Joanna Ellen Hopkins A/K/A Jeanna Hopkins v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Opinion filed August 10, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-22-00135-CR
__________
JOANNA ELLEN HOPKINS A/K/A JEANNA HOPKINS,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 35th District Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR28118
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 9, 2020, after a traffic stop, Appellant, Joanna Ellen Hopkins a/k/a
Jeanna Hopkins, was arrested, and later indicted by a grand jury, for the first-degree
felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine of
a weight between four and two hundred grams, with intent to deliver in a drug-free
zone. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112(a), (d), 481.134(c) (West
2017 & Supp. 2022). Appellant waived her right to a jury trial, entered a plea of not
guilty to the charged offense, and proceeded to trial before the court.
At trial, Appellant orally moved to suppress any evidence that law
enforcement personnel found, observed, or seized when they searched, during the
traffic stop, the vehicle that she had been driving. She contended that the actions
taken by law enforcement personnel violated her rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the Texas
constitution, and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; the trial
court denied Appellant’s motion. The trial court thereafter found Appellant guilty
of the indicted offense, and, after Appellant pleaded “true” to the enhancement
allegation in the indictment, assessed her punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment
in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
In her sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when
it denied her motion to suppress because reasonable suspicion was lacking to justify
the unreasonable duration of Appellant’s detention. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On the date of Appellant’s arrest, Officer Roberto Rodriguez, of the
Brownwood Police Department’s patrol division, was engaged in a telephone
conversation with Detective Ray Slayton, of the Brownwood Police Department’s
narcotics division, when he observed Appellant commit a traffic violation—
Appellant failed to signal her intention to turn at least one hundred feet before the
turn; Officer Rodriguez also noticed that the vehicle Appellant was driving had a
defective rear brake light. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 545.104(b), 547.323(d)
(West 2022). Officer Rodriguez testified that when he described this vehicle to
Detective Slayton, Detective Slayton informed him that it was consistent with the
description of a vehicle that had been frequently seen at a drug house that they were
investigating.
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Officer Rodriguez initiated a traffic stop. As he approached the vehicle, he
observed Appellant, the driver, reaching under the driver’s seat. Officer Rodriguez
testified that it is not unusual for citizens to briefly reach down to put their vehicle
in park, to engage the emergency brake, or to grab a cell phone. However, Appellant
was repeatedly reaching down to the point that Officer Rodriguez asked her to cease
“reaching down” and to place her hands on the vehicle’s steering wheel.
Officer Rodriguez testified that he immediately recognized Appellant from
his prior drug investigations that involved her when he was assigned to the narcotics
division. After notifying Appellant of the reasons for the traffic stop, Officer
Rodriguez asked her to produce her driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof
of insurance. While Appellant was searching for these items, Officer Rodriguez
observed that Appellant was taking rapid, shallow breaths, her stomach seemed to
be “jumping,” and her hands were visibly shaking.
Appellant was unable to locate her driver’s license; Officer Rodriguez then
asked Appellant to exit the vehicle so that he could obtain her personal information.
While dispatch was checking and verifying Appellant’s information, Officer
Rodriguez asked her why she appeared to be nervous. Officer Rodriguez then
requested permission to search the vehicle. Appellant refused and stated: “I’d prefer
that you didn’t. This isn’t my car.”
Based on his observations—Appellant’s furtive movements and nervous
behavior, coupled with Officer Rodriguez’s knowledge of Appellant’s possible
involvement in selling methamphetamine, Detective Slayton’s knowledge that the
vehicle Appellant had been driving was “involved” with a suspected drug house that
law enforcement was investigating, and Appellant’s denial of consent to search the
vehicle that she had been driving—together with the suspicions that he developed,
Officer Rodriguez decided to further investigate. He then called in a request for a
canine unit. According to Officer Rodriguez’s testimony and the dashcam video
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from his patrol unit, no more than nine minutes had elapsed from the time that
Officer Rodriguez initiated the traffic stop to the time that he requested a canine unit.
While waiting for the canine unit to arrive, Officer Rodriguez issued Appellant a
citation for the rear brake light violation and a warning for the turn signal violation.
