Philip Alan Gentry v. Pleasant View PLNDV TX ( 2024 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-23-00059-CV
Philip Alan Gentry, Appellant
v.
Pleasant View PLNDV TX, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF BELL COUNTY
NO. 22CCV01470, THE HONORABLE PAUL A. MOTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Philip Alan Gentry appeals the judgment ordering him to vacate a rented space in
a mobile-home park and to pay back rent and attorney’s fees to Pleasant View PLNDV TX. We
will affirm the judgment.
Gentry moved into a home in Pleasant View’s park in 2010. Evidence included a
one-year lease signed by Gentry effective September 1, 2017; Gentry denied signing a 2017
lease and said he signed a lease in 2019, but no 2019 lease is in the record before us. When the
2017 lease’s one-year term elapsed on August 31, 2018, the tenancy converted to month-to-
month. Under the 2017 lease, Pleasant View had to give Gentry 60 days’ notice it was
terminating the lease during the month-to-month period.
Pleasant View sent Gentry a Notice to Terminate Tenancy dated June 28, 2022.
Pleasant View’s representative said she put the notice on Gentry’s door—the record includes a
photo of something that she testified was the notice attached to a door—and sent service by
certified mail, which Gentry declined on July 5, 2022. After setting out the relevant terms of the
lease, the notice states that “the Landlord has elected to terminate your tenancy effective August
31, 2022.” It then states, “If you fail to vacate the Premises on or before 11:59 PM Wednesday,
August 31, 2022, Landlord will file a forcible entry and detainer suit against you to evict you
from the Premises.”
Pleasant View filed an “eviction case” in justice court by petition dated
September 7, 2022, stating grounds for eviction as “Non Renewal” and stating that notice to
vacate had been hand-delivered and sent by certified mail on June 28, 2022. Pleasant View did
not seek back rent. The justice court signed an Eviction Judgment dated September 22, 2022,
that awarded $154 in court costs.
Gentry appealed to the county court at law, and Pleasant View filed an amended
petition seeking back rent accrued after August 31, 2022. After a hearing, the county court
rendered judgment for Pleasant View, concluding that it was entitled to possession of the
property and awarding it $1,837.39 in back rent, $2,500 in attorneys fees, and $154 in
court costs.
Gentry appeals, filing a pro se brief that does not assign errors by the trial court.
He recounts his struggles getting his rent payments to Pleasant View beginning in February
2022—a period for which Pleasant View did not seek or recover back rent. He also discusses
interactions with Pleasant View personnel that occurred after the hearing and judgment at the
county court; these interactions are beyond the scope of our review. Our role in the judicial
system is largely to review complaints about trial courts’ rulings, orders, and omissions that led
to the judgment complained of; we conduct this review based on the pleadings, evidence, and
issues raised by the parties that were presented to the trial court when it made its decisions and
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rendered judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see also, e.g., Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d
580, 596 n.89 (Tex. 2008). Although we construe pro se briefs liberally, pro se appellants are
held to the same standards as appellants represented by counsel to avoid giving them an unfair
advantage. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). Reading
Gentry’s brief liberally, we consider his complaints to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the judgment.
In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the challenged findings and indulge every reasonable inference that supports them.
University Gen. Hosp., L.P. v. Prexus Health Consultants, LLC, 403 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the decision under review. Id. at 551. We credit
favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not. