Juan Francisco Avila v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 6, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00727-CR
JUAN FRANCISCO AVILA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1958617-H
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garcia, Goldstein, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Miskel
Appellant Juan Francisco Avila was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of
a child under the age of fourteen years and was sentenced to seventy-five years of
imprisonment after a multi-day jury trial. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(2)(B). In
three live issues, Avila argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting the expert
testimony of the State’s psychologist, which was based on her review of an academic
study; (2) admitting the State’s Exhibit No. 21 (containing the child’s therapy
records) over his cumulative hearsay objections and allowing the psychologist to
testify to opinions based on her review of the hearsay evidence; and (3) excluding
evidence of Avila’s immigration status and additional mitigation evidence at the
punishment stage. At oral argument, Avila’s counsel withdrew his fourth issue
complaining about the jury charge. We modify the judgment to reflect the correct
amount of costs awarded against Avila and otherwise affirm the judgment as
modified.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2019, Avila’s young stepdaughter “Deborah”1 reported to
her elementary school counselor that Avila had been sexually abusing her. The
counselor phoned police and child protective services to report the outcry. The
police took the child for a forensic interview. The Assistant Director of Forensic
Services at the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”) interviewed the child.
Deborah described multiple incidents of sexual abuse Avila committed against her
beginning in her third-grade year.
The investigation revealed that Deborah had made an outcry to her mother
about the abuse some time before making the September 2019 report to her
elementary school counselor. The mother had suspected something was wrong when
she caught Avila leaving Deborah’s bedroom late one night, in total darkness. The
next day the mother asked the child whether Avila had touched her, and Deborah
1
We use an alias to protect the minor’s identity.
–2–
described how Avila had sexually abused her. The mother called her pastor; the
pastor and his wife came to the home and Deborah again detailed the abuse.
Avila was indicted and proceeded to a jury trial where the jury convicted him
of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL
CODE § 22.021(a)(2)(B). The jury assessed Avila’s punishment at seventy-five
years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. THE COMPLAINT ABOUT IRRELEVANT EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS NOT
PRESERVED FOR REVIEW
In his first issue, Avila contends that the trial court committed reversible error
by admitting irrelevant testimony by the State’s psychologist Dr. Doskey at the
punishment stage. However, the record reflects that, at the punishment phase,
Avila’s counsel lodged no objections to the admissibility of the psychologist’s
testimony and, therefore, preserved no alleged error for our review. TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a).
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 governs error preservation and
requires that a complaint must be “made to the trial court by a timely request,
objection, or motion that ... state[s] the grounds for the ruling that the complaining
party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court
aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the
context[.]” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Although no “hyper-technical or
formalistic use of words or phrases” is necessary to preserve error, the complaining
–3–
party must notify the trial judge about what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to
it, and must do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the
judge is in the proper position to do something about it. Golliday v. State, 560
S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The record must show the trial court ruled
on the party’s request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or refused
to rule and that the complaining party objected to the trial court’s refusal. TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).
To preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must object each time the
alleged inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection. Valle v. State,
109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). An error in the admission of evidence
is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection. Id. The
requirement of error preservation “generally applies to all complaints except those
that involve rules that are ‘waivable only’ or ‘systematic’ (or ‘absolute’)
requirements.” London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
“[A]ll other complaints, whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are forfeited
by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
Our Court of Criminal Appeals has “consistently held that the failure to object
in a timely and specific manner during trial forfeits complaints about the
admissibility of evidence.” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). An appellant “must have made a proper and specific objection at the time the
–4–
evidence was offered or excluded to preserve his right of review of that evidentiary
claim.” Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The alleged
error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Clark v. State, 365
S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
B. The Request for a Jury Instruction did Not Preserve an Objection
to Admissibility
Instead of lodging evidentiary objections, the record reflects that Avila’s
counsel took Dr. Doskey on voir dire about State’s Exhibit 22—a summary of a
study of the relationship between Adverse Childhood Experiences (“ACEs”) and
negative health outcomes in adulthood.2
In the punishment phase, Avila’s counsel cross-examined the State’s
psychological expert about the study’s methodology and conclusions, as well as
establishing that Deborah was not included in the ACE study and that personal
investigation into Deborah’s circumstances would be necessary to assess the actual
adult outcomes for Deborah.
