon for some
time. She described their relationship as good until a “warm” day in 2019 when “[Mahon]
grabbed [her], pushed [her] up against the wall, and choked [her] . . . until [she] couldn’t
breathe.” Clark testified that she did not call the police to report that incident because Mahon
had threatened her and her three children. Clark testified that Mahon’s physical abuse of her
continued. According to Clark, Mahon choked her, punched her, broke things around the house,
threatened to kill her while holding broken glass to her throat, and threatened to kill her children.
Clark, who had never reported Mahon’s acts to the police, eventually decided to leave Mahon.
1
In companion causes 06-22-00096-CR, 06-22-00098-CR, and 06-22-00099-CR, Mahon appeals convictions for
family violence assault by occlusion causing bodily injury and two counts of aggravated assault.
2
Mahon filed a single brief raising the same issue in this cause, as well as in companion causes 06-22-00098-CR and
06-22-00099-CR. For judicial efficiency, we discuss the facts related to Mahon’s companion causes in this opinion.
2
After the breakup, Clark began to consider a romantic relationship with Justin
Grandmaison, who was also Mahon’s friend. The incidents that gave rise to the indictment in
this case and our companion causes occurred in October 2020, after Clark returned from a
camping trip with Grandmaison and her children.
Clark testified that Mahon showed up at her house unannounced and, after her children
were asleep, accused her and Grandmaison of “having a long, sexual relationship, which was
untrue.” When Clark denied the allegation, Mahon slapped her, prompting Grandmaison to urge
Mahon to calm down. Mahon made Clark and Grandmaison sit on the living room couch so he
could interrogate them while carrying a bone-handle hunting knife with a six-inch, fixed blade.
Despite Clark’s and Grandmaison’s denials, Mahon refused to believe that they had not slept
together. The conversation soon turned violent.
Grandmaison testified that Mahon held his knife to Clark’s throat while ranting and
raving. When Grandmaison told him to put down the knife, Mahon assaulted him. Clark
testified that Mahon kneed Grandmaison in the face several times, held the knife to
Grandmaison’s throat, and sliced his face with the knife.3 Grandmaison testified that Mahon
threatened to kill him during the assault and that he feared for his life. Clark said that
Grandmaison had blood everywhere, and Grandmaison testified that he fractured his nose and
almost blacked out when Mahon was kicking him.
3
Grandmaison said, “[Mahon] was punching, kneeing, kicking me in the head, headbutting me. He put the knife to
my head at one point. I have a minor scar here where he said he was going to scalp me. He said he was gonna take
my eyeball out. That’s when he cut my face.” In cause number 06-22-00098-CR, the State alleged Mahon
“intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to Justin Grandmaison by cutting him on or about
his face and head with a knife, and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a knife,
during commission of the assault.”
3
Clark said that, when Grandmaison stepped outside, Mahon squeezed and pushed her
throat “as hard as -- towards [her] trachea” until she could not breathe and started kissing her on
the side of the face while choking her.4 According to Clark, Mahon said that he would kill
Grandmaison if she did not tell him to go away, so Clark screamed for Grandmaison to leave.
Grandmaison left to get help.
Meanwhile, Clark said that Mahon held his knife to her throat and penetrated her vagina
with his fingers for “thirty, forty-five minutes” without her consent. She told Mahon, “If you’re
going to rape me, just rape me. I need a break from you choking me.” According to Clark,
Mahon penetrated her sexual organ with his penis while he held the knife. Clark said she did not
want to have sex with Mahon but did not try to stop him because she thought he would kill her.
Clark said that, after the sex, Mahon “started beating [her] head into the cabinet doors” while
holding the knife.5
By that time, Grandmaison had escaped to his friend’s house. His friend, John Sanders,
testified that Grandmaison came to him “covered head to toe in blood” and explained what
happened, which caused Sanders to call 9-1-1. On the call, which was played for the jury
without objection, Sanders told the dispatcher that Mahon had assaulted Grandmaison and was
still attacking Clark with a knife. Sanders noted Grandmaison’s many injuries and took him to
Atlanta Memorial Hospital for medical treatment. Photographs of an injured and bloodied
4
This act was the basis of the indictment in cause number 06-22-00096-CR.
5
In cause number 06-22-00099-CR, the State alleged that Mahon “intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause[d]
bodily injury to Haley Clark by hitting Haley Clark on or about her head and face with his hands, and the defendant
did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a knife, during commission of the assault.”
4
Grandmaison showed that his clothing was covered in blood and that he needed stitches and
other medical treatment.6
Because of Sanders’s call, police officers were dispatched to Clark’s home. Deputy Chad
Wilder arrived at Clark’s house and testified that she appeared scared, complained of a headache,
and had a visible knot on her head. Wilder found Mahon lying on the kitchen floor with the
knife near him and arrested him. The knife, which still had blood on the blade, was admitted
into evidence for the jury to inspect. Wilder also saw that there was blood throughout the scene
and took photos of the bloodied carpet, couch, towels, walls, and pillow, in addition to Clark’s
tossed belongings.
Deputy Chris Spear testified that Mahon had no injuries but that his vest was covered in
blood. Spear said that Mahon admitted the knife was his. According to Spear, Mahon said,
“[A]t least I got laid before I got arrested,” as he was being placed in the patrol car. Spear
became concerned that Mahon had forced Clark to engage in nonconsensual acts and interviewed
Clark, who said she let Mahon “do whatever he wanted to stop him from choking and beating
[her].” Clark also told officers that Mahon choked her, penetrated her vagina with his fingers,
and held a knife to Grandmaison. During a custodial interview played for the jury, Mahon
admitted that the knife was his and that he fought with Grandmaison, who had many injuries.
