In Re Lauren Ashley Alleman v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-23-00602-CV
In re Lauren Ashley Alleman
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Lauren Ashley Alleman has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in a suit
affecting parent-child relationship (SAPCR) challenging a temporary restraining order issued by
the trial judge after Alleman had filed a motion to recuse that trial judge. Alleman requests that
this Court issue a writ of mandamus (1) commanding the trial judge to recuse herself and
(2) vacating the August 31, 2023 temporary restraining order (TRO). For the reasons explained
below, we dismiss the mandamus petition as moot in part and deny it in part.
Based on the trial court’s ruling in another SAPCR concerning Alleman’s other
child, real party in interest David James Keese requested a similar TRO for his and Alleman’s
children by letter to the trial court on August 25, 2023, and informed the trial court of his intent to
file a motion and set it for hearing unless the trial court intended to move forward with a sua sponte
order. Alleman then filed her motion to recuse the trial judge on August 28, 2023. Keese filed his
“Motion for Emergency/Additional Temporary Orders” on August 30, 2023, and the trial court
conducted a hearing on that motion on August 31, 2023. Alleman received notice of the hearing
but did not appear. The trial court made a finding in the TRO that “there is a serious immediate
question concerning the welfare of the minor children in this cause and there is now and will
continue to be a substantial risk of immediate physical or mental harm to the children if the children
have unsupervised contact with Lauren Ashley Alleman.” The TRO was set for further hearing
on September 13, 2023. A different trial judge signed an order on September 13, extending the
TRO and resetting the hearing for September 19. That trial judge signed a second order on an
amended motion to extend the TRO on September 19, finding good cause existed for extension of
the TRO because the motion for recusal was pending. The extension order set a hearing for
October 3, 2023, to determine whether the temporary restraining order should be made a temporary
injunction pending final hearing and whether an additional temporary injunction sought should
be granted.
The motion to recuse was subsequently heard by the regional presiding judge and
denied on October 2. Alleman failed to appear at the October 2 hearing on the motion to recuse
and at the October 3 hearing to determine whether the TRO should be made into a temporary
injunction. Immediately after the October 3 hearing on the motion for temporary orders before the
trial judge, the trial judge granted temporary orders that also contained a temporary injunction.
Alleman filed her petition for writ of mandamus in this Court after the close of business on
October 3—after both the motion-to-recuse hearing and the temporary-injunction hearing had been
conducted and after both orders had been issued.
As Keese argues in his response to the petition for writ of mandamus, the TRO was
no longer in force after the trial court granted the temporary injunction and temporary orders
(which occurred after the motion to recuse was denied), rendering Alleman’s request to vacate the
TRO moot. See In re Texas State Univ., No. 03-19-00364-CV, 2019 WL 2707971, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Austin June 27, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that expiration of TRO
rendered relators’ challenge of TRO moot); see also Lesikar v. Rappeport, 899 S.W.2d 654, 655
(Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that trial court’s grant of temporary injunction while appeal was
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pending effectively converted TRO into temporary injunction and rendered moot appeal
challenging court of appeals’ decision that held trial court’s challenged order was TRO for which
there is no interlocutory appeal). Because the portion of the mandamus proceeding challenging
the TRO is moot, we lack jurisdiction to determine (1) whether, as Alleman contends, the TRO
was void because the trial judge violated Rule 18a by taking action in the case after the motion to
recuse was filed, see id. R. 18a(f)(2)(A) (establishing that “[i]f a motion is filed before evidence
has been offered at trial, the respondent judge must take no further action in the case until the
motion has been decided, except for good cause stated in writing or on the record”);1 or
(2) whether, as Keese contends, the trial court took action for good cause stated in writing or on
the record, see id.As for Alleman’s request that we issue a writ of mandamus commanding the trial
judge to recuse herself, Rule 18a provides that “[a]n order denying a motion to recuse may be
reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.” Tex. R. Civ. P.
18a(j)(1)(A). Accordingly, we deny Alleman’s petition for writ of mandamus seeking recusal of
the trial judge.
On this record and under the specific circumstances of this case, we dismiss the
petition for writ of mandamus as moot in part and deny it in part. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). We
also dismiss as moot Alleman’s emergency motion for temporary relief.
__________________________________________
Gisela D. Triana, Justice
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See also Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f)(3) (“If the respondent judge fails to comply with a duty
imposed by this rule, the movant may notify the regional presiding judge.”). Nothing in the record
indicates that Alleman notified the regional presiding judge of the trial judge’s alleged failure to
comply with Rule 18a.
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Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith
Filed: December 22, 2023
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