Simon Fass v. Richard C. Benson, Individually and Acting in His Official Capacity, Inga H. Musselman, Individually and Acting in Her Official Capacity and Jennifer Holmes, Individually and Acting in Her Official Capacity ( 2023 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 7, 2023
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-21-00799-CV
    SIMON FASS, Appellant
    V.
    RICHARD C. BENSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY, INGA H. MUSSELMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    ACTING IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND JENNIFER HOLMES,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 95th District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-05277
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Kennedy
    Opinion by Justice Nowell
    Appellant Simon Fass, a tenured professor at the University of Texas at Dallas
    (UTD), sued appellees, who are UTD administrators, for violating his Texas
    constitutional rights to academic freedom, procedural due process, and substantive
    due process. Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction raising sovereign immunity
    and other jurisdictional issues. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and
    dismissed the case. In four issues, Professor Fass argues his due process and
    academic freedom claims are viable, and his claims are not moot. We affirm the
    trial court’s order granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case.
    Background
    Professor Fass is a tenured professor of public policy and affairs at UTD. For
    the past thirty years, he has taught a wide range of graduate and undergraduate
    courses. Since 1988, he has regularly taught statistics courses for the School of
    Economics, Political, and Policy Sciences (EPPS). As a tenured professor, he is
    required to teach three classes in both the fall and spring semesters. In spring 2019,
    he taught two sections of EPPS 2302, a core statistics class required for EPPS
    students.
    In late March 2019, Dean Jennifer Holmes, who served as Head of UTD’s
    School of EPPS, informed Professor Fass he would receive a classroom “peer
    evaluation” outside of his usual scheduled evaluations. A non-tenured instructor
    who had not taught undergraduate statistics since 2004 observed Professor Fass’s
    evening class. The next day, Dean Holmes told Professor Fass the evaluator was
    “very critical” of his teaching. She also told him several of his students from his
    morning section complained about his class. This was the first time Professor Fass
    heard about any student complaints. Dean Holmes also discussed with him her
    concerns about the rate of withdrawals, failures, and drops (WFDs) in his class.
    UTD administrators had never stated WFDs were relevant to a professor’s teaching
    method and never included them as a metric in performance evaluations.
    –2–
    After the evaluation, Dean Holmes told Professor Fass to alter his approach
    to student grading by eliminating any further quizzes and relying solely on
    homework assignments. Professor Fass disagreed with the new approach but sent
    an alternate proposal. Dean Holmes rejected it. Thereafter, Dean Holmes removed
    Professor Fass from teaching his two EPPS 2302 statistics classes and replaced him
    with a PhD graduate student for the rest of the semester.
    Professor Fass alleged that “by giving the complaints of students greater
    weight than the academic freedom of a tenured profession, [Dean Holmes] upended
    the academic order.” He argued his teaching methods were specifically protected
    by UT System Rule 31004. He also argued UTD violated UT System Rule 31102,
    which required a professor whose teaching methods were found deficient to be given
    support in a specified manner. Removal from the classroom was outside the
    permissible manner of support.
    After Dean Holmes removed Professor Fass from teaching, he complained to
    Inga Musselman, UTD’s Provost, but Provost Musselman affirmed Dean Holmes’s
    actions. Professor Fass alleged Provost Musselman sidestepped her responsibilities
    thereby continuing to deprive him of his academic freedom and violating his due
    process rights.
    Professor Fass next pursued his rights before a UTD grievance panel. The
    panel convened on October 14, 2019, and ultimately declined to overturn Dean
    –3–
    Holmes’s decision.     President Richard Benson upheld the grievance panel’s
    decision.
    In spring 2020, two of the four classes assigned to Professor Fass failed to
    draw enough registered students to “make,” leaving him short of his six-course
    requirement as a tenured professor. Professor Fass proposed several possible non-
    classroom assignments to fulfill his requirements, but Dean Holmes only accepted
    one of them. Professor Fass refused a second assignment because he considered it
    a “meaningless task.” Professor Fass was then forced to forfeit ten percent of his
    annual salary because he could not fulfill his two other course requirements.