2
See Vincent J. Felitti, MD, FACP et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction
to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults. The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14
Am. J. Prev. Med. 245-58 (1998); see also Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma
Throughout Capital Mitigation Investigations and Presentations, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 923, 927 (2008);
Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/aces/about.html/ (last visited February 1, 2024).
–5–
After completing his voir dire of the State’s psychologist expert Dr. Doskey,
Avila’s counsel stated, “That’s all Your Honor. I would ask that the jury be
instructed that this is just general information and has nothing to do with the case at
hand regarding this child or any prediction of what—if—I’m sorry—any prediction
of what the jury has decided upon that occurred would have in her future life.” The
Court responded, “Request for Instruction is denied. Members of the jury, all
evidence presented for you is for your consideration both as to credibility, weight,
which means significance or what you’re gonna do with it.” The trial court admitted
State’s Exhibit No. 22 into evidence. Avila’s counsel did not object to the admission
of State’s Exhibit No. 22 (the ACE study summary) or Dr. Doskey’s testimony
relating to that exhibit, and he has not argued on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his requested jury instruction. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1),
38.1(i).
On appeal, Avila argues that defense counsel’s request for a jury instruction
“amounted to an objection” to both the testimony and to Exhibit 22 as irrelevant.
However, we conclude that the request for the instruction did not preserve a
relevance objection for appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Golliday v.
State, 560 S.W.3d at 670 (the complaining party must notify the trial judge about the
complaint and its basis, and must do so with clarity sufficient for the trial court to
understand it at a time when the court can act upon the complaint).
Issue one is decided against Avila.
–6–
III. THE CAC RECORDS WERE NOT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
In his second issue, Avila argues the trial court erred in admitting State’s
Exhibit 21—the child’s records from the CAC.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit an exhibit for an abuse of
discretion. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Khoshayand v. State, 179 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)
(citing, inter alia, Willover v. State and holding, “[w]e review the trial court’s ruling
in light of what was before it at the time the ruling was made and uphold the ruling
if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law
applicable to the case.”).
The trial record reflects that, while Avila acknowledged the business records
affidavit proving up Exhibit 21, he proceeded to object on the basis that the CAC
records contained unspecified instances of hearsay within hearsay. Avila did not
identify any of the particular entries in Exhibit 21 that he asserted constituted
cumulative hearsay. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, under these
circumstances, Avila, as the objecting party, presents nothing for this reviewing
court to decide, and the trial court will be deemed to have properly admitted the
evidence. Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled
on other grounds, Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035 (1993) (“The trial court need never sort through
challenged evidence in order to segregate the admissible from the excludable, nor is
–7–
the trial court required to admit only the former part or exclude only the latter part.
If the evidence is offered and challenged which contains some of each, the trial court
may safely admit it all or exclude it all, and the losing party, no matter who he is,
will be made to suffer on the appeal the consequences of his insufficiently specific
offer or objection…”).
Exhibit 21 contains the statements of the child and her mother relating to
therapy provided by the CAC. The record reflects that these statements were made
for—and reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment and that they
describe medical history, past or present symptoms or sensations, their inception or
their general cause and, thus, are expressly excepted from the rule against hearsay.
TEX. R. EVID. 803(4). The records do contain other administrative entries, such as
comments related to scheduling appointments. The record does not reflect that any
of the administrative entries were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted,
and Avila does not identify or analyze any harm related to the administrative entries.
