Mohammed-Yasir Ali v. Sadia Manzoor ( 2023 )

Opinion issued July 18, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00113-CV
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MOHAMMED ALI, Appellant
V.
SADIA MANZOOR, Appellee
On Appeal from the 312th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-24331
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final decree dissolving the marriage between
Mohammed Ali and Sadia Manzoor. In the divorce decree, the trial court awarded
spousal maintenance to Sadia. On appeal, Mohammed contends the trial court
abused its discretion because Sadia did not meet the eligibility requirements for
maintenance.1 We agree, and so we reverse that part of the trial court’s decree
awarding spousal maintenance and render judgment that Sadia take nothing on that
claim.
Background
Mohammed and Sadia married in June 2014 and have one child born during
the marriage. Mohammed filed for divorce after seven years, alleging the marriage
had become insupportable. He asked that he and Sadia be appointed joint managing
conservators of the child.
Sadia counter-petitioned, agreeing that the marriage had become
insupportable. But she also claimed that Mohammed treated her cruelly and had “a
history or pattern of committing family violence” in the two years before he filed for
divorce. Sadia pleaded for spousal maintenance, alleging that she would not have
adequate resources on dissolution to meet her minimum reasonable needs and that
she was eligible for maintenance because she experienced “domestic violence.”
Sadia asserted that she should be the child’s sole managing conservator in her
petition, but later she supported a joint managing conservatorship and had agreed to
share custody with Mohammed.
At the bench trial, Mohammed and Sadia gave their opinions on why the
marriage failed, how the marital property should be divided, and how their child
1
Sadia has not filed a brief on appeal.
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should be parented. Relevant to spousal support, Sadia testified that she had monthly
expenses of $5,088 but earned only $2,190 as a teacher at the child’s school. Even
with some amount of child support, she said, she would fall short of her minimum
reasonable expenses each month.
She testified that she was seeking spousal support based on domestic violence.
Though she did not identify any physical violence by Mohammed, Sadia testified
that he was “very controlling” in the three years before their separation. She spoke
of times when Mohammed threatened to leave her or kick her out of the house if she
was not “obedient,” denied her access to a car, took away her phone, or prevented
her from accessing or knowing about their bank accounts. And she described
Mohammed as “out of control” when he was angry. She testified that she feared
Mohammed and was concerned that “he had a lot of guns.”
Sadia presented evidence that Mohammed pleaded guilty to driving while
intoxicated (DWI) in 2019 and was arrested a second time for DWI in 2021. Sadia
was not present for either DWI arrest. She learned of the first arrest when
Mohammed called her the next morning to get out of jail. She learned of the second
arrest from public records.
She also testified that Mohammed sleepwalked, which caused her to sleep
separately with the child in a locked bedroom. Mohammed did not recall his activity
when he sleepwalked, but it sometimes involved dangers such as cooking while he
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was asleep. Sadia stated that Mohammed was skeptical of western medicine and
believed that his faith did not allow health insurance, but Mohammed disputed that
testimony. He agreed that although he prefers “holistic medicine,” the child should
have health insurance in case of an accident. And he offered his initiative to obtain
treatment for the child when the child had lice as evidence of his involvement in the
child’s medical care.
For his part, Mohammed acknowledged that his relationship with Sadia
deteriorated just a couple of years after they wed. He attributed the differences in
their opinions on family dynamics and parenting to differences in their religious
beliefs. Mohammed described feeling “gaslighted” or “nitpicked” by Sadia and her
family. And he claimed he feared for the child’s safety with Sadia based on text
messages in which Sadia expressed that she had become so upset with the child that
she almost struck the child. Mohammed also testified about his belief that Sadia had
taken and either used or hidden cash and jewelry without his consent.
Several other witnesses testified, including a family friend, G. Hashmi.
Hashmi testified that Sadia and the child had stayed with his family for about a week
and a half, after she got into a fight with Mohammed and the police were called.
Neither Hashmi nor Sadia supplied any details about the fight. But Hashmi recalled
that while Sadia and the child were at his home, Mohammed became angry and
threatened to report Hashmi to child protective services or the police in retaliation.
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When asked if Mohammed ever said anything that concerned him, Hashmi answered
affirmatively and stated his disagreement with Mohammed’s view that a wife must
obey her husband.
The trial court also heard from a faith leader and two teachers at the child’s
school. The lead instructor at the school, M. Rabago, testified about Sadia’s positive
performance as a teacher at the school. She described the child, who was her student,
as “wonderful,” “easily taught,” “well adjusted,” and “a pleasure to have in the
classroom.” The second teacher, S. Ahmed, taught the child as a toddler and
described the child in similar terms. The only problem either Rabago or Ahmed
identified for the child was episodes of constipation in both classrooms. According
to Rabago, Sadia was available to comfort the child on those occasions.
After the trial, the trial court signed a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage
on the ground of insupportability. In the decree, the trial court divided the marital
assets; named the parties joint managing conservators of the child, with Sadia having
the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence; awarded Mohammed
periods of possession under a modified standard possession order; awarded child
support; and awarded $600 in monthly spousal maintenance to Sadia.
At Mohammed’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. To explain its deviation from the standard possession order, the
trial court cited testimony that Mohammed “had been verbally abusive to Sadia,”
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“prohibited [her] from using the family car,” “tracked the car and threatened Sadia
[] he would call the police if she did not follow his rules,” “took Sadia’s personal
phone from her,” and “signed Sadia [] off of the rental apartment lease while still
married.” The trial court also noted the evidence that Mohammed was on bond for a
second charge of driving while intoxicated and “was still drinking alcohol in
excess.”
On spousal maintenance, the court made several relevant findings, including
that Sadia lacked sufficient resources to provide for her minimum reasonable needs
and had exercised diligence either in “earning sufficient income” or “developing the
necessary skills” to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. And it listed several
factors it considered “in determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of
periodic payments”:
• each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs independently, considering the spouse’s financial
resources on dissolution of marriage;
• the education and employment skills of the spouses, the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income, and the
availability and feasibility of that education or training;
• the duration of the marriage;
• the age, employment history, earning ability, and physical and
emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
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• the effect on each spouse’s ability to provide for that spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs while providing periodic child support
payments or maintenance; and
• the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.
Mohammed has appealed the trial court’s ruling on spousal maintenance only.
He does not appeal the trial court’s other rulings establishing the joint managing
conservatorship of the child or dividing the marital estate.
Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s spousal maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we do not disturb
the trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance.”). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it rules “arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal
principles, or without supporting evidence.” Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
The abuse-of-discretion standard of review overlaps with traditional
sufficiency standards of review in family law cases. Arellano v. Arellano, No.
01-16-00854-CV, 2018 WL 284333, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 4,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, legal and factual sufficiency challenges are not
independent grounds for reversal; instead, they are relevant factors in assessing
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whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Syed v. Masihuddin, 521 S.W.3d
840, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We ask whether the trial
court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred
in its application of that discretion. Day v. Day, 452 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
To answer the first question, we apply the appropriate sufficiency standard.
Id. To answer the second question, we determine whether, considering the evidence,
the trial court made a reasonable decision. Arellano, 2018 WL 284333, at *2. “Stated
inversely, we must conclude that the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports a finding, we
examine the record and credit evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable
factfinder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005);
Syed, 521 S.W.3d at 847 n.4. As the factfinder, the trial court is the sole judge of
testimonial weight. Willis v. Willis, 533 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). When the witness testimony is conflicting, we will not
disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations, and we presume that the trial court
resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict. Syed, 521 S.W.3d at 848. The trial
court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence of a substantial and probative
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character supports the decision. Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.); Arellano, 2018 WL 284333, at *3.
This appeal also presents questions of statutory construction, which we review
de novo. Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). Because it
is the Legislature’s prerogative to enact statutes, our primary goal is to carry out the
Legislature’s intent. See id. We therefore interpret statutes based on the plain
language chosen by the Legislature unless the surrounding context shows the
Legislature intended a different meaning or the application of the plain language
would yield absurd or nonsensical results that the Legislature could not have
intended. Id. When the statutory text is clear, the text alone resolves the Legislature’s
intent. Brazos Elec. Power Coop. v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 576 S.W.3d 374,
384 (Tex. 2019).
We accord a statute’s terms their common, ordinary meaning unless the
Legislature has defined a term, the term has a technical meaning, or the term has
another meaning when read in context. See id. We do not interpret statutory words
and phrases in isolation. Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 69 (Tex. 2019).
We also consider the statutory framework in which individual provisions reside. See
id.; Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018).
