Eric Montreal Anderson v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00005-CR
ERIC MONTREAL ANDERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 8th District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2329683
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Hopkins County jury found Eric Montreal Anderson guilty of possessing four grams or
more but less than 200 grams of fentanyl. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d)
(Supp.). After a punishment trial, the jury assessed a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment
and a fine of $7,500.00. The trial court’s judgment also ordered Anderson to pay $180.00 in
restitution to the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory (Texas Crime Lab) and
$80.00 in reimbursement fees, and the bill of costs included a $15.00 time payment fee.
On appeal, Anderson argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that he
possessed the fentanyl.1 He also argues that the trial court erred by imposing the fine without
determining his ability to pay it, by ordering payment of restitution and reimbursement, and by
including the time payment fee in the bill of costs. We find that sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s verdict of guilt. Pursuant to our opinion in Anderson’s appeal in cause number 06-24-
00002-CR, we also find that the fine was properly assessed and that Anderson failed to preserve
his complaint about restitution. While we determine that $80.00 for a reimbursement fee was
proper, we sustain Anderson’s complaint about the time payment fee and delete that fee from the
bill of costs. Because we have deleted the court costs improperly assessed in Anderson’s
companion cause number 06-24-00004-CR, we assess those fees in this case and modify the bill
of costs and the judgment to include them. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
In companion cause number 06-24-00002-CR, Anderson appeals a conviction for possession of five pounds or less
but more than four ounces of marihuana. He also appeals a conviction for evading arrest in cause number 06-24-
00004-CR and a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm in cause number 06-24-00006-CR.
2
I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Verdict of Guilt
A. Standard of Review
“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.
State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal
sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction
of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve
conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007))).
In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that
each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.3
“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a
defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Paroline v. State, 532
S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. struck) (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d
805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))).
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one
that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase
the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). Here, the State had to prove that Anderson knowingly possessed
four grams or more but less than 200 grams of fentanyl.
B. The Evidence at Trial
Josh Davis, an officer with the Hopkins County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO), saw Anderson
driving a silver Infiniti on Interstate 30 at 1:15 a.m. on August 19, 2022. After noticing that the
Infiniti’s license plate light was not working and that Anderson was driving in the left lane
without passing, Davis decided to run the license plate and discovered from dispatchers that the
plate belonged to a maroon passenger car. Davis testified that he attempted to conduct a traffic
stop, but Anderson fled and led him on a chase with speeds exceeding 130 miles per hour.
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According to Davis, Anderson “was cutting traffic, passing on the shoulder. He was all
over the place.” Davis collided with the right rear passenger side of the Infiniti, which slowed
down the car and allowed officers to catch Anderson, his front passenger, Darius Ewing, and
back passengers, Edarious Rogers, Ricky Miller, and Jermaine Edwards.
Davis approached the car and immediately noticed a strong odor of marihuana. After
arresting Anderson for evading arrest, Davis and other officers searched the car and found a large
quantity of marihuana in an open backpack on the front passenger seat. Davis testified, “Located
under the driver seat of the vehicle, which is where Mr. Anderson was sitting, were three tied-up
sandwich baggies. Those contained the small round blue pills” that later proved to be fentanyl.2
Davis said that “[a] fourth baggie of those was located under the front passenger seat.” Davis
also located (1) a stolen, “loaded Glock 19 9 millimeter handgun, . . . [with] a round chambered
to fire,” “under the driver’s seat where Mr. Anderson was seated,” (2) two loaded handgun
magazines, (3) debit cards and an “ID not belonging to anybody in the vehicle,” (4) two digital
scales, and (5) bags used to distribute drugs. Davis said that Anderson and his passengers denied
possession of the items found but were arrested because “they were all in accessibility of the
reach of the narcotics.”
Anderson testified in his defense. He admitted that he and his passengers had been
smoking marihuana and that he knew the marihuana and magazine clips were in the car. Even
so, Anderson testified that he was shocked when officers discovered the pills.
2
Sergeant Chris Baumann, HCSO property manager, testified that he received the laboratory report showing that the
four baggies held a total of “(363) blue-green round pills” containing a total of 36.5 grams of fentanyl.
5
In rebuttal, Matthew Davidson, a detective with the Memphis Police Department,
testified that Anderson was in the “Eric Bezzle Gang,” a “very violent criminal street gang,”
which “originated out of the Smokey City neighborhood area of North Downtown Memphis.”
Davidson said that the gang is known for drug dealing, armed robbery, vehicle thefts,
carjackings, and general theft. He added, “Anderson is also one of the upper-echelon leaders.
