in the Interest of G.A.B. ( 2022 )


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  •                                         In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-22-00062-CV
    ________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF G.A.B.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 88th District Court
    Hardin County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 62066
    ________________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Father appealed from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter,
    Gabrielle.1 In his appeal, Father argues that the evidence presented to the trial court
    was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings terminating
    his parental relationship with Gabrielle, including the trial court’s best interest
    finding.2 Based on our review of the record and Father’s arguments, we conclude
    1
    We use a pseudonym for the name of the minor and her family members to
    protect the minor’s identity. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (allowing courts to protect the
    identities of minors in parental-rights termination cases).
    2
    The trial court terminated Father’s rights on three predicate grounds,
    including condition endangerment and conduct endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code
    1
    that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to
    endangerment and the child’s best interest; for these reasons, we will affirm.
    I. Background
    A. Pre-Removal Investigation and Initiation of Suit
    In January of 2021, when Gabrielle was one year old, the Department of
    Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) received a report alleging
    neglectful supervision, medical neglect, and possible sexual abuse. Pursuant to that
    report, Department investigators visited the home that Mother and Father shared.
    Although they soon ruled out allegations of sexual abuse, they noted that Mother’s
    behavior was “irrational and bizarre[,]” and that Father often contradicted himself
    while speaking with the investigators. Because of the way that the parents presented
    themselves during the interview and based upon their history of criminal convictions
    for possession of a controlled substance and intoxicated behavior, when both Mother
    and Father tested positive for methamphetamines, the Department sought removal
    and possession of the child. The removal affidavit included information that Father
    Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The trial court further found that Father had
    constructively abandoned Gabrielle when she had been in the permanent or
    temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
    Services for not less than six months, and the Department had made reasonable
    efforts to return Gabrielle to Father, Father had not regularly visited or maintained
    significant contact with Gabrielle, and Father had demonstrated an inability to
    provide Gabrielle with a safe environment. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(N). The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Gabrielle’s
    mother, but the mother is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    was on parole for possession of a controlled substance, and that Mother was on
    probation for a similar offense.
    B. Evidence at Trial
    1. Linda Jones’ Testimony
    Linda Jones, the Department caseworker in this matter, testified that as of the
    date of her testimony, Gabrielle was doing well in her foster home, and her health
    had improved. She further noted that it was in Gabrielle’s best interest to remain in
    her foster care setting, as no appropriate relative was available to assume her care.
    Jones testified that Mother had not regularly visited Gabrielle, and that Father
    had been incarcerated during the time that Jones had been assigned to this case.
    2. Carla Hadnot’s Testimony
    Carla Hadnot, the Department supervisor on this case, echoed Jones’
    testimony that Gabrielle was doing well in her foster care placement and opined that
    she should remain there.
    Because Gabrielle has a congenital heart condition, the Department placed her
    in a primary medical needs home. Hadnot elaborated on the situation and indicated
    that Gabrielle was receiving appropriate therapy and medication, and that her
    medical status had improved significantly since she came into care.
    Hadnot noted that neither parent had complied with their service plan. With
    specific reference to Father, Hadnot stated that although he had been incarcerated
    3
    since April of 2021, roughly a month after his service plan was incorporated into a
    court order, it was not unfair to seek to terminate Father’s parental rights on the basis
    of noncompliance with the service plan because Father failed to initiate any services
    between the date of the child’s removal and the date he was incarcerated. She
    acknowledged that it was impossible for Father to have complied with the service
    plan while he was in jail but contended he could have begun to comply with it, even
    though funding for some of the plan’s requirements had not then been approved. She
    also recalled that two of Father’s eight drug tests were positive.
    Hadnot testified that Mother had missed several of her scheduled visits with
    Gabrielle and had not complied with her plan of service. Moreover, five of Mother’s
    ten drug tests yielded positive results.
    3. Foster Mother’s Testimony
    R.S., Gabrielle’s foster mother, testified that Gabrielle was placed in her home
    in February of 2021, and has been doing very well since that time. Due to Gabrielle’s
    delicate medical condition, she requires an extensive regimen of medication and
    therapy; she also sees a cardiologist, has had two heart surgeries, and will need a
    third surgery when she is a bit older.
    Being a registered nurse, R.S. was able to not only understand Gabrielle’s
    condition, but to appreciate its severity and the concomitant necessity to ensure that
    Gabrielle receive appropriate and consistent medical treatment. She repeated the
    4
    cardiologist’s opinion that Gabrielle’s dramatic improvement was due to her
    receiving her medication on a regular basis following her removal from Mother’s
    and Father’s care.
    4. Father’s Testimony
    Father participated remotely from the Hardin County jail, where he was then
    incarcerated on a domestic violence charge, for which he pleaded guilty for having
    assaulted Mother, to whom he has been married since Gabrielle was approximately
    three months old. Father acknowledged that he was aware of his plan of service, and
    that he failed to comply with it due to his incarceration but stated that he wanted the
    opportunity to complete those services, because he loves Gabrielle and wants to be
    there for her. Once he is released from jail, he hopes to obtain housing and a job, so
    that he can again be a father to her. After Father was charged with assaulting Mother,
    a warrant was issued for his arrest for violation of his parole. He has been
    incarcerated since April 29, 2021. The next time he “came into contact” with Orange
    County law enforcement, he was arrested on the blue warrant. At the time of trial,
    Father was still waiting to hear the parole board’s decision either to allow his
    conditional release again or to revoke his parole and continue to keep him
    incarcerated on his previous felony convictions for possession of controlled
    substances.
    5
    Father testified that he had remained sober during the pendency of the case
    but conceded that he and Mother used ecstasy on New Year’s Eve while Gabrielle
    was in their care, and he said that “slip-up” caused a positive drug test. Father was
    aware of Gabrielle’s medical needs and stated that while they lived in the same
    residence, he and Mother “took very good care of” Gabrielle and ensured that she
    adhered to her medication schedule. He promised that despite his previous parenting
    mistakes, he would be a good father if permitted to do so.
    5. Mother’s Testimony
    Like Father, Mother confirmed knowledge of her plan of service. She stated
    that despite the difficulties caused by her illness, she has tried to comply with her
    service plan and has evidence of compliance with some of the tasks in the plan; the
    record of the trial does not, however, include this documentation. She indicated that
    she never missed a required drug test, and a positive drug test was a false positive.
    She testified that after Gabrielle was removed, she lost her place to live and has been
    living with various friends off and on. She also lost her car. She has been
    unemployed since the beginning of Covid. She had been drawing unemployment
    benefits but those had terminated by the time of trial. She planned to use her income
    tax refund of $4600 to obtain suitable housing and transportation and planned to
    return to work at a local restaurant in order to properly care for Gabrielle. In the
    effort to care for her daughter, Mother testified that she not only took her daughter
    6
    to doctors’ appointments and gave her medication as needed but also, she says she
    has trained at home to become a “cardiological nurse,” and she says she is now
    qualified to provide that level of care to a heart patient, including Gabrielle. That
    said, Mother said she had not attended any schools for her training. She begged the
    trial court not to terminate her rights and testified that she had addressed her mental
    health issues, to be a better mother to Gabrielle.
    6. Bonnie Hollier’s Testimony
    Because of concerns of Mother’s possible mental incapacity, the trial court
    appointed Hollier as Mother’s guardian ad litem. Based on her limited contact with
    Mother, Hollier doubted Mother’s understanding of the seriousness of the pending
    case, although Mother did appear to have an understanding of the requirements of
    her plan of service.
    II. Standard of Review
    The decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and
    convincing evidence. 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b). Under the Family Code,
    “‘[c]lear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will
    produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
    the allegations sought to be established.” 
    Id.
     § 101.007; In re J.L., 
    163 S.W.3d 79
    ,
    84 (Tex. 2005). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more
    7
    predicate acts or omissions and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See
    
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1), (2); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.
    In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental rights
    termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief
    or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 
    283 S.W.3d 336
    , 344-45 (Tex.
    2009) (quoting In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 266 (Tex. 2002)). We assume the
    factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
    could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
    disbelieved. 
    Id.
     In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to
    evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and
    convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must determine “‘whether the
    evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
    about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 25
    (Tex. 2002)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable
    factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
    factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the
    evidence is factually insufficient.” 
    Id.
    8
    III. Analysis
    A. Statutory Grounds D and E
    In his first two issues, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support termination of his parental rights under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
    of the Texas Family Code. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D) and (E).
