Marvin-Levoid Goss v. Joseph A. Alvesteffer ( 2023 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00097-CV
Marvin-Levoid Goss, Appellant
v.
Joseph A. Alvesteffer, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF BELL COUNTY
NO. 21CCV91490, THE HONORABLE JEANNE PARKER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marvin-Levoid Goss appeals from the county court’s judgment in a forcible entry
and detainer suit awarding possession of real property and back rent to Joseph A. Alvesteffer.
See generally Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry and
detainer). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Alvesteffer owns a rental property in Killeen. In April of 2021, Goss and
Alvesteffer executed a residential lease agreement under which Goss agreed to pay $1,300 per
month. The lease provided that rent was due on the first day of each month and that failure to
pay rent by the seventh day could result in eviction.
When Goss failed to pay the monthly rent by October 7, 2021, Alvesteffer sent
Goss a notice of eviction. On October 26, 2021, Alvesteffer filed a forcible detainer action in the
justice court seeking to evict Goss. The justice court awarded Alvesteffer possession of the
property, $1,300 in back rent, and court costs. Goss appealed the justice court’s judgment to the
county court at law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509.8(a) (governing de novo appeal to county court).
The county court signed a default judgment in favor of Alvesteffer but
subsequently withdrew it and set the case for a bench trial. Both parties appeared at the trial and
represented themselves. The county court heard testimony from Alvesteffer’s wife, Gina, and
admitted documentary evidence from both parties. The county court subsequently rendered
judgment in favor of Alvesteffer, awarding him possession of the property, back rent of $5,200,
and court costs. This appeal ensued. 1
DISCUSSION
Goss has filed a pro se brief challenging the county court’s judgment in fifteen
issues. 2 The arguments are difficult to discern, and he generally fails to present substantive
1 Alvesteffer has not filed a brief in this Court.
2 The record reflects that Goss vacated the property ahead of the execution of a writ of
possession on January 20, 2022. That raises the question of whether the possession portion of
this dispute has become moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162
(Tex. 2012) (explaining that Texas courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases). “In a
forcible-detainer case, the issue of possession becomes moot when the appellant ceases to have
actual possession of the property, unless the appellant asserts a potentially meritorious claim
of right to current, actual possession of the premises.” Allen-Mercer v. Roscoe Props.,
No. 03-15-00674-CV, 2016 WL 4506294, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 786–87
(Tex. 2006)). Even if the issue of possession has become moot, there is still a live controversy
with respect to the trial court’s award of damages. See id. (concluding that while issue of
possession was moot, live controversy remained regarding appellant’s challenge to award of
damages and attorney’s fees); Daftary v. Prestonwood Mkt. Square, Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 708, 711
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (same).
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arguments or cite to relevant authorities. 3 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief
to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record”). Although pro se litigants must comply with all rules applicable to
licensed attorneys, Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005), we construe pro se
filings “liberally and with patience ‘so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the
parties’ rights,’” Housing Auth. of City of Austin v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc.,
549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.)). In the interest of justice, we will
address Goss’s issues to the extent we are able to ascertain his arguments. See Onkst v. Onkst,
No. 03-15-00636-CV, 2017 WL 2628245, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (deciding to address “‘pro se issues as best we can’ in the interest of justice” (citing
Forbes v. Forbes, Nos. 03-15-00130-CV, 03-15-00337-CV, 2016 WL 612175, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Austin Feb. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.))).
Reading Goss’s brief liberally, he asserts that (1) Alvesteffer failed to give Goss
seven days to respond to the notice to vacate before filing suit, (2) Alvesteffer evicted him for
unpaid rent even though Alvesteffer had agreed to accept less rent that month, (3) Alvesteffer
3 For example, Goss argues in his first and eleventh issues that the trial judge
participated in ex parte communications in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 76.15 (2023). That
regulation applies in a proceeding under federal law to assess a civil penalty relating to the
possession of controlled substances. See generally id. § 76.3 (2023). Goss does not explain the
relevance of that regulation here. His third issues asks: “Does Court allow affidavit of
government agent as witness? 10 U.S. Code 1044a(B)(d) Authority to act as notary.” That
statute pertains to legal assistance that the Secretary of Defense may provide to certain military
personnel. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1044 (2022).
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defamed him by calling him a sovereign citizen, and (4) the county court’s default judgment
was defective. 4
Goss argues in his first issue that he was statutorily entitled to seven days “to
respond to [the] notice to vacate.” He cites Section 92.0561 of the Property Code, which
addresses the circumstances under which a tenant may repair or remedy a condition after giving
notice to the landlord. As relevant here, a tenant may repair or remedy a condition that would
affect the ordinary tenant’s health if the landlord does not respond to the notice in seven days.
See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.0561(a), (e)(4). The statute does not address notices to vacate. See
generally id. § 92.0561. We overrule Goss’s first issue.
Next, Goss argues Alvesteffer could not evict him for unpaid rent because they
had agreed that Alvesteffer would accept less than the full amount of rent due for September
because of delays in fixing the air conditioning in the residence. The county court admitted a
document titled “Remediation” reflecting that the parties agreed that $750 in rent was due for
September 2021. The notice to vacate, however, states that Goss failed to pay the rent due for
October and then states that Goss violated other terms of the lease, including by allowing others
to live on the property without permission. Goss does not dispute the nonpayment of rent or the
other alleged lease violations in his brief. We reject Goss’s argument that Alvesteffer violated
the lease and overrule Goss’s second issue.
Goss argues in his third issue that Alvesteffer defamed him by asserting at trial
that Goss is a “sovereign citizen.” Whether Alvesteffer defamed Goss by characterizing him as a
4 As recompense for these harms, Goss asks us to order appellees to pay him “One
Million dollars by postal money order or silver troy ounce per the going rate per ounce and
kilogram.”
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sovereign citizen is not relevant because Goss did not bring a defamation claim in this case. We
overrule Goss’s third issue.
Goss argues in his final issue that the county court erred by signing a
default judgment when he was not present. The county court signed a default judgment on
December 9, 2021 and vacated it by order on December 16, 2021. Goss subsequently appeared
at the bench trial, where he argued and presented evidence. Goss has not explained how the
issuance of the vacated default judgment warrants reversal of the judgment rendered after a
subsequent trial in which Goss participated. See Vaclavik v. Addison, No. 03-19-00528-CV,
2021 WL 1704249, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem op.) (“The appellant
usually bears the burden of presenting a trial court record that is sufficient to show reversible
error.” (citing Dominguez v. Gilbert, 48 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.))).
We overrule Goss’s fourth issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the county court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Theofanis, and Jones*
Affirmed
Filed: June 8, 2023
* Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).
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