Paul Johnson v. Bastrop Central Appraisal District ( 2023 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00173-CV
PAUL JOHNSON, APPELLANT
V.
BASTROP CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 335th District Court
Bastrop County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 2274-335, Honorable Reva Towslee-Corbett, Presiding
August 30, 2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Paul Johnson appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of mandamus.
Johnson filed his petition after the Bastrop Central Appraisal District (BCAD) failed to
1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should
a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this
appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
provide him with public records he requested pursuant to the Texas Public Information
Act (TPIA). We affirm the trial court’s order.
BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2022, Johnson made a request for public records to the email
address designated by BCAD for TPIA requests. Specifically, Johnson requested, “I want
to know who actually made the database entry listing the agricultural market valuation as
$4,137, when they made that database entry, and, if [they] were making the entry at the
direction of someone else, who that other person was” and “I also want to know who
actually made the database entry listing the agricultural market valuation as [$]0, when
they made that database entry, and, if they were making the entry at the direction of
someone else, who that other person was.” Under TPIA, BCAD had ten business days
to provide the requested information or notify Johnson that it was requesting an Attorney
General decision regarding the request. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 552.221(d),
.301(d). After BCAD failed to either provide the requested information or notify Johnson
that it was requesting an opinion from the Attorney General, Johnson filed the instant
petition for writ of mandamus. BCAD’s answer to Johnson’s petition was an unverified
general denial. At the time it filed its answer, BCAD also filed a plea to the jurisdiction
asserting that there was no justiciable controversy because BCAD did not have any public
records responsive to Johnson’s requests.
On January 24, 2023, the trial court denied Johnson’s petition. Johnson filed a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found, inter alia, that
no documents existed that responded to Johnson’s questions, there was no justiciable
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controversy between Johnson and BCAD, and Johnson failed to meet his burden of
establishing his entitlement to mandamus relief. Johnson subsequently filed a request
for additional findings and conclusions, specifically about the lack of a verified answer
from BCAD. The trial court did not issue additional findings and conclusions. Johnson
timely filed the instant appeal.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Johnson presents two issues by his appeal. Those issues contend that BCAD
answered Johnson’s petition with an unverified general denial. As a result, Johnson
argues that this Court must accept all factual allegations made in Johnson’s petition as
true. BCAD argues that Johnson failed to meet his burden to prove his entitlement to
mandamus relief, including by failing to establish that a justiciable controversy exists
between himself and BCAD.
To be entitled to mandamus relief, the petitioner generally must meet two
requirements. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding). First, he must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Id.Second, he must show that he has no adequate remedy by appeal. Id. at 135–36. The
relator bears the burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. In
re Carrington, 438 S.W.3d 867, 868 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, orig. proceeding). “Even
a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary
relief he seeks.” Id. (quoting Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).
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“Public information” is defined as “information that is written, produced, collected,
assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction
of official business . . . .” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.002(a). The TPIA “compels
disclosure of public information that is in existence, but it does not require a government
entity to prepare or assemble new information in response to a request.” A & T
Consultants v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing
predecessor to TPIA). The Attorney General has issued a decision in accord with Sharp
that has been adopted by the transferor court in the present case. See City of El Paso v.
Abbott, 444 S.W.3d 315, 326 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Att’y Gen.
ORD–555 (1990)). This AG decision states:
The Open Records Act does not require governmental bodies to provide
answers to general inquiries. Open Records Decision No. 342 (1982). It
simply requires, with certain exceptions, that governmental bodies make
available information they collect, assemble, or maintain. . . .
The Open Records Act does not mandate the creation of new documents
or the compilation of information in response to a request. Open Records
Decision No. 342 (1982). Only that information in existence is subject to
disclosure. Id.Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD–555 (1990).
In the present case, Johnson does not meet his burden to show that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion as a matter of law. As noted above, he requested the identity
of the persons making certain valuation entries, when those entries were made, and the
identity of any person directing those persons to make those entries. As such, Johnson
did not request records that were already in existence. See Sharp, 904 S.W.2d at 676
(TPIA compels disclosure of public information in existence but does not require new
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information to be assembled to respond to a request). Rather, he requested specific
answers to general inquiries. See Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD–555 (1990) (TPIA does not
require governmental entities to provide answers to general questions). Because
Johnson failed to prove that a justiciable controversy exists in the present case, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Johnson’s petition for writ of mandamus.
We note that Johnson contends that, because BCAD failed to file a verified denial
to his petition for writ of mandamus, we must accept all factual allegations he made in his
petition as true. Johnson cites cases supporting his proposition and we accept his
articulation of the law as correct. See Hays v. Kessler, 564 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Dallas 1978, orig. proceeding) (“We recognize that when no sworn denial of facts
alleged in a petition for mandamus is filed, all factual allegations in the petition must be
accepted as true.”); Narro Warehouse, Inc. v. Kelly, 530 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (when neither respondent or real
party in interest filed verified denials to mandamus petition, “all allegations of fact
contained in the petition must be accepted as true”); Myers v. Zoning & Planning Comm’n
of the City of West Univ. Place, 521 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Under the rules of pleading and practice in mandamus actions
where defendants stand solely on an unverified general denial, plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment if his pleadings state facts entitling him to the relief sued for . . . .”).
However, nothing in the factual allegations in Johnson’s petition entitles him to mandamus
relief. He makes no allegation that BCAD could respond to his inquiries by producing
records already in existence. In fact, the only factual allegations contained in Johnson’s
petition establish that his requests were properly submitted to BCAD and that, prior to him
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filing the instant action, BCAD had neither provided him responsive information or notified
him that it was requesting an AG opinion about the requests. Accepting Johnson’s factual
allegations as true does not change the fact that his petition does not present a justiciable
controversy between the parties and, as such, the trial court did not err in denying
Johnson’s petition for writ of mandamus.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that Johnson has failed to meet his burden to prove his
entitlement to mandamus relief, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Johnson’s
petition.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
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