    As to these subsections, Father relies on the apparent lack of direct evidence that
    either his conduct or Gabrielle’s living environment endangered Gabrielle in any
    way and relies on In re L.C.L. to support his argument that the Department must
    prove such a causal nexus when seeking a parental rights termination. 
    599 S.W.3d 79
    , 84-85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet denied).
    In his fourth point of error, Father contends that the evidence was legally and
    factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that it was in Gabrielle’s best
    interest to terminate his parental rights; Father attacks the conclusory nature of the
    testimony at trial, noting that conclusory statements do not constitute evidence and
    implying that the conclusory testimony of the caseworkers therefore could not
    support the trial court’s termination order.
    We are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to
    Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if challenged. See In re N.G., 
    577 S.W.3d 230
    ,
    235-36 (Tex. 2019). If the evidence is sufficient as to one of these, it will not be
    necessary to address the other predicate grounds because sufficient evidence as to
    9
    only one ground in addition to the best interest finding is all that is necessary to
    affirm a termination judgment. See 
    id. at 232-33
    . Because the evidence of statutory
    grounds D and E is often interrelated, we may consolidate our review of the evidence
    supporting these grounds. See In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 
    2020 WL 1161098
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
    Endangerment arises when a parent’s conduct jeopardizes the child’s emotional or
    physical health or exposes a child to loss or injury. See In re S.R., 
    452 S.W.3d 351
    ,
    360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
    Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing
    evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly
    allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the
    physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D). Subsection E allows for termination of parental rights if clear and
    convincing evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “engaged in conduct or
    knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers
    the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” 
    Id.
     § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
    “Conduct” includes the parent’s failure to act. See In re T.A., No. 12-20-00276-CV,
    
    2021 WL 2182316
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 28, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
    Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated based on a single act
    or omission by the parent. In re L.E.S., 
    471 S.W.3d 915
    , 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
    10
    2015, no pet.) (citing In re A.B., 
    125 S.W.3d 769
    , 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003,
    pet. denied)). Under that subsection, we examine the time before the child’s removal
    to determine whether the environment of the home posed a danger to the child’s
    physical or emotional well-being. 
    Id.
     at 925 (citing In re L.C., 
    145 S.W.3d 790
    , 795
    (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.)). “A finding of endangerment under
    subsection E, however, may be based on conduct both before and after removal.” In
    re A.L.H., 
    515 S.W.3d 60
    , 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)
    (citing In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360). “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or
    injury[.]’” In re N.S.G., 
    235 S.W.3d 358
    , 367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)
    (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 
    727 S.W.2d 531
    , 533 (Tex. 1987)).
    Under subsection E, it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized or
    exposed to loss or injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 
    235 S.W.3d at 367
    .
    “‘A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the
    parent is aware of, but disregards.’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 925 (quoting In re
    N.B., No. 06-12-00007- CV, 
    2012 WL 1605457
    , at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May
    8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Generally, subjecting a child to a life of uncertainty
    and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re
    R.W., 
    129 S.W.3d 732
    , 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
    In addition, a pattern of drug abuse will support a finding of conduct
    endangering a child even if there is no evidence that such drug use caused a physical
    11
    or actual injury to the child. Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
    
    190 S.W.3d 189
    , 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). A history
    of illegal drug use is conduct that subjects a child to a life that is uncertain and
    unstable, endangering the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re S.D.,
    
    980 S.W.2d 758
    , 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Dupree v. Tex.
    Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 
    907 S.W.2d 81
    , 85-86 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    1995, no writ). A parent’s drug use, criminal history, and employment and housing
    instability prior to and during the case create a course of conduct from which the
    factfinder could determine the parent endangered the child’s emotional and physical
    well-being. See In re M.C., No. 09-18-00436-CV, 
    2019 WL 1561824
    , at *6 (Tex.
    App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d
    at 361-62 (parent’s drug use may qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious
    course of conduct endangering the child’s well-being); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of
    Family & Protective Servs., 
    312 S.W.3d 608
    , 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2009, pet. denied) (illegal drug use may support termination under subsection E
    because “it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or
    imprisoned[ ]”).
