Bradley K. Weiner M.D. v. Patrick Lashford ( 2023 )


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  • Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Majority and Dissenting
    Opinions filed July 27, 2023.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-21-00289-CV
    BRADLEY K. WEINER M.D., Appellant
    V.
    PATRICK LASHFORD, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 61st District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2020-18756
    MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION
    Bradley K. Weiner, M.D., appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss
    Patrick Lashford’s health care liability claim due to the inadequacy of an expert
    report under Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In a single
    issue, Weiner contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because the
    report does not adequately explain causation.     We agree with Weiner, so we
    reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    I.    Legal Principles and Standard of Review
    For a health care liability claim, a claimant must serve an expert report on
    each defendant early in the litigation or risk dismissal of the claim. See Tex. Civ.
    Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a)–(b); E.D. ex rel. B.O. v. Tex. Health Care,
    P.L.L.C., 
    644 S.W.3d 660
    , 664 (Tex. 2022). An expert report is “a written report
    by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s opinions . . . regarding
    applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the
    physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal
    relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.” Tex.
    Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(r)(6).
    When, as here, a defendant challenges the adequacy of the expert report, the
    trial court must grant a motion to dismiss “if it appears to the court, after hearing,
    that the report does not represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the
    definition of an expert report.” Id. § 74.351(l); Baty v. Futrell, 
    543 S.W.3d 689
    ,
    693 (Tex. 2018). An expert report satisfies this “good-faith effort” requirement if
    the report discusses the standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient
    specificity to (1) inform the defendant of the specific conduct called into question
    and (2) provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit.
    See Baty, 543 S.W.3d at 693–94; Jelinek v. Casas, 
    328 S.W.3d 526
    , 539 (Tex.
    2010). Although a report need not marshal the plaintiff’s proof, it must provide
    more than conclusory statements concerning the applicable standard of care,
    breach, and causation. See Baty, 543 S.W.3d at 693; Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539,
    540 n.9. Regarding causation, a report must explain “how and why the breach
    caused the injury based on the facts presented.” Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 540. The
    purpose of the expert-report requirement is to deter frivolous claims, not to dispose
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    of claims regardless of their merit. Scoresby v. Santillan, 
    346 S.W.3d 546
    , 554
    (Tex. 2011).
    A court’s inquiry into the adequacy of a report is confined to the four
    corners of the report, taken as a whole. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664. The necessary
    information must be found in the text of the report itself; omissions cannot be
    supplied by inference. Hall v. Davies, 
    598 S.W.3d 803
    , 807 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 555–56).
    We review the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of
    discretion. Bailey v. Amaya Clinic, Inc., 
    402 S.W.3d 355
    , 361 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see also Baty, 543 S.W.3d at 693. A trial
    court abuses it discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or
    without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Bailey, 
    402 S.W.3d at 361
    .
    Under this standard, “close calls must go to the trial court.” E.D., 644 S.W.3d at
    664 (alteration and quotation omitted).
    II.   Background
    Lashford sued Weiner, bringing a single health care liability claim of
    negligence. Lashford alleged that during the summer of 2017, he began having
    pain in his lower back and left leg. In March 2018, Weiner performed surgery on
    Lashford—a “revision decompression/fusion surgery at L5-S1 with implantation of
    an interspinous process device.” Lashford alleged that Weiner’s care fell below
    acceptable medical standards because Lashford was “not a proper candidate for
    that procedure, and the procedure itself was not performed properly.”
    Lashford served Weiner with an expert report, which the trial court ruled
    was deficient, and the court allowed Lashford to file an amended report. In the
    amended report—the subject of this appeal—the expert reviewed Lashford’s
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    medical history, including that Lashford underwent three surgeries: an L5/S1
    microdisectomy in November 2017 with no complications, the complained-of
    fusion surgery in March 2018, and a subsequent microdisectomy in September
    2019. Weiner’s notes from the March 2018 surgery indicated that he “decorticated
    in standard fashion and used a combination of local bone graft and allograft bone
    to afford an excellent fusion bed.” The expert explained that Weiner’s treatment
    involved a “decision to excise the interspinous ligament, insert an interspinous
    device, and attempted fusion” of the L5 and S1 vertebrae. However, more recent
    imaging showed that the vertebrae were not fused together. The expert noted that
    “‘decortication’ of bone involves removing the outermost cortex of the vertebral
    surface and joints in order to create a surface that will fuse.” Decortication is
    beneficial “only if the bones successfully fuse[] together.”
    The expert detailed the standard of care applicable to Weiner and the alleged
    breach; Weiner does not challenge this aspect of the report. The expert opined that
    a large majority of practicing spine surgeons view an interlaminar fusion procedure
    as “inappropriate and a fringe operation in all cases.” Generally, spinal fusions are
    recommended in a limited number of cases: (1) instability; (2) malalignment, i.e.,
    scoliosis involving a curve from side to side or sagittal malalignments in which the
    patient is pitched forward; or (3) when the amount of bone that needs to be
    removed is so much that the spine would become unstable. The expert reviewed
    all pre-surgical imaging and found no evidence of any of these circumstances.
    Thus, Weiner’s excision of Lashford’s interspinous ligament, insertion of an
    interspinous device, and attempted fusion were “not supported by reasonable
    modern medical care, and an attempted fusion was a deviation from the standard of
    care of a reasonable and prudent surgeon.” The expert identified the breach of the
    standard of care as “performing an inappropriate procedure lumbar fusion surgery
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    on Mr. Lashford on May 23, 2018, given the lack of evidence of instability,
    malalignment, or need for extensive decompression.”            The surgery offered
    Lashford no potential benefit, and “any risks of the surgery would outweigh the
    potential benefit.”