Statements by a suspected victim of child abuse as to the causation and source
of the child’s injuries are properly admissible under rule 803(4) as express
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Davidson v. State, No. 05-05-00864-CR, 2006 WL
3020403, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 183 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). Further, statements made by the parent of an
–8–
injured child for purposes of diagnosing or treating the child qualify as an exception
under rule 803(4). Delavega v. State, No. 05-21-00229-CR, 2022 WL 1564548, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); Barnes v. State, No. 05-16-01184-CR, 2017 WL 5897746, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Nov. 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Sandoval v. State, 52 S.W.3d 851, 856-57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,
pet. ref’d); Ponce v. State, 89 S.W.3d 110, 120 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2002, no
pet.).
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, neither the State nor the
trial court had the burden to affirmatively identify TEX. R. EVID. 803(4) as a specific
hearsay exception supporting admission of Exhibit 21 when presented with Avila’s
general and non-specified cumulative hearsay objection. See also Sewell v. State,
629 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“When a trial court's ruling on the
admission of evidence is correct, although giving a wrong or insufficient reason, this
Court will not reverse if the evidence is admissible for any reason.”) (citations
omitted).
Nevertheless, the record does not show that Exhibit 21 was admitted into
evidence. When Avila objected, the trial court carefully announced that “The exhibit
is received as a court exhibit at this point and may be subject to substantial redactions
before being published before the jury in its entirety” (emphasis added). Nothing in
the record reveals that Exhibit 21 was redacted, published to the jury, or sent to the
–9–
jury as an admitted trial exhibit in any form. The reporter’s record, in listing the
admitted exhibits, contains only a blank where the page and line reference for
Exhibit 21 would be had it been admitted. Finally, relative to Exhibit 21, the trial
court later instructed the jury that “the [expert] witness is permitted to testify as an
expert, having reviewed certain documents, but those documents are not available
for your consideration.”
We conclude that Avila has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting Exhibit 21, because the record does not show that Exhibit 21 was
admitted into evidence. Further, Avila makes no effort to establish harm from any
hearsay statements in Exhibit 21 not subject to a hearsay exception. The first part
of Avila’s second issue is overruled.
IV. AN EXPERT MAY BASE OPINIONS ON INFORMATION CONTAINING HEARSAY
Avila contends that Dr. Doskey should not have been allowed to review the
therapy records in Exhibit No. 21 and then testify about the trauma signs the child
and her mother communicated to the therapist along with the therapist’s recording
of their trauma symptomology scores. Avila’s argument is without merit.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Experts may properly consider materials in forming their opinions, whether
or not such materials are admitted into evidence and whether or not the materials
might contain hearsay, so long as they are of the type experts in the same field
commonly rely upon. TEX. R. EVID. 703, 705. More specifically, expert witnesses
–10–
may base their opinions on facts or data which are inadmissible, if such information
is commonly relied upon by experts within that same field; and the trial court will
examine the basis for the expert’s opinion and determine whether disclosure to the
jury of such facts or data would be more prejudicial than probative. Joiner v. State,
825 S.W.2d 701, 707-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific expert
testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Sexton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 96, 99
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). If the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement, then the trial court’s ruling will be upheld. Id. “A witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 702.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Permitting the Expert’s Testimony
The State’s psychologist Dr. Doskey reviewed the therapy records contained
within Exhibit 21 and testified about how she used those therapy records to form her
own expert opinions. This is a permissible and anticipated scenario under the rules
of evidence and case law. TEX. R. EVID. 703; Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions,
Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 352 (Tex. 2015) (“No rule prohibits experts from using other
experts’ opinions to formulate new opinions based on their own expertise. In fact,
Texas Rule of Evidence 703 and our prior cases contemplate exactly such an
–11–
arrangement.”); Anderson v. Gonzalez, 315 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2010, no pet.) (“An expert may rely on the opinions of other individuals who have
rendered reports or diagnoses.”) (citations omitted).
In accordance with the rules governing expert testimony, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Doskey to testify about the bases for her
opinions, including her review of the therapy records in Exhibit 21. Because the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of Dr. Doskey’s testimony
based on the CAC therapy records, we overrule the second part of Avila’s second
issue.