He’s also one of the main public faces of the gang, especially with his addition to his rap career.”
After hearing that evidence, the jury found Anderson guilty of possessing the fentanyl
pills.
C. Analysis
“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (Supp.). To obtain a conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, the State must show that the accused not only “exercised actual care, control, or
custody of the [controlled] substance” but that he was “conscious of his connection with it and”
“possessed it knowingly.” Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see
Smith v. State, 118 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
“[E]vidence which affirmatively links [the accused] to [the drugs] suffices for proof that
he possessed it knowingly,” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747, because it tends to show “that the
accused’s connection with the contraband was more than just ‘fortuitous,’” Gill v. State, 57
S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (quoting Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927,
933 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d)). Even so, the State must demonstrate that “the accused
was aware of the object, knew what it was, and recognized his or her connection to it.” Smith,
6
118 S.W.3d at 842 (citing Gill, 57 S.W.3d at 544). For this reason, the mere presence of the
accused at the location where contraband is found is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish
his knowing possession. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Evans
v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
“When the contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the defendant, a fact[-]finder
may nonetheless infer that the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if
there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference.” Tate, 500
S.W.3d at 413–14. Under the links test, if combined with other evidence, the accused’s presence
or proximity may be sufficient to establish knowing possession. Id. at 415. Some factors that
may be legally sufficient, either alone or in combination, to circumstantially establish an
accused’s “knowing possession of contraband” include:
(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of
narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or
narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements
when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the
defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband;
(10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether
the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were
found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed;
(13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and
(14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12); see Smith, 118 S.W.3d at 842; Nguyen v.
State, 54 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d), overruled on other grounds by
Fagan v. State, 362 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d).
7
It is the logical force of the links, rather than the number of links, that is dispositive.
Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet.
ref’d). Also, the links need not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the defendant’s
guilt. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413; Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 748. Even though the factors in the
links test guide us, “ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the
combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a
jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).
Here, there was no evidence of several of the links test factors, including factors two, six,
eight, eleven, and thirteen. Even so, most other factors supported the jury’s verdict. The jury
heard that the defendant was present when the enclosed space of the car was searched. Davis
testified that Anderson was in close proximity to the fentanyl found under his seat and could
access the fentanyl found in the passenger seat. Anderson admitted to smoking marihuana in the
car, indicating that he was under the influence of the drug during his arrest, and the odor of
marihuana was present throughout the car. Officers found other drug paraphernalia, like the
digital scales and baggies. Anderson also admitted to possessing the marihuana and the
magazine clips, and to leading Davis on a high-speed chase, indicating a consciousness of guilt.
In sum, factors one, three, four, five, seven, nine, ten, twelve, and fourteen linked Anderson to
the fentanyl.
“[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury’s
guilty verdict.” Id. at 417. Considering the cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in
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the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the jury’s verdict that Anderson
knowingly possessed more than four, but less than two hundred, grams of fentanyl is supported
by legally sufficient evidence. As a result, we overrule Anderson’s first point of error.
II. The Fine Is Proper and the Complaint About Restitution is Unpreserved
In his second point of error, Anderson argues that the $7,500.00 fine was improperly
assessed because the trial court did not determine his ability to pay it pursuant to Article 42.15 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15(a-1). We
addressed a similar complaint in Anderson’s appeal in cause number 06-24-00002-CR. For the
reasons stated therein, we find that Anderson was unharmed by any statutory error because the
record showed that he was not indigent at trial. As a result, we conclude that the fine was proper.
In his third point of error, Anderson argues that the trial court erred by ordering
restitution payable to the Texas Crime Lab. As in our opinion in cause number 06-24-00002-
CR, we find that Anderson failed to preserve this complaint for our review. See Garcia v. State,
663 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Assessed Reimbursement
Next, Anderson argues that the $80.00 reimbursement fee assessed by the trial court is
unsupported by the record.
Initially, we note that Anderson was charged reimbursement fees in his companion cases,
which we deleted. This is because, “[i]n a single criminal action in which a defendant is
convicted of two or more offenses . . . , the court may assess each court cost or fee only once
9
against the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a). As a result, we will look
to the records in Anderson’s cases to determine whether the $80.00 reimbursement fee is proper.
