Judy D. Brown v. Oaks Riverchase Apartments ( 2024 )

NO. 12-23-00161-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
JUDY D. BROWN, § | APPEAL FROM THE
APPELLANT
V. § COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO 3
OAKS RIVERCHASE APARTMENTS,
APPELLEE § | SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Judy D. Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her causes of
action against Appellee Oaks Riverchase Apartments (ORA). In one issue, Brown argues that
the trial court erred in dismissing her case. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Brown moved out of her apartment unit at Oaks Riverchase Apartments in Coppell, Texas
on September 24, 2022, after ORA declined to renew her lease. She relocated to Tyler, Texas at
her own expense and, due to the greatly increased commute time, no longer could continue to
work for her then-employer.
Brown filed the instant suit against ORA on March 3, 2023, in which she alleged ORA
was liable to her, pursuant to Texas Property Code, Sections 92.024, 92.056, 92.0563, and
92.331. On June 13, the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing, during which it considered the
admissibility of the parties’ trial exhibits.! During the hearing, the trial court indicated that the
parties’ written, signed lease would be admissible. Brown sought to discuss a copy of the lease,
which she claimed was invalid because it was “created” at a later date. She further objected to
1 Because the exhibits under consideration were not marked, it is difficult, at times, for this court to
determine which exhibits were excluded or admitted.
the admission of the signed lease, which she claimed was “damaged” or “destroyed” because of
“holes punched” in the document, which partially obscured a bar code on it and, further, which
was invalid because it was not delivered to her within three days of signing pursuant to Section
92.024 of the property code. The trial court noted that Brown lived at ORA for approximately
five years, and the parties’ acknowledged that she timely paid her rent. As the proceedings
continued, the trial court made efforts to direct and instruct Brown regarding what evidence was
admissible and what matters she could present to the jury, but Brown continued to return to the
issue of the lease’s validity, the suggestion that ORA engaged in fraud by its subsequent
“creation” of an unsigned copy of the lease and it’s “hole-punching” the document so as to
obscure its bar code. She later returned to the subject of ORA’s alleged violation of Section
92.024, at which point, the following exchange occurred:
MS. BROWN: And I can’t bring in the Code that I didn’t get a copy of the lease within three days?
THE COURT: No.
MS. BROWN: You bring that in?
THE COURT: No.
MS. BROWN: But it’s a law.
THE COURT: And there are no damages attached to that law.
MS. BROWN: Well, it’s not damages attacked [sic] to it, but it’s not a valid lease. If you don’t get
the lease within three days, the lease is invalid for anything but to collect rent.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. BROWN: So if the valid -- if the lease isn’t valid, they had no right to terminate, to tell me
we’re not going to renew your lease.
THE COURT: Okay. Dll tell you what, if your position is the lease isn’t valid, this case is
dismissed. Okay?
So right now the case is dismissed. All right. And you can take this and you can go appeal it.
MS. BROWN: So I can’t present this to the jury?
THE COURT: No.
MS. BROWN: So I have to file a new case?
THE COURT: No -- well, no, you have to appeal this case.
MS. BROWN: And how do I appeal that?
THE COURT: I don’t know. You go talk to a lawyer.
MS. BROWN: Your Honor, that doesn’t seem right that they can -- they can do what they want
and create what they want and hurt the little person, that’s me.
THE COURT: I understand that’s what your position is. But what you just told me on the record
is you don’t believe there’s a lease. I’ve dismissed the case. You can go appeal it.
This appeal followed.
PRETRIAL DISMISSAL OF CAUSES OF ACTION
In her sole issue, Brown argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her causes of
action.”
The purpose of Rule 166 is “to assist in the disposition of the case without undue
expense or burden to the parties.” TEx. R. Crv. P. 166; Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs.,
Inc., 97 8.W.3d 303, 322 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The trial court’s
authority in a pretrial conference is limited to deciding legal, not factual, issues. Walden, 97
S.W.3d at 322. Dismissal at a Rule 166, pretrial conference is allowed in limited situations when
determination of a legal question is dispositive of a case in its entirety. See Stamatis v.