    Professor Fass filed an original petition alleging the following causes of
    action: (1) “Violation of the Texas Constitution by Benson, Musselman, and
    Holmes, in their official capacities–deprivation of academic freedom and violation
    of Article I, Section 8”; (2) “Violation of the Texas Constitution by Benson,
    Musselman, and Holmes, in their official capacities–deprivation of property interest
    without procedural due process in violation of Article I, Section 19; and (3)
    deprivation of substantive due process through the arbitrary, capricious,
    unreasonable, and/or irrational actions taken against him.
    He sought injunctive and declaratory relief preventing future interference in
    his classroom methods and barring the deduction of any of his salary. He specifically
    sought a declaration barring UTD and its administrators from “arbitrary removal of
    –4–
    professors from their classrooms based on contested student complaints and mere
    days after a single negative classroom observation.”
    Professor Fass pleaded that “Defendants’ conduct deprived [him] of his
    constitutional rights to free speech and academic freedom, as well as denying him
    the due process required for deprivation of his property interest in his teaching
    salary.” He alleged Dean Holmes’s actions stripped him of his eligibility to teach
    core statistics and research method classes required of all undergraduate EPPS
    students, which resulted in a shortfall in his teaching loads for both fall 2019 and
    spring 2020.
    Appellees filed an original answer and subsequent plea to the jurisdiction
    asserting sovereign immunity.     They argued, among other defenses, that any
    academic or disciplinary decisions were made for legitimate pedagogical reasons.
    They further asserted the following:
     Dean Holmes’s actions were not ultra vires because she made a
    discretionary decision within her lawful authority regarding faculty.
     Professor Fass’s academic freedom claim was not viable because his
    speech was not protected under the First Amendment, and the alleged
    violation was not content-based.
     Professor Fass’s procedural due process claim was not viable because he
    did not have a protected interest in a particular teaching assignment, and
    he received all the process that was due.
     Professor Fass’s substantive due process claim was not viable because he
    did not have a protected interest and even if he did, appellees’ actions were
    not arbitrary. Instead, their decisions “are the academic decisions of
    university officials who carefully considered the best interests of UTD and
    –5–
    its students, and [the trial court] should not substitute its judgment for that
    of [appellees].”
    Professor Fass filed a first amended original petition and deleted his claims
    for monetary relief under the Texas Constitution, his claims against UTD, and his
    claims for equitable relief against President Benson, Provost Musselman, and Dean
    Holmes in their individual capacities. Professor Fass then filed his response to the
    plea to the jurisdiction emphasizing the facts establishing the trial court’s jurisdiction
    as to his remaining claims against the UTD administrators, acting in their official
    capacities, because of ultra vires actions violating his constitutional rights and
    denying his academic freedom without due course of law.
    Appellees filed a reply, and the trial court subsequently held a hearing. On
    August 17, 2021, the trial court granted appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction without
    stating the basis for its ruling and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal
    followed.
    Standard of Review
    Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
    and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
    v. Miranda, 
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 226 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction
    challenges the pleadings, the court must determine whether the pleader has alleged
    facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. 
    Id.
     If
    the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the
    –6–
    jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.
    
    Id. at 227
    . Whether sovereign immunity defeats a trial court’s subject-matter
    jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.; see also Tex. S. Univ. v.
    Villarreal, 
    620 S.W.3d 899
    , 904–05 (Tex. 2021).
    As part of a state educational institution, UTD and its employees acting in
    their official capacities have sovereign immunity from suit. Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d
    at 904–05. However, an exception to sovereign immunity is the ultra vires doctrine.
    To fall within the ultra vires exception, a suit must not complain of a government
    officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the
    officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. See
    Hall v. McRaven, 
    508 S.W.3d 232
    , 238 (Tex. 2017); see also City of El Paso v.
    Heinrich, 
    284 S.W.3d 366
    , 372 (Tex. 2009).1 Thus, ultra vires suits do not seek to
    alter government policy, but rather to enforce existing policy. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d
    at 372. If a plaintiff has not actually alleged such an action, the claims remain
    jurisdictionally barred. Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 240–41 (holding the official capacity
    defendant acted within legal discretion and therefore was entitled to sovereign
    1
    Courts often use the terms sovereign immunity and governmental immunity interchangeably.
    However, they are distinct concepts. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the state
    and its various agencies, boards, and universities. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 
    106 S.W.3d 692
    , 695 n.3 (Tex. 2003). The common law doctrine of governmental immunity protects political
    subdivisions of the state, such as counties and municipalities. 