After hearing this evidence, the jury found Mahon guilty of the family violence assault by
occlusion, aggravated sexual assault, and two counts of aggravated assault.
6
Sergeant Ernest Wade Cutchall, who questioned Sanders and Grandmaison, also described Grandmaison’s multiple
injuries.
5
II. Mahon Was Not Egregiously Harmed by Any Alleged Jury-Charge Error
The trial court provided the following definition for the term “deadly weapon” in its jury
charge:
“Deadly weapon” means-
1. a firearm; or
2. anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of
inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
3. anything actually used by the defendant in a manner making it capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury; or
4. anything that the defendant intended to use in a manner that if so used
would make it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Mahon does not complain about this definition, which is supported by Section 1.07(a)(17) of the
Texas Penal Code. Instead, Mahon complains of the trial court’s omission of the definition of
serious bodily injury.
Also, Mahon argues that “the Court’s application section[s] . . . for the offenses of
aggravated assault do[] not properly instruct the jury that it must find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, . . . that [Mahon] used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the commission of an assault.” In
addition to other elements, those application paragraphs stated that the jury was required to find
the following third element, beyond a reasonable doubt: “the defendant, during the alleged
assault, used or exhibited a knife, a deadly weapon.” Mahon argues that “[t]he inclusion of the
descriptor ‘a deadly weapon’ after ‘a knife’ [is] an explicit statement that a knife is a deadly
weapon per se.”
6
A. Standard of Review
“We employ a two-step process in our review of alleged jury-charge error.” Murrieta v.
State, 578 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing Abdnor v. State, 871
S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). “Initially, we determine whether error occurred and
then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.” Id. (quoting
Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)).
“The level of harm necessary to require reversal due to jury charge error is dependent
upon whether the appellant properly objected to the error.” Id. at 555 (citing Abdnor, 871
S.W.2d at 732). “Here, because [Mahon] did not object to the charge, we will not reverse unless
the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm.” Id. (citing Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738,
743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984) (op. on reh’g)).
“Jury-charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives
the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.” Id. (quoting Stuhler v.
State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “In making this determination, we review
‘the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant
information in the record as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Villarreal v. State, 205 S.W.3d 103, 106
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. dism’d) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171)). “Direct
evidence of harm is not required to establish egregious harm.” Id. (citing Hutch v. State, 922
S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). However, “[a]n egregious harm determination must
be based on a finding of actual rather than theoretical harm.” Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d
7
834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011)).
B. Analysis
Here, we assume, without deciding, that there was error in the jury charge. See Blanson
v. State, 107 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Even so, we find that
Mahon was not egregiously harmed by the alleged errors.
In making our determination, we review the jury charge, state of the evidence, argument
of counsel, and other relevant information. See Murrieta, 578 S.W.3d at 554. In reviewing the
entire jury charge, we note that the charge contained a definition of “bodily injury” and that the
trial court’s proper definition of the term “deadly weapon” required the jury to find that the
weapon was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The jury was also instructed on
the lesser-included offenses of sexual assault and assault, which would not have required a
deadly weapon finding, but rejected them.
Next, during argument, the State acknowledged that it had the burden to prove that the
knife was a deadly weapon. It argued that Mahon was not using the knife “to peel potatoes.”
The State continued, “He held it up to throats. He was cutting [Grandmaison].” However, the
State argued that the knife was “inherently a deadly weapon,” which Mahon argued “cut[] at
least slightly in favor of a finding of egregious harm.” Even so, we find that the state of the
evidence is the most important factor in deciding whether Mahon suffered egregious harm in this
case.
8
Mahon does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the knife was a
deadly weapon. Instead, his appellate brief admits that “analysis of the weight of the probative
evidence would cut against a showing of egregious harm.” We agree. Our review of the record
shows that Mahon never suggested that his knife would not have been capable of inflicting
serious bodily injury. Instead, the evidence showed that Mahon held the knife to Clark’s and
Grandmaison’s throats while threatening to kill them and sliced Grandmaison’s face, which
required him to have stitches. As a result, it did not appear that the question of whether the knife
was a deadly weapon was contested at trial. Consequently, the alleged charge error did not affect
the very basis of the case or vitally affect Mahon’s defensive theory.
Moreover, Mahon’s hunting knife, which had a six-inch, fixed blade, was admitted into
evidence for the jury to inspect. “[E]ven casual observation of the five-to-six-inch blade on [a]
knife reveals that if wielded during an assault, the knife is capable of causing serious bodily
injury or death.” Alvarado v. State, 317 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, pet.
ref’d). “Because ‘objects used to threaten deadly force are in fact deadly weapons[,]’ a knife is a
deadly weapon if its possession facilitates the commission of the underlying assaultive offense.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000)).
In a case similar to the one here, the Beaumont Court of Appeals found that a defendant
was not egregiously harmed by an instruction that a knife was a deadly weapon. In its reasoning,
the Beaumont court noted that the knife was “between five and six inches in length,” id. at 550,
and wrote,
9
Given the physical properties of the knife at issue in this case, the knife clearly
would be capable of causing serious bodily injury if it were used as an instrument
of force against another person. The jury did find that [the defendant] committed
an assault with the knife. By virtue of the assaultive manner of the use of the
weapon, that finding necessarily included a finding that the knife was capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. Therefore, the erroneous jury charge did
not deprive [the defendant] of the valuable right to have a jury finding on each
element of the offense.
Id. at 754. We find the same reasoning applicable in this case.
We conclude that, on the facts here, Mahon has not shown actual egregious, rather than
theoretical, harm. As a result, we overrule Mahon’s arguments related to jury-charge error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: July 5, 2023
Date Decided: July 6, 2023
Do Not Publish
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