Rodrigo Miguel Castelan v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  •                     In the
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-23-00244-CR
    RODRIGO MIGUEL CASTELAN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 354th District Court
    Hunt County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 34308CR
    Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A Hunt County jury found Rodrigo Miguel Castelan guilty of aggravated sexual assault
    of a twelve-year-old child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021. The jury
    assessed a sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00. On appeal,
    Castelan argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt and that
    he received an excessive sentence. We find that the jury’s verdict was supported by legally
    sufficient evidence and that Castelan failed to preserve his complaint about an excessive
    sentence. Even so, we find that the trial court’s judgment must be modified to reflect that the
    jury found Castelan guilty of aggravated sexual assault instead of sexual assault. As modified,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    I.     Legally Sufficient Evidence Support’s the Jury’s Verdict of Guilt
    A.      Standard of Review
    “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
    elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 
    589 S.W.3d 292
    , 297
    (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 912 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.
    State, 
    305 S.W.3d 859
    , 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal
    sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” 
    Id.
     (citing Brooks, 323
    S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction
    of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve
    2
    conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
    to ultimate facts.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
    (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2007))).
    “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
    by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” 
    Id.
     at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets
    out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
    proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
    particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Malik, 
    953 S.W.2d at 240
    ).
    A person commits aggravated sexual assault if he, with intent or knowledge, “causes the
    penetration of the . . . sexual organ of a child by any means” and “the victim is younger than 14
    years of age.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B). Here, the State’s indictment
    alleged that Castelan intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Aleena’s1 sexual organ
    by his finger when Aleena was younger than fourteen.
    B.       The Evidence at Trial
    Aleena was fourteen by the time of trial. She testified that, two years earlier, she was
    spending the night at Castelan’s house while he was having a party. Aleena said that she was
    “half asleep” when she heard the door open, followed by Castelan’s voice. Aleena testified that
    Castelan laid on her bed behind her, reached underneath her pajamas, and started touching her
    1
    To protect the child’s identity, we will use pseudonyms for her and her family. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10.
    3
    chest and private area with his hand. She clarified that Castelan’s fingers went “inside” her
    “vagina area.” According to Aleena, she feigned sleep, and when Castelan was finished, he
    “retrieved [his] hand and put [her] clothes back on and then walked out of the room.” Aleena
    said that she was in shock and just continued to lay in bed. Aleena testified that, later in the
    night, Castelan came back into her room and penetrated her vagina with his penis, causing her
    great pain. After the act, Castelan put Aleena’s clothes back on and left. This time, Aleena
    reached out to her mother.
    Aleena’s mother, Janeen, testified that, after midnight, she received a text message from
    Aleena asking to be picked up from Castelan’s house. When Janeen asked Aleena if she was
    okay, Aleena responded, “No, I don’t want to be here anymore. . . . Don’t call or text [Castelan].
    Just don’t. . . . I’ve been assaulted. . . . I want to go home.” According to Janeen, Aleena said
    she “was touched in [her] sleep” by Castelan, that it hurt, and that she could still feel the pain
    from the assault. Janeen immediately went with her sister, Sally Naman, to pick the child up
    from Castelan’s house.
    Janeen testified that there was a party at Castelan’s house but that, as soon as she texted
    Aleena to let her know she was there, “[Aleena] came out, running - - walking really fast towards
    [her], crying, confused. Her face had tears and fear and anger all at the same time.” Naman
    testified that she could tell that something was wrong with Aleena, who appeared to be scared, in
    shock, and wanted to get out of Castelan’s home as soon as possible. After speaking to Aleena,
    Janeen and Naman took her to the police station.
    4
    Gerrell Crawford, an officer with the Caddo Mills Police Department (CMPD), testified
    that he met with Janeen, Naman, and Aleena at 2:00 a.m. Crawford described Janeen as “more
    in shock and angry.” On hearing the allegation against Castelan, Crawford and Roger Cole, a
    detective with the CMPD, arrived with Aleena at a hospital so she could meet with a sexual
    assault nurse examiner (SANE).
    Jennifer Knight, the SANE, testified that she first obtained Aleena’s account of the
    incident. According to Knight, Aleena said that she was asleep when she was assaulted by
    Castelan, who touched her on the chest and “touched her private point with his fingers and his
    private point.” Knight said Aleena clarified that Castelan had touched her vagina with his
    fingers and penis and that, even though she was feigning sleep, she had opened her eyes during
    the assault to identify Castelan as the perpetrator. Aleena told Knight that Castelan stopped on
    his own and that she texted her mom to report the incident. Knight testified that, during the
    examination, she was “very surprised” to find the extent of Aleena’s injuries, including
    lacerations to her vagina, bruising, and “swelling [that] went all the way down in her perineum.”
    Knight testified, “[T]o be honest, initially because the swelling was so bad, I had difficulty
    determining what body part of the vagina that was and where the swelling extended to, down
    into her anus.” Photos of the injuries, which Knight said were consistent with Aleena’s account
    of the assault, were shown to the jury.
