Yaser Abdel Said v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  • AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed December 21, 2023
    In the
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-22-00791-CR
    YASER ABDEL SAID, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F08-33908-Y
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
    Opinion by Justice Carlyle
    In a 2022 trial delayed by his twelve years in hiding, a jury convicted Yaser
    Abdel Said of capital murder for the January 1, 2008 close range shooting of his
    teenage daughters in the back of his taxi at the Omni Mandalay in north Irving. We
    affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    Said had long mistreated his family, and on December 21, 2007, his elder
    daughter A.S. emailed a trusted teacher about problems she and her younger sister
    S.S. were having at home:
    [S.S.] and I were talking and we are having a lot of issues at home . . . . I
    dont want police involved until we are totally ready.. god I am so scared
    right now its crazy… ok well as you know we are not allowed to date
    and my dad is arranging our marriage… my dad said that I cannot put
    it off anymore I have to get married this year that I cannot attend college
    without getting married . . . . [S.S.] and I have both decided that we do
    not hate arabs but do not want to live by the culture or marry men from
    over there especially men we dont know or love… we have had each
    others backs and have been dating… we dont know if its love or
    infatuation, but the point is we want our chance… my dad began
    checking phone records and he took my sister to the room and
    specifically threatened to “hurt her very badly” if she didnt tell what
    was going on……when we were younger he used to do things and he’s
    started hinting at them again.. look I could go on forever he has simply
    made our lives a nightmare.. he’s one man, not god. Someone should
    be able to stop him!!!!!! he can’t torment us this way! He shouldn’t….
    anyway we are running away… hopefully before the break ends.. I
    know that he will search till he finds us and he will without ANY
    DRAMA OR DOUBT kill us…. I am worried for my mother but she
    would tell him out of fear… we cant bring her and I can only hope she
    doesnt get hurt . . . .is it illegal for [S.S.] to leave shes only 17.. how
    will we finish school? and can he track us from tht? should we change
    our names!!!? . . . . thank you soooooooooo much for everything! wish
    us luck. . . . WE WILL GET THE LAW INVOLVED SO PLZ KEEP
    THIS BETWEEN US WE NEED OUR CHANCE TO GET SETTLED
    BECAUSE WHEN HE GOES TO JAIL HIS BROTHERS WILL STEP
    IN.. WE HAVE TO THINK THIS THROUGH U DONT KNOW HOW
    THEY THINK.. heck I live with them and still dont understand it….life
    goes on..
    S.S. and A.S. ultimately decided to include their mother Patricia in their plan
    to flee the state with their boyfriends, E.P. and Edgar. The five of them left together
    on December 25, after Mr. Said threatened A.S. with a gun. The group got an
    apartment together in Oklahoma, but returned to Lewisville on December 30 because
    Edgar needed to attend a family event, and Patricia told the girls she needed to run
    errands and visit her sister.
    –2–
    Unbeknownst to A.S., Patricia had convinced S.S. it would be safe to return
    home. When the four returned to Lewisville, E.P. went home, A.S. stayed with Edgar,
    and Patricia took S.S. to meet Mr. Said. Mr. Said appeared happy to see S.S. and
    asked about A.S., but Patricia told him A.S. was staying with a friend.
    Two days later, on New Year’s Day 2008, Patricia showed up at Edgar’s house
    demanding that A.S. return home with her. As A.S. left, she warned Edgar that he
    had failed to protect her and would never see her again. Edgar interpreted that to
    mean A.S. believed she was going to die and not that she was breaking up with him.
    When A.S. arrived home, Mr. Said insisted on taking A.S. and S.S. out to dinner to
    talk. Patricia asked to come along, but Mr. Said refused.
    Mr. Said left with the girls in his leased taxi around 7:00 p.m., and Edgar, who
    had gone with his father to bail an uncle out of jail, testified he saw the taxi on the
    road around that same time. According to Edgar, Mr. Said was driving with A.S. in
    the front seat and S.S. in the back seat. A.S. looked scared, and Edgar thought it was
    strange that Patricia was not with them. He and his father followed the taxi for a
    while, but they eventually concluded the girls seemed safe and abandoned pursuit.
    At 7:29 p.m., Patricia called Mr. Said and asked if he would reconsider
    allowing her to join him and the girls for dinner. Mr. Said again refused and told her
    he was putting gas in the taxi and would be home soon.
    Four minutes later, 911 dispatch received a frantic call from S.S.’s cell phone.
