Michael Eugene Lewis v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Opinion issued June 6, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00440-CR
———————————
MICHAEL EUGENE LEWIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1742369
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found appellant Michael Eugene Lewis guilty of the offense of
aggravated kidnapping1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for 20 years.
The trial court also entered an affirmative finding that Lewis used or exhibited a
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b).
deadly weapon, namely, a knife, during the commission of the offense. In two
issues, Lewis contends that his trial counsel was ineffective during the
guilt/innocence phase of trial and that the judgment should be reformed to reflect his
actual jail-time credit.
We affirm.
Background
In August 2017, Lewis, his wife P.H., and their three children were living with
P.H.’s mother (complainant R.M. (“Mother”)) and seventeen-year-old sister
(complainant D.M. (“Sister”)).2 Lewis’s two minor sons by a prior relationship, E.L.
and O.L., were also living in the house.
P.H. testified that Lewis had a history of losing his temper and physically
assaulting her. She noted that he kept “guns and knives” and had used them to
threaten her on several occasions during their marriage. On August 13, 2017, Lewis
“strangled [her] and used a bedsheet to wrap around [her] face” in front of their
children. That night, P.H. and the children left and went to a domestic-violence
shelter.
2
In accordance with our common practice, and as did the State in its brief, we protect
the identities of the children involved in this case by referring to them, and to their
family members, by initials or pseudonyms. See Bays v. State, 396 S.W.3d 580, 582
n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Jenkins v. State, No. 01-18-00987-CR, 2020 WL
1679697, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
2
Mother testified that she did not know why P.H. had left or where she had
gone. Eight days later, Sister accompanied Mother to her housekeeping job at a
hotel. When they got home after work, around 1:00 a.m., Lewis was in the driveway
waiting for them. E.L. and O.L. were waiting for them in the house as well.
Mother testified that Lewis directed her and Sister to give him their cellular
phones. They complied and Lewis turned them off. Lewis, who was holding a knife,
asked where P.H. had gone. When Mother replied that she did not know, Lewis
“pulled [Mother] by her hair and took [her] down to the ground.” Lewis placed his
hands around Mother’s neck and choked her. When Mother awoke, her head was
wrapped in tape and her hands and feet were bound. She heard Lewis tell one of his
sons to shoot her if she moved.
Mother was carried outside to Lewis’s truck, and Sister, who was also bound,
was placed on top of her. Mother felt the truck start, and it was moving for a “very
long” time. When it stopped, Sister was removed. Lewis then “dragg[ed]” Mother
out and along the ground. Mother heard sounds that she identified as weapons being
loaded. Mother then felt Lewis place the cold blade of a knife against her neck, and
she thought that he was going to “slit [her] throat.”
Instead, Lewis said something inaudible and cut the tape from Mother and
Sister. Lewis put them back into the truck and drove back to the house. During the
drive, Lewis threw the duct tape that had bound Mother and Sister into the street.
3
And Lewis told Mother and Sister not to tell anyone what had happened, because he
had “friends who were in a cartel.”
When they arrived back at the house, Lewis directed Mother and Sister to give
him their clothes so that he could wash them. Mother testified that she and Sister
stayed in Mother’s room because they did not feel free to leave.
Early the next morning, Mother awakened Sister and the two of them quietly
left the house and drove to a police station. Mother was then taken by ambulance to
a hospital. The trial court admitted into evidence Mother’s medical records and
photographs of the wounds she suffered to her neck, chest, elbow, and wrists.
Sister testified that on the night of the kidnapping, Lewis “pulled [Mother] by
her hair” and “pulled both of us to the floor.” He put his hands around Mother’s
neck and strangled her, until she “turned purple” and “went unconscious.” Sister
further testified that Lewis told E.L. and O.L. to bind Mother’s and Sister’s ankles
and wrists with duct tape, and they complied. They taped Sister’s hands behind her
and put tape over her mouth. Sister noted that either E.L. or O.L. had a gun. Lewis
opened the garage and carried Mother to his truck. He placed her on the backseat
floorboard and placed Sister on top of her.
