Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P. v. Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District, Ty Edwards, in His Capacity as General Manager of the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
COCKRELL INVESTMENT §
PARTNERS, L.P.,
§ No. 08-21-00200-CV
Appellant,
§ Appeal from the
v.
§ 83rd District Court
MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER § of Pecos County, Texas
CONSERVATION DISTRICT, TY
EDWARDS, in his Official Capacity as § (TC# P-8277-83-CV)
General Manager of the MIDDLE PECOS
GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION §
DISTRICT, and FORT STOCKTON
HOLDINGS, L.P., §
Appellees. §
SUBSTITUTED OPINION
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied. The opinion and judgment issued on
March 8, 2023 is withdrawn, and the following is the substituted opinion of this Court.
Appellant, Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P. (Cockrell), appeals the trial court’s judgment
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, which include the Middle Pecos Groundwater
Conservation District and its general manager, Ty Edwards, in his official capacity (collectively,
the District), as well as Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH) (collectively, Appellees), and further
appeals the court’s order denying its cross motion for summary judgment. Cockrell sought judicial
review of: (1) the District’s decision to deny it party status as to FSH’s application to renew its
2017 permit to produce and export 28,400-acre feet of groundwater, and (2) the District’s ultimate
decision to renew FSH’s permit for a three-year term. After initially denying the District and FSH’s
plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court granted their motions for summary judgment. On appeal,
Cockrell asserts the trial court erred in its interpretation of the applicable statutes and in finding it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims asserted. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The parties
Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., is a limited partnership that owns property located in
Pecos County, Texas, and it holds certain permits issued by the District. The District is a
governmental entity and political subdivision governing the groundwater underlying Pecos
County, Texas. Ty Edwards served as general manager of the District during the relevant time
alleged by Cockrell’s suit. FSH is a limited partnership that owns a groundwater estate covering
approximately 18,000 acres of land, west of Fort Stockton, in Pecos County, Texas. FSH also
submitted permit applications and received permits issued by the District.
In 2017, the District entered into a settlement agreement with FSH and a predecessor entity,
resulting in the approval of two permit applications in favor of FSH: (1) a permit amending the
amount of production in its historical and existing use permit (H&E permit), and (2) an export
permit giving it the right to produce and export 28,400-acre feet of groundwater for a three-year
term. Cockrell then filed suit against the District, the District’s board president, FSH, and another
company, contesting the District’s decision to deny it party status to FSH’s two permit applications
and asserting the underlying settlement agreement was void. This suit led to a prior appeal that
was very recently resolved by this Court. See Cockrell Inv. Partners, L.P., v. Middle Pecos
Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 08-21-00017-CV, 2023 WL 2050024, at *1 (Tex. App.—
2
El Paso Feb. 16, 2023, no pet. h.) (Cockrell I).1 After the trial court granted the District’s plea to
the jurisdiction, Cockrell appealed that ruling. We affirmed the trial court’s decision after
concluding that Cockrell failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review.
B. The renewal application
But further events developed regarding the parties and the permits issued to FSH in 2017.
The export permit giving FSH the right to produce and export 28,400-acre feet of groundwater for
a three-year term—was set to expire on July 18, 2020, if not renewed. On April 2, 2020, FSH sent
a letter to the District regarding its application to renew the 2017 Regular Production Permit. The
letter indicated it desired a renewal of its permit for an additional three-year period using the same
terms and conditions including the export provisions and the Special Permit Conditions contained
in the existing permit. FSH requested the District consider the letter as a renewal application
pursuant to § 36.1145 of the Texas Water Code. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1145 (Operating
Permit Renewal).
On May 18, 2020, Cockrell filed with the District a written request for party status in any
hearing on FSH’s application for permit renewal. Cockrell asserted FSH was conflating the
statutory requirements of §§ 36.1145 and 36.122 of the Texas Water Code. It asserted the export
component of the permit was “exclusively governed by Section 36.122 of the Texas Water
Code[.]” See id. § 36.122 (Transfer of Groundwater Out of District). Additionally, Cockrell
asserted it had a justiciable interest in FSH’s request for a permit renewal.
On May 22, 2020, the District’s general manger, Ty Edwards, informed FSH by letter that
he had granted its renewal request pursuant to §§ 36.1145 and 36.122 of the Texas Water Code
1
A more comprehensive background is included in Cockrell I. See Cockrell I, 2023 WL 2050024, at *1–4.
3
and Rule 11.8(f) of the District’s rules.2 Edwards indicated the permit would be renewed for
another three-year term “as long as FSH satisfactorily addresses Special Permit Conditions,” as
further detailed in the letter. Edwards also specifically advised as follows:
Please note that Rule 11.8(f) requires that I inform the District’s Board of this
decision, which the Board may overrule. Rule 11.8(f) also provides you with the
right to appeal my decision to the Board. I intend to add items to the next District
Board agenda as contemplated by Rule 11.8(f) and to provide the Board an
opportunity to consider and act on Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P.’s Request for
Party Status regarding the Renewal Application. Our next meeting is currently
scheduled to be in person on Tuesday, June 16, 2020, at the Pecos County
Courthouse, and I encourage you to attend. Between now and then, I look forward
to working with you to satisfy the requirements of Special Permit Conditions 7, 9,
13, and 14.
On June 16, 2020, the District held a regular board meeting and permit hearing. Meeting
minutes record that some argument occurred about whether FSH needed to comply with the
requirements of § 36.122 of the Water Code, as well as whether a hearing needed to take place on
FSH’s permit renewal request. The minutes further reflect that Cockrell had requested party status.
At the conclusion of the meeting, the minutes indicate the Board took no further action on the
issue.
2
Rule 11.8(f) states:
Any permit holder seeking renewal may appeal the General Manager’s ruling by filing, within ten
(10) calendar days of notice of the General Manager’s ruling, a written request for a hearing before
the Board. The Board will hear the applicant’s appeal at the next available regular Board meeting.
The General Manager shall inform the Board of any renewal applications granted or denied. On the
motion of any Board member, and a majority concurrence in the motion, the Board may overrule
the action of the General Manager. The General Manager may authorize an applicant for a permit
renewal to continue operating under the conditions of the prior permit, subject to any changes
necessary under proportional adjustment regulations or these rules, for any period in which the
renewal application is the subject of a hearing.
Rule 11.8(f), Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation Rules (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.middlepecosgcd.org/pdf/
rules/2020/MPGCD%20Rules%20-%20adopted%20August%202020.pdf?_t=1600099392.
4
C. Cockrell files suit
On September 11, 2020, while Cockrell I remained pending on appeal, Cockrell filed its
original petition and application for temporary injunction. The suit named several defendants to
include the District, Ty Edwards, in his capacity as the District’s general manager, FSH, the City
of Abilene, the City of San Angelo, and the City of Midland. Under the Texas Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act (UDJA), Cockrell sought a declaration as to whether § 36.122 of the Water Code
allowed a three-year export permit to be renewed or extended without the construction of a water
conveyance system. Cockrell asserted § 36.122 of the Water Code required a permitholder to begin
construction of a conveyance system such as to turn a three-year permit into a 30-year permit
renewable under § 36.1145 of the code. Cockrell sought a judicial declaration interpreting the
meaning of § 36.122 and a declaration that the District and Edwards both acted outside their scope
of authority when they renewed FSH’s permit. Additionally, Cockrell sought judicial review of
the District’s failure to conduct a hearing on FSH’s application to renew its permit and its decision
to deny it party status.
All defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction. The city defendants, Abilene, San Angelo,
and Midland, each asserted they were home rule municipalities vested with governmental
immunity and Cockrell had failed to assert a valid waiver of immunity. The District also asserted
that Cockrell had failed to allege a waiver of immunity, adding it was not an applicant nor a party
to a contested case hearing that pertained to the renewal permit. Additionally, the District asserted
there was no basis for declaratory relief due to the redundant remedies doctrine. Relying on a
decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, they argued this doctrine precludes declaratory relief
“where a party is seeking in the same action a different enforceable remedy, and a judicial
declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a final judgment.” See
5
Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015). Lastly, FSH
alleged that Cockrell lacked standing.