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY LIMIT MITIGATION TESTIMONY
ABOUT AVILA’S IMMIGRATION STATUS OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT
In his third issue, Avila contends the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion in preventing Avila from offering mitigation evidence on whether the
family’s apartment was furnished or his immigration status. During the punishment
phase, defense counsel questioned Avila about whether the family’s apartment was
furnished. The trial judge stopped the questioning and excused the jury, assuming
that the line of questioning was improperly aimed at exploring the existence of
security cameras and by extension Avila’s innocence at the punishment phase. The
trial court further limited questions about Avila’s immigration status and whether he
was subject to an immigration hold or deportation. Avila argues on appeal that it
was error for the court to limit his mitigation evidence.
–12–
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure set out two appellate standards of
review that may apply in a criminal case, one for constitutional errors and the second
for other errors. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); 44.2(b). Any non-constitutional error that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
The exclusion of a defendant’s evidence will be constitutional error only if
the evidence forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively
precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657,
659, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Here, Avila complains not that he was barred
from presenting mitigation evidence at the punishment phase, but only that he was
not permitted to adduce specific evidence of his financial support of his family and
his immigration status. Because Avila does not raise a complaint of constitutional
dimension, we must disregard any error that does not affect his substantial rights.
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is not affected, and the error is harmless
if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court determines the error did not
influence, or had only a slight influence, on the trial outcome. Motilla v. State, 78
S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Montez v. State, 975 S.W.2d 370, 373
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.).
Avila’s citation to Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 160-61 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (per curiam) is far wide of the mark. In that case, the trial court announced
its sentence immediately after adjudicating the defendant’s guilt for violating his
–13–
probation. The defendant in Issa was never afforded a punishment hearing after the
adjudication of guilt, and the trial court deprived the defendant of the opportunity to
present any mitigation evidence whatsoever. Id. Here, Avila was afforded a separate
punishment phase and testified before the jury to present mitigation evidence.
B. The Trial Court’s Limits on Questions Relating to Avila’s
Financial Support of the Mother and Child Were Not Error
Avila’s argument that he was denied the opportunity to present mitigation
evidence is contrary to the record. Avila acknowledges that the trial court permitted
the admission of evidence showing that he paid to bring the child and her mother
from the family’s native country of Honduras, that he provided financial support for
the child and her mother in the United States, and that he personally installed security
cameras at the apartment they all lived in to increase security.
The trial court was entitled to infer that further questioning about the
furnishing of the apartment may develop into an attempt to relitigate the issue of
security cameras and whether their footage would show Avila’s innocence.
Importantly, “at the punishment stage of a criminal trial, evidence is not admissible
for the purpose of relitigating the defendant’s guilt.” McGee v. State, 233 S.W.3d
315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Avila nonetheless did actually testify during the
punishment phase that he was innocent of the crime the jury had already convicted
him of. The trial court’s ruling was not error, and further, Avila was not deprived of
the opportunity to present mitigation evidence.
–14–
C. The Trial Court Did not Err in Limiting Questions about Avila’s
Immigration Status
Avila also complains that the trial court improperly halted testimony about his
citizenship status. Avila’s counsel attempted to explore immigration status when
he asked Avila if he had ever been sent to immigration. The State objected as to
relevance and the trial court instructed the jury that a person’s nationality has no
bearing on the punishment phase. During a break, Avila’s counsel explained he was
attempting to show the jury that Avila had the ability to flee the country but elected
not to. The trial court observed:
I think we can -- it can be done a whole lot more direct without
overemphasizing the history of bonds and immigration proceedings. I
think is that if [Appellant] was at liberty, had the opportunity to leave -
- to flee and did not, that’s perfectly good evidence in my mind.
Admissible. All the other stuff, I don’t think is appropriate. Because,
obviously, the State would not be permitted to try to punish -- seek
harsher punishment for somebody not a US citizen or not lawfully in
this country. It is the offense for which the jury has found him guilty
that they’re supposed to set punishment, not whether they like the cut
of his hair or not.
Avila’s counsel responded “I fully understand that” and the court stated
“Well, I’m telling you, my friend, I’m limited you to that. If you can put it in one or
two questions, do it. If you try to go further, I’m gonna be stopping it.” Avila’s
counsel appeared to agree with this direct approach and responded, “It could be done
real easy with two direct questions, but I’ve been admonished.”