    The expert opined regarding causation, “to a reasonable degree of medical
    certainty, that the breach in the standard of care by Dr. Weiner has resulted in pain,
    the need for ongoing medical care, and physical limitations to Mr. Lashford, which
    can be expected to continue into the future.” The expert noted that Lashford has
    had “three operations at his L5/S1 level, and his interspinous ligament between L5
    and S1 has been excised,” which “places the patient at an increased risk for
    instability at the L5/S1 level. If this level becomes unstable in the future, he would
    require an additional procedure to fuse these vertebrae.” The expert opined that
    disruption of the L5/S1 joints, which would have been performed in this case,
    “leads to accelerated degenerative changes at this level, leading to premature
    osteoarthritis and subsequent pain.” The expert opined:
    From the patient’s current condition (pseudoarthrosis or nonunion
    after an attempted fusion), he will have, to a reasonable degree of
    medical certainty, further symptoms and is at risk for requiring
    additional surgical intervention. This is especially true because of the
    patient’s relatively young age and remaining life expectancy. I
    believe that the additional pain and suffering experienced by Mr.
    Lashford, including additional medical treatments that he may require,
    are a direct result of Dr. Weiner’s breach in the standard of care.
    Weiner filed an objection to the amended report and motion to dismiss. The
    trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion. Weiner appeals.
    III.   Analysis
    In a single issue, Weiner contends that the expert’s report is inadequate
    because, among other reasons, (1) the expert’s opinions about potential future harm
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    are insufficient to demonstrate causation, and (2) the expert’s opinions about
    existing harm are conclusory.
    We agree with Weiner that the expert’s reference to potential future
    symptoms and medical treatments did not describe an injury that Weiner caused.
    The expert opined that Lashford “may require” and is “at risk” or an “increased
    risk” for additional medical treatments or procedures “if” Lashford’s vertebrae
    become unstable. Similarly, the expert explained that Weiner’s surgery leads to
    premature osteoarthritis, but the expert did not opine that Lashford suffers from the
    condition. See Mooring v. Britton, No. 07-20-00253-CV, 
    2021 WL 537205
    , at *3–
    4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 12, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (expert report was
    inadequate to establish causation of hemorrhage, which actually occurred, when
    expert opined that the breach caused a “risk” of hemorrhage); THN Physicians
    Ass’n v. Tiscareno, 
    495 S.W.3d 599
    , 613–14 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.)
    (expert report was inadequate to establish causation of injury to baby from
    mother’s alleged condition during childbirth—chorioamnionitis—when expert
    opined only that the defendant’s breach created an “increased risk” for the
    condition rather than actually caused the condition).
    Regarding current pain, the expert’s opinion is conclusory. The expert
    provided no detail or explanation for how or why Weiner’s performing an
    unnecessary surgery caused Lashford “additional pain and suffering” or “pain, the
    need for ongoing medical care, and physical limitations.” See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d
    at 540 (expert report was conclusory and inadequate on issue of causation when the
    expert opined that a breach “resulted in increased pain and suffering and a
    prolonged hospital stay” with “no explanation of how the breach caused the
    injury”). The report provided no explanation for how or why the surgery resulted
    in pain, medical care, or physical limitations beyond what Lashford would have
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    experienced with no medical intervention for the condition that Lashford already
    suffered from. “Any recovery for pain and suffering in a medical malpractice case
    is limited to the additional pain and suffering caused by the improper medical
    treatment; recovery is not allowed for the normal pain that would have been
    experienced as part of proper treatment.” Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Bernal, 
    482 S.W.3d 165
    , 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (holding that lay testimony could not
    establish causation for purposes of an expert report even when common sense
    would enable a layman to determine the causal relationship between an event and
    the condition). Neither this court nor the trial court may infer that Lashford
    suffered injury from the surgery beyond what he would have suffered without the
    surgery; the expert must explain how and why the breach caused any additional
    injury. See Hall, 598 S.W.3d at 807–09; see also Ranelle v. Beavers, No. 02-08-
    437-CV, 
    2009 WL 1176445
    , at *4, *6 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30,
    2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (sufficient expert report for claim based on unnecessary
    surgery when the expert explained that the defendant’s breach caused the
    plaintiff’s “ongoing back problems and all of the consequences that naturally flow
    from performing a surgery that would not have been performed if [the defendant]
    had been honest,” including “hospitalization, pain associated with recovery from
    the trauma of surgery, limitation in activities and additional medical care including
    in this case, physical therapy and additional surgery to remove the bone
    stimulator”); Arboretum Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. Of Winnie, Inc. v. Isaacks, No. 14-
    07-00895, 
    2008 WL 2130446
    , at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 22,
    2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (sufficient expert report detailed injury resulting from
    amputation because the expert “opined that the cutting of the skin and deeper tissue
    including the bone is associated with physical pain due to the severing of the
    sensory nerves,” and “amputation is associated with mental anguish because of the
    human cerebral/emotional response to the loss of a body part”).
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    The expert’s conclusions regarding causation are mere ipse dixit and, thus,
    insufficient to satisfy the expert report requirement for Chapter 74. See Hall, 598
    S.W.3d at 808–09.
    IV.   Conclusion
    Weiner’s sole issue is sustained. We reverse the trial court’s May 6, 2021
    order overruling Weiner’s objections and denying Weiner’s motion to dismiss, and
    we remand to the case to the trial court with instructions for the court to assess and
    award Weiner reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of court and to dismiss
    Lashford’s claim with prejudice. See id. (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
    § 74.351(b), (c)).
    /s/       Ken Wise
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Wise, Poissant, and Wilson. (Poissant, J. dissenting).
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