The trial court held a hearing on the pleas to the jurisdiction on December 17, 2020. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court verbalized its intention to grant the pleas of the city
defendants. But it further indicated it found it could be called upon to look at the meaning and
application of the permitting process for permit renewals. As a result, the court denied the pleas to
the jurisdiction asserted by the District, Edwards, and FSH. On January 11, 2021, the trial court
entered a written order granting the city defendants their pleas to the jurisdiction. On the next day,
the trial court entered a written order denying the pleas to the jurisdiction of FSH, the District, and
Edwards.
D. Cross motions for summary judgment
On March 10, 2021, Cockrell filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Cockrell moved
for partial summary judgment on its declaratory action claim and to declare Edwards had
improperly renewed the 2017 export permit under the plain terms of the Texas Water Code.
Cockrell asserted two grounds in support of its motion: (1) that the permit renewal provisions
applicable to FSH’s 2017 permit required it commence construction of a water conveyancing
system to qualify for permit renewal, and (2) the Texas Water Code expressly excludes
§ 36.122(i)(1) permits from being renewed via the automatic renewal provisions of § 36.1145. To
its motion, Cockrell attached evidence described as follows: FSH 2017 Export Permit, the FSH
2020 Permit Renewal Application, Cockrell’s Request for Party Status, meeting minutes for the
renewal meeting held on June 16, 2020, and the District’s plea to the jurisdiction.
In response, the District and Edwards jointly filed a cross motion for partial summary
judgment in their favor regarding Cockrell’s claims and its administrative appeal. The District
6
asserted § 36.1145 did not require a hearing on the request for permit renewal; and consequently,
party status could not be afforded to others. Independently, FSH also filed a cross motion for
summary judgment against Cockrell’s claims. FSH re-urged its arguments made in its plea to the
jurisdiction, asserting Cockrell lacked standing and the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider
its complaints.
On October 20, 2021, the trial court granted FSH’s separate motion for summary judgment,
and granted, as well, the joint motion of the District and Edwards, while it denied Cockrell’s cross
motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s order did not specify any basis for these rulings.
Moreover, the trial court also awarded attorney’s fees and other costs pursuant to a prior agreement
reached between the District and Cockrell.
In filing its appeal, Cockrell originally included all parties. The notice of appeal indicated
it was challenging the trial court’s final judgment on summary judgment signed on October 20,
2021, and its earlier order granting the city defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction. Based on an
agreement, Cockrell and the city defendants later filed a joint motion for partial dismissal of the
appeal during its pendency. We granted the motion and partially dismissed the appeal as to the city
defendants while modifying it against the remaining parties. See Cockrell Inv. Partners, L.P. v.
Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 08-21-00200-CV, 2022 WL 3715477, at *1
(Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Cockrell presents two issues on appeal. First, Cockrell asserts the district court erred in
denying its motion for partial summary judgment while granting Appellees’ cross motions
regarding the proper construction of § 36.122 of the Texas Water Code. Second, Cockrell contends
7
the trial court erred in dismissing its administrative appeal and its request for declaratory relief
based on: (1) lack of standing, and (2) its alleged request for redundant remedies.
Because the second issue implicates the trial court’s jurisdiction, we reorder the issues to
address the jurisdictional arguments first.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review the granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). “Although the denial of summary judgment is normally
not appealable, we may review such a denial when both parties moved for summary judgment and
the trial court granted one and denied the other.” Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n
of Texas, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007). When both parties move for summary judgment and
the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review all the summary judgment
evidence, determine all issues presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have. Mann
Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).
In reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, we apply the following standards:
(1) the movant has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (2) evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as
true when deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment,
and (3) every reasonable inference is indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved
in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985).
