Joe Michael Enriquez v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-21-00424-CR
Joe Michael ENRIQUEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 7464
Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1
Delivered and Filed: July 26, 2023
AFFIRMED
Joe Michael Enriquez was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(d). Enriquez filed a motion to suppress the
methamphetamine seized by law enforcement officers during a traffic stop. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Thereafter, Enriquez entered into
1
Sitting by assignment pursuant to section 74.003(b) of the Texas Government Code
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a plea-bargain agreement with the State and pled guilty to the charged offense, and the trial court
accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction. 2
In four issues, Enriquez argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to suppress. In his first two issues, Enriquez challenges the lawfulness of his detention. In his
second two issues, Enriquez challenges the lawfulness of the pat-down search that occurred during
his detention. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2019, Enriquez was a passenger in a car pulled over by a Texas Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”) trooper for operating with an expired license plate and displaying a wrong
registration insignia. 3 Approximately eight minutes after the car was stopped and during a pat-
down search, the trooper found methamphetamine in Enriquez’s pocket and arrested him for the
charged offense.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court considered the testimony of Steven Edward
Mayfield (“Mayfield”), the DPS trooper who initiated the traffic stop and ultimately arrested
Enriquez; the videos from the dash cam and the trooper’s body cam; a photograph of a long-blade
knife or dagger found on the passenger-side floorboard of the car; and the trooper’s written offense
report. The suppression hearing evidence showed that after the car’s driver, Miguel Gonzalez
Arispe, pulled into a gas station and stopped, Mayfield approached the driver’s side window and
started talking to him and Enriquez, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Mayfield asked
Arispe and Enriquez what type of work they did. One of them answered that they sheared sheep,
and the other one answered that they sheared goats. Mayfield testified that he believed that Arispe
2
The trial court certification states this is a plea bargain case, but Enriquez has the right to appeal because matters were
raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial.
3
TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 502.407, 502.475.
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and Enriquez’s answers were suspicious because in his personal experience goats were not
sheared 4 and because he noticed that neither Arispe nor Enriquez had sheep or goat hair on them.
Mayfield noticed that both Arispe and Enriquez were shirtless and tattooed. Mayfield also
observed that Arispe and Enriquez “talked over each other” and avoided eye contact with him,
which he considered to be signs of nervousness. Mayfield asked Arispe and Enriquez for
identification, and they provided him their licenses. Mayfield asked Arispe for proof of insurance,
but Arispe had trouble locating it.
At this point, Mayfield asked Arispe to step out of the car and follow him to his DPS
vehicle. Arispe complied while looking through some papers for his proof of insurance. Before
reviewing Arispe’s proof of insurance and running a computer check on him, Mayfield told Arispe
that he would receive a warning for the traffic violations. According to Mayfield, Arispe’s
nervousness did not diminish, which Mayfield found to be unusual. It was Mayfield’s experience
that people usually relax when they are told they will receive a warning instead of a citation.
Arispe’s continued nervousness made Mayfield suspect that criminal activity could be taking
place. Mayfield then asked Arispe if he had ever been arrested before. Initially, Arispe said that he
had no prior arrests. But when Mayfield asked, “Never?”, Arispe changed his answer, stating that
he had been arrested before but only for “minor” things like “disorderly conduct.”
Mayfield sat down in the cab of the DPS vehicle and scanned Arispe and Enriquez’s
licenses to check for outstanding warrants and review their criminal histories. While Mayfield was
conducting the warrant and criminal history checks, Arispe found his proof of insurance and
handed it to Mayfield, who reviewed the document and returned it to Arispe. After scanning the
4
Enriquez disputes the accuracy of this statement, pointing out that Angora goats, which produce mohair, are
sometimes sheared. Because the statement is not necessary to our determination of the existence of reasonable
suspicion, we do not consider it.
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licenses, Mayfield learned that Arispe and Enriquez did not have any outstanding warrants, but
they both had criminal records. In fact, contrary to Arispe’s representation that he had only been
arrested for minor offenses, Arispe had several prior arrests for felony offenses. Enriquez had
fourteen previous convictions, including convictions for drug possession, manufacture and
delivery of a controlled substance, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful
possession of weapons charges. Mayfield explained that this type of criminal history causes him
to be more alert and cautious during a traffic stop because someone with a history of weapons and
narcotics charges is more likely to have a weapon. At this point, two additional officers appeared
on the scene.
Mayfield exited his DPS vehicle and conducted a pat-down search of Arispe. He asked
Arispe if there was anything illegal in his car and Arispe said there was not. Thereafter, Mayfield
asked Arispe for consent to search his car, but Arispe did not answer the question. According to
Mayfield, the request for consent to search caused Arispe to become extremely nervous and he
turned his head and looked back at his car. This increased Mayfield’s suspicions of some criminal
activity. In Mayfield’s training and experience, it was common for people to look directly at
contraband. Mayfield further observed that the request for consent to search caused Arispe to start
“fumbling over his words.” When Mayfield asked Arispe for consent to search his car a second
time, Arispe continued talking but did not answer the question. Finally, when Mayfield asked
Arispe for consent to search his car a third time, Arispe refused consent.
Based on these circumstances, Mayfield believed there might be something illegal going
on between Arispe and Enriquez. Mayfield radioed for a K-9 unit, but none was on duty. Mayfield
then decided to continue his investigation and speak with Enriquez, who was still sitting in the
front passenger seat. Mayfield testified that he wanted to talk to Enriquez to further his
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investigation, to confirm Enriquez’s story, to see if Enriquez and Arispe had matching stories, or
to see if Enriquez’s story had changed.
Mayfield walked over to the front passenger-side door and knocked on it. Enriquez opened
the car door. Mayfield then asked Enriquez to step out of the car, and Enriquez complied. Mayfield
noticed that Enriquez was now wearing a shirt and he wondered if Enriquez had put on a shirt to
cover his tattoos. When Enriquez exited the car, Mayfield saw, in plain view, a large knife in the
car where Enriquez’s feet had been. Concerned for his safety, Mayfield decided to conduct a pat-
down search of Enriquez for weapons. As Mayfield started the pat-down search of Enriquez, one
of the other officers saw multiple white pills inside the car and he asked Enriquez about them.
Enriquez said the pills were Arispe’s heartburn medication.
When Mayfield touched the outside of Enriquez’s left front pocket, he felt an object in it
and asked Enriquez to remove it. Enriquez complied and retrieved a pack of cigarettes and a lighter
from his pocket and handed them to Mayfield. When Mayfield touched the outside of Enriquez’s
right front pant pocket, he felt a hard object in it and asked Enriquez to empty the pocket and pull
the object out slowly. Enriquez put his hand in his pocket, but then claimed his hand was stuck
and said there was nothing in that pocket. Indicating to Enriquez’s right front pant pocket, Mayfield
asked, “What’s that hard thing right there?” Enriquez’s demeanor changed at this point—he
became uncooperative, cursed, turned, and started moving away from Mayfield. In response,
Mayfield and another officer handcuffed Enriquez. Mayfield asked Enriquez if the object in his
pocket was a gun and Enriquez said it was not. Mayfield then asked, “[Is it] weed?” To which
Enriquez replied, “Yeah.” Mayfield then removed the object, discovering that it was a plastic
container holding twenty small plastic packets, each of which contained methamphetamine.
Mayfield arrested Enriquez for possession of a controlled substance and placed him in the DPS
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vehicle. After arresting Enriquez, Mayfield prepared and issued a warning to Arispe for the traffic
violations.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court made thirty-eight findings of
fact, most of which are not challenged on appeal. The trial court also made the following relevant
conclusions of law:
• Mayfield was reasonable in questioning Arispe and Enriquez during the stop
and the investigation;
• Mayfield developed reasonable suspicion that Arispe and Enriquez were
involved in criminal activity independent of the traffic stop;
• Mayfield did not prolong the traffic stop when he spoke to Arispe and Enriquez;
and
• Mayfield acted reasonably when he patted down Enriquez due to his behavior
and having a weapon in the car. 5
Enriquez appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated
standard of review. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In
conducting our review, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based on
an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). However, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Lerma,
543 S.W.3d at 190.
When, as here, the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we first determine if the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the trial court’s
5
The trial court also concluded that Mayfield had probable cause to stop Arispe’s car. However, the validity of the
traffic stop is not challenged on appeal.
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fact findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then review the
trial court’s legal rulings de novo. Id. In conducting our review, we afford the prevailing party the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We must affirm the
trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d
at 190.
DURATION OF THE TRAFFIC STOP
In his first issue, Enriquez argues that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment
because it continued after the tasks associated with the traffic violations were completed or should
have been completed.
When a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation, the driver and all
passengers are “seized” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
323, 333 (2009). “The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and
remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.” Id. “Normally, the stop ends when the police
have no further need to control the scene and inform the driver and passengers they are free to
leave.” Id. “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . .
do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Id.During the course of a lawful traffic stop, an “officer may request certain information from
a driver, such as the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, and run a
computer check on that information.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190. An officer may check for
outstanding warrants and may ask about the purpose of the trip and the destination. Kothe v. State,
152 S.W.3d 54, 63-64 n.36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). An officer may perform a criminal history
check as long as it does not unduly prolong the traffic stop. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 307-
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08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “An officer is also permitted to ask drivers and passengers about
matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning does not measurably extend
the duration of the stop.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190.
Generally, an officer’s authority for a traffic stop “ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” United States v. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191 (“Once the computer check is completed, and
the officer knows that the driver has a current valid license, no outstanding warrants, and the car
is not stolen, the traffic stop investigation is fully resolved.”). “A traffic stop made for the purpose
of investigating a traffic violation must be reasonably related to that purpose and may not be
prolonged beyond the time to complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop.” Lerma, 543
S.W.3d at 190.
Enriquez’s argument is premised on the idea that as soon as Mayfield reviewed Arispe’s
proof of insurance and returned the document to Arispe, all of the tasks associated with the traffic
stop were completed. Enriquez argues that at this juncture Mayfield was required to issue the
warnings for the traffic violations and permit Arispe and Enriquez to leave the scene. We disagree
with this premise. The record conclusively establishes that when Mayfield returned the insurance
document to Arispe, Mayfield had not completed all of the tasks associated with the traffic
violations. First, Mayfield had not finished the criminal history checks. The body cam video shows
that after handing the insurance document back to Arispe, Mayfield spent approximately a minute
continuing to review the criminal history on the computer. Second, Mayfield had not returned
Arispe and Enriquez’s licenses to them. Finally, Mayfield had not prepared the written warning
for the traffic violations and issued it to Arispe. Mayfield testified that DPS policy prohibited him
from issuing a mere verbal warning and required him to create a written warning in the computer,
print it, and have the driver sign it, and he did not issue a written warning to Arispe until after
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Enriquez was arrested. 6 Under the facts and circumstances presented, we conclude that “the tasks
tied to the traffic infraction” were not, nor reasonably should have been, completed when Mayfield
returned the proof of insurance to Arispe. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.
Furthermore, the overall duration of the traffic stop was not unduly prolonged in this case.
In Lerma, a case in which a passenger similarly challenged the duration of his detention during a
traffic stop, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a nine-minute lapse from the time the
officer initiated the stop to the time the passenger was arrested was not an unreasonable amount of
time to investigate the situation. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 195. Here, only about eight minutes elapsed
from the time Mayfield first approached the driver’s side window to begin his investigation of the
traffic violations to the time he found the methamphetamine in Enriquez’s pocket and placed him
under arrest. During much of this time, Mayfield was actively involved in tasks related to
investigating the traffic violations, including gathering licenses from Arispe and Enriquez, waiting
for Arispe to locate his proof of insurance, checking for outstanding warrants, and reviewing
Arispe and Enriquez’s criminal histories. See id. at 191 (concluding the officer did not unlawfully
prolong the traffic stop by questioning the passenger because he “was still actively involved in the
traffic stop when he questioned [the passenger] and he had not yet completed all aspects of the
traffic stop,” including running a computer warrant check on the driver).