    Id.
     The differences in the doctrine are not
    material to the issues presented here. We further note the Texas Supreme Court relied on governmental
    immunity cases in considering the ultra vires issue in Hall, which was a sovereign immunity case involving
    a regent with The University of Texas System and the University of Texas System’s Chancellor. See Hall,
    508 S.W.3d at 238.
    –7–
    immunity). Merely asserting legal conclusions or labeling a defendant’s actions as
    “ultra vires,” “illegal,” or “unconstitutional” does not suffice to plead an ultra vires
    claim—what matters is whether the facts alleged constitute actions beyond the
    governmental actor’s statutory authority, properly construed. Tex. Dep’t of Transp.
    v. Sunset Transp., Inc., 
    357 S.W.3d 691
    , 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.).
    The Supreme Court of Texas recently clarified what it means for an official
    to act “without legal authority.” Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 238. The court stated, “a
    government officer with some discretion to interpret and apply a law may
    nonetheless act ‘without legal authority,’ and thus ultra vires, if he exceeds the
    bounds of his granted authority or if his acts conflict with the law itself.” Id.
    “Ministerial acts,” on the other hand, are those “where the law prescribes and defines
    the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to
    the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Id. (citing Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 
    459 S.W.3d 578
    , 587 (Tex. 2015) (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 
    883 S.W.2d 650
    , 654 (Tex. 1994))). The basic justification for this ultra vires exception to
    sovereign immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should
    not be considered acts of the state at all. 
    Id.
    Discussion
    Because this case was decided on the pleadings, our focus is on whether
    Professor Fass’s first amended petition stated viable claims under the Texas
    Constitution to overcome sovereign immunity. When a plea to the jurisdiction
    –8–
    asserts several grounds and the trial court does not specify on which ground the plea
    is granted, an appellant must show that each independent ground is insufficient to
    support the order. See Gentry v. Smith, No. 05-18-01181-CV, 
    2019 WL 4033947
    ,
    at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 27, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We address each
    of Professor Fass’s arguments in turn.
    A.       Academic Freedom
    Professor Fass contends his academic freedom includes his freedom to teach
    without interference and “undeniably” protects an individual professor’s classroom
    method from the arbitrary interference of university officials. Appellees respond the
    Texas Constitution does not protect speech made by public employees while
    exercising their official duties, and even if such a right exists under Texas law,
    appellees did not violate Professor Fass’s right to academic freedom under the facts
    of this case.
    The Texas Constitution provides: “Every person shall be at liberty to speak,
    write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
    privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the
    press.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. Both parties agree we may rely upon persuasive
    authorities applying free-speech protections under both the federal and Texas
    constitutions. See Caleb v. Carranza, 
    518 S.W.3d 537
    , 543 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Davenport v. Garcia, 
    834 S.W.2d 4
    , 40 (Tex.
    1992) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“When state and federal provisions overlap or
    –9–
    correspond, state law, as well as federal law and the law of other states, may be
    helpful in analyzing their proper application.”).
    When interpreting the Texas Constitution, courts have held that public
    employees must establish they spoke as citizens, rather than as employees pursuant
    to their official duties.   See Caleb, 
    518 S.W.3d at 544
    .          Although the First
    Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak
    as a citizen addressing matters of public concern, not all speech by public employees
    is constitutionally protected. 
    Id.
     (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
    547 U.S. 410
    , 417
    (2006)). When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
    the employees are not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes, and the
    Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. 
    Id.
    Here, Professor Fass’s academic freedom claim concerns activities taken
    pursuant to his official duties as a professor. Based on complaints from students and
    an in-person observation of his class, “Holmes insisted that Professor Fass must
    abandon his syllabus and alter his approach to student evaluation, eliminating any
    further quizzes and switching to only homework assignments.” At Dean Holmes’s
    request, Professor Fass provided alternative grading options, but she rejected them.
    These claims relate to actions in his official duties as a professor; therefore, they are
    not protected under the First Amendment unless they involve issues of public
    concern. See 
    id.
    –10–
    The Supreme Court has established that academic freedom is “a special
    concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
    orthodoxy over the classroom.” Buchanan v. Alexander, 
    919 F.3d 847
    , 852 (5th Cir.