When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, a summary judgment must
be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious. Merriman, 407
S.W.3d at 248.
8
IV. THE PERMIT FRAMEWORK
A. Texas groundwater districts
Groundwater districts are political subdivision of the State of Texas created under Article
XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. §§ 36.001(1), 36.001(15), 36.011(a). Except as provided by § 36.117, § 36.113 of the Act
provides that “a district shall require a permit for the drilling, equipping, operating, or completing
of wells or for substantially altering the size of wells or well pumps.” TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.113(a). A groundwater district oversees the process for permit applications and issues
appropriate permits. See id. §§ 36.113, .114, .401–.418.
B. Permit renewals
The case at hand more specifically concerns the process for renewing permits previously
issued by a groundwater district. Section 36.1145 governs an operating permit renewal. See id.
§ 36.1145. Specifically, § 36.1145 provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a district shall without a hearing renew
or approve an application to renew an operating permit before the date on which
the permit expires, provided that:
(1) the application, if required by the district, is submitted in a timely manner
and accompanied by any required fees in accordance with district rules; and
(2) the permit holder is not requesting a change related to the renewal that
would require a permit amendment under district rules.
(b) A district is not required to renew a permit under this section if the applicant:
(1) is delinquent in paying a fee required by the district;
(2) is subject to a pending enforcement action for a substantive violation of a
district permit, order, or rule that has not been settled by agreement with the
district or a final adjudication; or
9
(3) has not paid a civil penalty or has otherwise failed to comply with an order
resulting from a final adjudication of a violation of a district permit, order,
or rule.
(c) If a district is not required to renew a permit under Subsection (b)(2), the permit
remains in effect until the final settlement or adjudication on the matter of the
substantive violation.
Id. § 36.1145.
A second provision is at issue here. Section 36.122 governs the transfer of groundwater out
of the district. Id. § 36.122. This provision addresses the applicable considerations when districts
determine whether to grant or deny a permit that seeks to transfer groundwater outside of the
district’s boundaries. See id. § 36.122(a). The statute provides that certain conditions apply
including a specification of “the period for which the water may be transferred.” Id. § 36.122(h)(2).
The period shall be:
(1) at least three years if construction of a conveyance system has not been initiated
prior to the issuance of the permit; or
(2) at least 30 years if construction of a conveyance system has been initiated prior
to the issuance of the permit.
Id. § 36.122(i). When a term is specified as one under (i)(1), the term “shall automatically be
extended to the terms agreed to under Subsection (i)(2) if construction of a conveyance system is
begun before the expiration of the initial term.” Id. § 36.122(j). Moreover, this provision further
provides in pertinent part:
A district shall extend a term under Subsection (i)(2) or (j) on or before its
expiration in the manner prescribed by Section 36.1145:
(1) to a term that is not shorter than the term of an operating permit for the
production of water to be transferred that is in effect at the time of the
extension; and
(2) for each additional term for which that operating permit for production is
renewed under Section 36.1145 or remains in effect under Section 36.1146.
10
Id. § 36.122(j-1).
C. Governmental immunity and judicial review
It is well established that sovereign immunity protects the State from lawsuits for money
damages. Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). A
groundwater district, as a political subdivision, is also entitled to this same immunity—referred to
as governmental immunity when applied to a groundwater district—unless it has been waived.
Pecos Cnty. v. Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P., 457 S.W.3d 451, 453 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.); see also Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District v. City of Conroe, 515 S.W.3d 406,
412–13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, no pet.). To this extent, the Texas Water Code provides that
a suit can be brought against groundwater districts in the following instances:
(d) A person, firm, corporation, or association of persons affected by and
dissatisfied with any rule or order made by a district, including an appeal of a
decision on a permit application, is entitled to file a suit against the district or
its directors to challenge the validity of the law, rule, or order.
