Deeantoine Reed Lewis v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Opinion issued August 8, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00558-CR
———————————
DEEANTOINE REED LEWIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 506th District Court
Waller County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 21-12-17920
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant Deeantoine Reed Lewis guilty of the felony offense of
evading arrest or detention.1 The jury returned a special issue affirmatively finding
that Lewis used a deadly weapon, namely, a motor vehicle, during the commission
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04; TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 541.201.
of the offense. After finding true the allegations in two felony enhancement
paragraphs, the jury assessed his punishment at confinement for 50 years.2 The trial
court sentenced Lewis in accordance with the jury’s verdict and entered its
affirmative finding.
Before trial began, Lewis filed a motion to suppress the “fruits of []his arrest
and detention,” challenging the lawfulness of his arrest under Texas law.3 After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Lewis’s motion to suppress. Lewis now
challenges that ruling.
In his sole issue, Lewis contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the arresting officer “was not primarily motivated by his
community caretaking function and any encounter quickly escalated to a detention
unsupported by reasonable suspicion.”
We affirm.
Background
At the hearing on Lewis’s motion to suppress, Waller County Sheriff’s Office
Deputy C. Rodriguez testified that, at around 10:30 p.m. on September 1, 2021, he
was on patrol in southern Waller County, approximately three miles from the City
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42.
3
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 9; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a).
2
of Brookshire. He noted that “it’s a remote area,” in that “[t]here is not very much
around there,” other than “a lot of pastures, rice fields, [and] a lot of farming.”
While on patrol, Deputy Rodriguez came upon Lewis’s car “sitting in the
roadway” on Morton Road, near Farm-to-Market Road 362. Initially, Lewis’s car
was “blacked out,” but Lewis activated his hazard lights a few seconds later.
Rodriguez testified that Lewis’s vehicle constituted a traffic hazard because there
were no streetlights—it was “completely blacked out in that area”—and another
driver “probably wouldn’t see that vehicle sitting on the roadway.”
Deputy Rodriguez activated his emergency lights and parked his patrol car
behind Lewis’s car. Rodriguez stated that his intention was to determine why the
vehicle was stopped in the middle of the road and to get it off the roadway.
When Deputy Rodriguez got out of his car and approached the driver’s-side
door of Lewis’s car, he noted that the engine was not running. Lewis, who was the
car’s sole occupant, was sweating profusely, and Rodriguez surmised that Lewis
“had been sitting there for quite awhile.”
The trial court admitted into evidence Deputy Rodriguez’s body-camera
video, which depicts his face-to-face encounter with Lewis.4
4
Both parties, in their briefs, direct us to “State’s exhibit 3,” the unredacted version
of Deputy Rodriguez’s body-camera video. However, during the suppression
hearing, the trial court admitted “State’s Exhibit No. 3-A,” which is the redacted
version. Thus, we consider the trial court’s ruling in light of Exhibit 3-A, the
redacted version.
3
In the video, Deputy Rodriguez, who was holding a flashlight, approached the
open driver’s-side window of Lewis’s car and asked, in a light tone, “What’s going
on, man?” Lewis replied that his car was “running a little hot.” Rodriguez asked,
“Where [are] you coming from?” And Lewis replied that he was coming from a
friend’s house on Katy Hockley Road. Rodriguez inquired about the nature of the
car problem and explained that he could not leave Lewis sitting “in the middle of the
road.” Lewis stated that the car should be operable in about “20 or 30 minutes.”
Deputy Rodriguez asked if Lewis had his driver’s license. Lewis responded
that he had an identification card and handed Rodriguez a Texas Identification Card.
Rodriguez asked Lewis why he did not have a driver’s license. Lewis replied that
he had been unable to get an appointment, referring to the Texas Department of
Public Safety. Rodriguez stated that “the county [was] cracking down real hard on
people who don’t have driver’s licenses, and they want us to tow vehicles and stuff
like that if you don’t have a driver’s license.” Rodriguez asked if Lewis at least had
proof of insurance with him, and Lewis replied that he did not.
Deputy Rodriguez told Lewis that he was going to check for outstanding
warrants and then they might have to push Lewis’s car off the road. Rodriguez asked
Lewis if the address on his identification card was current, and Lewis replied in the
affirmative. Rodriguez asked where his street was located. When Lewis replied that
it was on Barker Cypress Road, Rodriguez asked, “So what are you doing over
4
here?” Lewis again stated that he was visiting a friend on Katy Hockley Road and
added that he was “trying to get back home.”
Deputy Rodriguez pointed out to Lewis that if he was on Katy Hockley and
was going home to Barker Cypress, he would have traveled east. Instead, he had
traveled west and was “going the complete opposite way” from where he lived.
Rodriguez told Lewis that he was not being “straight up.” Lewis replied, “I just got
confused.”