Affording the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, we conclude that all of the tasks associated with
the traffic stop were not completed, nor reasonably should have been completed, when Mayfield
6
In support of his argument, Enriquez directs our attention to a portion of Mayfield’s testimony elicited on cross-
examination in which he agrees that he had completed all the tasks completed with the traffic stop “as of 4:11 on the
body cam.” However, the body cam video shows that at 4:11 Mayfield was still reviewing Enriquez’s proof of
insurance. At 4:20 Mayfield handed the insurance document back to Arispe and he turned his attention back to
reviewing Arispe and Enriquez’s criminal histories on the computer until 5:19. Additionally, on direct examination,
Mayfield testified that the traffic stop did not end until he issued the written warning to Arispe.
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returned the proof of insurance document to Arispe. Rather, all of the tasks associated with the
traffic stop were not completed until Mayfield prepared the written warning for the traffic
violations and issued it to Arispe. Based on this record, we conclude the officer did not
unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop. Enriquez’s first issue is overruled.
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
In his second issue, Enriquez argues that his continued detention, beyond the time the tasks
associated with the traffic stop were completed, violated the Fourth Amendment because Mayfield
lacked reasonable suspicion that Enriquez was involved in criminal activity based on specific,
articulable facts. Like his first issue, Enriquez’s second issue is premised on the idea that as soon
as Mayfield reviewed Arispe’s proof of insurance and returned the document to Arispe, all of the
tasks associated with the traffic stop were completed. However, as we stated in our discussion of
the first issue, all of the tasks associated with the traffic stop were not completed until Mayfield
prepared the written warning for the traffic violations and issued it to Arispe. But even if all of the
tasks associated with the traffic stop had been completed, Enriquez’s continued detention was
lawful because Mayfield had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity independent of the traffic
violations.
“A seizure justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to conduct the traffic stop.” Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29,
36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, “if an officer develops reasonable
suspicion that the driver or an occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity the officer
may continue questioning the individual regardless of whether the official tasks of a traffic stop
have come to an end.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191. Therefore, “continuing a brief investigatory
detention beyond the time necessary to conduct a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity apart from the traffic violation.” Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36. If a valid
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traffic stop evolves into an investigative detention for a drug-related offense, the temporary
detention may continue for a reasonable time to dispel the reasonable suspicion that a vehicle
contains drugs. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
“Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts that,
when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect
that a person has engaged, is engaging, or soon will be engaging in criminal activity.” Hamal, 390
S.W.3d at 306. “The reasonable suspicion standard is wholly objective; the subjective intent of the
officer conducting the investigation is irrelevant.” Id. “The standard requires only some minimal
level of justification for the [investigation].” Id. Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Reasonable suspicion “looks to the
totality of the circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but
if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative
detention is justified.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Challenged Fact Findings
As a preliminary matter, we must consider Enriquez’s challenges to the trial court’s
findings of fact. Enriquez argues that the following fact findings are unsupported by the evidence:
(1) that Arispe and Enriquez were nervous at the inception of the stop, (2) that Arispe still appeared
nervous after learning he would be given a warning, and (3) that Mayfield found Arispe’s nervous
demeanor to be consistent with someone being deceptive.
Under our standard of review, we first determine if the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the trial court’s fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at
818. “When there are factual disputes regarding testimony or the contents of a videotape, the trial
court’s findings of historical fact are afforded almost total deference.” Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d
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255, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, “when evidence is conclusive . . . such as . . .
‘indisputable visual evidence,’ then any trial-court findings inconsistent with that conclusive
evidence may be disregarded as unsupported by the record.” Id.; Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d
323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (recognizing it is improper to defer to the trial court’s fact
findings when “the videotape presents indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions
of [the officer’s] testimony.”).
As to the first two challenged fact findings, we reject Enriquez’s contention that they are
unsupported by the record. Mayfield testified that when he first approached the car, both Arispe
and Enriquez “were nervous, avoided some eye contact,” and “were both kind of answering over
each other when he was talking to the driver.” Mayfield further testified that Arispe’s demeanor
did not change when he told him he was going to get a warning and this was suspicious to Mayfield
because “normally when you tell [a person he’s] going to get a warning, [he’ll] kind of relax.”
Mayfield also testified that Arispe was “nervous throughout the contact.” Enriquez argues that
Mayfield’s testimony was contradicted by the videos, but we disagree. The videos do not show
Arispe and Enriquez’s facial expressions and body movements when Mayfield first approached
the car and they confirm that Arispe and Enriquez were in fact “answering over each other.”
Additionally, neither the dash cam video nor the body cam video conclusively contradict
Mayfield’s testimony about Arispe’s nervous demeanor after Mayfield told him he would only
receive a warning. At this point, Arispe is not captured in the dash cam video, and he is partially
obstructed by the door of the DPS vehicle in the body cam video. Accordingly, we must afford
these fact findings almost total deference. See Miller, 393 S.W.3d at 263.
As to the third challenged fact finding—that Mayfield found Arispe’s nervous demeanor
to be consistent with someone being deceptive—we conclude it is not supported by the evidence.
Nowhere in his testimony did Mayfield draw a connection between Arispe’s nervous demeanor
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and deception. However, the trial court made other fact findings concerning Arispe’s deception,
namely, that Mayfield believed that Arispe’s action in “looking back at the [car] while denying
consent [to search] was a sign of deception” and that Arispe informed Mayfield that “he had only
been arrested for disorderly conduct,” when in fact “Arispe had several felony arrests.”
Reasonable Suspicion to Investigate Other Criminal Activity
For reasonable suspicion to exist, there must be specific articulable facts that, when
combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to
suspect that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or soon will be engaging in criminal activity.
See Hamal, 390 S.W.3d at 306. Here, Mayfield was aware of the following specific articulable
facts. When Mayfield approached the driver’s side window of the car at the inception of the stop,
he noticed that Arispe was nervous. Mayfield observed that Arispe’s nervousness did not diminish
after he was advised that he would receive only a warning for the traffic violations. Additionally,
Arispe lied twice about his prior criminal record and Mayfield believed that Arispe’s action in
“looking back at the [car] while denying consent [to search] was a sign of deception.” Mayfield
explained that in his training and experience an individual who is asked about the presence of
contraband will look directly at it. All of these facts were known to Mayfield before he walked
over to the passenger-side door to talk to Enriquez.
“Although nervousness alone is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for an
investigative detention, it can do so in combination with other factors.” Id. at 308. While a person’s
criminal history cannot be the sole basis for reasonable suspicion, it is also a factor that may be
considered in combination with other factors in determining reasonable suspicion. Id. “Deception
regarding one’s own criminal record has also been recognized as a factor that can contribute to
reasonable suspicion.” Id.- 13 -
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Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Mayfield had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Arispe had engaged in, was engaging in, or would soon be engaging in
criminal activity. See id. Therefore, when Mayfield decided to approach Enriquez and confirm or
dispel his suspicions about Arispe’s engagement in other criminal activity, Mayfield had the
required specific, articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion. 7
Here, the trial court made an express fact finding that after learning that no K-9 unit was
available, Mayfield “decided to continue his investigation and speak with” Enriquez to determine
if his “story” matched Arispe’s story. Mayfield testified that the reason he decided to speak to
Enriquez was “to further the investigation and confirm [Arispe and Enriquez’s] stories or see if
they had matching stories or if things had changed.” Because this finding turns on an evaluation
of Mayfield’s credibility, we must defer to it. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
“If, during a valid traffic stop and detention, the officer develops reasonable suspicion that
the detainee is engaged in criminal activity, prolonged or continued detention is justified.” Haas
v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d
7At the time Mayfield decided to approach Enriquez, he did not have specific, articulable facts to support reasonable
suspicion as to Enriquez. At this point, all Mayfield knew about Enriquez was that he seemed nervous and had a
criminal history, which was not enough to support reasonable suspicion. See Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 671
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating that nervousness is a factor but not in and of itself sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion and noting that nervousness “is not particularly probative because most citizens with nothing to hide will
nonetheless manifest an understandable nervousness in the presence of the officer.”); Hamal, 390 S.W.3d at 308(stating “a prior criminal record does not by itself establish reasonable suspicion but is a factor that may be
considered.”). Nevertheless, Mayfield soon learned additional specific, articulable facts which—when considered in
conjunction with Enriquez’s nervousness and criminal history—established reasonable suspicion as to Enriquez.
When Mayfield approached the car, he noticed that Enriquez had put a shirt on and believed that Enriquez might be
trying to conceal gang tattoos; when Enriquez exited the car, Mayfield saw a long knife on the passenger-side
floorboard where Enriquez had been seated; and another officer on the scene saw numerous white pills scattered on
the inside of the car and asked Enriquez about them. Based on the totality of the circumstances—Enriquez’s
nervousness; his criminal history, which included convictions for multiple drug offenses; Enriquez’s potential
concealment of gang tattoos; the presence of a knife where Enriquez had been seated; and the pills scattered in the
car—we conclude that reasonable suspicion existed that Enriquez had engaged in, was engaging in, or would soon be
engaging in criminal activity. See Hamal, 390 S.W.3d at 308 (concluding the totality of the information known to the
officer—that appellant was traveling late at night, was speeding, appeared nervous, had a criminal record, had past
arrests for drug offenses, had a recent drug arrest, and told the officer that she had not been in trouble before—
established reasonable suspicion).
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240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). And, under the framework provided by the United States
Supreme Court: “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful
seizure, so long as those inquires do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” See Johnson,
555 U.S. at 333; see also Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 (“An officer is also permitted to ask …
passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning does not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.”).
Having developed reasonable suspicion that Arispe was engaged in criminal activity
independent of the traffic violations, Mayfield was entitled to confirm or dispel his suspicions as
long as he acted promptly in doing so. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (“In
assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we
consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the defendant.”); Martin v. State, 565 S.W.3d 814, 821 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, no pet.) (holding that under the totality of the circumstances, the State met its burden to
show that the officer developed reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and investigate
suspected narcotics activity). Additionally, the law permitted Mayfield to ask Enriquez about
“matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning [did] not measurably
extend the duration of the stop.” See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 (citing Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333)
“Although a detention that follows a traffic stop may become unduly prolonged, there is no rigid,
bright-line rule governing the amount of time that detentions should take.” Martinez v. State, 500
S.W.3d 456, 469 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d).
Applying the law to the facts presented, we conclude that Mayfield did not measurably
extend the duration of the traffic stop. The dash cam and body cam videos establish that less than
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three minutes elapsed from the time Mayfield finished checking for any outstanding warrants and
reviewing Arispe and Enriquez’s criminal histories to the time he started the pat-down search of
Enriquez. During this brief time period, Mayfield asked Arispe for consent to search, which Arispe
refused; conducted a pat-down search of Arispe; radioed for a K-9 unit; was told that a K-9 unit
was not available; walked to the passenger-side door of Arispe’s car and knocked on it; asked
Enriquez to exit the car; walked with Enriquez to the front of the car; directed Arispe not to follow
him and to remain standing by the DPS vehicle; and asked Enriquez about the knife on the
floorboard. The facts and circumstances in this case support the conclusion that Mayfield’s
investigation into other criminal activity did not measurably extend the duration of the stop. See
Martin, 565 S.W.3d at 821 (holding deputy acted diligently when he developed reasonable
suspicion, questioned the driver, and learned of the passenger’s drug possession about ten minutes
from the inception of the traffic stop); Willis v. State, 192 S.W.3d 585, 591-92 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2006, pet. ref’d) (holding a twenty-five-minute detention while waiting for a K-9 unit was not
unduly prolonged when the officer had reasonable suspicion); Haas, 172 S.W.3d at 54 n.8 (holding
the officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong traffic stop and a twenty-minute wait for a canine
sniff was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
Enriquez relies on St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
However, the present case is distinguishable from St. George. In St. George, the officer did not
begin questioning the passenger until after he had completed a computer check on the driver and
issued a traffic citation to him, which was about nine minutes into the traffic stop. Id. at 722.
Additionally, when the officer initiated the questioning, he lacked any reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity independent of the traffic violation. Id. Here, by contrast, Mayfield approached
Enriquez before he issued a warning to Arispe and after he had reasonable suspicion that Arispe
was involved in criminal activity independent of the traffic violations.