    2019) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 
    385 U.S. 589
    , 603 (1967)). However,
    even this protection has limits, and whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter
    of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
    statement, as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 853. Speech involves a matter of
    public concern when it involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to a
    community. Id.
    Professor Fass argues his right to academic freedom was violated as set forth
    in the American Association of University Professors’ 1940 Statement of Principles
    on Academic Freedom, which is located on Provost Musselman’s homepage.
    According to his amended petition, the 1940 Statement provides, “The University of
    Texas at Dallas recognizes academic freedom as the freedom to conduct the
    fundamental activities of a community of scholars and students without interference:
    to learn and to teach.” Professor Fass did not plead factual allegations of how
    requiring him to change his evaluation of student performance from quizzes to
    homework interfered with his ability to teach or the students’ ability to learn.
    Moreover, he did not plead any facts that his evaluation method of students involves
    an issue of social, political, or other interest to the community. “The linchpin of the
    inquiry is, thus, for both public concern and academic freedom, the extent to which
    –11–
    the speech advances an idea transcending personal interest or opinion which impacts
    our social and/or political lives.” Meriwether v. Hartop, 
    992 F.3d 492
    , 508 (6th Cir.
    2021).    A dispute between a professor and a dean regarding quizzes versus
    homework assignments is not a matter of public concern under these pleaded facts.
    In reaching this conclusion, we recognize a professor’s freedom of expression
    is paramount in the academic setting. However, Professor Fass has not pleaded any
    facts indicating Dean Holmes or the other appellees censored, or sought to regulate
    in any way, the content of his quizzes or homework assignments. A dispute that is
    purely private, “such as a dispute over one employee’s job performance,” enjoys no
    First Amendment protection as to that speech. See Bates v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
    
    952 S.W.2d 543
    , 550 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. denied); see also Day v. S. Park
    Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    768 F.2d 696
    , 700 (5th Cir.1985) (concluding teacher’s dispute
    with principal concerning negative performance evaluation was purely private
    matter), cert. denied, 106 
    474 U.S. 1101
     (1986). We conclude Professor Fass’s
    academic freedom claim is without merit. To the extent the trial court granted the
    plea to the jurisdiction on this basis, the trial court did not err.
    Professor Fass also failed to plead facts establishing the ultra vires exception.
    He has not pleaded facts establishing a ministerial duty “where the law prescribes
    and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave
    nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Emmett, 459 S.W.3d at 587
    (defining a ministerial duty). To the contrary, Professor Fass’s factual allegations
    –12–
    challenging his academic freedom are complaints about actions within Dean
    Holmes’s discretion. See Henrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. And, labeling the actions
    “unconstitutional” is not enough. Sunset Transp., Inc., 
    357 S.W.3d at 702
    . To the
    extent the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction on this basis, the trial court
    did not err.
    B.       Procedural Due Process
    Professor Fass next argues appellees denied him procedural due process by
    failing to abide by UTD’s policies and procedures in handling his complaint against
    Dean Holmes and that such actions deprived him of his protected property interest
    in his tenure and employment contract (citing article I, section 19 of the Texas
    Constitution). Appellees respond that his argument is moot or alternatively, he has
    not established any property interest entitling him to due process.
    The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be
    deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities . . . except by the due
    course of the law of the land.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Our due course clause is
    nearly identical to the federal due process clause. See Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex.
    Educ. Agency, 
    555 S.W.3d 54
    , 61 (Tex. 2018). Because the two are so similar, “we
    have traditionally followed contemporary federal due process interpretations of
    procedural due process issues.” Id.; see also Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v.
    Than, 
    901 S.W.2d 926
    , 929 (Tex. 1995).
    –13–
    Before any substantive or procedural due-process rights attach, however, the
    citizen must have a liberty or property interest that is entitled to constitutional
    protection. Honors Acad., Inc., 555 S.W.3d at 61. Property interests “are created
    and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
    an independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 577 (1972). To have a constitutionally protected property interest, a
    person must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” rather than a mere “unilateral
    expectation.” Honors Acad., Inc., 555 S.W.3d at 61. Texas law similarly states that
    a “vested right” is “something more than a mere expectancy based upon an
    anticipated continuance of an existing law.” Id.