Methodist Willowbrook Hosp., No. 14-14-00492-CV, 2015 WL 3485734, at *4 (Tex. App—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Standard of Review
Because Brown’s sole issue concerns whether the trial court improperly disposed of
claims or issues which should have gone to the jury, we review by the same standard used in
reviewing a directed verdict. See Walden, 97 S.W.3d at 324. A trial court may direct a verdict
when the evidence conclusively proves that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Gomer v. Davis, 419 8.W.3d 470, 475 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A
directed verdict is appropriate when reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the
evidence. Id. In reviewing the granting of a directed verdict, we follow the standard of review
for assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Jd. We can consider any reason why the
directed verdict should have been granted. See id. at 476.
? Brown raises a host of arguments in support of her issue concerning the trial court’s exclusion of “critical
evidence” and its failure properly to consider her presentation of her causes of action. Having considered Brown’s
arguments and having construed them liberally in the interest of justice, we consolidate the arguments in a single
issue concerning the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of Brown’s suit based on the trial court’s stated reason in
its order that dismissal was based on Brown’s “assertion that there was no lease agreement” between the parties. See
TEX. R. App. P. 38.1(f)}, 38.9; see also Vaughn y. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 12-10-00272-CV, 2012 WL
2133594, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Effect of Brown’s Assertion that Lease is Invalid
The trial court’s order sets forth that its decision to dismiss is based on Brown’s assertion
that the lease between the parties is invalid. ORA posits that the trial court considered the
assertion to be a judicial admission and dismissed Brown’s causes of action on that basis.’
A judicial admission is an assertion of fact, usually found in pleadings or stipulations of
the parties, that acts as a formal waiver of proof. Burns v. Burns, 434 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Mendoza v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters,
Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1980)). A party’s testimonial declarations, which are contrary to
her position, generally are admissions, but they are not outcome-determinative judicial
admissions. See Burns, 434 8.W.3d at 228. Testimonial admissions are not entirely conclusive
upon the admitter; rather, a factfinder may consider their evidentiary weight in light of other
evidence. Jd. Courts treat a testimonial admission as a judicial admission, however, if it appears
that: (1) the testimony relied upon was made during the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the
testimony is contrary to an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense asserted
by the person giving it; (3) the testimony is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal, and not merely a
mistake or slip of the tongue; (4) giving the testimony conclusive effect would be consistent with
the public policy that it would be unjust to allow a party to recover after she has sworn herself
out of court; and (5) the testimony is not also destructive of the opposing party’s theory of
recovery. Id. A statement that constitutes a legal assertion or conclusion based on stated facts
rather than a statement of fact is not a judicial admission. See French vy. Gill, 252 S.W.3d 748,
755 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).
In the instant case, Brown’s statement, assuming it was testimonial, which formed the
basis of the trial court’s order of dismissal is that the lease between her and ORA is invalid.
Whether a particular agreement constitutes a valid contract, that is, whether an agreement is
legally enforceable or binding, generally is a question of law. See Cleveland Reg’! Med. Ctr.,
L.P. v. Celtic Properties, L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 333 (Tex. App._Beaumont 2010, pet. denied);
Gutierrez v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., 139 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no
3 ORA suggests that the trial court’s dismissal should be evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard of
review. In support of this contention, it cites Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002) and
Beaumont Bank v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991), neither of which involves a pretrial dismissal of a
claim under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166. ORA also objects generally to Brown’s pro se brief as being vague,
disjointed, and unclear, which it asserts makes a proper response impossible. And thus, ORA declines to offer any
briefing in support of why the trial court’s dismissal on the ground in its order was appropriate.
pet.). Thus, Brown’s general statement that the contract is invalid amounted to the assertion of a
legal conclusion, which is not a judicial admission. See French, 252 8.W.3d at 755. Moreover,
prior to Brown’s assertion, the trial court previously authorized the admissibility of a signed,
written lease between the parties. See Henry C. Beck Co. v. Arcrete, Inc., 515 8.W.2d 712, 716
(Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, writ dism’d) (when undisputed documentary evidence shows that
parties intended to be bound and there is no contrary, legally-sufficient evidence, existence of
contract is question of law). Lastly, Brown’s assertion that the lease was invalid was made in
conjunction with her request to present the language of Section 92.024 to the jury. That section
sets forth that a landlord’s failure to provide a complete copy of the lease within three business
days after the date it is signed by the parties does not invalidate the lease. See TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 92.024(a), (c) (West 2023) (emphasis added). Thus, the statement comprising the sole,
stated reason for the trial court’s dismissal of Brown’s claim not only was a statement of law but
an incorrect one at that. See id.