Sister also testified that Lewis drove them to a forest, where he “pulled
[Mother and Sister] out of the truck onto the grass.” Sister testified that Lewis had
a “hunting knife” and that she saw him “pull” Mother’s hair up and “put [the] knife
4
on her neck.” Sister thought that Lewis going to kill Mother. Instead, he cut the
tape off of Mother and Sister and told them that they were going home and that “none
of that happened.” During the drive, Lewis told Mother and Sister not to tell anyone
or go to the police because “he has people who can find [them] and kill [them].”
Sister additionally testified that, once back at home, she and Mother stayed in
Mother’s bedroom. Lewis came in and demanded their clothes and ordered them to
shower. Early the next morning, Mother and Sister left the house barefooted to avoid
waking Lewis or his sons.
E.L. testified under an immunity agreement with the State. E.L. testified that
at the time of the events, he was 13 years old. He further testified that when P.H.
left, Lewis was “outraged.” Before Mother and Sister got home from work on the
night of the kidnapping, Lewis told E.L. and O.L. “exactly what we were going to
do that night.”
According to E.L., everything “happened exactly as [Lewis] planned.” E.L
and O.L had duct tape and, at Lewis’s direction, they “taped [Mother’s and Sister’s]
hands first and then their mouths, then their legs and sat them down.” As they were
doing that, Lewis was “[s]tanding there with a gun.” E.L. further testified that during
the kidnapping two firearms were used—an AR-15 and a Glock. Lewis also
brandished an “all-black hunting knife” with paracord wrapped around the handle.
5
After Mother and Sister were bound, Lewis, E.L., and O.L took them to
Lewis’s truck. Mother and Sister were “stacked” on the backseat floorboard of the
truck and blankets were put on top of them. Lewis then drove everyone to his land
about 45 minutes away. Once they arrived, E.L. testified that he helped Lewis take
Mother and Sister out of the truck and place them on their knees. Lewis then directed
E.L. and O.L. to wait in the truck. About an hour later, Lewis, Mother, and Sister
came walking back to the truck. According to E.L., Lewis said during the drive
home that “We don’t speak about this. This didn’t happen. Everybody goes to bed.”
E.L. further testified that, early the next morning, Mother and Sister were
gone. Lewis then directed E.L. and O.L. to pack and he drove them back to his land.
They stayed there for several days in Lewis’s truck before Lewis drove E.L. and
O.L. to his mother’s house in Mississippi. That is where Lewis was arrested.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked E.L. whether he had previously
told anyone a different version of these events. E.L. admitted that he told his mother,
grandmother, and Lewis (on the phone and in letters) that these events did not occur.
E.L. further testified that those statements were not truthful. He also testified that
Lewis “used to whoop [him and O.L.] with a belt or choke or hurt [them]” if they
disobeyed him, and that Lewis had directed him not to be truthful about the events
of that night. E.L. added that he followed Lewis’s orders during the kidnapping
because he “wasn’t exactly going to argue with the guy that had the gun that was
6
already doing something like this.” And E.L. “was just trying to make sure nothing
ended up happening to [him or O.L.] at the time.”
O.L. likewise testified under an immunity agreement with the State. At the
time of these events, he was 12 years old. O.L. stated that during the kidnapping, he
and E.L. followed Lewis’s instructions and taped Mother’s and Sister’s legs, hands,
and mouths and had “held guns on them.” According to O.L., they used a knife and
two firearms—an AR-15 and a Glock.
After Mother and Sister were bound and “stacked” on the backseat floorboard
of Lewis’s truck, Lewis drove them to his land in Plantersville, Texas. There, Lewis
took Mother and Sister out of the truck. O.L. testified that he and E.L. waited in the
truck for about 45 minutes. Lewis then returned to the truck with Mother and Sister
and he drove everyone home.
According to O.L., the next morning, Lewis drove O.L. and E.L. back to his
land. They stayed in the truck for “about a week” before driving to Mississippi.
O.L. testified that Lewis told him that if he was ever questioned about these events,
he was to say: “[W]e didn’t do that.” O.L. admitted that he followed Lewis’s orders
and told his mother and grandmother that these events did not occur. O.L. further
admitted that was not the truth.
Lewis then testified and denied that a kidnapping took place. According to
Lewis, on the night in question, Sister was texting with P.H. and showed him a
7
photograph of P.H. with a man. Lewis testified that he then told Mother that he
reported to immigration authorities that P.H. had taken the children, that he had
contacted a divorce attorney, and that he was moving out. The next day, Lewis,
E.L., and O.L. went to his land in Plantersville. Lewis also testified that when he
learned that he had been charged with kidnapping, he took his sons to his mother’s
house in Mississippi.