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In sum, once he developed reasonable suspicion that Arispe was involved in criminal
activity independent of the traffic violations, Mayfield was justified in taking some action to
confirm or dispel his suspicions. Mayfield was authorized to ask Enriquez about matters unrelated
to the purpose of the stop so long as the questioning did not measurably extend the duration of the
stop. Mayfield acted quickly in conducting his investigation and did not measurably extend the
duration of the traffic stop.
For these reasons, we hold that Enriquez’s continued detention while Mayfield investigated
other criminal activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 8 Enriquez’s second issue is
overruled.
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH
In his third issue, Enriquez argues that Mayfield’s pat-down search of him violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was performed to discover evidence rather than for officer safety.
The crux of Enriquez’s argument is that the videos show that Mayfield did not perform the pat-
down search for officer safety.
“During the course of a detention, an officer may, in certain circumstances, conduct a pat-
down search of an individual to determine whether the person is carrying a weapon.” Lerma, 543
S.W.3d at 191. “The purpose behind a pat-down is to discover whether the individual is armed and
dangerous.” O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “That need does not
disappear once the person disposes of an obvious weapon, since other weapons could be in his
possession but hidden from view.” Id. “Before conducting a pat-down search, an officer need only
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
8
In his second issue, Enriquez also argues that the State failed to establish that Mayfield’s encounter with him was
consensual. We do not address this argument, which is unnecessary to final disposition of this appeal. See TEX. R.
APP. 47.1 (requiring the court of appeals to hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses
every issue raised and necessary to the final disposition of the appeal).
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those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Id. at 550-51. “The officer’s subjective level of fear
is not controlling.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191. Furthermore, “[t]he officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed.” O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 551. “The issue is whether a reasonably
prudent person would justifiably believe that his safety or the safety of others was in danger.” Id.Again, the applicable standard of review requires us to give almost total deference to the
trial court’s fact findings as long as they are supported by the record. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
Here, the trial court made the following fact findings, which are supported by Mayfield’s
testimony. Mayfield learned from a criminal history check that Enriquez had an extensive criminal
record, including convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, felon in possession of
a firearm, and manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance. Mayfield knew that he needed
to proceed with caution because Enriquez, especially in light of his criminal history, might be
armed. When Enriquez stepped out of the car, Mayfield saw a long-blade knife in the car close to
where Enriquez had been seated and this reinforced Mayfield’s concern that Enriquez might be
armed. Contrary to Enriquez’s argument, nothing in the videos conclusively contradicts these
findings.
Based on these specific and articulable facts and the rational inferences therefrom, a
reasonably prudent officer in Mayfield’s situation would justifiably believe that his safety or the
safety of others was in danger. See O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 551. The fact that Mayfield saw the knife
in the car and not on Enriquez’s person did not “alter the reality that [Enriquez] could have
possessed additional weapons on his person.” See id. at 553. Accordingly, we conclude that
Mayfield was justified in conducting a pat-down search of Enriquez for officer safety. See id. at
554-55 (holding officer’s pat-down search was justified even after the defendant discarded the
“belt knife” worn on his person). Enriquez’s third issue is overruled.
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SCOPE OF THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH
In his fourth issue, Enriquez argues that the pat-down search conducted by Mayfield
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was excessive in scope.
“Law enforcement personnel may conduct a limited search for weapons of a suspect’s outer
clothing, even in the absence of probable cause, where an officer believes that the suspect is armed
and dangerous to the officer or others in the area.” Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court, recognized that: “A search
for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest . . . must . . . be strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation.” 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968). “Thus it must be limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less that a ‘full’ search, even
though it remains a serious intrusion.” Id. at 26. To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a
pat-down search must be “confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Id. at 29. If a
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine whether the individual is armed, it
is no longer a lawful pat-down search under Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373
(1993). “If in the course of a pat-down frisk the officer satisfies himself that the suspect has no
weapons, the officer has no valid reason to further invade the suspect’s right to be free of police
intrusion absent probable cause to arrest.” Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984).
