Linda Kaye McDonald v. Cecil Dale McDonald ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00446-CV
___________________________
LINDA KAYE MCDONALD, Appellant
V.
CECIL DALE MCDONALD, Appellee
On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 233-708703-21
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a division of property incident to a divorce. In a single
issue, Wife Linda Kaye McDonald argues that the trial court erred by finding that the
premarital agreement between Husband Cecil Dale McDonald and Wife is valid and
enforceable. We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Husband and Wife initially married in 1968 and divorced in 1974. After a series
of other marriages to and divorces from other partners, 1 Husband and Wife remarried
in September 2018.
Shortly before Husband and Wife remarried, they began living together in a
house located at 6412 Alexandra Meadows Drive in Fort Worth, Texas. Husband and
Wife each paid $23,000 toward the down payment on the home. Because Husband
was still in the middle of divorce proceedings with his previous wife at the time of
purchase, his name was not initially placed on the deed, but a new deed reflecting his
ownership was executed in December 2017.
Husband and Wife planned to remarry as soon as Husband’s divorce was
finalized. But in July 2018, Wife texted Husband that she intended to remarry her
other ex-husband Greg instead and told Husband that he should go on their paid-for
honeymoon cruise alone.
The record reflects that as of the commencement of this divorce proceeding,
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both Husband and Wife had been married four times, including twice to each other.
2
In August 2018, Wife had a change of heart and decided that she wanted to
remarry Husband after all. Husband was still prepared to re-marry Wife but had some
reservations due to her recent vacillation. Specifically, given his age and financial
situation, Husband was concerned that he would have difficulty finding a place to live
if Wife divorced him and their house was sold as part of a property division. To
alleviate his concerns, he asked Wife if she would be willing to enter into a premarital
agreement. After Wife expressed her willingness, Husband—without the assistance of
an attorney—drafted a simple premarital agreement providing in relevant part as
follows:
If [Wife] file[s] for divorce from [Husband], all equity from [their]
jointly owned house at 6412 Alexandra Meadows Dr., Fort Worth, TX
76131 will go to [Husband]. When the property is sold, [Wife agrees]
that all proceeds from the sale[] will go to [Husband].
If [Husband and Wife] have subsequently purchased another
home prior to [Wife’s] filing for divorce, all equity proceeds from its sale
will go to [Husband.]
....
[Wife] freely agree[s] to the above provisions without reservation
or pressure.
On August 25, 2018—eight days before they remarried—Husband and Wife signed
the agreement at a UPS store before a witness and a notary.
In November 2020, Husband and Wife sold the Alexandra Meadows home and
purchased a new house located at 12224 Treeline Drive in Crowley, Texas. They used
approximately $50,000 of the sale proceeds from the Alexandra Meadows home as a
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down payment on the Treeline house. Husband and Wife lived in the Treeline house
until October 2021 when Wife moved out to reunite with her ex-husband Greg.
Wife filed for divorce in November 2021. In March 2022, Wife filed a summary
judgment motion requesting that the trial court declare the premarital agreement
unenforceable on the grounds that it is unconscionable. The trial court declined to
grant Wife’s summary judgment motion2 and, in August 2022, conducted a bench trial
regarding the division of the marital estate. During trial, Wife again argued that the
premarital agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable and because
Husband had failed to properly disclose his property and financial obligations to Wife
before the agreement was signed. Rejecting Wife’s arguments, the trial court
concluded that the premarital agreement was enforceable and signed a divorce decree
awarding the Treeline house to Husband as his sole and separate property. This
appeal followed.
2
The clerk’s record contains a letter confirming that Wife’s summary judgment
motion was set for hearing on March 30, 2022, and Husband’s proposed order
denying the motion, but it does not contain a denial order signed by the trial court.
Nevertheless, because Wife’s summary judgment motion solely concerned the
enforceability of the premarital agreement and this issue was decided as part of the
August 2022 bench trial, it appears that the trial court denied Wife’s summary
judgment motion.
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II. DISCUSSION
In her sole issue on appeal, Wife argues that the trial court erred by rejecting
Wife’s argument that the premarital agreement is unconscionable and instead finding
it to be valid and enforceable. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The issue of a premarital agreement’s unconscionability is a question of law for
the court. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.006(b). We review conclusions of law de novo.
Garner v. Long, 49 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (citing
Piazza v. City of Granger, 909 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ)).
