Enrique Moreno Sanchez A/K/A Enrique Sanchez v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

NUMBER 13-22-00281-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ENRIQUE MORENO SANCHEZ
A/K/A ENRIQUE SANCHEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 206th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Enrique Moreno Sanchez a/k/a Enrique Sanchez was found guilty by a
jury for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child (Count One), six counts of
indecency with a child (Counts Two through Seven), and six counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child (Counts Eight through Thirteen). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02,
21.11, 22.021. By two issues, which we construe as one, Sanchez argues that his
convictions for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child violate his
rights under the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and his rights
under Article 1, § 14 of the Texas Constitution. The State concedes Sanchez’s issue. We
reverse and render judgment vacating Sanchez’s convictions for indecency with a child
and aggravated sexual assault of a child and affirm his remaining conviction for
continuous sexual abuse of a young child.
I. BACKGROUND
Sanchez was indicted for continuous sexual abuse a child under the age of
fourteen for allegedly committing two or more acts of sexual abuse against Elizabeth1
during a period that began on June 1, 2017 and ended on July 17, 2019. This first count
generally alleged that the acts of sexual abuse included aggravated sexual assault of a
child and indecency with a child by sexual contact.
The indictment also included twelve additional counts against Sanchez. Six of the
counts alleged different types and incidences of aggravated sexual assault of a child
against Elizabeth, and the other six counts alleged different types and incidences of
indecency with a child by sexual contact against Elizabeth. Each offense was alleged to
have been committed during the period of continuous abuse alleged in the first count.
At Sanchez’s trial, after presentation of all the evidence and testimony by the
1 We refer to the minor victim by a pseudonym to protect their identity.
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parties, the trial court read and provided separate charges for each offense alleged in the
indictment to the jury. After the parties presented closing arguments, the jury found
Sanchez guilty on all counts. The jury assessed punishment of ninety-nine years’
imprisonment for the continuous sexual abuse of a young child conviction, twenty years’
imprisonment for each of the six indecency with a child convictions, and ninety-nine years’
imprisonment for each of the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. The
jury also assessed a $10,000 fine for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run
concurrently. This appeal followed.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Sanchez argues that the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions and
the six indecency with a child convictions should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds.
The State agrees with Sanchez, as do we.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects a person from multiple punishments
for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54, 58
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “In the multiple-punishments context, two offenses may be the
same if one offense stands in relation to the other as a lesser-included offense, or if the
two offenses are defined under distinct statutory provisions but the Legislature has made
it clear that only one punishment is intended.” Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 275–76
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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“To obtain a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State must show
that the defendant committed at least two acts of sexual abuse against a child younger
than 14 years of age during a period of at least 30 days’ duration.” Ramos v. State, 636
S.W.3d 646, 651–52. (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)).
Aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact are
among the predicate offenses listed as an “act of sexual abuse.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.02(c)(2), (4).
Dual convictions for continuous sexual abuse and a predicate offense are
prohibited under certain circumstances. Id. § 21.02(e). “A defendant charged with
continuous sexual abuse who is tried in the same criminal action for an enumerated
offense based on conduct committed against the same victim may not be convicted for
both offenses unless the latter offense occurred outside the period of time in which the
continuous-sexual-abuse offense was committed.” Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601, 606
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (interpreting § 21.02(e)). Simply put, “the Legislature did not intend
to permit dual convictions for continuous sexual abuse and for an enumerated act of
sexual abuse unless the latter occurred during a different period of time.” Id.
B. Discussion
As the State acknowledges, Sanchez’s six convictions for aggravated sexual
assault of a child and six convictions for indecency with a child constituted acts of sexual
abuse that Sanchez committed against Elizabeth during the period of continuous abuse
alleged in the indictment, which spanned from June 1, 2017 until July 17, 2019.
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Accordingly, we agree with the State that the Legislature did not intend for Sanchez to be
convicted separately for all thirteen crimes. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(e); Price,
434 S.W.3d at 606.
C. Remedy for Double Jeopardy Violations
When multiple convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, we retain the
conviction for the “most serious” offense and set aside the others. Bien v. State, 550
S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Generally, “[t]he most serious offense is the
offense of conviction for which the greatest sentence was assessed.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006)). In this case, Sanchez was assessed ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for the
continuous sexual abuse of a young child conviction, twenty years’ imprisonment for each
of the six indecency with a child convictions, and ninety nine years’ imprisonment for each
of the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. The jury also assessed a
$10,000 fine for each conviction. Sanchez’s convictions for indecency with a child are
unequivocally not the most serious offense as their associated twenty-year sentences are
lower than the ninety-nine-year sentences assessed for Sanchez’s continuous sexual
abuse of a young child and aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. However,
because the assessed sentences for Sanchez’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse
of a young child and aggravated sexual assault of a child are the same, we cannot solely
rely on the “greatest sentence” factor to determine the most serious offense.
When the most serious offense cannot be determined by the general rule, we may
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look to other distinguishing factors, such as parole eligibility. See Villanueva v. State, 227
S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Gunter v. State, 673 S.W.3d 335, 347
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg, 2023 pet. ref’d) (noting other distinguishing
factors). Here, the State has suggested that continuous sexual abuse of a young child is
the most serious offense because it has, among other things, the most serious parole
eligibility restrictions. We note that continuous sexual abuse of a young child carries
parole ineligibility as a penalty upon conviction. See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 508.145(a).
Aggravated sexual assault of a child also carries parole ineligibility as a penalty upon
conviction “if the offense is punishable under Subsection (f) of” penal code § 22.021. See
id. § 508.145(a)(3). In this case, none of Sanchez’s six convictions for aggravated sexual
assault of a child were punishable under § 22.021(f). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(f). 2 Under these circumstances, we will find that Sanchez’s conviction for
continuous sexual abuse of a young child is the most serious of his convictions. See
Villanueva, 227 S.W.3d at 749. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction for continuous
sexual abuse of a young child and vacate the convictions for indecency with a child and
aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Bien, 550 S.W.3d at 188. We sustain Sanchez’s
2 Texas Penal Code § 22.021 provides that
The minimum term of imprisonment for an offense under [§ 22.021] is increased to 25 years
if: (1) the victim of the offense is younger than six years of age at the time the offense is
committed; or (2) the victim of the offense is younger than 14 years of age at the time the
offense is committed and the actor commits the offense in a manner described by
Subsection (a)(2)(A).
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f).
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sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse and render judgment vacating Sanchez’s six convictions for
aggravated sexual assault of a child and six convictions for indecency with a child by
sexual contact (Counts Two through Thirteen). We affirm Sanchez’s conviction for
continuous sexual abuse of a young child (Count One).
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
29th day of February, 2024.
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