    The trial court, sitting without a jury, heard evidence of Father’s drug use,
    criminal history, unemployment, and housing instability, both before removal and
    during the pendency of the case. Much of this evidence came from Father, himself,
    12
    in that he testified that he used ecstasy, an illegal drug, while Gabrielle was in his
    care, that he had been convicted of two felony drug offenses, that he pleaded guilty
    to family violence toward Mother during the pendency of this case, and that he had
    neither a job nor a home to go to upon his release from jail. Father was incarcerated
    prior to the child’s birth and afterwards and remained incarcerated at the time of
    trial, awaiting the parole board’s decision to revoke his conditional release. Even his
    parents refused to assist him with a suitable place to live until after he could show
    them a steady course of employment, creating a reasonable inference that Father has
    had previous problems maintaining steady employment. The record supports a
    finding that Gabrielle was endangered by the uncertainty and instability caused by
    Father. See In re M.C., 
    2019 WL 1561824
    , at *5-6. Although Father testified he had
    reformed, relatively recent improvements in his lifestyle do not necessarily negate
    his criminal history, drug use, lack of steady employment, and violent behavior
    toward Mother. See In re J.F.-G., 
    627 S.W.3d 304
    , 316-17 (Tex. 2021). His promise
    that he would, if given the chance, care for Gabrielle after his release from
    incarceration, while undoubtedly well intentioned, likewise provides no assurance
    of Gabrielle’s future well-being, and the trial court therefore need not have
    determined that his good intentions weighed in Father’s favor, especially given the
    evidence tending to show that based on Father’s past behavior Gabrielle had been
    neglected and endangered while in Father’s care. See In re A.M., 
    385 S.W.3d 74
    , 83
    13
    (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied) (stating that a trier of fact may reject a parent’s
    promises of future stability).
    Although both Father and Mother testified that they took excellent care of
    Gabrielle, the evidence indicates otherwise. The evidence reveals that Gabrielle
    made significant medical strides after being removed and placed with her foster
    family. The cardiologist opined that Gabrielle’s impressive improvement after
    removal from Mother and Father was at least partially due to receiving her
    medication on a regular basis. This evidence supports an inference that Gabrielle
    was not correctly medicated while in Mother’s and Father’s care. Failure to
    administer medication or medical care to a child with a heart defect qualifies as
    endangerment. See In re J.I.G., No. 01-18-00023-CV, 
    2018 WL 3233874
    , at *8
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that
    failure to provide appropriate medical care constitutes endangering conduct for
    purposes of subsection E).
    Father’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to show endangerment
    because of the alleged lack of evidence causally connecting his bad conduct toward
    the child misstates the law; endangering conduct need not be directed at the child in
    question, nor need the child sustain any injury, for the evidence to warrant the
    conclusion that the child has been endangered, as that term is used in the context of
    a parental rights termination. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Boyd, 727
    14
    S.W.2d at 533). The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from
    parental misconduct standing alone. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. Father’s reliance on
    In re L.C.L. likely is misplaced, because even though the Texas Supreme Court
    denied the petition for review, Justice Lehrmann’s concurring opinion implies that
    if presented with a “proper case,” the court probably would decide that no causal
    nexus between the drug use and the alleged endangerment would be necessary to
    find clear and convincing evidence of endangerment. 599 S.W.3d at 84; 
    629 S.W.3d 909
    , 911 (Tex. 2021). Even if we were to assume, which we do not, that the law
    requires a cause-and-effect relationship between the allegedly endangering conduct
    and harm to the child, the evidence that Father failed to ensure that Gabrielle was
    properly medicated and allowed Gabrielle to remain in an environment of illegal
    drug abuse by himself, Mother, and others, and as a result of this neglect, the harm
    she suffered constituted the evidence of endangerment that Father contends is absent
    from the record. See In re J.I.G., 
    2018 WL 3233874
    , at *8.
    We have carefully reviewed the entire record, and after examining the
    evidence we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
    conviction that Father engaged in conduct whereby Gabrielle’s physical or
    emotional well-being was endangered by the parents’ conduct and by her living
    conditions while in their care. Accordingly, we overrule Father’s first and second
    issues.
