Kenneth Eddens v. Melissa Nunan, Amanda Joyce Williams & the Williams-Nunan Revocable Living Trust ( 2024 )


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  •        TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-22-00441-CV
    Kenneth Eddens, Appellant
    v.
    Melissa Nunan, Amanda Joyce Williams &
    The Williams-Nunan Revocable Living Trust, Appellees
    FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
    NO. D-1-GN-17-005924, THE HONORABLE MAYA GUERRA GAMBLE, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Kenneth Eddens appeals from the trial court’s judgment in his suit against Melissa
    Nunan, Amanda Joyce Williams, and the Williams Nunan Revocable Living Trust (the Trust).
    Eddens asserts that the trial court erred by (1) failing to render judgment against the Trust on his
    breach of contract claim and (2) failing to rule on certain of the claims asserted in his live
    pleadings. We will affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Eddens sued Nunan, Williams, and the Trust asserting various causes of action
    including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, quantum meruit, and promissory
    estoppel.   The court held a two-day bench trial during which Eddens testified that, doing
    business as Eddens Property Management Company, he performed construction services at a
    residence located at 2113 Singletree Lane in Austin. Eddens stated that the project, which was
    to remodel the residence, was identified and brought to his attention by Shawn Patton, an
    acquaintance of Eddens who was also involved in the Monarch Haven of Hope, an organization
    Eddens and Patton were affiliated with whose mission was to help veterans obtain housing.
    Eddens testified that his company could make money remodeling the home and “also get a home
    for a veteran” as part of that program. Patton introduced Eddens to Williams, who was living at
    the residence. Eddens testified that he was told that Williams and her wife, Nunan, were getting
    a divorce. In January 2017, Eddens met with Williams to discuss the possibility of working with
    her to remodel the house. According to Eddens, Williams told him that she wanted to bring the
    residence up to code, add some improvements, and sell it. Eddens recounted that Williams
    advised him that she was “having problems” with Nunan and that Nunan had been physically
    abusive to her. Williams told Eddens that, because of the family violence, a court had ordered
    that Nunan could not enter the residence. Williams showed Eddens court documents that she
    represented restricted Nunan’s access to the residence and photographs of injuries to her that
    Williams stated were caused by Nunan.
    Eddens stated that he was aware that Williams and Nunan were married and
    owned the property but was “unaware of the details involving their relationship.” Eddens
    testified that he would normally require both members of a married couple to sign a contract to
    remodel a home they owned but that he believed he did not need to do that in this instance
    because of the “extenuating circumstances” Williams told him about. Eddens stated that he had
    no reason to disbelieve Williams when she informed him that the court had given her the right to
    handle the remodeling and sale of the marital home. Eddens further testified that he would not
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    have entered into a contract with Williams alone if she had not told him that the court had given
    her the “sole right to renovate the house.”
    In March 2017, Eddens and Williams executed a contract titled “General
    Contractor Contract Major Home Repairs or Remodeling” that outlined the work Williams
    wanted done at the residence. The contract identified Williams as “Homeowner” and was signed
    by Williams and Eddens. Eddens testified that the goal was to bring the house up to code to be
    able to sell it for the best price. He stated that it was also important for the residence to be code-
    compliant if a veteran were to purchase it because the “VA is very particular” about homes being
    code-compliant. Eddens testified that the contract between him and Williams gave him control
    over the actual sale of the property, which was important to ensure that a particular veteran who
    wanted to purchase the home was able to do so. Eddens testified that the contract with Williams
    gave him the right to “choose the real estate agent to orchestrate the sale.”
    In April 2017, Williams and Eddens executed a second document titled
    “Independent Contractor Final Cost Agreement” whereby Eddens agreed to furnish all the labor
    and materials for the job and Williams agreed to pay Eddens “as full payment $150,000 for
    doing the work.” The Final Cost Agreement also provided that “[t]he entire amount of $150,000
    is due upon the final sale of the residential home.”