The canine unit arrived at the scene approximately eight minutes after Officer
Rodriguez’s request. The canine proceeded to conduct an open-air sniff around the
vehicle. The canine alerted on the vehicle and the officers thereafter searched the
vehicle. As a result of the search, the officers discovered methamphetamine, drug
paraphernalia, cash, prescription pills, and marihuana in the vehicle.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review.
Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Martinez, 348
S.W.3d at 922–23. We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination
of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s fact
findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Derichsweiler v.
State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d
666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)). We also defer to the trial court’s findings as to questions of fact
and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the
evidence. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436; Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 666–67
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913.
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of pure questions of law,
the application of the law to established facts, and the legal significance of those
facts. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Wade, 422
S.W.3d at 667; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54,
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62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682
(1985)). We also review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that are not
dependent upon credibility determinations. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436;
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673).
If the record is silent as to the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, as in the case
before us, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, infer the necessary fact findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the
evidence supports those findings, and assume that the trial court made implicit
findings to support its ruling. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); see Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When
considering a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). As such, the trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve all
or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Therefore, we will sustain the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, regardless
of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion, if it is supported by the record
and if it is correct under any applicable theory of law. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190;
Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
III. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). These constitutional
protections extend to investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a
traditional arrest. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). A warrantless
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traffic stop by law enforcement personnel to address traffic violations constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is tantamount to a
temporary detention; therefore, the traffic stop must be justified and supported by
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
Reasonable suspicion for a detention exists if a law enforcement officer has
specific, articulable facts, in light of his experience and knowledge, combined with
rational inferences from those facts, that would lead the officer to reasonably
conclude that the person detained has engaged in, is presently engaging in, or soon
will engage in criminal activity. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 7); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968); Crain v. State, 315
S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This is an objective standard that
disregards the actual subjective intent of the detaining officer and focuses, instead,
on whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Terry, 392
U.S. at 21–22; York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914.
When we evaluate whether reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the
totality of the circumstances from an objective standpoint and whether the totality
of the objective information available to the detaining officer indicates that the
officer had a particularized and objective basis to suspect wrongdoing. Ramirez-
Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–916 (citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This consideration includes “both the content of
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
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We may not use a “divide and conquer” approach, in which we disregard some
individual circumstances as not being suspicious; instead, we must consider the
cumulative force of all the circumstances. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 880 n.8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015)). As such, whether the facts known to the officer rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.
State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
An officer need not develop a suspicion that a particular crime has been or
will be committed; rather, the officer need only suspect that something “of an
apparently criminal nature is brewing.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916–17
(citing White, 496 U.S. at 330). In other words, it is sufficient if the officer’s action
is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.”
Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273); see Terry,
392 U.S. at 30. This requires that the information available to the officer supports
more than a mere hunch or intuition. Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Wade,
422 S.W.3d at 668. The officer may then pursue multiple plausible theories in an
attempt to resolve his suspicion. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 509 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Therefore, even when circumstances seem innocent in isolation, an investigative
detention is justified if the circumstances combine to reasonably suggest that
criminal conduct is afoot or imminent. See Furr, 499 S.W.3d at 880 n.8; Murray,
457 S.W.3d at 448; see also Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917. Further, we may
consider an officer’s ability to “draw on his own experience and specialized training
to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available
to him that might well elude an untrained person.” Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at36 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).
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A. Specific, Articulable Facts of Criminal Activity
Appellant contends that the facts expressed by Officer Rodriguez in support
of his objective reasonable suspicion, are not specific articulable facts, but instead
are disingenuous, conclusory, self-serving generalities that are insufficient to prove
that Officer Rodriguez had the necessary reasonable suspicion to “support [the]
additional detention” of Appellant.
An officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity for reasonable suspicion
to exist. Lambeth v. State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet.
ref’d); see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Suspicions that conduct
is occurring need not be criminal in nature; however, the suspicious conduct relied
upon by an officer must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent people
under the same circumstance to clearly, if not conclusively, set the suspect apart
from them. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Crockett v.
State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Lambeth, 221 S.W.3d at 837.
Officer Rodriguez testified and articulated an abundance of facts regarding
his interaction with and observations of Appellant that, taken together, sufficiently
establish reasonable suspicion that a separate crime, other than the traffic violations
committed by Appellant that justified the traffic stop, had occurred or was occurring.