But even if Brown’s assertion was such that it amounted to a judicial admission that the
lease was invalid, the trial court nonetheless erred in dismissing her causes of action on that
basis. Section 92.056 sets forth a landlord’s liability and a tenant’s remedies, as well as notice
requirements and time for repair. See id. § 92.056 (West 2023). Section 92.0563 sets forth a
tenant’s judicial remedies. See id. § 92.0563 (West Supp. 2023). A tenant’s remedies under
Texas Property Code, Chapter 92, subchapter B, which includes Sections 92.056 and 92.0563,
are conditioned on the existence of a duty under Section 92.052. See Philadelphia Indem. Ins.
v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 484 (Tex. 2016).* In addition to setting forth certain duties a landlord
owes to a tenant, Section 92.052 addresses the form of notice the tenant is required to give the
landlord with regard to conditions allegedly requiring repair. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 92.052(a), (d) (West 2023). Section 92.052(d) expressly contemplates the difference in notice
required when there is a written lease between the parties versus when there is not. See id.
§ 92.052(d).
Here, despite only one signed lease’s being authorized for admission during the hearing,
ORA’s counsel suggested that the parties were bound by a lease agreement during the relevant
4 See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.331 (West 2023) (providing that landlord may not retaliate against
tenant because tenant gives landlord notice to repair or exercises remedy under Chapter 92).
timeframe,” which it declined to renew at the expiration of the lease’s term in late 2022. But
even assuming arguendo that no signed lease existed during that time, the parties agreed at the
hearing that Brown timely paid her rent. Thus, to the extent any lease potentially expired, Brown
remained a paying tenant on a month-to-month basis during the relevant time period according to
the automatic renewal terms of the lease as set forth in Section 3. Thus, under these facts, Brown
did not have to demonstrate the existence of a written lease throughout her tenancy in order to
pursue relief for alleged violations of ORA’s duties under Section 92.052.
In sum, Brown’s assertion that the lease was invalid was a conclusion of law, which does
not amount to a judicial admission. See French, 252 8.W.3d at 755. The legal conclusion she
asserted with regard to the lease’s invalidity made pursuant to Section 92.024 was incorrect. See
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.024(a), (c). And even assuming the parties were not operating under
a written lease during the relevant timeframe, the record reflects that the parties’ agreed that
Brown was a paying tenant. Thus, the absence of a written lease is not an impediment to her
ability to seek relief for ORA’s alleged violations of its duties to her under Section 92.052. See
id. § 92.052(d). Therefore, because the testimony, if any, before the trial court did not
conclusively enable it to determine that a legal question before it is dispositive of Brown’s case
in its entirety, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing Brown’s suit under Rule 166.
Brown’s sole issue is sustained.
DISPOSITION
Having sustained Brown’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing her suit
with prejudice and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this
court.
GREG NEELEY
Justice
Opinion delivered February 22, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C_J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
5 The clerk’s record includes Brown’s motion for new trial, to which is attached signed leases covering the
relevant timeframe.
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
FEBRUARY 22, 2024
NO. 12-23-00161-CV
JUDY D. BROWN,
Appellant
V.
OAKS RIVERCHASE APARTMENTS,
Appellee
Appeal from the County Court at Law No 3
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 75138-B)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the
briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this court that
there was error in the judgment of the court below, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED by this court that the trial court’s order dismissing her suit with prejudice be
reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings; and that all costs
of this appeal are hereby adjudged against the appellee, OAKS RIVERCHASE
APARTMENTS for which execution may issue, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.