    Professor Fass contends UTD administrators deprived him of any meaningful
    due process before removing him from teaching. He specifically alleged his removal
    from the classroom “together with the prohibition against teaching core courses were
    themselves adverse employment actions” that deprived him of his “protected
    property interest in tenure and [his] employment contract.” However, in his response
    to appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction, Professor Fass stated, “Here, it is important to
    note that Plaintiff does not claim a protected interest in a particular teaching
    assignment, but he does claim a protected interest in being permitted to teach the
    classes he was assigned.”
    First, to the extent he has alleged a property interest in teaching classes he was
    assigned in 2019, any such claim is moot as the classes have ended. But more
    –14–
    importantly, courts have held a professor “has no property interest in his teaching
    assignment, or in teaching classes at all,” absent a contractual provision limiting a
    university’s right to reassign professors. See, e.g., Wagner v. Tex. A&M Univ., 
    939 F. Supp. 1297
    , 1312 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Dooley v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    686 F. Supp. 1194
    , 1199 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff’d, 
    866 F.2d 1418
     (5th Cir. 1989), cert
    denied, 
    490 U.S. 1107
     (1989); see also McCartney v. May, 
    50 S.W.3d 599
    , 609 (Tex.
    App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). Professor Fass has not pleaded any contractual
    provision limiting Dean Holmes’s right to assign or reassign his classes. To the
    contrary, he conceded in his response that “Dean Holmes has the authority to assign
    classes in the school, and that he has no entitlement to teach any specific courses in
    the future.”
    Despite this concession, Professor Fass asserts he has a property interest in
    the UT System’s procedures and rules regarding grievances for addressing deficient
    teaching methods.     We disagree.    A state agency’s failure to follow its own
    procedural rules governing employment will not create a property interest which
    otherwise does not exist. Alford v. City of Dallas, 
    738 S.W.2d 312
    , 316 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 1987, no writ). An individual does not have a property interest in the rules
    themselves or in his state employer’s observance of the rules. 
    Id.
     “Rather, a property
    interest protected by procedural due process arises where an individual has a
    legitimate claim of entitlement that is created, supported, or secured by rules or
    mutually explicit understandings.” 
    Id.
     Thus, a state employer’s rules or procedures
    –15–
    governing employment merely evidence a property right, and to have a procedural
    due process cause of action, the plaintiff must establish a protectable property
    interest separate and apart from the rules themselves. 
    Id.
     Procedural rights that
    protect due process cannot be used to “bootstrap” an employee into having a property
    interest entitlement. See San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dis. v. Leal, No. 13-20-
    00569-CV, 
    2022 WL 243725
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 27,
    2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Cote v. Rivera, 
    894 S.W.2d 536
    , 541 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 1995, no writ) (quoting Evans v. City of Dallas, 
    861 F.2d 846
    , 849 (5th Cir.
    1988)).
    Professor Fass has not alleged a property interest, but instead alleged his
    contract required him to abide by UT System’s policies and rules, and appellees
    violated those rules. But requiring Professor Fass to follow UT System’s rules does
    not make them his property and will not establish a protectable property interest
    separate and apart from the rules themselves. Therefore, we conclude Professor
    Fass’s pleadings do not establish he has a property interest protected by the due
    process clause of the Texas Constitution. To the extent the trial court granted
    appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction on this basis, the trial court did not err. Having
    reached this conclusion, we need not address whether the October 14, 2019
    grievance proceeding satisfied procedural due process. See TEX. R. AP. P. 47.1.
    C.     Substantive Due Process
    –16–
    Professor Fass argues his substantive due process rights were violated because
    Dean Holmes’s actions were a complete departure from academic norms. Appellees
    respond a tenured professor has no substantive due process right to continuing
    employment.
    Professor Fass relies on the general proposition that “in evaluating a
    substantive due process claim based on allegedly arbitrary state action, a judge may
    not override a faculty’s professional judgment in academic matters unless ‘it is such
    a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
    person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’”
    Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 
    984 S.W.2d 672
    , 684 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov.
    4, 1998, pet. denied) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 
    474 U.S. 214
    ,
    225 (1985)). This argument, however, presupposes Professor Fass has a substantive
    due process claim. We must first determine if such a fundamental claim exists.