    15
    B. Best Interest Finding
    In his last issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
    evidence to support the trial court’s determination that terminating his parental rights
    was in Gabrielle’s best interest. Father has attacked the best interest finding on the
    ground that the only evidence of Gabrielle’s best interest consisted of a conclusory
    statement, which amounts to no more than a scintilla of evidence. See In re L.C.L.,
    599 S.W.3d at 85. While it is a correct statement of the law that conclusory
    statements are not evidence, Hadnot’s conclusory testimony that it was in Gabrielle’s
    best interest to remain with her foster family does not end the inquiry. As the
    reviewing court, the question we must decide is whether the record, when considered
    as a whole, supports the trial court’s best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
    at 28. To make this determination, we consider the non-exclusive factors identified
    by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, to the extent that they apply to the
    case before us. 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 371-72 (Tex. 1976).3
    3
    These factors are as follows:
    1. the child’s desires;
    2. the child’s current and future physical and emotional needs;
    3. the current and future physical and emotional danger to the child;
    4. the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody;
    5. the programs available to assist the party seeking custody;
    6. the plans for the child by the parties seeking custody;
    7. the stability of the home or proposed placement;
    8. the parent’s acts or omissions that reveal that the existing parent-child
    relationship is improper; and
    16
    There need not be evidence of all, or even most, of the Holley factors; instead,
    strong evidence of one factor, particularly a factor involving the child’s safety, may
    be adequate to justify the trial court’s decision that the child’s best interest is served
    by terminating the parent-child relationship. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28.
    Applying this standard to the instant case indicates that the trial court was justified
    in forming the requisite firm conviction that termination was in Gabrielle’s best
    interest, for Hadnot’s brief statement about Gabrielle’s best interest was far from the
    only evidence that her best interest would be best served by terminating Father’s
    parental relationship. As shown above, the record contained evidence that not only
    was Gabrielle’s physical safety endangered by Father’s neglect of his daughter’s
    medical needs, the parenting abilities of Gabrielle’s foster mother, as illustrated by
    Gabrielle’s remarkable improvement after she was removed from Mother’s care and
    placed with her foster mother weigh heavily in favor of termination. Given the
    gravity of Gabrielle’s medical state, it clearly was in her best interest that both
    Father’s and Mother’s parental rights be terminated, so that Gabrielle could be
    adopted by the foster family that had demonstrated the ability to care for her
    properly.
    9. any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.
    Holley v. Adams, 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
    17
    Neither Mother nor Father had a realistic plan for providing a stable home for
    Gabrielle. During the pendency of the suit, despite the gravity of the situation,
    Mother had been living with various friends, had not been employed, and had no
    transportation at time of trial. Mother’s plan was dependent upon receiving an IRS
    refund to, at most temporarily, obtain a place to live and some form of transportation.
    Father’s plan was wholly contingent upon him being released from incarceration. In
    that case, he planned to be housed in a halfway house and “hoped” to go to work for
    a previous employer; only after proving a consistent history of stable employment,
    he would rely upon his elderly parents to provide him with suitable housing. On the
    other hand, the foster parent wished to adopt Gabrielle, and maintained a stable home
    life and employment, where Gabrielle was reportedly happy and loved. This factor
    weighs heavily in favor of termination of Father’s parental rights.
    As Father has correctly noted in support of his position, there is a strong
    presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest. 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131
    (b); see also In re R.R., 
    209 S.W.3d 112
    , 116 (Tex. 2006)
    (noting that a “strong presumption” exists favoring keeping a child with his or her
    parent). Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt and permanent placement of the
    child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.” 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307
    (a). To reconcile these seemingly contradictory principles, the trial court
    is afforded “wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.”
    18
    Gillespie v. Gillespie, 
    644 S.W.2d 449
    , 451 (Tex. 1982) (citing Leithold v. Plass,
    
    413 S.W.2d 698
     (Tex. 1967)). The trial court exercised this latitude in favor of
    termination, and we decline to disturb it absent any indication to show that that
    decision was erroneous or reached improperly. Considering the Holley factors, and
    considering all the evidence, we find that the trial court could have reasonably
    formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights was in
    the best interest of Gabrielle. We overrule Father’s final issue.
    Having found the evidence supports the trial court’s findings made pursuant
    to 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D) and (E), and the trial court’s best-
    interest finding, we need not address Father’s additional contention that the evidence
    was insufficient to support the finding that he had constructively abandoned his
    child. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(N); Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
    We affirm the trial court’s order of termination in trial court cause number
    62066.
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    CHARLES KREGER
    Justice
    Submitted on August 15, 2022
    Opinion Delivered August 18, 2022
    Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    19