Ex Parte P. A. E., an Adult v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

NUMBER 13-22-00243-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
EX PARTE P.A.E., AN ADULT
On appeal from the 92nd District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV) appeals the trial court’s
order granting expunction for appellee P.A.E. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02.
UTRGV argues that the trial court (1) abused its discretion when it granted the expunction
weeks prior to the hearing date originally set in the case; (2) abused its discretion in
granting the expunction when P.A.E. entered the same records he sought to expunge into
two sperate pending legal proceedings; and (3) erred by exempting from its order only
certain investigative records created before the arrest rather than all investigative records.
We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2022, P.A.E. filed a verified petition for expunction of records
related to his arrest for harassment. On February 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order
setting a hearing on the verified petition for March 31, 2022. UTRGV, as a public entity
named in the petition, received notice of the March 31, 2022 hearing date. On March 9,
2022, P.A.E. filed an agreed statement of facts between himself and the Hidalgo County
District Attorney’s Office (DA’s office), along with a proposed order for expunction. The
trial court granted the expunction on March 9, 2022, weeks before the scheduled hearing.
UTRGV subsequently filed several motions to vacate and motions for new trial.
UTRGV was unable to secure a hearing, and its motions were overruled by operation of
law. This appealed followed.
II. NOTICE & HEARING FOR EXPUNCTION PETITIONS
By its first issue, UTRGV argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
P.A.E.’s expunction order prior to the scheduled hearing date.
A Standard of Review & Applicable Law
An expunction order requires governmental agencies to return, remove, delete, or
destroy all records of a person’s arrest and generally permits the person to deny the
occurrence of the arrest and the existence of the expunction order. See id. arts. 55.02–
.03. “A trial court’s expunction order is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the meaning
of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d 313,
317 (Tex. 2021) (citing State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018)). A trial court
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abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or if its
actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. See Interest of A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282
(Tex. 2019); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.
1985).
Article 55.02 states that the trial court “shall set a hearing on” the petition for
expunction “no sooner than thirty days from the filing of the petition and shall give to each
official or agency or other governmental entity named in the petition reasonable notice of
the hearing[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02, § 2(c). However, an evidentiary
hearing is not required if the petition seeking expunction can be decided on the paper
record alone. Matter of J.J.R., 599 S.W.3d 605, 613 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.);
see also Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Nasa 1 Bus. Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988)
(noting that a “hearing” does not necessarily require either a personal appearance before
the court or an oral presentation to the court). A trial court may rule on an expunction
petition without conducting a formal hearing and without the consideration of live
testimony if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve the issues raised
by the petition. Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ).
The procedures listed in the expunction statute are mandatory and must be
complied with in the proceeding. Bargas v. State, 164 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.). If the record does not indicate that an agency
was notified in accordance with the statute, the proceeding is in violation of the statute,
and the expunction order must be set aside. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Soto, 285 S.W.3d
542, 544 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.) (setting aside expunction
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order because DPS, although a named agency in the petition, did not receive notice of
the expunction hearing).
B. Analysis
UTRGV was notified of the original March 31, 2022 hearing date in accordance
with the statute, as it was a governmental entity named in the petition. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02, § 2(c). However, the record is devoid of any subsequent
notices to UTRGV that the trial court intended to rule on P.A.E.’s proposed agreed order
with the DA’s office in lieu of holding the scheduled hearing. Further, UTRGV was not
served with a copy of the agreed statement of facts and proposed order prior to the trial
court granting the petition.
Article 55.02’s notice requirement does not permit the trial court to reset the
expunction hearing without notice or to rule on a petition without affording the interested
agencies the allotted time to contest the petition. 1 See id. Because UTRGV was not
notified that the trial court was going to rule prior to the March 31, 2022 hearing date,
UTRGV was effectively denied notice of the resetting, and the expunction order must be
set aside. See Soto, 285 S.W.3d at 544; Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Deck, 954 S.W.2d
108, 112–13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (setting aside expunction order
where DPS received notice of the first expunction hearing date but was not notified of the
reset date and DPS had not waived the notice requirement); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety v. Lozano, No. 13-08-00636-CV, 2009 WL 1975392, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (setting aside expunction order
1 P.A.E. argues that UTRGV cannot now complain on appeal that it was deprived of proper notice
because “UTRGV had 21 days between being provided with notice of the hearing and the signing of the
Order of Expunction to file an answer or contest the suit.” However, because of the trial court’s actions,
UTRGV was deprived of over three weeks in which to answer or otherwise contest the suit.
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because “nothing in the record show[ed]” that DPS received notice of the reset expunction
hearing). We further note that the DA’s office purported agreement with P.A.E. is not
binding on UTRGV because each law enforcement agency is entitled to represent itself
at an expunction hearing. Deck, 954 S.W.2d at 111–13.
For all the above reasons, we sustain UTRGV’s first issue. As this issue is
dispositive, we need not address UTRGV’s remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
29th day of February, 2024.
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