    Eddens performed construction services at the residence from early March
    through the end of April when the court presiding over Williams and Nunan’s divorce
    proceedings ordered the work to stop. Eddens testified that it was Williams who informed him
    of the court’s order and that he was under the impression that it was only a temporary pause in
    the construction project. Eddens testified that, after that, Nunan met with him and informed him
    that she was going to be in charge of finishing the project and asked him for a list of items that
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    still needed to be done. Eddens stated that he prepared documents titled “Cost Summary for the
    Work that has Already Been Done” and “Cost Summary for Work Remaining” and gave them to
    Nunan but that Nunan never offered to pay him and did not allow him to finish work on the
    residence. Eddens testified that Nunan told him that Williams was “a big liar” and that she had
    never assaulted Williams. Eddens stated that “his own investigation” confirmed to him that
    Williams had lied to him and that he “was being duped big time.”
    Nunan also testified at trial. She stated that she and Williams had created the
    Trust in April 2006 and that the residence was put into the Trust. Williams and Nunan were the
    beneficiaries of the Trust and its only trustees. Nunan stated that she delivered a letter revoking
    the Trust to Williams in January 2017. The letter stated, in part “I have no choice but to file for
    divorce. The Trust is null and void.” Nunan testified that this revocation was done pursuant to
    the terms of the Trust, which provided that either Willliams or Nunan had “the power and right
    to amend, modify or revoke” the Trust by “notice in writing delivered to the Trustee.” The Trust
    also provided that such revocation “shall be effective immediately upon delivery” to the Trustee.
    Nunan testified that she had never given Williams power of attorney to enter into contracts on
    her behalf.
    Finally, the court heard testimony from Shawn Patton, an associate of Eddens.
    Patton testified that she had introduced Eddens and Williams and that she helped with work on
    the residence and helped find volunteers to work on the project. Patton testified that Williams
    never said anything about splitting the proceeds from the sale of the residence with Nunan and
    that Williams told her that it “was up to her to take care of the house” and that it was important
    that the residence be sold. Williams did not appear at the trial.
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    After trial, the court signed a final order rendering judgment against Williams on
    Eddens’s claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit. The court
    awarded Eddens $231,200.00 on his claims against Williams, stating that “[t]his judgment is
    solely against Defendant Amanda Williams.” The court order stated that neither Nunan nor the
    Trust were liable to Eddens for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, or quantum meruit and
    dismissed all claims against them. The order further stated that Nunan and the Trust were not
    jointly and severally liable with Williams for the judgment because “Williams acted alone in her
    individual capacity and in violation of court ordered injunctions.” Thereafter, the court filed
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Eddens perfected this appeal.
    In his second issue, which we will address first, Eddens asserts that the trial court
    erred by “failing to rule on [Eddens’s] claims for Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Unjust
    Enrichment, Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation.” In his first issue, Eddens argues that the
    trial court’s failure to find that the Trust was liable to him for breach of contract was “against the
    great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” We construe this as a challenge to the factual
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the Trust was not liable
    to Eddens for breach of contact. See Dow Chem. v. Francis, 
    46 S.W.3d 237
    , 242 (Tex. 2001)
    (“When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which she has
    the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great
    weight and preponderance of the evidence.”).
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Eddens asserts that the trial court erred in failing to rule on three of
    his claims and that, consequently, we should abate the appeal and remand it to the trial court for
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    adjudication of these claims. In the present case, the court held a two-day trial on the merits
    of Eddens’s claims and rendered a judgment. “[A]ny judgment following a conventional trial
    on the merits creates a presumption that the judgment is final for purposes of appeal.” Vaughn
    v. Drennon, 
    324 S.W.3d 560
    , 561 (Tex. 2010) (citing North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge,
    
    400 S.W.2d 893
    , 897-98 (Tex. 1966)). “A judgment following a conventional trial on the merits
    need not dispose of every party and claim for the Aldridge presumption of finality to apply.” 
    Id.