Lewis noted that he is a “weapons expert” and kept knives and firearms—
including a Glock. Lewis admitted that while he was jailed, he wrote several letters
to his sons with specific instructions to “tell the people” “we didn’t do this stuff.”
Lewis also admitted that he had drafted affidavits containing his version of the
events, which he had instructed his sons to execute.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his first issue, Lewis contends that his trial counsel was ineffective during
the guilt/innocence phase of trial. Lewis maintains that his counsel “failed to
properly impeach O.L. with his prior inconsistent statement [which] would have
demonstrated that [O.L.] had previously sent a letter to [Lewis] that indicated
nothing happened.” According to Lewis, but for this alleged error, the outcome of
his trial would have been different.
8
Standard of Review
The United States Constitution, Texas Constitution, and Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure guarantee an accused the right to assistance of counsel. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051. As
a matter of state and federal law, this right includes the right to reasonably effective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Ex
parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). A failure to make a showing under either prong of the Strickland
test defeats a claim for ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. at 697, 670 (“If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”); Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675,
687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Under Strickland’s first prong, we must look to the totality of the
representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel—indulging a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable
9
professional assistance and was motivated by sound trial strategy. 466 U.S. at 689;
Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 482–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We “must be
highly deferential to trial counsel and avoid the deleterious effects of hindsight.”
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “The mere fact that
another attorney might have pursued a different tactic at trial does not suffice to
prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d
866, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Allegations of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record.
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. In most cases, a direct appeal is an inadequate vehicle
for raising an ineffective assistance claim because the record is undeveloped, and a
silent record cannot adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel’s actions. See
Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[T]rial counsel
should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being
denounced as ineffective.”); see also Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). In rare cases in which counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent from
the record, an appellate court may address the claim on direct appeal. Lopez, 343
S.W.3d at 143. But, “the record must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law, and that no
reasonable trial strategy could justify counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his
or her subjective reasoning.” Id.10
Under Strickland’s second prong, we must determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. That an error had “some conceivable effect
on the outcome” will not suffice. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Rather, there must be a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to guilt. Id.Discussion
Texas Rule of Evidence 613(a) governs the impeachment of a witness with
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. It provides in relevant part:
(1) Foundation Requirement. When examining a witness about the
witness’s prior inconsistent statement—whether oral or
written—a party must first tell the witness:
(A) the contents of the statement;
(B) the time and place of the statement; and
(C) the person to whom the witness made the statement.
(2) Need Not Show Written Statement. If the witness’s prior
inconsistent statement is written, a party need not show it to the
witness before inquiring about it, but must, upon request, show
it to opposing counsel.
(3) Opportunity to Explain or Deny. A witness must be given the
opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement.
(4) Extrinsic Evidence. Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior
inconsistent statement is not admissible unless the witness is first
examined about the statement and fails to unequivocally admit
making the statement.
TEX. R. EVID. 613(a).
11
Accordingly, to be admissible under Rule 613(a), a prior statement must be
inconsistent with the one given at trial. Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). If the witness denies or cannot recall having made the prior
statement, or if his admission is partial, qualified, or otherwise equivocal, the
statement is admissible for impeachment purposes. Ruth v. State, 167 S.W.3d 560,
566 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). However, “if the witness
unqualifiedly admits making the prior inconsistent statement[], this precludes further
proof [of] the statement such as the introduction of the statement into evidence.”
McGary v. State, 750 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (internal quotations
omitted).
Here, O.L. testified that Lewis had directed him not to be truthful about the
kidnapping, and O.L. explained why he complied, as follows:
Q. Do you remember your dad ever telling you what to say about
this—about this incident?
A. Only thing close to that was we didn’t do that.
Q. Okay. And was that true?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you were growing up, what would happen to you if you
disobeyed your dad?
A. I got whooped.
Q. And during this incident, what did you think would happen to
you if you didn’t do what your dad was telling you to do?
A. Maybe worse.
12
On cross-examination, O.L. admitted that he had previously stated that
“nothing had happened,” as follows:
Q. Initially, did you indicate to people that nothing had happened?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. And who all did you tell that to?
