Woodrow Maybin v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  •         TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-22-00414-CR
    Woodrow Maybin, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
    NO. D-1-DC-22-904015, THE HONORABLE JON N. WISSER, JUDGE PRESIDING
    M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N
    Appellant, Woodrow Maybin, challenges his conviction for continuous sexual
    abuse of young child. Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b). Maybin was accused of multiple acts of sexual
    abuse against his four granddaughters. 1 After the jury found Maybin guilty, the trial court assessed
    punishment at twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Id. at § 21.02(h). Maybin contends in his first
    two issues that the trial court erred when it designated two forensic interviewers as the outcry
    witnesses for two of the child victims instead of those children’s mother. Maybin contends in his
    third issue that the trial court erred when it allowed Maybin’s son to testify that CPS had informed
    him of a “no contact order” that required that Maybin not have any contact with his grandson. In
    1
    The continuous sexual abuse of young child statute creates one offense that may include
    allegations of sexual abuse against one or more child victims. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b) (“A
    person commits an offense if . . . during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person
    commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are
    committed against one or more victims).
    his final issue, Maybin contends that the cumulative error of the three alleged trial court errors
    requires reversal of his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s order of conviction.
    BACKGROUND 2
    At trial, Maybin’s four granddaughters, K.M., M.M., O.M., and A.M 3.—two sets
    of sisters who are cousins—testified regarding multiple incidents of sexual abuse spanning years
    and committed by Maybin against each of them personally. The granddaughters also testified to
    acts of sexual abuse that they had witnessed Maybin perpetrate against one or more of the other
    granddaughters. The oldest of the granddaughters, K.M., was fourteen at the time the outcries
    were made and eighteen when she testified at Maybin’s trial.
    The Outcry Witness Hearing
    The proper outcry witnesses for two of the granddaughters, K.M. and M.M., were
    contested by the parties. The State asserted that the proper witnesses were the forensic interviewers
    who interviewed each child individually. Maybin asserted that the proper witness was the
    children’s mother. The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the
    proper outcry witnesses to designate for the sisters K.M. and M.M. It is undisputed that before the
    forensic interviews took place, their mother spoke to them and asked them if Maybin had
    inappropriately touched them.
    2
    We recite only the relevant facts necessary to resolve the presented issues.
    3
    To protect the privacy of the minor victims, we will refer to them by their initials and we
    will refer to their parents by their relationship to the children rather than by name. See Tex. R.
    App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
    2
    At the hearing, their mother testified that on Mother’s Day of 2018 she asked her
    daughters if anyone, and specifically if Maybin, had ever touched them inappropriately. She
    testified that her daughter K.M. told her that Maybin had inappropriately touched her. The mother
    testified that K.M. did not go into details during that initial discussion but that K.M. spoke about
    it in more detail after the forensic interview. The mother expressed difficulty remembering exactly
    what K.M. had told her and explained that it had been four years, that the mother was trying to
    “move past” the experience, and that the mother had blocked out some of the details so that she
    “could be the best mother [she] can for [her daughters].” The mother testified that her knowledge
    of what K.M. initially told her was limited to “it happened multiple times at multiple houses” and
    “it” meant “touching her in her vagina” but that the mother could not remember if those were the
    words K.M. used.
    Octavia Littles, the forensic interviewer who interviewed K.M. on May 18, 2018—
    when K.M. was fourteen years old—testified that K.M. told her that there were about six incidents
    in which Maybin touched her “no-no place” and that they spoke about three of those incidents.
    K.M. described the most recent incident, which occurred at K.M.’s grandparents’ house about three
    years prior to the interview. K.M. told Littles that while K.M. was sitting with Maybin in a chair
    looking at photos of cars, Maybin reached under a blanket that was covering her and touched her
    “no-no place.” Littles testified that K.M. also told her about the first incident that occurred. K.M.
    told Littles that when she was four or five years old, K.M. was sitting in a chair with Maybin while
    her parents were out to dinner and her grandmother was asleep on the couch. K.M. told Littles
    that Maybin touched her over her underwear. Littles testified to a third incident that K.M.
    described to her, which occurred in between the other two incidents. K.M. told Littles that K.M.
    3
    was sitting next to Maybin watching “NCIS” while her mother and sister were in the kitchen and
    Maybin touched her “no-no square” over her clothes.
    The mother was recalled as a witness and testified that during her initial
    conversation with M.M. about the abuse, M.M. told her that Maybin had touched her breast that
    morning. M.M. also told her mother that Maybin had touched M.M.’s vagina over her clothes but
    her mother did not testify to any additional details, including when the touching happened. The
    mother testified that the only information M.M. gave her prior to the forensic interview was that
    Maybin “rubbed her breast and would touch her vagina.”