(e) Only the district, the applicant, and parties to a contested case hearing may
participate in an appeal of a decision on the application that was the subject of
that contested case hearing. An appeal of a decision on a permit application
must include the applicant as a necessary party.
(f) The suit shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in any county in which
the district or any part of the district is located. The suit may only be filed after
all administrative appeals to the district are final.
Id. § 36.251.
V. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS
In its second issue, Cockrell asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
the basis it lacked jurisdiction to hear its two claims. Cockrell argues it had standing to bring an
administrative appeal of the denial of party status and claim for declaratory relief. Appellees
respond that because Cockrell was neither a permit applicant nor a party to a contested case
11
hearing, no waiver of immunity applied either to the District or to its general manager. Appellees
contend that jurisdictional prerequisites were not met. Because the trial court could have granted
the summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, and such would be dispositive of this appeal, we
address this issue first.
A. Party status claims
We begin with Cockrell’s complaints against the District for denying it party status and
granting FSH’s renewal permit. It contends the District misapplied the statutes governing renewal
applications. Appellees argue that Cockrell lacked standing to protest the District’s denial of party
status, and to that end, it further lacked standing to protest the District’s ultimate decision to renew
FSH’s permit. Cockrell urges it had standing to bring the administrative appeal in the trial court
because the Water Code granted such standing under § 36.251(a). Cockrell also contends it has a
“personal stake” in the instant controversy because it contests the District’s denial of its request
for party status regarding FSH’s renewal application.
Section 36.251(a) of the Water Code entitles any persons, who is “affected by and
dissatisfied with” any rule or order made by a district, may file suit against the district or its
directors to challenge the validity of the law, rule, or order. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.251(a). This language broadly permits an appeal to be taken by any person “affected by and
dissatisfied with” a decision by a district, which would include a challenge to a decision on a
request for party status on a permit application. See generally Texas Comm’n on Env’t Quality v.
City of Aledo, No. 03-13-00113-CV, 2015 WL 4196408, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 8, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating the court has repeatedly allowed persons to appeal a commission’s
actions without having been designated as a party to the agency proceedings on the basis it did not
12
establish it was an affected party when the applicable code section does not limit appeal to “parties”
on ruling).
Yet, regarding the decision made on an application that was the subject of a contested case
hearing, subsection (b) of the provision imposes a limit on who may file suit. Section 36.251(b)
establishes that “[o]nly the district, the applicant, and parties to a contested case hearing,” may
participate in an appeal of a decision on the application. See id. § 36.251(b). When subsection (a)
and (b) are read together, it then becomes clear that persons denied party status may appeal the
party status decision, but they may not otherwise appeal the district’s final decision on the permit
application. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.251(b); End Op, L.P. v. Meyer, No. 03-18-00049-
CV, 2018 WL 4102013, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding
governmental immunity not waived because landowners could not challenge the final order
granting the disputed permit application because it was not a party to the application under
§ 36.251 of the Texas Water Code). Regardless, in either scenario, the suit against the district may
only be filed “after all administrative appeals to the district are final.” See TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.251(c).
Cockrell contended it had exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing its suit. The
parties concede that Cockrell submitted a motion for rehearing to the District on July 6, 2020. The
District did not formally act on the motion. A request for rehearing is deemed denied on the 91st day
after the date the request is submitted. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.412(e). Here, the motion
would not be denied by operation of law until October 5, 2020.Yet, Cockrell filed the underlying suit
on September 11, 2020. As we held in Cockrell I, filing suit before a motion for rehearing has been
ruled on or deemed overruled by operation of law is premature. Such a prematurely filed suit does
not exhaust administrative remedies, which is necessary to waive immunity. See TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 36.413 (providing that judicial review may not be sought under § 36.251 of the Water Code
13
if a request for rehearing was not timely filed). For this reason, we conclude that Cockrell lacks
standing to pursue a complaint on the District’s denial of party status. Absent party status, Cockrell
could not file suit challenging the District’s decision to grant a permit renewal. See id. 36.251(b). To
contest a decision made on a permit application, a person must be a party to a contested case hearing.