While we are not bound by a trial court’s conclusions of law, we will uphold them if
the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Wyde v.
Francesconi, 566 S.W.3d 890, 894–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.). Even an
incorrect conclusion of law will not require a reversal if the controlling findings of fact
support a correct legal theory. Id. at 895; Garner, 49 S.W.3d at 922.
B. The Premarital Agreement Is Enforceable
“Texas has a ‘strong public policy favoring freedom of contract’ that is ‘firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence.’” In re Marriage of I.C. & Q.C., 551 S.W.3d 119,
124 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tex.
2016)). The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “parties ‘shall have
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by [c]ourts.’” Id. (quoting Gym-
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N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 220 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tex. 2007)). In the same vein, the
supreme court has cautioned that we should “rarely find a contract unenforceable on
public policy grounds” and that “[p]remarital agreements are no exception.” Id.In accordance with this strong freedom-of-contract policy, premarital
agreements are presumed to be valid and enforceable under Texas law. Marsh v. Marsh,
949 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (citing
Grossman v. Grossman, 799 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1990, no writ)); see also Larson v. Prigoff, No. 05-99-01755-CV, 2001 WL 13352, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 8, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Texas
law generally favors premarital agreements.” (first citing Beck v. Beck, 814 S.W.2d 745,
749 (Tex. 1991); and then citing Grossman, 799 S.W.2d at 513)). To rebut this
presumption, the party seeking to avoid enforcement must prove either (1) that she
signed the agreement involuntarily or (2) that the agreement is unconscionable and
failed to fairly and reasonably disclose the “property or financial obligations of the
other party.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.006(a); see also Marriage of I.C. & Q.C.,
551 S.W.3d at 124; Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 194–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
pet. denied); Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 739.
Wife argues that the premarital agreement is unconscionable and that Husband
failed to adequately disclose his property and financial obligations. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 4.006(a)(2). “Because disclosure forms the second prong of the test to rebut
the presumption of enforceability, lack of disclosure is material only if the premarital
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agreement is unconscionable.” Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 743. Thus, we will begin our
analysis with the threshold question of unconscionability. See id.; see also Fazakerly v.
Fazakerly, 996 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. denied) (“The issue
of unconscionability must be decided by the trial court as a matter of law before the
disclosure questions are addressed.”).
Neither the Texas legislature nor Texas courts have precisely defined
unconscionability in the context of prenuptial agreements. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 739.
Rather, courts have addressed unconscionability claims on a case-by-case basis by
examining “the entire atmosphere in which the agreement was made.” Id. (citing Pearce
v. Pearce, 824 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied)). In performing
this analysis, courts have considered factors such as (1) the maturity and age of the
individuals, (2) their business backgrounds, (3) their educational levels, (4) their prior
marriages, and (5) other motivations, including the parties’ motivation to protect their
respective children. Id. at 741 (citing Williams v. Williams, 720 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)). But courts have also acknowledged that
“a party who knowingly enters a lawful but improvident contract is not entitled to
protection by the courts,” and “[i]n the absence of any mistake, fraud, or oppression,
the courts . . . are not interested in the wisdom or impolicy of contracts and
agreements voluntarily entered into between [competent] parties.” Id. at 740 (quoting
Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1975, no writ)).
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Here, taking into account the “entire atmosphere” in which Husband and Wife
entered into the premarital agreement, we cannot conclude that it is unconscionable.
See id. at 739. Husband and Wife are nearly identical in age and have both been
married multiple times, including twice to each other. Nothing in the record suggests
that Husband’s business background or educational level gave him an advantage in
sophistication or bargaining power, nor has Wife asserted that this was the case.
Moreover, Husband had a very specific motivation for making the premarital
agreement: he was afraid that if Wife divorced him—which was a very real possibility
considering Wife had previously divorced him and had backed out of their most
recent engagement only a month earlier—and the couple’s home was sold as part of a
property division, he might be left homeless.
Wife argues that the premarital agreement was unconscionable because “[it]
was not fair”; because Wife did not understand that the agreement applied not only to
the Alexandra Meadows home but also to any “subsequently purchased” home; and
because she did not have sufficient time to review the agreement or consult with an
attorney before it was signed. 3 These arguments lack merit.