A. My mother and my grandmother.
Defense counsel then asked, “And did you also write that in the letter to your
dad?” O.L. responded, “I don’t remember.”
Later, during the direct examination of Lewis, defense counsel attempted to
introduce a copy of a letter that O.L. had written to Lewis. The State objected based
on hearsay, and the following colloquy occurred:
[Defense Counsel]: This is going for the impeachment with regard to
[O.L.’s] testimony with regard to what
happened—directly happened with regard to this
case. It’s an inconsistent statement.
[State’s Counsel]: Once again, Your Honor—
[Trial Court]: Hold on. Hold on. Okay. But shouldn’t you
confront [O.L.] about that?
[Defense Counsel]: I did talk with [O.L.] about that yesterday.
The trial court sustained the State’s objection, and Defense counsel made a
bill of exception. In the letter, O.L. complained to Lewis that he had tried to call
P.H.’s children and that they “never answer[ed],” which made him angry that “these
people are trying to keep me and [E.L.] from them and they know none of that stuff
is true.”
13
Lewis argues on appeal that, “[a]lthough trial counsel correctly made a bill of
exception regarding the excluded evidence, trial counsel did not properly go through
the predicate for introducing a prior inconsistent statement with O.L. first.”
Specifically, Lewis contends that his trial counsel did not inform O.L. of the time
and place at which his statement was made to Lewis and did not confront O.L. with
the prior inconsistent statement from the letter.
Our review of the record shows that Lewis’s trial counsel did not present O.L.
with the statement at issue in the letter, the time and place of the statement, and did
not give O.L. an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. See TEX. R. EVID.
613(a). And Lewis did not file a motion for new trial, in which the reasons for
counsel’s actions could have been developed. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 (“An
appellate court should be especially hesitant to declare counsel ineffective based
upon a single alleged miscalculation during what amounts to otherwise satisfactory
representation, especially when the record provides no discernible explanation of the
motivation behind counsel’s actions[.]”).
Nevertheless, even if we were to conclude that the record establishes that
Lewis’s counsel failed to properly impeach O.L., Lewis has not shown a reasonable
probability on appeal that, but for this error, the result of the trial would have been
different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
14
As discussed above, O.L. unqualifiedly admitted to having made the prior
inconsistent statement, i.e., that the kidnapping did not occur. O.L. testified that
Lewis had directed him to say “we didn’t do that,” which O.L. admitted was not true.
And O.L. admitted that he told his mother and grandmother that nothing had
happened. Thus, when Lewis’s counsel asked O.L. whether he had “also writ[ten]
that in the letter” to Lewis—O.L. had already impeached himself. (Emphasis added.)
See McGary, 750 S.W.2d at 787 (“When the contradictions are confessed, evidently
there is no use or purpose for the impeaching testimony; for this work he performs
upon himself.” (internal quotations omitted)).
As a result, because the impeachment value of the prior inconsistent statement
at issue had already been realized, whether O.L. repeated the same statement in a
letter to Lewis was of marginal value. See Joseph v. State, 960 S.W.2d 363, 367
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that impeachment value
of prior inconsistent statement was de minimus because credibility of witness, who
was testifying under immunity agreement, had already been impeached); see also
McGary, 750 S.W.2d at 787 n.5 (“The form of the inconsistent statement is
immaterial.”).3
3
We note that the trial court also had before it the testimony of E.L., with whom O.L.
moved in tandem throughout these events, in which E.L. admitted that he had also,
in the past, written letters to appellant in which E.L. had maintained that the events
at issue had not occurred. And E.L. admitted that such statements were not truthful.
15
Moreover, the record shows that the trial court heard substantial evidence of
Lewis’s guilt. See Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893; Joseph, 960 S.W.2d at 367 (noting that,
in analyzing weight factfinder might have placed on error, we look to other evidence
of defendant’s guilt).
A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he “intentionally
or knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during
the commission of the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b). “‘Abduct’ means to
restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding
him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use
deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2).