Officer Rodriguez’s articulated facts, although not exhaustive, included:
(1) Appellant’s furtive movements upon being stopped; (2) Appellant’s excessive
nervous behavior; (3) his personal knowledge of Appellant’s affiliation with the use
and distribution of drugs; (4) information he received from Detective Slayton
regarding one of his on-going investigations that implicated Appellant; and
(5) Appellant’s denial of consent to search the vehicle she had been driving. These
articulated facts, in combination, led Officer Rodriguez to believe that Appellant had
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been, was, or was about to be engaged in criminal activity, i.e., the use or the
distribution of methamphetamine.
Based on the specific, articulated facts discussed above, and the relevant
factors and circumstances when considered cumulatively, Officer Rodriguez, in
relying on his experience as a law enforcement officer, could reasonably have
suspected that other criminal activity, independent of Appellant’s observed traffic
violations, had occurred or was afoot. Accordingly, we hold that a sufficient and
justifiable basis for reasonable suspicion existed for the officers to continue to detain
and investigate Appellant for criminal activity.
B. Alleged Unreasonable or Undue Delay or Prolonged Detention
Appellant asserts that she was detained for an unreasonable period of time for
the traffic violations and that an excessive period of time elapsed from when the
purpose of the traffic stop had concluded until a canine unit arrived at the scene and
alerted to the vehicle she had been driving. Whether a traffic stop was unduly
delayed or prolonged by the actions of law enforcement officers is a question of
reasonableness that we review de novo. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190, 194; Kothe, 152
S.W.3d at 62–63; see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682.
A person may be detained upon reasonable suspicion that the person
committed a traffic violation. Guerra v. State, 432 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). Once initiated, a traffic stop (an investigative stop) may not last longer
than “necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 193
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)); see Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
685. Therefore, after the reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, the stop may
not then be used by law enforcement as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal
activity. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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In a traffic stop setting, in addition to determining whether to issue a traffic
citation and, while the investigation is ongoing, a law enforcement officer may
appropriately request and verify (1) the driver’s license and proof of insurance,
(2) the driver’s destination and purpose of the trip, (3) whether the driver has
outstanding warrants, and (4) the vehicle’s ownership and registration. Lerma, 543
S.W.3d at 190, 193–94 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355); Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at
63. The officer may also inquire about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop,
so long as those inquiries do not prolong the detention beyond the time that is
reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190;
Parker v. State, 297 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d) (citing
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686); see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–51. In this regard,
reasonable suspicion that another offense was or is being committed is required in
order to delay or prolong the duration of the driver’s initial detention. Lambeth, 221
S.W.3d at 836; McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2001, pet. ref’d). As such, if during his investigation of the circumstances that
precipitated the traffic stop the detaining officer develops reasonable suspicion that
other criminal activity has occurred or is occurring, the scope of the initial
investigation may expand to include the other offense and the officer may further
detain the driver for a reasonable period of time in order to dispel or confirm the
officer’s reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191;
State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 750–51 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.)
(citing Smith v. State, No. 02-15-00426-CR, 2017 WL 1289354, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Apr. 6, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).
Officer Rodriguez originally initiated a traffic stop for two traffic violations.
During the traffic stop, Officer Rodriguez observed Appellant’s furtive movements
and nervous behavior and additionally, recognized her as someone associated with
the use and distribution of drugs. Importantly, those facts existed or were
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discovered, either prior to or during the traffic stop and Officer Rodriguez’s initial
investigation—thus, reasonable suspicion existed and had developed during the
officers’ initial traffic stop investigation. Here, because Officer Rodriguez
developed reasonable suspicion during the course of the traffic stop investigation,
the continued detention of Appellant was justified. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191;
Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 751.
Once a detention is extended beyond the purpose of the initial traffic stop, a
law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion that illegal activity, such as
the presence of drugs in the vehicle that has been stopped, is imminent or afoot in
order to justify the continuation of the detention. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
409–410 (2005); see Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 193 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354).