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Spousal Maintenance
In his sole issue on appeal, Mohammed argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering spousal maintenance because no evidence showed Sadia was
eligible for it under the Family Code.
Spousal maintenance is an award of “periodic payments from the future
income of one spouse for the support of the other spouse.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 8.001(1). The trial court may exercise its discretion and award spousal
maintenance if the party seeking maintenance meets the requirements in Family
Code section 8.051. Id. § 8.051. Under section 8.051, the court may order spousal
maintenance if the maintenance-seeking spouse lacks sufficient resources to provide
for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs and:
(1) the spouse from whom maintenance is requested was convicted of
or received deferred adjudication for a criminal offense that also
constitutes an act of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004,
committed during the marriage against the other spouse or the other
spouse’s child and the offense occurred:
(A) within two years before the date on which a suit for dissolution
of the marriage is filed; or
(B) while the suit is pending; or
(2) the spouse seeking maintenance:
(A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or
mental disability;
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(B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and
lacks the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
minimum reasonable needs; or
(C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who
requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a
physical or mental disability that prevents the spouse from earning
sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs.
Id. (emphasis added); Cooper v. Cooper, 176 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
Mohammed does not challenge the trial court’s finding that Sadia will lack
sufficient resources upon dissolution of the marriage to provide for her minimum
reasonable needs. But he contends there was no substantive or probative evidence of
section 8.051’s other eligibility requirements. Although the trial court did not specify
the basis for spousal maintenance, we agree with Mohammed that none is supported
by sufficient evidence.
1. Family violence offense
Under subsection 8.051(1), a spouse is eligible for spousal maintenance if the
other spouse “was convicted of or received deferred adjudication for a criminal
offense that also constitutes an act of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004,”
during the statutory period. TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(1). Neither conviction nor
deferred adjudication are defined in the maintenance statute. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines conviction as:
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1. The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime;
the state of having been proved guilty.
2. The judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.
Conviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see
Conviction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar
y/conviction (last visited July 9, 2023) (defining conviction as “the act or process of
finding a person guilty of a crime especially in a court of law”). And it defines
deferred adjudication as a “deferred judgment,” meaning “[a] conditional judgment
placing a convicted defendant on probation, the successful completion of which will
prevent entry of the underlying judgment of conviction.” Deferred Adjudication,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Deferred Judgment, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
There was no evidence at trial that Mohammed received deferred adjudication
for any criminal offense. There was evidence of a DWI conviction. But DWI is not
a criminal offense that also constitutes an act of family violence under Family Code
section 71.004, as subsection 8.051(1) requires. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 71.004,
8.051(1). Acts of family violence include:
(1) an act by a member of a family or household against another
member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that
reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive
measures to protect oneself;
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(2) abuse, as that term is defined by Sections 261.001(1)(C), (E), (G),
(H), (I), (J), (K), and (M), by a member of a family or household toward
a child of the family or household; or
(3) dating violence, as that term is defined by Section 71.0021.
Id. § 71.004. DWI—defined by the Penal Code as an offense involving an intoxicated
person’s operation of a motor vehicle in a public place—does not satisfy any of these
definitions. See id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a). Thus, there was no
evidence that Mohammed was “convicted of or received deferred adjudication for a
criminal offense that also constitutes an act of family violence,” and the trial court
abused its discretion if it awarded spousal maintenance on that basis.
2. Incapacitating physical or mental disability
Subsection 8.051(2)(A) authorizes spousal maintenance if the
maintenance-seeking spouse is “unable to earn sufficient income . . . because of an
incapacitating physical or mental disability.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2)(A). “No
authority directly addresses the quantum of evidence that is required to prove
incapacity in an action for maintenance.” Schafman v. Schafman, No.
01-20-00231-CV, 2022 WL 962466, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31,
2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). But the Family Code does not require the
maintenance-seeking spouse to present medical evidence of an incapacitating
physical or mental disability. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228; Pickens v. Pickens, 62
S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). The factfinder may
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reasonably infer an individual’s incapacity from circumstantial evidence or the
competent testimony of a lay witness. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228; Pickens, 62
S.W.3d at 215–16.