    Not every property right is entitled to the protection of substantive due
    process. See Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d at 909. “While property interests are protected
    by procedural due process even though the interest is derived from state law rather
    than the Constitution, substantive due process rights are created only by the
    Constitution,” and “[t]he history of substantive due process counsels caution and
    restraint” in recognizing such rights. Id. (quoting Ewing, 
    474 U.S. at 229
     (Powell,
    J., concurring)). In Villarreal, the supreme court held the Texas Constitution does
    –17–
    not recognize higher education as a fundamental right and, therefore, does not fall
    within any substantive protection provided by the due course of law. 
    Id.
    Further, in County of Dallas v. Wiland, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with
    the Third Circuit’s reasoning that there is no substantive due process right under the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the continued employment of a tenured professor. 
    216 S.W.3d 344
    , 361 (Tex. 2007) (citing Nicholas v. Penn. State Univ., 
    227 F.3d 133
    ,
    142 (3rd. Cir. 2000)). The supreme court emphasized the following language from
    Nicholas:
    [T]enured public employment is a wholly state-created contract right;
    it bears little resemblance to other rights and property interests that have
    been deemed fundamental under the Constitution. . . . “[I]t cannot be
    reasonably maintained that public employment is a property interest
    that is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.” Nor does
    public employment approach the interests “‘implicit in the concept of
    ordered liberty like personal choice in matters of marriage and family.’”
    Accordingly, we view public employment as more closely analogous
    to those state-created property interests that this Court has previous
    deemed unworthy of substantive due process.
    Id. at 360 (quoting Nicholas, 
    227 F.3d at 143
    ). Because there is no substantive due
    process right to tenured employment at a public university, there is likewise no
    constitutionally-protected right for a tenured professor to teach courses in a specific
    manner. Stated differently, as applied here, because there is no fundamental interest
    in tenured employment, there is no such interest in Professor Fass’s classes or
    teaching methods in the course of his public employment as a tenured UTD
    professor. Accordingly, any governmental action was “entirely outside the ambit of
    substantive process and will be upheld so long as the state satisfied the requirements
    –18–
    of procedural due process.” 
    Id.
     As explained above, Professor Fass failed to
    establish a property interest entitled to procedural due process.
    Even assuming Professor Fass established a protected interest, cases dealing
    with abusive executive action have repeatedly emphasized “only the most egregious
    official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense’” and rise to
    a level of “abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.” 
    Id.
     at 361–62
    (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
    , 834 (1998)). Professor Fass’s
    pleadings indicate Dean Holmes made decisions based on student complaints about
    his class and a “very critical” classroom evaluation. She also considered the number
    of WFDs. She allowed Professor Fass the opportunity to address her concerns, but
    she determined his proposal was unsatisfactory. Ultimately, her decision was upheld
    after a grievance hearing. Viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to
    Professor Fass, any actions against him do not “remotely approach the conscience-
    shocking required for a substantive due process violation.” Am. K-9 Detection
    Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 
    556 S.W.3d 246
    , 266 (Tex. 2018).
    D.     Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
    Finally, Professor Fass requested certain injunctive and declaratory relief to
    prevent future denials of rights to himself and others at UTD. Appellees respond he
    seeks overbroad and improper relief and lacks standing to seek such relief.
    Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
    
    369 S.W.3d 137
    , 150 (Tex. 2012). The Texas standing doctrine requires a concrete
    –19–
    injury to the plaintiff, and a real controversy between the parties the court can
    resolve. Id. at 154.
    A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists
    as to the rights and status of the parties, and the controversy will be resolved by the
    declaration sought. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 
    907 S.W.2d 465
    , 467 (Tex. 1995).
    In order “[t]o constitute a justiciable controversy, there must exist a real and
    substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests and not
    merely a theoretical dispute.” Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 
    595 S.W.3d 678
    , 686
    (Tex. 2020).
    However, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not create jurisdiction,
    but instead is merely a procedural vehicle for resolving issues related to claims
    already within the court’s jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 
    355 S.W.3d 618
    , 621–22 (Tex. 2011). “A litigant’s couching its requested relief in terms of
    declaratory relief does not alter the underlying nature of the suit.” Tex. Educ. Agency
    v. Am. YouthWorks, Inc., 
    496 S.W.3d 244
    , 258 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016), aff’d,
    Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 
    555 S.W.3d 54
     (Tex. 2018). Stated in
    terms applicable here, to the extent Professor Fass’s claims suffer from sovereign-
    immunity defects, he cannot avoid those problems merely by seeking declaratory
    judgment.      