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Wife also asserts that the agreement’s release language, which provides that
Wife “freely agree[d]” to the agreement’s terms “without reservation or pressure,” is
ambiguous and inadequate because it is “devoid of an acknowledgement that [Wife]
fully understood the terms of the premarital agreement, that she entered into the
agreement with informed consent, and that it was not procured by fraud, duress, or
overreaching.” Even accepting Wife’s assertion as true, this is not grounds for holding
the agreement unenforceable. “[T]he only formality required by the Texas Family
Code for a premarital agreement is that it ‘must be in writing and signed by both
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First, “unfairness is not material to the enforceability of the agreement.” Id. at
741 (citing Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1989, writ denied)). Thus, even if the trial court had found the premarital agreement
to be disproportional, such a finding would “not satisfy the burden of proof required
to establish unconscionability.” See id. at 741–42.
Second, because Wife signed the agreement after having been given the
opportunity to read it,4 she is presumed to know its contents. See Nat’l Prop. Holdings,
L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419, 423–24 (Tex. 2015). This is true even if—as Wife
claims—she chose not to read it.5 See Reynoso v. Dibs, US, Inc., 541 S.W.3d 331,
340 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Nat’l Prop. Holdings,
parties.’” In re Marriage of Sauls & Worley, 648 S.W.3d 359, 363–64 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 4.002). Thus, no specific
release language is required. Moreover, because the premarital agreement is presumed
to be valid, see Sheriff v. Moosa, No. 05-13-01143-CV, 2015 WL 4736564, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.), it was not incumbent on Husband
to include specific language in the agreement reflecting that Wife understood its terms
or that it was not procured by fraud, duress, or overreaching; rather, Wife, as the party
seeking to avoid the agreement’s enforcement, has the burden to show
unconscionability, see id.; Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 739.
While Husband’s and Wife’s accounts differ regarding the amount of time
4
Wife had to review the agreement, at a minimum, Wife acknowledged having the
opportunity to read the agreement—which is only two paragraphs in length—at the
UPS store shortly before signing.
5
Husband contends that Wife read the agreement multiple times before it was
executed, including at the UPS store just before it was signed. But while Wife
acknowledged having the opportunity to read the agreement at the UPS store, she
testified that “there w[ere] so many people in line, I didn’t want to take the time to
read it.”
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453 S.W.3d at 423–24). “One who signs an instrument without reading it can avoid
this presumption under a narrow ‘trick or artifice’ exception by showing that the
signing party was prevented by a fraudulent trick or artifice from reading the
instrument or having the instrument read to the signing party,” id. (citing Nat’l Prop.
Holdings, 453 S.W.3d at 425), but Wife has not alleged any such “trick or artifice” here.
Therefore, we presume that Wife knew and accepted all of the terms of the premarital
agreement, including the clause applying the agreement not only to the Alexandra
Meadows home but also to any “subsequently purchased” home.
Third, Wife’s argument that she was not given sufficient time to review the
agreement and consult with an attorney is specious. Wife testified that at the time the
agreement was signed, no wedding date had been set. Thus, if Wife had concerns
about the premarital agreement or wanted to have an attorney review it, the wedding
could have easily been delayed to allow her time to consult with counsel. Moreover,
because “the advice of counsel is not a prerequisite to the validity of a premarital
agreement,” Marriage of Sauls & Worley, 648 S.W.3d at 364 (citing Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 4.002), the mere fact that Wife was not represented by counsel is not sufficient
to show unconscionability, cf. Pearce, 824 S.W.2d at 199 (concluding postmarital
agreement was not unconscionable even though “at the time the agreement was
signed, [wife] did not have a lawyer, she did not read or understand the agreement[,]
and there was no reasonable disclosure of its effect made to her” because wife “kept
the books” for her husband and had encouraged her daughter-in-law to sign the
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agreement against the daughter-in-law’s attorney’s advice). Indeed, because neither
party was represented by an attorney in connection with the drafting or execution of
the premarital agreement, Wife’s lack of legal counsel did not place her in an inferior
position to Husband.
In sum, considering the “entire atmosphere” surrounding the execution of the
premarital agreement, we conclude that Wife has not met her burden to show that it is
unconscionable. See Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 739. Accordingly, we need not address the
adequacy of Husband’s financial disclosures. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.006(a)(2);
Michelina v. Michelina, No. 13-09-00588-CV, 2012 WL 3012642, at *18 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at
739; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We overrule Wife’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Wife’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: June 8, 2023
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