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Dylan Eugene Taylor v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  •                                    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-23-00402-CR
    DYLAN EUGENE TAYLOR, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    On Appeal from the 274th District Court
    Hays County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CR-20-5525-C, Honorable Don R. Burgess, Presiding
    September 3, 2024
    DISSENTING OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
    I agree with the majority’s analysis for issues two and three; however, I respectfully
    dissent from the majority’s analysis and opinion regarding issue one—the motion to
    suppress. I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the inventory
    search; I would therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    We review a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Valtierra
    v. State, 
    310 S.W.3d 442
    , 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give almost total deference
    to the trial court’s findings of fact and review de novo the application of the law to the
    facts. 
    Id.
     We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and
    uphold the ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of the law
    applicable to the case. 
    Id.
     at 447–48.
    The State bears the burden to establish that the police conducted a lawful
    inventory search. Moskey v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 696
    , 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2010, no pet.). The State meets its burden by demonstrating that an inventory policy
    exists, and the police officers followed the policy. 
    Id.
     Here, it is uncontested that an
    inventory policy existed. Appellant’s argument is the inventory policy was not followed in
    that the State failed 1) to obtain Appellant’s signature upon completion of the search, and
    2) to specifically list which items were in the vehicle.
    The inventory policy contains the following language:
    The owner or operator of the vehicle shall be asked to remove, if
    possible, all valuables from the vehicle prior to impoundment. If such
    items cannot be removed, they shall be inventoried before the vehicle is
    removed, and the owner/operator shall be requested to verify the
    completeness of the inventory by signature.
    Appellant’s arguments on appeal focus on the latter half of the inventory policy—
    that items should be inventoried, and a signature obtained. However, this process only
    applies to items that cannot be removed. In Appellant’s vehicle, there were no other such
    valuables that necessitated his signature. There was no evidence at the suppression
    hearing of other unaccounted valuables in Appellant’s vehicle—there was no requirement
    under the inventory policy to secure his signature on the inventory report. There is no
    requirement of the inventory policy to create a form that says, “no valuables found.”
    2
    Turning to Appellant’s second argument—the State failed to specifically list which
    items were in the vehicle. The inventory policy contains the following language:
    A vehicle inventory report shall be completed whenever an officer assumes
    responsibility for towing a vehicle, and shall complete an inventory at the
    location where the vehicle was seized unless reasons of safety or
    practicality require the inventory to take place later.
    The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that Kyle Police Department uses a
    “ticket writer”—a device similar to a phone with a photo-taking program—to conduct
    vehicle inventory searches. This practice was standard for KPD. Officer Waters testified
    that, due to the large amount of trash and miscellaneous items in the back of Appellant’s
    vehicle, he took two photos instead of itemizing each item. These photos were attached
    to the Towed Vehicle Receipt and are part of the inventory report. Waters also confirmed
    that he followed KPD policy, and that he observed no other valuables in the vehicle.
    There was no evidence that any valuables were overlooked or that KPD’s inventory
    procedure was not followed.
    While the majority asserts that the search was merely cursory, this does not align
    with the standard for evaluating the validity of inventory searches. The standard does not
    demand an exhaustive search but rather requires adherence to a standardized
    procedure.1 The trial court had before it evidence that supported the officer’s compliance
    1 While this Court recognizes it is not bound by federal precedent unless deciding questions of
    federal law, Henry v. Smith, 
    637 S.W.3d 226
    , 236 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied), Appellant
    relies on the Fourth Amendment to support his arguments. Thus, the Court’s holding in Florida v. Wells,
    
    495 U.S. 1
    , 4, 
    110 S. Ct. 1632
    , 
    198 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (1990), that an inventory search need not be conducted in
    a hyper technical manner is instructive.
    3
    with the policy, and it was within the trial court’s discretion to accept this evidence as
    sufficient.
    Given the trial court’s findings and the evidence supporting the procedural
    adherence, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. The inventory
    search was valid as it was conducted in accordance with a reasonable, standardized
    procedure. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision.
    CONCLUSION
    Giving deference to the trial court and viewing the record in the light most favorable
    to the trial court’s ruling, I find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. I would overrule
    all issues in Appellant’s brief and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Alex Yarbrough
    Justice
    Publish.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-23-00402-CR

Filed Date: 9/3/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/5/2024