Deputy Rodriguez asked Lewis to step out of his car while Rodriguez checked
for outstanding warrants. Rodriguez explained to Lewis that he had “ma[d]e
contact” with him because his car was in the roadway. And, subsequently, he had
learned that Lewis was not a licensed driver. Rodriguez noted that he would likely
write Lewis a warning and that, after he ran Lewis’s information, he would help push
the car out of the roadway.
As Deputy Rodriguez began to step away, Lewis started his car. Rodriguez
commanded him to turn it off, but Lewis ignored him and sped away. Rodriguez
ran to his patrol car, activated his emergency sirens, and pursued Lewis.
Deputy Rodriguez testified that Lewis drove at speeds in excess of 100 miles
per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone for approximately 4 miles. He drove on the
wrong side of the road, through stop signs, and against a traffic light.
5
Once inside the City of Brookshire, Lewis “slammed on his brakes” to make
a turn, and Rodriguez’s patrol car collided with Lewis’s car. Lewis then climbed
out through the passenger side of his car and fled. Rodriguez pursued Lewis on foot
for approximately 300 yards before apprehending him.
After the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
Motion to Suppress Evidence
In his sole issue, Lewis contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because Deputy Rodriguez “was not primarily motivated by his
community caretaking function and any encounter quickly escalated to a detention
unsupported by reasonable suspicion.”
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard. State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
“On the one hand, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination
of historical facts and the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact,
especially when those determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and
demeanor.” State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “On the
other hand, we review pure questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and
fact that do not turn on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, on a de novo
6
basis.” Id. at 740–41. We review questions of statutory construction, which is a pure
question of law, on a de novo, non-deferential basis. Id. at 741.
At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of
the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, even if
uncontroverted. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We
generally consider only the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing unless the
parties consensually re-litigate the issue at trial. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799,
809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we “must view all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” State v.
Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When, as here, the
trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we “infer[] the necessary factual
findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the record evidence . . . supports
th[o]se implied fact findings.” Id. We uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is correct
under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
B. Legal Principles
“The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between
the police and the citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).
7
Not all encounters with law enforcement officers implicate the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable seizures. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991); Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). There are
three distinct types of interactions between officers and citizens: (1) consensual
encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests. State v. Woodard, 341
S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
(1) Consensual Encounter
“Consensual police-citizen encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment
protections.” Id. at 411. Police officers are “as free as any other citizen to knock on
someone’s door and ask to talk with them, to approach citizens on the street or in
their cars and to ask for information or their cooperation.” Garcia-Cantu, 253
S.W.3d at 243 (emphasis added). An officer may ask questions, determine whether
assistance is needed, and request identification. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35;
State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). No justification
is required. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411. And the citizen may terminate the
encounter at will. Id. “The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny
unless it loses its consensual nature.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
An encounter loses its consensual nature and implicates Fourth Amendment
protections if the officer “convey[s] a message that compliance with [his] requests
is required.” Id. at 435. No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter
8
becomes a seizure. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466–67. “[A] person has been
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
In determining whether a reasonable person in the citizen’s shoes would have
felt free to ignore an officer’s requests or terminate the interaction, courts consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interaction from an objective
perspective. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 467. Factors rising to a seizure have
included: the threatening presence of several officers; an officer’s display of a
weapon; use of flashing lights as a show of authority; physically touching an
individual; ordering the individual to roll down the car window or to get out of the
car; an officer’s tone of voice or use of words indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled; and blocking an individual’s vehicle.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 243. When an
encounter becomes a detention or arrest, both of which are seizures, Fourth
Amendment scrutiny is necessary. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411.
(2) Investigative Detention
An officer may conduct an investigative detention if he reasonably suspects
that an individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific,
9
articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts,
would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon
will be engaged in criminal activity.” Id. For instance, a police officer may lawfully
stop a vehicle if he has a reasonable basis for suspecting the motorist has committed
a traffic violation. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The reasonable suspicion standard is wholly objective; the subjective intent of the
officer conducting the investigation is irrelevant. Id.(3) Probable Cause for a Warrantless Arrest
“Probable cause” for a warrantless arrest exists if, “when the arrest is made,
the facts, circumstances, and reasonably trustworthy information known to the
arresting officer[] are sufficient for a prudent person to conclude that the individual
committed or was committing a criminal offense.” Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667.
Specific and articulable facts are required. Id. A mere suspicion or hunch is
insufficient. Id. The test for probable cause is objective, unrelated to the subjective
beliefs of the arresting officer, and requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
“A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense
committed in his presence or within his view.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.01(b);
Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667. “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
10
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–
70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
For instance, Chapter 521 of the Texas Transportation Code generally
provides that a person “may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state
unless the person holds a driver’s license.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.021.5 And a
person required to hold a license “shall . . . have in the person’s possession while
operating a motor vehicle the class of driver’s license appropriate for the type of
vehicle operated” and “display the license on the demand of a . . . peace officer.” Id.