Thus, the reasonableness of the duration of Appellant’s extended detention depends
on whether Officer Rodriguez diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to quickly confirm or dispel his suspicions. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686;
Parker, 297 S.W.3d at 812. Therefore, a temporary detention may continue for a
reasonable time period until the officer confirms or dispels his suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014).
In this case, Officer Rodriguez had reasonable suspicion that other criminal
activity, independent of the purpose of the traffic stop, was occurring, had occurred,
or was imminent. Officer Rodriguez developed reasonable suspicion that Appellant
could be, or could have been, engaged in the use or the distribution of
methamphetamine. Because of Officer Rodriguez’s suspicions, and because
Appellant denied law enforcement consent to search the vehicle that she was driving,
Officer Rodriguez was justified in requesting the assistance of a canine unit and
extending the duration of Appellant’s detention for a reasonable period of time in
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order to dispel or confirm his reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. See
Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 752.
“Generally, an open-air sniff of a vehicle’s exterior by a trained canine is not
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at
752; Johnson v. State, 323 S.W.3d 561, 563–64 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet.
ref’d); 1979 Pontiac Auto. v. State, 988 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1998, no pet.); Mohmed v. State, 977 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1998, pet. ref’d). This is because the use of a trained canine unit is recognized as a
minimally intrusive method of investigation for a law enforcement officer to either
confirm or dispel his suspicions of the presence of narcotics. Parker, 297 S.W.3d at
812; Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d);
Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref’d). Consequently, if an officer temporarily detains “an automobile to allow an
olfactory inspection by a police dog trained to detect the odor of illegal drugs,” that
detention “is not offensive to the Fourth Amendment when based on a reasonable
suspicion that the automobile contains narcotics.” Mohmed, 977 S.W.2d at 628.
However, reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a detention so that a canine
sniff can occur. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63–64; see Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 52
(Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d).
There is no rigid timeframe or bright-line rule that governs the acceptable
duration of a temporary detention. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685–86 (expressly
rejecting the adoption of a “hard-and-fast” time limitation for permissible traffic
stops). In fact, no requirement exists that a canine unit must arrive at the location of
the traffic stop within a certain period of time; instead, it is only necessary that the
timing of the canine unit’s arrival is not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 752; Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 492. A canine sniff that results
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from an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop is invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
See Haas, 172 S.W.3d at 52.
In this instance, we conclude that Officer Rodriguez diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. It
is undisputed that Officer Rodriguez immediately requested the presence of a canine
unit once it became apparent to him that a canine sniff would be necessary to dispel
or confirm his suspicion that Appellant had been, was, or would be engaged in, other
criminal activity, namely, the possession, use, or distribution of drugs in the vehicle
she had been driving. The canine unit arrived at the scene of the traffic stop
approximately eight minutes after Officer Rodriguez requested it. Based on these
circumstances, we cannot say that an eight-minute detention to await the arrival of a
canine unit is unreasonable. See Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 754–55 (holding that a
thirty-eight minute detention following a traffic stop until the canine unit arrived at
the scene is not unreasonable); Parker, 297 S.W.3d at 812 (holding that a seventy-
minute detention following a traffic stop until the canine alerted on the defendant’s
vehicle is not unreasonable per se); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 492 (holding that a
seventy-five-minute detention from the time of the traffic stop until the arrival of the
canine unit is not unreasonable); Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 840–41 (holding that a ninety-
minute detention from the time of the stop until the officers searched the vehicle was
not unreasonable).
Further, after its arrival at the scene, the canine alerted on the vehicle that
Appellant had been driving and confirmed Officer Rodriguez’s suspicions. Once
the canine alerted, Officer Rodriguez’s reasonable suspicion ripened into probable
cause to search the vehicle. See State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 527–28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011) (recognizing that a positive alert by a trained canine provides
probable cause to search a vehicle); Parker v. State, 182 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 754; Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893,
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901 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d); Parker, 297 S.W.3d at 812. As such, the
duration of Appellant’s further detention until the canine unit arrived at the scene
was reasonable and did not violate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
We conclude that the specific facts known to and articulated by Officer
Rodriguez established the existence of an objectively reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity that was beyond the scope of Appellant’s traffic violations, which
in turn justified the extended detention of Appellant pending the arrival of the canine
unit. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s oral motion to
suppress. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
August 10, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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