    Krista Wold, the forensic interviewer who interviewed M.M. on May 18, 2018—
    when M.M. was ten years old—testified that M.M. told her about three times that Maybin abused
    her. M.M. told Wold that the previous weekend while at her father’s house, Maybin came into her
    room, told her to wake up, and licked her breast and her vagina. It is undisputed that the weekend
    prior to the forensic interviews was Mother’s Day weekend. The earliest incident that M.M. could
    remember was when she was in kindergarten. M.M. told Wold that Maybin was sitting in a
    recliner, asked her to come sit with him, positioned her so that she was at the foot of the recliner
    facing him, opened her mouth with his hands, and put her mouth on his penis. M.M. also told
    Wold about a third incident, which Wold referred to as “the second worst time.” M.M. told Wold
    that she was sitting with Maybin in the living room, that Maybin’s penis was out, and that he
    attempted to put her on top of him. Wold explained that M.M. described that Maybin was
    attempting to put his penis inside of M.M.’s anus but that M.M. was able to get away.
    The trial court designated each forensic interviewer as the respective outcry witness
    for the child that they interviewed.
    4
    Testimony of “No-Contact Order”
    Maybin’s son and the father of O.M. and A.M., testified that in 2018 while he was
    in the process of adopting his son I.M., he was notified by Child Protective Services (CPS) that
    there was a “no-contact order” prohibiting Maybin from having contact with I.M. Maybin objected
    and argued at trial that the testimony was impermissible hearsay, irrelevant, and barred by Rule of
    Evidence 403 as highly prejudicial. The trial court sustained the objection “to anything further
    than the fact that CPS contacted them and maybe the basic just short reason why” and reasoned
    that “anything further is not sufficiently relevant to be admitted.”
    After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Maybin guilty of continuous sexual
    abuse of young child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.
    DISCUSSION
    Maybin contends through three issues that the trial court committed reversible error.
    Maybin’s final issue raises a cumulative error claim.
    Outcry Witnesses
    Maybin contends that the proper outcry witness for K.M. and M.M. was their
    mother because she was the first person the children outcried to about Maybin’s abuse. The State
    contends that the information that K.M. and M.M shared with their mother was not specific enough
    to constitute an outcry and that the mother’s memory issues regarding her initial discussion with
    her daughters made the two forensic interviewers the proper outcry witnesses.
    We review a trial court’s admission of testimony from an outcry witness under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard. Gibson v. State, 
    595 S.W.3d 321
    , 325 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no
    pet.). A trial court has “broad discretion” in determining who qualifies as a proper outcry witness,
    5
    and we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and within the
    zone of reasonable disagreement. See Garcia v. State, 
    792 S.W.2d 88
    , 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
    Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. Martinez v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 806
    ,
    810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure creates a
    hearsay exception in the prosecution of certain sexual offenses committed against children for the
    admission of a child’s first outcry of sexual abuse to an adult. See 
    id.
     “This witness may recite
    the child’s out-of-court statements concerning the offense, and that testimony is substantive
    evidence of the crime.” 
    Id. at 811
    . To be admissible under Article 38.072, “[t]he statement must
    be ‘more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse is
    going on’; it must be made in some discernible manner and is event-specific rather than
    person-specific.” Lopez v. State, 
    343 S.W.3d 137
    , 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Garcia,
    
    792 S.W.2d at 91
    ).
    “There may be only one outcry witness per event.” 
    Id.
     However, when a child tells
    a second adult about a different type of abuse than the child told the first adult, the second adult
    may testify about what the child told them about that different abuse. Hernandez v. State,
    
    973 S.W.2d 787
    , 789 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (citing Turner v. State, 
    924 S.W.2d 180
    ,
    183 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, pet. ref’d) (concluding officer could testify to victim’s outcry
    about penile penetration because victim’s previous outcry to counselor was about digital
    penetration)). Additionally, the subsequently told adult may be the proper outcry witness, if the
    first adult whom the child told cannot remember the child’s outcry. Foreman v. State, 
    995 S.W.2d 854
    , 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (“We interpret the statute to mean that the ‘first
    person’ refers to the first adult who can remember and relate at trial the child’s statement that in
    some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.”)
    6
    Here, Maybin contends that the offenses that K.M. and M.M. described to the
    forensic interviewers were the same offenses they had already told their mother about, just in
    additional detail. See Robinett v. State, 
    383 S.W.3d 758
    , 761–62 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no
    pet.) (“The proper outcry witness is not to be determined by comparing the statements the child
    gave to different individuals and then deciding which person received the most detailed statement
    about the offense.”). We disagree. With the exception of the Mother’s Day incident, the mother
    did not testify that she knew any details regarding the timing of the events her children told her
    about. See Lopez, 
    343 S.W.3d at 140
     (explaining “[t]he statement must be ‘more than words which
    give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse is going on’; it must be made in
    some discernible manner and is event-specific rather than person-specific”). As the State correctly
    points out, continuous sexual abuse of young child makes it “an offense if . . . during a period that
    is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of
    whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims” and the child is
    younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code § 21.02. The mother testified that her children
    did not give her details. The trial court could have reasonably determined that the mother was not
    told enough details to describe individual events underlying the charged offense of continuous
    abuse of young child in a “discernible manner.” See Lopez, 
    343 S.W.3d at 140
    .