“In fact, the testimony of the injured party will support a finding of incapacity
even if directly contradicted by expert medical testimony.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at
228 (quoting Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 216). But the testimony “must still be sufficient
and probative to establish a disability exists and to establish this disability prevents
that party from obtaining gainful employment.” Id. at 230; see Chafino v. Chafino,
228 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (refusal to award spousal
maintenance was not abuse of discretion because record contained no “explanation
of why [wife’s] ailments prevent[ed] her from returning to work as a bookkeeper”).
The party seeking maintenance must present probative evidence “that rises above a
mere assertion that unsubstantiated symptoms collectively amount to an
incapacitating disability.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 230.
Here, the trial court could not award spousal maintenance under subsection
8.051(2)(A) because there was no evidence that Sadia has an incapacitating physical
or mental disability that prevents her from earning sufficient income. The subject of
physical or mental disability was not directly addressed at trial. Though not required,
Sadia did not present medical testimony or records showing any physical or
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cognitive impairment. And she did not testify that she suffers any symptoms that
prevent her from working. Neither did any other witness.
No circumstantial evidence supports an inference that Sadia is physically or
mentally incapacitated. See Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228; Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 215.
To the contrary, the evidence showed that Sadia has a master’s degree in applied
mathematics and is employed as a teacher at her child’s school. Nothing suggested
that her capacity for employment at the school or elsewhere is limited in any way
because of a physical or mental disability. The school’s lead instructor described
Sadia as a “wonderful teacher,” “very dedicated,” and “extremely dependable.” She
expressed gratitude for Sadia as a colleague and for her work at the school.
In short, there was no substantive or probative evidence that Sadia is
incapacitated because of physical or mental disability, and therefore the trial court
lacked discretion to award her spousal maintenance. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 8.051(2)(A); see also Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228; Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 475. If
the trial court did so, it abused its discretion.
3. Inability to earn sufficient income after marriage of ten or more
years
Subsection 8.051(2)(B) authorizes spousal maintenance if the
maintenance-seeking spouse has been married to the other spouse for at least ten
years and cannot earn sufficient income to meet her minimum reasonable needs.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051(2)(B). The trial court lacked discretion to award spousal
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maintenance under this subsection because there was no evidence that Sadia was
married to Mohammed for ten or more years. It was undisputed that Mohammed and
Sadia married in June 2014. Mohammed filed for divorce seven years later, in April
2021. Sadia counter-petitioned the next month. And the trial court granted their
divorce in January 2022. The marriage thus lasted less than eight years, under the
minimum statutory duration. See id. If it awarded spousal maintenance under
subsection 8.051(2)(B), the trial court abused its discretion.
4. Custodian of child requiring substantial care
Subsection 8.051(2)(C) authorizes spousal maintenance if the
maintenance-seeking spouse is the custodian of a child “who requires substantial
care and personal supervision because of a physical or mental disability that prevents
the spouse from earning sufficient income.” Id. § 8.051(2)(C). The trial court could
not have awarded spousal maintenance under this subsection because there was no
evidence that Mohammed and Sadia’s child has a physical or mental disability that
prevented Sadia from working. By all accounts at trial, the child was developing
appropriately. Although the child had lice and sometimes was constipated, Sadia
testified the child was healthy. One of the child’s teachers described the child as
“very intelligent,” a fast learner, and “well-adjusted.” Another teacher said the child
interacted “just fine” with other children, was “very talkative,” “thoughtful,” a “great
helper,” and a “pleasure to have in the classroom.” No evidence contradicted these
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characterizations of the child or otherwise indicated that the child experiences any
physical or cognitive impairment that prevents Sadia from working. See id. Although
there was testimony that Sadia tended to or comforted the child at times when the
child was constipated at school, that testimony was not presented alongside any
evidence that doing so interfered with Sadia’s work at the school. And the only
inference the trial court could reasonably draw from the testimony of the school’s
lead instructor that the school was satisfied with her work performance. In other
words, there was no substantive or probative evidence of Sadia’s eligibility for
spousal maintenance under subsection 8.051(2)(C), and the trial court lacked
discretion to award spousal maintenance on that basis. See id.
Having concluded that the trial court lacked sufficient information on which
to exercise its discretion to find that Sadia was eligible for spousal maintenance
under any subsection of section 8.051, we hold the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding maintenance.
We sustain Mohammed’s sole issue on appeal.
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Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the final divorce decree awarding Sadia spousal
maintenance and render judgment denying her claim for maintenance. The final
divorce decree is affirmed in all other respects.
Sarah Beth Landau
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.
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