See id. In short, Cockrell cannot establish a waiver of immunity. Such waiver of immunity is a
prerequisite to filing a suit challenging the District’s renewal of FSH's permit. 1
Based on Cockrell's lack of party status, it cannot travel under § 36.122(b)’s waiver of
immunity to challenge the District's renewal of FSH's application. The trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. We conclude the trial court's grant of summary judgment can be upheld on this
basis alone.
B. The UDJA claim
Cockrell secondly asserted a claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)
requesting an interpretation of the relevant Water Code statutes. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 37.004(a). Cockrell alleged the District and its general manager renewed FSH’s permit
outside the scope of their authority under Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code.
The UDJA, however, is “merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a
court’s jurisdiction.” El Paso County v. El Paso Cnty. Emergency Servs. Dist. No. 1, 622 S.W.3d
25, 38 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). The Supreme Court of Texas has held that sovereign
immunity bars UDJA actions against the state and its political divisions absent a legislative waiver.
3
Appellees further point out in briefing that Cockrell never in fact requested a hearing on the renewal application, and
no contested hearing was ever held. For multiple reasons, Appellees contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Cockrell’s appeal of the District’s permit-renewal decision: (1) that Cockrell had no real, imminent, or
particularized injury directly connected to the District’s decision to renew FSH’s permit; (2) that Cockrell actually
never requested a contested hearing on the application; and therefore, had no standing to complain about one not held;
(3) that the renewal of permits is governed by § 36.1145 of the Act, which mandates that no hearing be held on a
renewal request; and (4) that § 36.1145 also mandates the automatic renewal of groundwater permits if the conditions
prescribed by the statute are met, and Cockrell did not contest that such were met. Because Cockrell failed to establish
a waiver of immunity, Appellees’ additional arguments are not reached. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
14
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. 2009). Jurisdictional limitations cannot be
avoided by merely pleading claims under the UDJA, as this procedural vehicle does not operate as
a general waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 370. Said differently, “the UDJA does not enlarge
the trial court’s jurisdiction but is merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a
court’s jurisdiction.” Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621-622 (Tex. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellees assert Cockrell’s UDJA claims were barred by the “redundant remedies
doctrine.” Because Cockrell utilized the statutory process afforded under § 36.251 in filing its suit,
Appellees assert Cockrell’s UDJA claims are redundant as they target the same decisions. Cockrell
responds that its UDJA claims go beyond seeking reversal of the District’s decision to renew the
permit. Rather, Cockrell contends it sought an injunction against the use of the FSH permit and
investments made in reliance on the permit. We conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether
Cockrell’s UDJA claims were barred by the redundant remedies’ doctrine. Regardless, Cockrell’s
UDJA claims lack a valid waiver of immunity.
Generally, a plaintiff may seek a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or other law
under the UDJA. See, generally, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a). But to maintain
such an action against a party with governmental immunity, the plaintiff must plead a valid waiver
of immunity. El Paso Cnty. Emergency Services Dist. No. 1, 622 S.W.3d at *40 (citing Sefzik, 355
S.W.3d at 621). Cockrell did not seek a declaration of its own rights under the Water Code but
rather sought an interpretation of certain provisions to invalidate the District’s actions regarding
the renewal of FSH’s permit. The UDJA itself does not waive the District’s immunity for that
purpose. Id. Therefore, the trial court could also grant summary judgment on this basis.
We overrule Cockrell’s second issue.
15
VI. REMAINING ISSUE ON APPEAL
Because we conclude that Cockrell failed to establish a waiver of immunity for either its
claim for party status or its claim under the UDJA, we conclude the trial court did not err in
granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment and in denying Cockrell’s cross motion. Given
the resolution we reached on Cockrell’s jurisdictional issue, we further conclude it is not necessary
to final disposition of the appeal to address the first issue regarding the proper construction of
§ 36.122. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
VII. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
July 10, 2023
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
16