    Id.
     (explaining UDJA does not waive immunity when asserted
    constitutional claims are not viable as a matter of law).
    –20–
    As explained above, Professor Fass cannot establish jurisdiction over his
    claims; therefore, he cannot establish his request for declaratory relief. Goodwin v.
    Hohl, No. 03-20-00433-CV, 
    2021 WL 6129001
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 29,
    2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying his
    requested relief. For similar reasons, he cannot establish the trial court’s jurisdiction
    over his request for injunctive relief. Id.; see also Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
    Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00631-CV, 
    2016 WL 3521888
    , at *6 (Tex. App.—
    Austin June 23, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding injunctive relief under
    the UDJA not available without a declaratory judgment); State v. Anderson Courier
    Serv., 
    222 S.W.3d 62
    , 66 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (noting relief
    granted under section 37.011 of UDJA must be ancillary to judgment).
    To the extent Professor Fass seeks injunctive relief separate from the UDJA,
    we likewise conclude he is not entitled to such relief because he cannot satisfy the
    redressability component of standing. Because injunctive relief “cannot conceivably
    remedy any past wrong,” Professor Fass could satisfy this requirement only by
    demonstrating a “continuing injury or threatened future injury.” Stringer v. Whitley,
    
    942 F.3d 715
    , 721 (5th Cir. 2019). The threatened future injury must be (1)
    potentially suffered by the plaintiff, not someone else, (2) “concrete and
    particularized,” not abstract, and (3) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
    hypothetical.” 
    Id.
     To satisfy the imminence requirement, there must be at least a
    “substantial risk” that the injury will occur. 
    Id.
    –21–
    Professor Fass sought injunctive relief requiring appellees to refrain from
    future interference with classroom methods, to give him the due process he was
    denied, and to require mandatory training for faculty and those administrators
    supervising faculty to prevent “ultra vires actions to limit classroom authority
    without adherence to UT System rules.”
    First, Professor Fass has not shown a substantial risk that appellees will assign
    him to teach a class and then again interfere with his teaching methods; however,
    even if this occurred, he has admitted he has no right to teach a particular class.
    Thus, the threatened future injury is abstract and hypothetical. See 
    id.
     Next,
    Professor Fass has not established he was denied due process; therefore, the trial
    court acted within its discretion by denying such injunctive relief. See Jordan v.
    Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc., 
    89 S.W.3d 737
    , 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2002, pet. denied) (decision whether to grant injunctive relief is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court). Finally, we have concluded appellees did not engage
    in any ultra vires actions, and Professor Fass has cited no legal authority supporting
    a trial court’s ability to enter an injunction requiring mandatory training for college
    administrators when, as here, there has been no academic freedom violation and he
    has failed to show any “substantial risk” any injury/violation will occur again.
    Stringer, 942 F.3d at 721. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    by denying Professor Fass’s request for injunctive relief. See Jordan, 
    89 S.W.3d at 742
    .
    –22–
    Conclusion
    In this suit, we are simply tasked with assessing whether appellees exceeded
    their authority in their UTD administrative roles. On this record, we conclude they
    did not. Having overruled each of Professor Fass’s arguments, we conclude the trial
    court properly granted appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s
    order granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case.
    /Erin A. Nowell//
    210799f.p05                                 ERIN A. NOWELL
    JUSTICE
    –23–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    SIMON FASS, Appellant                          On Appeal from the 95th District
    Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-21-00799-CV          V.                 Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-05277.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
    RICHARD C. BENSON,                             Justices Partida-Kipness and
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN                     Kennedy participating.
    HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, INGA
    H. MUSSELMAN,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN
    HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND
    JENNIFER HOLMES,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN
    HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
    Appellees
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s August
    17, 2021 order granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellees RICHARD C. BENSON, INDIVIDUALLY
    AND ACTING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, INGA H. MUSSELMAN,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY                       AND
    JENNIFER HOLMES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ACTING IN HER OFFICIAL
    CAPACITY recover their costs of this appeal from appellant SIMON FASS.
    Judgment entered this 7th day of June, 2023.
    –24–