Here, Mother, Sister, E.L., and O.L. each gave testimony that corroborated
one another and satisfied the elements of the offense. Multiple witnesses testified
that Lewis was angry that P.H. had left; that Lewis planned the kidnapping in
advance; that Lewis exhibited a knife and strangled Mother; that Lewis directed E.L.
and O.L. to bind Mother’s and Sister’s hands, feet, and mouths with duct tape; that
firearms were exhibited; that Lewis directed E.L. or O.L. to shoot Mother if she
moved; that Lewis loaded Mother and Sister into his truck and drove them to a forest
where he held a knife to Mother’s neck; and that Mother and Sister believed Lewis
would “slit [Mother’s] throat.” See id.
16
In addition, multiple witnesses testified that Lewis directed Mother and Sister
not to tell anyone about the kidnapping or go to the police; otherwise, Lewis’s
friends would kill them. E.L. and O.L. also both testified that Lewis had directed
them to falsely deny that the kidnapping had occurred. Additionally, the record
includes Mother’s medical records from the hospital and photographs of the wounds
she suffered to her neck, chest, elbow, and wrists.
Considering the record as a whole and the totality of the evidence establishing
Lewis’s guilt, we conclude that Lewis has not demonstrated a reasonable probability
that, but for his counsel’s failure “to properly impeach O.L. with his prior
inconsistent statement,” the result of the trial would have been different or that the
trial court would have had reasonable doubt with respect to his guilt. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 894.
We thus overrule Lewis’s first issue.
Credit for Time Served
In his second issue, Lewis argues that the trial court’s judgment incorrectly
reflects only one day of credit for time served and that the judgment should be
reformed to credit him with 769 days. The State argues that Lewis should have
raised this issue in the trial court by requesting a judgment nunc pro tunc.
Article 42.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent
part:
17
In all criminal cases the judge of the court in which the defendant is
convicted shall give the defendant credit on the defendant’s sentence
for the time that the defendant has spent:
(1) in jail for the case, including confinement served as described by
Article 46B.009 and excluding confinement served as a condition of
community supervision, from the time of his arrest and confinement
until his sentence by the trial court[.]
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03, § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 42.01,
§ 1(18) (“The judgment shall reflect . . . any credit for time served[.]”).
This Court has the authority to reform a judgment that the trial court could
have corrected nunc pro tunc—but only if the evidence necessary to do so clearly
appears in the record. Jackson v. State, No. 01-16-00242-CR, 2018 WL 1003362, at
*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 22, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Houston v. State, No. 01-09-00669-CR, 2011 WL
946979, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication).
“Although this Court may sometimes reform [a] judgment, when an appellant
has been denied credit for jail time to which he is entitled, the preferred practice is
for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc order authorizing the appropriate credit.”
Steinocher v. State, 127 S.W.3d 160, 163 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. dism’d) (citing Ex parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643, 645 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998)). Alternatively, an inmate may file an application for a writ of habeas corpus
to receive such time credit. Id.18
Here, Lewis seeks credit for time served from September 11, 2017 through
October 18, 2019. Lewis asserts that the trial court took judicial notice in another
case that he was arrested by United States Marshals in Mississippi on September 11,
2017, and our record reflects that he posted bond on October 18, 2019. Lewis also
seeks credit for June 10, 2022, the date on which sentence was imposed.
In Jackson, this Court reformed a trial court’s judgment to credit the defendant
with 11 additional days of time served. 2018 WL 1003362, at *5. There, we
concluded that the record clearly supported at least that amount of time. Id.Similarly, in Houston, the record enabled us to reform a trial court’s judgment to
credit the defendant with two additional days of time served. 2011 WL 946979, at
*4.
The record in this case provides no such clarity. We are unable to ascertain
from this record whether the credit for jail time in the judgment is actually incorrect,
and, even assuming arguendo that it is incorrect, the record does not allow us to
determine what the correct jail-time credit under article 42.03 should be.
Accordingly, this Court lacks the authority to change or modify this aspect of the
trial court’s judgment.4 See Steinocher, 127 S.W.3d at 163 (declining to reform
4
Again, the preferred practice is for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc order
authorizing the appropriate credit. See Steinocher v. State, 127 S.W.3d 160, 163 n.3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d). As the State notes in its brief,
such outcome is not inefficient because the trial court must calculate certain jail
19
judgment to credit defendant with two years additional time served because record
was unclear).
We therefore overrule Lewis’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Terry Adams
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
credit upon receipt of this Court’s mandate. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03,
§ 3. Thus, these matters may be addressed together.
20