The record reflects that Avila later testified in response to direct questions
that, indeed, he had been released from incarceration and was free for almost three
–15–
years before the criminal trial and that Avila did not leave the country or attempt to
avoid his criminal trial. Here is the key testimony:
Q Very simply. You were free for most – for almost three years?
A Yes.
Q And you did not leave the country or attempt to avoid these
proceedings?
A No.
Immediately after this exchange, Avila’s counsel stated, “Nothing further, Your
Honor.” Avila’s counsel never made a record of any additional questions he wished
to ask or Avila’s anticipated testimony in response.
On appeal, Avila asserts that the trial court’s statement that Avila’s counsel
should proceed with “one or two questions” in order to establish that “he could have
fled to Honduras or some other country and avoided prosecution” somehow limited
his counsel’s ability to present “a fuller picture of his character.” But with no record
of any supplemental questions Avila’s counsel ever actually proffered or even a
reasonably specific summary of the additional evidence he would have adduced at
the sentencing stage, the trial court was never presented with additional questions or
the related evidence to consider and rule upon. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a); Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding
no alleged error was preserved for appeal where defendant’s counsel failed “to
proffer, with some degree of specificity, the substantive evidence he intended to
present”).
–16–
There can be a substantial risk of unfair prejudice inherent in the admission
of collateral evidence on an accused’s immigration status. See, e.g. TXI Transp. Co.
v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 241–42, 244 (Tex. 2010) (holding evidence of
immigration status unrelated to merits of claims was not admissible and, citing cases
from across the country, observing “[e]ven in instances where immigration status
may have limited probative value as to credibility, courts have held that such
evidence is properly excluded for undue prejudice under Rule 403.”) (citations
omitted).
In the present case, the trial court was aware of this potential for unfair
prejudice against Avila. Immediately after Avila’s counsel introduced the topic of
Avila being “sent to immigration,” the trial court sustained the State’s relevance
objection. The court then instructed the jury that, irrespective of any party’s
citizenship, wealth or poverty, primary language, or length of time in the U.S., the
law expects all parties to be treated equally under the law.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting testimony relating
to Avila’s immigration status. Cf. Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138, 152 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (rejecting the argument that witnesses who may “be in the country
illegally, or have some other ‘vulnerable status’ are automatically subject to cross-
examination with that status regardless of its lack of relevance to the testimony of
that witness.”).
–17–
Avila was permitted to testify to the evidence he wanted the jury to hear—that
he had not used his foreign citizenship to flee the United States to avoid trial.
After reviewing the entire record, this Court determines that any error did not
influence, or had only a slight influence, on the punishment phase outcome. Avila’s
third issue is overruled.
VI. MODIFICATION OF COSTS AWARDED AGAINST AVILA
In a cross-issue, the State argues that mandatory court costs should be
correctly reflected in the judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.16. The
record reflects that the District Clerk’s bill of costs assessed $451, although the trial
court’s judgment awarded only $386.
We have authority to modify the judgment to make the record speak the truth
when we have the necessary information before us to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); French v. State, 830
S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (adopting the reasoning in Asberry v. State,
813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc)). We
decide the State’s cross-issue in its favor and modify the judgment to reflect that a
total of $451 in costs is awarded against Avila.
VII. CONCLUSION
We overrule all of Avila’s live issues. We sustain the State’s cross-issue on
costs and modify the judgment to award costs against Avila in the total amount of
$451.00. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
–18–
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects the
modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment. See Shumate v. State, 649
S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).
/Emily Miskel/
220727f.u05 EMILY MISKEL
Do Not Publish JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
–19–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JUAN FRANCISCO AVILA, On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1958617-H.
No. 05-22-00727-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
Justices Goldstein and Garcia
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
The total costs awarded against Appellant Juan Francisco Avila are modified to the
new total amount of $451.00.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 6th day of February, 2024.
–20–