Enriquez argues that the pat-down search was excessive in scope because it was an
improper “general exploratory search.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. We disagree with Enriquez’s
characterization of the pat-down search in this case. The body cam video establishes that the pat-
down search was targeted, not general, in nature. The body cam video shows that Mayfield touched
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the exterior of Enriquez’s clothing and felt objects in two areas—Enriquez’s left and right front
pant pockets. Mayfield then limited his attention to these two areas. Initially, Mayfield asked
Enriquez to empty his left front pant pocket, which contained a pack of cigarettes. Next, Mayfield
asked Enriquez to empty his right front pant pocket, but Enriquez did not comply with this request.
To the extent Enriquez contends that Mayfield was not permitted to give Enriquez verbal
instructions during the pat-down search, we disagree. Nothing in Terry prohibits an officer from
talking to an individual and giving verbal instructions during a pat-down search. See id. at 18-27(discussing the proper scope of a protective search for weapons). Furthermore, most of the verbal
instructions provided in this case were aimed at determining if the object in Enriquez’s right front
pant pocket was a weapon. 9
Enriquez also argues that the pat-down search was excessive in scope because it continued
after he was handcuffed. During a pat-down search, an officer is permitted to handcuff an
individual if there is a reasonable belief that such restraint is necessary for officer protection.
Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190, 193 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (concluding
that an officer was justified in handcuffing an individual during a pat-down search for officer
safety); see Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 770 (noting the appellant was handcuffed during a pat-down
search). In this case, Enriquez was handcuffed in the middle of the pat-down search after he cursed,
turned his body, and started moving away from Mayfield. Neither the law nor the facts support
Enriquez’s argument that Mayfield was required to stop the pat-down search after he handcuffed
Enriquez. See Farmer, 47 S.W.3d at 193 (noting that the officer placed the appellant in handcuffs
partway through the pat-down search after the officer felt an object and did not know if it was a
weapon).
9
The trial court found that Mayfield “felt [Enriquez’s] right pocket,” “felt something hard,” “was unable to manipulate
the item,” and “could not identify it.” Mayfield’s testimony supports these findings.
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Enriquez also argues that the pat-down search was excessive in scope because, in its final
phase, Mayfield placed his fingers in Enriquez’s pocket and touched the object before removing
it. In Balentine v. State, an officer conducting a pat-down search of the appellant’s exterior clothing
felt an object he thought was a weapon. 71 S.W.3d at 770. The officer then reached into the
appellant’s pocket to determine if the object was in fact a weapon and instead discovered an object
he recognized by touch as a bullet. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the scope
of the pat-down search was not excessive because it “did not exceed the scope of that which was
necessary to determine whether [the] appellant was armed.” Id. Thus, a pat-down search does not
exceed the proper scope merely because the officer places his fingers in an individual’s pocket and
touches the object contained therein. See id.Here, the trial court found that when Mayfield touched the outside of Enriquez’s right front
pocket, he felt a hard object and he was “unable to manipulate the item” and “could not identify
it.” Additionally, the body cam video shows that mere seconds before reaching his fingers into
Enriquez’s pocket and touching the unknown object, Mayfield asked, “Is it a gun or no?” In other
words, Mayfield was still not satisfied that Enriquez was unarmed. Thus, when Mayfield reached
into Enriquez’s pocket and touched the object, he was still trying to determine if Enriquez was
armed. “Once [an officer’s] protective search reveal[s] an item he reasonably believe[s] might be
a weapon, he [is] justified in making a more intrusive search for his own protection.” Farmer, 47
S.W.3d at 193. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, Mayfield
did not exceed the proper scope of the pat-down search by reaching into Enriquez’s right pant
pocket to determine if the hard object contained therein was in fact a weapon. See Balentine, 71
S.W.3d at 770 (concluding that officer’s reaching into the appellant’s pocket to determine if an
object was in fact a weapon did not exceed the scope of a proper pat-down search); Worthey v.
State, 805 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding an officer’s search of the interior of
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the appellant’s purse was reasonable when merely touching the purse’s exterior was not sufficient
to determine if the appellant was carrying a weapon); McAllister v. State, 34 S.W.3d 346, 353
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding an officer was justified in reaching into
suspect’s pocket during a pat-down search because when he touched the exterior of the pocket he
felt an object that might be a weapon).
We conclude the pat-down search was not excessive in scope. Enriquez’s fourth issue is
overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Enriquez’s issues, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion to suppress. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
PUBLISH
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