K. H. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2024 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00246-CV
K. H. M., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-22-006532, THE HONORABLE MARIA CANTÚ HEXSEL, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
K.H.M. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered
judgment finding by clear and convincing evidence that three statutory grounds existed for
terminating Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (N), (O), (2).
Mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that her appeal is
frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in
appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between the
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute
frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable
grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying
Anders procedure in parental-termination case). Mother’s counsel has certified to this Court that
he has provided her with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of the entire appellate record
and informed her of her right to file a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective
Services has filed a response to the Anders brief, waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief
unless requested by this Court or as needed to respond to any pro se brief filed by appellant. To
date, Mother has not filed a pro se brief.
We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have specifically reviewed the jury’s findings under
part (D) of Family Code § 161.001(b)(1), and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could
be raised on appeal with respect to that finding. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex.
2019) (holding that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate
court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under section
161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code”). After reviewing the record and the Anders briefs,
we find nothing in the record that would arguably support Mother’s appeal. We agree with
Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s order terminating the parental rights of Mother. We deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw.1
1
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination
of parental rights extends to “all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing
2
__________________________________________
Thomas J. Baker, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly
Affirmed
Filed: June 28, 2024
of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
Accordingly, counsel’s obligations to K.H.M. have not yet been discharged. See id. If after
consulting with counsel appellant desires to file a petition for review, her counsel should timely
file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an
Anders brief.” See id.3