Looking at the bills of costs in this case and in Anderson’s companion cases, we find the
following reimbursement fees: (1) a $10.00 “SHERIFF TAKE & APPROVE BOND” fee, (2) a
$10.00 “SHERIFF COMMIT OR RELASE FEE,” (3) a $50.00 “SHERIFF EXECUTE
WARRANT FEE,” (4) a $5.00 “NOTICE TO APPEAR” fee, and (5) a $10.00
“SUBPOENA/WITNESS FEE.”3 While Anderson notes that all of those fees are allowed by
Article 102.011 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he argues that the record fails to
support those fees.4
As for the first three fees, the record in 06-24-00002-CR shows that Anderson was given
a surety bond on September 3, 2022, which supports the $10.00 fee for taking and approving the
3
Those fees total $85.00.
4
In relevant part, Article 102.011(a) states:
(a) A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following
reimbursement fees to defray the cost of the services provided in the case by a peace officer:
(1) $5 for issuing a written notice to appear in court . . . ;
(2) $50 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro
fine . . . ;
(3) $5 for summoning a witness;
...
(5) $10 for taking and approving a bond and, if necessary, returning the bond to the
courthouse; . . .
(6) $5 for commitment or release[.]
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a) (Supp.).
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bond.5 Because he was released on bond, the record supports a $5.00 release fee. After his
release, Anderson was later arrested and incarcerated in the “Shelby Co[unty] Jail, Memphis,
TN.” As a result, the record contains an affidavit of surety to surrender pursuant to Article 17.19
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, along with a motion praying for the issuance of a
capias. Article 17.19, titled “Surety may obtain a warrant,” states that, “[i]n a prosecution
pending before a court, if the court finds that there is cause for the surety to surrender the
surety’s principal, the court shall issue a capias.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.19(b).
The record shows that the trial court granted the motion and ordered the clerk to issue the capias.
Article 17.19 further provides, “An arrest warrant or capias issued under this article shall be
issued to the sheriff of the county in which the case is pending . . . .” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 17.19(d). Because the record shows that Anderson was “re-arrest[ed]” after capias was
issued, we find the $50.00 fee for executing or processing a warrant or capias and another $5.00
commitment fee were supported by the record.
As for the $5.00 notice to appear fee, the record in cause number 06-24-00006-CR shows
that a notice to appear for trial was hand-delivered to Anderson while in custody. Thus, the
record is sufficient to support this fee.
Next, although there is a $10.00 fee assessed for issuing a subpoena, the appellate record
confirms that no subpoenas were issued. As a result, we sustain Anderson’s complaint about that
fee and will delete it from the bill of costs.
5
Another surety bond was set on July 10, 2023.
11
Even so, the record reflects that Anderson had a jury trial. Article 102.011 permits a fee
of “$5 for summoning a jury, if a jury is summoned.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.011(a)(7). As a result, the bill of costs should be modified to add that fee.
In sum, the record supports the trial court’s assessment of the $10.00 taking and
approving bond, a $10.00 fee for commitment or release, a $50.00 fee for issuing capias, a $5.00
notice to appear fee, and a $5.00 fee for summoning a jury, which totals $80.00 in
reimbursement fees.
IV. The Time Payment Fee Must Be Deleted
Last, Anderson argues that the $15.00 time payment fee in the bill of costs is improper.
For the reasons stated by our opinion in cause number 06-24-00002-CR, we sustain Anderson’s
complaint about the time payment fee.6
V. Court Costs Must Be Added
Because Anderson’s companion cases were consolidated with this case for trial,
Anderson could only be charged once for court costs. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
102.073(a). “[E]ach court cost or fee the amount of which is determined according to the
category of offense must be assessed using the highest category of offense that is possible based
on the defendant’s convictions.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(b). Out of all of
Anderson’s offenses, this case is the one with the highest category of offense. As a result, we
6
By separate point of error, Anderson raised a challenge to the order to withdraw funds. As explained by our opinion
in cause number 06-24-00002-CR, Anderson’s complaint is a civil matter, and we decline to address it in this
criminal appeal. See Johnson v. Tenth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals at Waco, 280 S.W.3d 866, 871–72 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (orig. proceeding); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 318–19 (Tex. 2009); Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 89
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Alcalá, J., concurring).
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deleted the $290.00 in court costs assessed in cause number 06-24-00004-CR. Consequently, we
must add consolidated court costs to both the judgment and bill of costs in this case.
VI. Disposition
We delete the time payment fee and the $10.00 fee for issuing subpoenas from the bill of
costs but add a $5.00 fee for summoning a jury. We also modify the bill of costs and the trial
court’s judgment to include $290.00 in court costs and affirm the trial court’s judgment, as
modified.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: July 30, 2024
Date Decided: September 6, 2024
Do Not Publish
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