    After the examination, Aleena was taken to the Hunt County Children’s Advocacy Center
    (CAC), where she spoke with its program director, Jessica Francis. According to Francis,
    Aleena made an outcry of sexual abuse that occurred at Castelan’s house during a party. After
    5
    the CAC interview, Cole collected the SANE kit from Knight’s examination, secured buccal
    swabs from Castelan, and submitted the evidence to the Texas Department of Public Safety
    Crime Laboratory.
    Cassandra Canela, a manager at the crime lab, testified that “[t]he vulva swabs from the
    victim were sent forward for YSTR testing.” Canela explained that YSTR testing is a “male
    specific” test that deletes out the female DNA profile. Canela presented the following results of
    her scientific testing:
    A.      For the vulva swab, the partial YSTR profile is interpreted as
    originating from a single individual. [Castelan] cannot be excluded as a
    contributor of the male DNA profile at the following locus, DYS456.
    At this locus, the selected profile is found in 4,314 of the
    16,000,388 total individuals within the database. In addition, any paternally
    related male relatives of the suspect cannot be excluded as the contributor of this
    male DNA profile.
    After hearing all of the evidence, the jury convicted Castelan of aggravated sexual assault
    of Aleena.
    C.      Analysis
    Castelan argues that the evidence is legally insufficient because there could have been
    other possible suspects from the party. He also suggests that Aleena could have been asleep and
    was confused about Castelan being the perpetrator or made up the incident entirely. Those
    arguments fail to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
    Aleena testified that Castelan came into her room during the party and touched the inside
    of her vaginal area with his finger, underneath her clothing. After that touching, Castelan left
    Aleena’s room but returned to sexually assault her again by penetrating her vagina with his
    6
    penis. From Aleena’s testimony, the jury could find that Castelan’s acts were intentional or
    knowing. “[T]he testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
    aggravated sexual assault,” and here, we find Aleena’s testimony sufficient to establish each
    element of the indicted offense. Allen v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 815
    , 820 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
    2014, pet. ref’d); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07.
    Also, Janeen testified about the text-message discussion with Aleena after the incident.
    The jury saw the text messages sent by Aleena stating that Castelan had sexually assaulted her.
    Both Janeen and Naman testified about Aleena’s upset demeanor. Knight testified that Aleena
    told her Castelan touched her vagina with his fingers. Evidence from the SANE examination
    showed that Aleena suffered physical injuries to her vaginal area from the assault, and results of
    the scientific testing showed that Castelan could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA
    from vaginal swabs obtained during Aleena’s SANE examination.
    We decline Castelan’s invitation to sit as the thirteenth juror since we “cannot . . . make
    [our] own assessment of the evidence.” Arroyo v. State, 
    559 S.W.3d 484
    , 487 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2018). Instead, we conclude that, when viewed in the proper light, the evidence is legally
    sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, each element of aggravated sexual assault. As
    a result, we overrule Castelan’s first point of error.
    II.    Castelan Failed to Preserve His Complaint About an Excessive Sentence
    “To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate,
    constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely
    request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.” Navarro v.
    7
    State, 
    588 S.W.3d 689
    , 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (quoting Russell v. State, 
    341 S.W.3d 526
    , 527 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.)); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Rhoades v.
    State, 
    934 S.W.2d 113
    , 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Curry v. State, 
    910 S.W.2d 490
    , 497 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1995).
    The record shows, and Castelan agrees, that he raised no complaint in the trial court
    regarding whether the punishment assessed was cruel or unusual. Even so, he argues in a
    conclusory manner that “emotion played far too great a role in the sentence,” which he
    characterizes as excessive. Even assuming that Castelan is arguing something besides cruel and
    unusual punishment, we still find the matter unpreserved. This is because Castelan was required
    to raise the issue with the trial court and obtain a ruling but failed to do so.2 See TEX. R. APP. P.
    33.1(a)(2). As a result, we overrule Castelan’s last point of error.
    III.        The Trial Court’s Judgment Must be Modified to Reflect the Correct Offense
    While we have overruled Castelan’s points of error, we note that the trial court’s
    judgment states Castelan was convicted of sexual assault of a child, a second-degree felony,
    under Section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)
    (Supp.). Yet, before voir dire, the State clarified that Castelan’s offense was aggravated sexual
    assault of a child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021. As a result, the
    trial court charged the jury with deciding whether Castelan was guilty of aggravated sexual
    assault and, after receiving the verdict of guilt, the trial court instructed them to assess
    punishment within the first-degree range.
    2
    Castelan filed a motion for new trial but did not raise any complaint about his sentence.
    8
    “This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for
    accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 
    531 S.W.3d 739
    , 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.
    State, 
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 526
    , 529 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)).      “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect
    judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of
    whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at
    529–30).
    Because the record reflects that the jury found Castelan guilty of aggravated sexual
    assault, instead of sexual assault, we must modify the trial court’s judgment accordingly. We
    also modify the judgment to show the correct statute of offense for this first-degree felony.
    IV.    Conclusion
    We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Castelan was found guilty of
    aggravated sexual assault under Section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code, a first-degree felony.
    As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Scott E. Stevens
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:        August 16, 2024
    Date Decided:          September 4, 2024
    Do Not Publish
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-23-00244-CR

Filed Date: 9/4/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/4/2024