    Unless a trial court orders a separate trial to resolve a specific issue, there is a presumption that
    the trial court’s judgment disposes of all claims and issues in the case. See Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d
    at 897-98. “If there is any doubt as to the judgment’s finality, then finality must be resolved by a
    determination of the intention of the court as gathered from the language of the decree and the
    record as a whole, aided on occasion by the conduct of the parties.” Vaughn, 324 S.W.3d at 563
    (internal quotations omitted). Here, the judgment is titled “Final Order” and includes language
    stating that “the Court dismisses all claims against Defendants, Melissa Nunan and the Williams-
    Nunan Revocable Trust.” The trial court did not order a separate trial to resolve any of the
    claims Eddens asserted against Williams, Nunan, or the Trust. Eddens treated the order as final
    by filing a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in which he stated that “[t]he Court
    signed a Final Judgment in this matter on June 28, 2022” and by filing a notice of appeal. There
    is nothing to indicate that the trial court did not intend to finally dispose of the entire case. Thus,
    the trial court’s judgment after a conventional trial on the merits is final for purposes of appeal.
    We overrule Eddens’s second issue.
    In his first issue, Eddens challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting the trial court’s determination that the Trust is not liable to Eddens for breach of
    contract. When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which
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    he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the
    great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We must
    consider and weigh all the evidence and can set aside the finding only if the evidence is so weak
    or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly
    wrong and unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 
    715 S.W.2d 629
    , 635 (Tex. 1986).
    In its findings of fact, the trial court found that Williams acted alone in her
    individual capacity when dealing with Eddens and, based on that finding, concluded that neither
    Nunan nor the Trust was liable to Eddens on any of his claims arising out of the contracts that
    Eddens and Williams executed or based on any of Williams’s conduct regarding the remodeling
    project Eddens undertook at the residence. On appeal, Eddens challenges this finding, asserting
    that “a review of the undisputed facts makes it clear that Williams was acting in her Trustee
    capacity” when she executed a contract with Eddens. Eddens points to evidence that Nunan and
    Williams created the Trust in April 2006; that the residence was deeded to the Trust in May
    2006; that both Williams and Nunan had power to act on the Trust’s behalf; and that Williams
    signed the two contracts with Eddens in her stated capacity as “Homeowner” and “Owner” of the
    residence. Having reviewed this evidence, along with the other evidence presented at trial, we
    cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding that Williams acted alone in her individual capacity
    is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Evidence that the Trust existed or
    that it held title to the residence has no bearing on whether Williams acted alone in her individual
    capacity when dealing with Eddens. Furthermore, evidence that both Williams and Nunan had
    the authority to act on the Trust’s behalf does not compel the conclusion that, in this instance,
    Williams was doing so. Instead, the evidence establishes that Williams never informed Eddens
    that the Trust existed, never purported to act on the Trust’s behalf, and never told Eddens that the
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    Trust held title to the residence. Eddens himself testified that Williams represented to him, and
    he believed, that it was an order of the court presiding over Williams and Nunan’s divorce, not
    the terms of a trust, that authorized Williams to handle the remodel and sale of the residence.
    Nunan, the only other beneficiary of the Trust, was unaware of Williams’s dealings with Eddens.
    Evidence that Williams misrepresented to Eddens that she was the “Homeowner” and “Owner”
    of the residence when she negotiated and executed contracts with Eddens does not support a
    finding that she was acting on the Trust’s behalf rather than individually. Finally, although the
    court did not make any express findings regarding whether the Trust still existed at the time
    Williams and Eddens negotiated and signed the contracts, there was undisputed evidence that
    Nunan had delivered a letter revoking the Trust to Williams in January 2017 and that Nunan was
    exercising her right to revoke the Trust pursuant to the terms of the Trust, which provided that
    either Willliams or Nunan had “the power and right to amend, modify or revoke” the Trust by
    “notice in writing delivered to the Trustee” and that such revocation “shall be effective
    immediately upon delivery” to the Trustee.
    Having considered and weighed all the evidence, we conclude that the trial
    court’s finding that Williams acted alone and in her individual capacity is not so against the great
    weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. We overrule
    Eddens’s first issue.
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Eddens’s two appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
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    __________________________________________
    Chari L. Kelly, Justice
    Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith
    Affirmed
    Filed: March 7, 2024
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Document Info

Docket Number: 03-22-00441-CV

Filed Date: 3/7/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/12/2024