    The only incident that the mother had any time reference for was the Mother’s Day
    incident. M.M. told her mother on Mother’s Day 2018 that Maybin had touched her breast “that
    morning.” M.M. told her forensic interviewer that Maybin licked her breast and vagina when he
    woke her up during Mother’s Day weekend. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that
    the forensic interviewer was the correct outcry witness for the alleged abuse event regarding
    licking M.M.’s breast and vagina and that the mother had described a different event—touching
    7
    M.M.’s breast. See Turner, 
    924 S.W.2d at 183
     (distinguishing child’s outcry regarding penile
    penetration from previous outcry about digital penetration).
    Further, the mother testified at the hearing that she could not remember exactly
    what the children had told her, alluded that they had shared more details with her after the forensic
    interview than they had initially, and testified that she had forgotten and blocked out the details of
    the events surrounding the offenses committed against her children. The trial court could have
    reasonably determined that the forensic interviewers were the first adults who could “remember
    and relate at trial” the children’s statements. See Foreman, 
    995 S.W.2d at 859
     (“We interpret the
    statute to mean that the ‘first person’ refers to the first adult who can remember and relate at trial
    the child’s statement that in some discernible manner describes the alleged offense.”)
    We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it designated
    the forensic interviewers as the outcry witnesses for K.M. and M.M.             See Torres v. State,
    No. 03-99-00485-CR, 
    2000 WL 1028098
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 27, 2000, no pet.) (not
    designated for publication) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it designated
    subsequent adult told about the abuse when subsequent adult was told the “how, when, and where”
    through statements that were “quite detailed,” while first adults told were only told “yes” in
    response to asking the victim if defendant had ever hurt her or touched her privates, which
    constituted only allusion to sexual abuse rather than describing event in discernible manner).
    We overrule Maybin’s first two issues.
    Testimony Regarding “No-Contact Order”
    Maybin contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to
    elicit testimony from O.M.’s and A.M.’s father that CPS had contacted him and told him that there
    8
    was a “no-contact order” in place prohibiting Maybin from being around I.M. because it was
    extraneous offense evidence prohibited by Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The State correctly
    points out that Maybin’s objections to this evidence at trial did not include a Rule 404 extraneous
    offense objection. Rather, Maybin argued at trial that the testimony was impermissible hearsay,
    irrelevant, and barred by Texas Rule of Evidence Rule 403 as highly prejudicial. The trial court
    generally sustained the objection, with limited exception for the complained of testimony, and
    stated that any further detail would not be relevant. On appeal, Maybin has filed a reply brief but
    has not addressed the State’s contention that he failed to preserve his Rule 404 issue for
    appellate review.
    To preserve a complaint for appellate review, (1) a party must have made a timely,
    specific objection, request, or motion to the trial court that stated the specific grounds for the ruling
    sought by the complaining party, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context, and
    (2) the trial court must have either ruled or refused to rule on the request—in which case the
    complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
    “[T]he point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.” Wilson v. State,
    
    71 S.W.3d 346
    , 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement.
    Haley v. State, 
    173 S.W.3d 510
    , 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
    After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that Maybin’s Rule 404(b)
    complaint was not preserved because he did not object on that basis in the trial court. Maybin’s
    general relevancy, Rule 403, and hearsay objections did not preserve any Rule 404 complaint. See
    Medina v. State, 
    7 S.W.3d 633
    , 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that general relevancy
    objection does not preserve Rule 404(b) issue); Parmer v. State, 
    38 S.W.3d 661
    , 668 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that Rule 404(b) issue was not preserved because there was no
    9
    Rule 404(b) objection, but there was Rule 403 objection made). Thus, we do not address the merits
    of this issue. See Ford v. State, 
    305 S.W.3d 530
    , 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“If an issue has not
    been preserved for appeal, neither the court of appeals nor this Court should address the merits of
    that issue.”).
    Cumulative Error
    Because we have concluded that Maybin’s first two asserted errors were not an
    abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and because we may not review his third asserted error, we
    conclude that there is no cumulative error in this case. See Chamberlain v. State, 
    998 S.W.2d 230
    ,
    238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[W]e are aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their
    cumulative effect cause error.”).
    CONCLUSION
    Because we overruled the first two of Maybin’s issues and cannot reach his third,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
    __________________________________________
    Gisela D. Triana, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith
    Affirmed
    Filed: August 24, 2023
    Do Not Publish
    10