    S.S. shouted: “Help! My dad shot me! (inaudible) I’m dying!” When the operator
    –3–
    asked what was going on, S.S. replied: “I’m dying. That’s what’s up.” Soon after,
    S.S. could be heard pleading, “Oh my God, not again! Stop it! Stop it! Stop it!” S.S.
    said no further words on the 911 call, but the line tragically captured another minute
    and a half of her dying whimpering and moaning. The call stayed connected for an
    additional 41 minutes while police searched for S.S.’s location.
    About an hour later, they found the taxi abandoned at a taxi stand outside the
    Omni Mandalay. A.S. was in the front seat with two gunshot wounds to the chest,
    and S.S. was in the back seat with nine gunshot wounds in total. An autopsy
    determined four of the shots S.S. sustained were at very close range.
    Mr. Said turned his phone off shortly after S.S.’s 911 call and with the help of
    his son and other relatives, evaded capture for more than twelve years.
    At trial, Mr. Said testified he was upset that the girls ran away with their
    boyfriends, but he denied killing them. Instead, he claimed he pulled over at a bus
    station, left the girls alone in the taxi, and ran off into the woods because he was
    scared that the girls’ friends might be following them intending to harm him. He
    claimed to have only learned about the murders later and saw news coverage that he
    thought was “un-normal” and “harsh.” So he decided to continue to hide from
    authorities because he thought the media was steered against him by a “secret
    agenda,” and he was afraid he would not get a fair trial.
    Mr. Said acknowledged that he did not tell Patricia he was concerned people
    were following them when he spoke to her just minutes before S.S.’s 911 call. And
    –4–
    he admitted he had a nine millimeter handgun with him in his taxi that night,
    although he claimed he did not take it with him when he got scared and ran off into
    the woods.
    The jury convicted Mr. Said of capital murder, and the trial court assessed the
    mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In his sole
    issue on appeal, Mr. Said contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to
    introduce extraneous evidence that: (1) A.S. and S.S. accused him of sexual abuse
    in 1998; (2) Patricia filed a retaliation case against him based on threats that he
    would kill Patricia if she and the girls continued to pursue the sexual abuse
    allegations; (3) Mr. Said was abusive towards Patricia; and (4) Mr. Said threatened
    A.S. with a gun shortly before the murders.
    We review the trial court’s rulings for abuse of discretion and will uphold
    them if correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court
    did not articulate the correct theory. De La Paz v. State, 
    27 S.W.3d 336
    , 344 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2009).
    Mr. Said first argues that the trial court should have excluded all evidence
    concerning allegations of sexual abuse and retaliation because this evidence has no
    probative value and constitutes improper character evidence in violation of rule
    404(b). But Mr. Said was the first party to elicit evidence related to those subjects.
    During his cross-examination of Patricia’s sister, Connie, Mr. Said’s counsel asked
    if there was a period of time when the sisters were not close. Connie responded that
    –5–
    there was, and when asked when, Connie said, “When [A.S.] accused [Mr. Said] of
    sexual assault.”
    Upon receiving that answer, Mr. Said’s counsel asked to approach the bench,
    and the trial court conducted a brief bench conference. Mr. Said asked for a running
    objection to any testimony concerning the sexual abuse allegations on grounds that
    such testimony violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling on his motion to exclude
    extraneous offense evidence. The trial court denied that request, noting both that Mr.
    Said had elicited the testimony at issue and that its pretrial ruling allowed evidence
    of the girls’ outcry as long as it did not detail the substance of the alleged sexual
    abuse. The trial court told Mr. Said he could get into the specifics of the abuse if he
    wished, and when Mr. Said resumed his cross-examination, he elicited further
    testimony concerning both the strength of the evidence supporting the sexual assault
    allegations and the girls’ eventual recantations of those allegations.
    Here, by first eliciting testimony concerning the sexual abuse allegations and
    subsequent recantations, Mr. Said waived any objection to the State introducing
    similar testimony on those subjects. See Rogers v. State, 
    853 S.W.2d 29
    , 35 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1993) (error regarding improperly admitted evidence is waived if that
    same evidence is brought in later by the defendant or by the State without objection);
    see also Webb v. State, 
    760 S.W.2d 263
    , 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (defendant
    cannot complain about evidence he first elicits).