§ 521.025(a). “A peace officer may stop and detain a person operating a motor
vehicle to determine if the person has a driver’s license.” Id. § 521.025(b). And a
“person who violates this section commits an offense.” Id. § 521.025(c).
Further, section 543.001 of the Transportation Code “allows any peace officer
to arrest without a warrant a person found committing a traffic violation,” apart from
exceptions not applicable here. Marzett v. McCraw, 511 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Tex.
5
Because the term “highway” is not defined in Transportation Code, Subtitle B,
Chapter 521, we apply the definition in Subtitle C. TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 521.001(b) (“A word or phrase that is not defined by this chapter but is defined
by Subtitle C has the meaning in this chapter that is assigned by that subtitle.”).
Pursuant to Subtitle C, the term “[h]ighway” means “the width between the
boundary lines of a publicly maintained way any part of which is open to the public
for vehicular travel.” Id. § 541.302(5).
11
App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 543.001,
.004(a)(1)).6
C. Analysis
Lewis maintains that “no reasonable person would have felt free to terminate
the encounter” with Deputy Rodriguez and that Rodriguez “did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe that [Lewis] was engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal
activity so as [to] justify the detention.”
However, based on this record, we conclude that the initial interaction
between Deputy Rodriguez and Lewis was a consensual encounter, which then gave
rise to probable cause for arrest.
The pertinent evidence shows that when Deputy Rodriguez happened upon
Lewis’s vehicle, it was parked in the middle of the roadway without any lights and
Lewis was sitting inside. Rodriguez noted that Lewis’s car constituted a traffic
hazard because there were no streetlights—it was “completely blacked out in that
area”—and another driver “probably wouldn’t see that vehicle sitting on the
6
See Cano v. State, No. 03-15-00485-CR, 2017 WL 3908640, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 24, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“[T]here was undisputed evidence presented that Cano did not have his driver’s
license with him at the time of the stop, which is an arrestable offense,” and thus
“the district court would not have erred in concluding that [officer] had probable
cause to arrest Cano for committing that offense.”).
12
roadway.” Rodriguez activated his emergency lights and parked his patrol car
behind Lewis.
When Deputy Rodriguez got out and approached the driver’s side door of
Lewis’s car, he noted that the engine was not running. Rodriguez’s body-cam video
shows that he held a flashlight as he approached Lewis’s open window and asked,
in a light tone, “What’s going on, man?” Lewis replied that his car was “running a
little hot.” Rodriguez asked, “Where [are] you coming from?” And Lewis replied
that he was coming from a friend’s house on Katy Hockley Road. Rodriguez
inquired about the nature of the car problem and explained that he could not leave
Lewis sitting “in the middle of the road.”
Deputy Rodriguez asked if Lewis had his driver’s license. Lewis responded
that he had an identification card and handed Rodriguez a Texas Identification Card
without hesitation. Lewis admitted that he did not have a driver’s license.
At the outset, Deputy Rodriguez was free to stop and talk with Lewis, to
inquire about his car being parked in the middle of a dark and desolate road without
any lights, and to ask to see his driver’s license.7 No justification was required.
7
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991); State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d
460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that officer may, without reasonable
suspicion, request identification or information from citizen); Cole v. State, No.
03-08-00045-CR, 2008 WL 3877714, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2008, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that asking for and
examining driver’s license, without more, does not transform encounter into
detention).
13
Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411. And Lewis readily complied. Even though Rodriguez
did not tell Lewis that his request for identification or information may be ignored,
the fact that Lewis complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature
of the encounter. See Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 466.
In considering whether a reasonable person in Lewis’s shoes would have felt
free to decline Deputy Rodriguez’s requests or to terminate the interaction, we
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interaction. See id. at 467.
Deputy Rodriguez activated the emergency lights on his patrol car when he
approached Lewis’s car and parked, and he held a flashlight when he approached
Lewis on foot. These factors can suggest a detention. See Garcia–Cantu, 253
S.W.3d at 245 n.43 (noting that use of “blue flashers” or police emergency lights is
frequently held sufficient to constitute detention, either in parked or moving car).
However, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances of this case, the
evidence shows that the encounter occurred at 10:30 p.m., in a dark area with no
ambient lighting, and Lewis was parked in the middle of a roadway where another
motorist could have hit him. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s implied
finding that Deputy Rodriguez activated his lights and used a flashlight for safety
reasons.8
8
See Cole, 2008 WL 3877714, at *4 (holding record supported trial court’s implied
finding that activation of patrol car’s emergency lights in dark area was for safety
14
Additionally, Deputy Rodriguez parked behind Lewis in an open roadway and
did not block Lewis’s vehicle. See Franks, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (“Although [officer]
parked his vehicle behind appellant’s, nothing in the record suggests that the position
of his vehicle blocked hers or prevented appellant from leaving the rest area by
simply driving forward.”).9
With respect to whether a reasonable person in Lewis’s shoes would have felt
able to terminate the interaction with Deputy Rodriguez in light of the car being
inoperable: “the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his business.” See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added; internal quotation
omitted). Here, according to Lewis, his car was inoperable. Thus, based on Lewis’s
own representation, his freedom of movement was restricted by a factor independent
of any conduct by Deputy Rodriguez. See id. at 436 (“Bostick’s freedom of
movement was restricted by a factor independent of police conduct—i.e., by his
being a passenger on a bus.”).
reasons and did not constitute detention); Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135, 142
(Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding officer’s activation of patrol car’s
overhead lights was not determinative where officer testified that he activated lights
to illuminate rest area, which was dark and did not have any lighting).
9
Cf. State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 243, 246 & n.44 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (“Most courts have held that when an officer ‘boxes in’ a car to prevent its
voluntary departure, this conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.”).
15
Further, Deputy Rodriguez was the sole officer on the scene. See Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 554 (considering presence of multiple officers threatening). There is no
evidence that he displayed a weapon or physically touched Lewis. See id.; Monjaras
v. State, 664 S.W.3d 921, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). And the trial court could
have reasonably found Rodriguez’s tone, as heard in the body camera video, to be
friendly and conversational. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Monjaras, 664
S.W.3d at 928. Thus, the video does not reasonably indicate that Lewis’s
compliance with Rodriguez’s requests for information was compelled. See
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Monjaras, 664 S.W.3d at 928.
Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, we therefore conclude that Deputy Rodriguez’s initial interaction with
Lewis did not constitute such a show of authority as to indicate to a reasonable
person that he would not be free to terminate the encounter. See Castleberry, 332
S.W.3d at 467; Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241. As a result, we hold that Deputy
Rodriguez’s initial interaction with Lewis constituted a consensual encounter. See
Franks, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (“The initial interaction between [the officer] and
appellant, after he approached the car, was an encounter.”).10
10
See also Adams v. State, No. 02-17-00358-CR, 2019 WL 1065913, at *13 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“Sergeant Cooper’s walking up to Adams’s parked car and requesting
his identification was a consensual encounter . . . .”); Gilbert v. State, No. 07-16-
16
However, the initial consensual encounter progressed to probable cause for
arrest once Lewis admitted that he did not possess a driver’s license. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 14.01(b) (“A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant
for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.”); Villarreal v. State,
631 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“The officer
developed probable cause to arrest appellant almost immediately after the stop began
because appellant did not possess a driver’s license.”).11 And, as a matter of law, an
arrest for a minor traffic violation is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 340; Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469.
Although Lewis was parked at the time of his encounter with Deputy
Rodriguez, the record shows that Lewis was the sole occupant of his car, and he
admitted that he had recently operated his vehicle and intended to drive home. See
00158-CR, 2016 WL 7010570, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 22, 2016, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that, under totality of
circumstances, consensual encounter occurred when officer approached car parked
in church parking lot near midnight and asked whether anything was wrong and
whether he could see occupants’ identification). Because we conclude that the
initial interaction between Deputy Rodriguez and Lewis was a consensual
encounter, we need not address the community-caretaking exception the parties
dispute.
11
See also TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 521.021 (person operating motor vehicle must
possess license), 521.025 (person must display license on demand of peace officer
and violation constitutes offense); Gracia v. State, No. 14-15-00106-CR, 2016 WL
3965108, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 21, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (“After appellant told [officer] that he did not
have a driver’s license, [officer] reasonably concluded that appellant was violating
the Texas Transportation Code by driving without a driver’s license,” and “[officer]
therefore had probable cause to arrest appellant.”).
17
Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 668 (notwithstanding that car was parked, statements by
defendant found seated in driver’s seat about where she was coming from and where
she was headed “could be interpreted by a prudent person as admissions” that she
had operated her vehicle).
Because there was a legitimate basis for Lewis’s arrest, it is not relevant that
Deputy Rodriguez did not state that he planned to arrest Lewis for his failure to
display a driver’s license before Lewis drove away. An officer’s subjective reasons
for an arrest are not considered. See Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542–43 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000); Garcia v. State, 218 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Consequently, we further hold that the record supports the trial
court’s implied finding that Rodriguez had probable cause to arrest Lewis for driving
without a license. See Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667.
Accordingly, based on all of the reasons above, we overrule Lewis’s sole issue
and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s motion
to suppress.
18
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all things.
Terry Adams
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
19