    –6–
    Mr. Said likewise “opened the door” for the State to present evidence
    concerning his previous threat to kill Patricia—the subject of the 1998 retaliation
    charge. See Porter v. State, No. 05-19-00194-CR, 
    2022 WL 16735369
    , at *7 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (citing TEX. R. EVID. 107). Patricia testified that Mr. Said threatened to kill her and
    her family if she did not have the sexual abuse charges dropped. She also explained
    that the retaliation case was based on those threats1 and that the girls recanted their
    allegations. Connie testified that A.S. told her she was forced to recant the sexual
    abuse allegations and that her recantation was a lie. Evidence concerning the threats
    against Patricia was thus admissible to offer a complete presentation of the evidence
    relating to the girls recanting their sexual abuse allegations. See 
    id.
    Mr. Said next challenges the trial court’s ruling to allow evidence of his prior
    abuse towards Patricia because the State failed to elicit evidence demonstrating the
    girls ever saw or knew of it. Under the doctrine of “conditional relevancy,” a trial
    court may admit seemingly irrelevant evidence on the condition that the proponent
    later introduces additional evidence demonstrating its relevancy. See TEX. R. EVID.
    104(b); Powell v. State, 
    898 S.W.2d 821
    , 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Rawlins v.
    State, 
    521 S.W.3d 863
    , 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). The
    trial court denied Mr. Said’s motion to exclude this evidence at a pretrial hearing
    1
    Both Mr. Said and the State reference in their arguments an allegation that Mr. Said told Patricia he
    would kill her and “never be found,” but neither party cites to anywhere in the record showing that the
    “never be found” portion of the statement actually came into evidence.
    –7–
    based on the State’s representation that it would make the connection if it needed to
    bring in that evidence. But after the evidence came in, Mr. Said neither renewed his
    original objection nor asked the court for an instruction to disregard the testimony at
    the close of the State’s evidence and thus he has not preserved the issue for our
    review. See Powell, 898 S.W.2d at 829; Rawlins, 
    521 S.W.3d at
    868–69.
    Had he preserved an objection, any error in allowing the evidence was
    harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Gonzalez v. State, 
    544 S.W.3d 363
    , 373 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2018) (“we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it
    might be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the
    evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence
    indicating guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained of error.”).
    Patricia testified only generally that she left Mr. Said several times over the
    years because he “was controlling, abusive.” And in response to questions
    concerning why she returned to Mr. Said after the alleged sexual abuse and threats
    of retaliation, Patricia testified that Mr. Said “was abusive” and that she was “scared
    of getting hurt.” She did not detail specific instances of abuse, the State did not
    emphasize the testimony, and the evidence of Mr. Said’s guilt was overwhelming,
    including S.S.’s desperate, dying 911 call specifically identifying him as her killer
    fulfilling A.S.’s email prediction days earlier. Based on our examination of the
    record as a whole, we are confident that Patricia’s general statements about Mr. Said
    –8–
    being controlling and abusive had no more than a slight influence on the jury. See
    
    id.
    Mr. Said next contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
    testimony that Mr. Said threatened A.S. with a gun in the weeks before the murders.
    At the hearing on his motion to exclude, Mr. Said argued that the evidence was
    irrelevant, that the only person who could attest to it was an “inherently unreliable
    witness,” and that “it would only arouse the jury’s hostility against the defendant
    and confuse the issues.” On appeal, however, Mr. Said argues that the trial court
    should have excluded the testimony both because it was inadmissible hearsay and
    because it was more prejudicial than probative.
    As an initial matter, Mr. Said failed to preserve his hearsay complaint by
    making a timely objection in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also
    Wilson v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 346
    , 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (point of error on appeal
    must comport with trial objection). With respect to his complaint that the testimony
    was unfairly prejudicial for purposes of rule 403, A.S.’s boyfriend, E.P., testified that
    shortly before the murders, A.S. told him Mr. Said had pulled a gun on her and
    threatened to kill her, which is why the group decided to flee the state. Patricia
    testified that S.S. told her Mr. Said had threatened A.S. with a gun. This evidence
    was highly probative of both Mr. Said’s identity as A.S.’s killer and his intent to
    commit the murders. We can discern nothing unfairly prejudicial about introducing
    evidence that an accused threatened to kill the victim with a gun shortly before the
    –9–
    victim was found shot to death. In any event, rule 403 requires exclusion of probative
    evidence only if “there is a clear disparity between the degree of prejudice” and the
    evidence’s probative value. Hammer v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 555
    , 568 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2009). There is no such disparity here.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Cory L. Carlyle//
    220791f.u05                                 CORY L. CARLYLE
    Do Not Publish                              JUSTICE
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    –10–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    YASER ABDEL SAID, Appellant                   On Appeal from the Criminal District
    Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-22-00791-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F08-33908-Y.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 21st day of December, 2023.
    –11–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-22-00791-CR

Filed Date: 12/21/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/27/2023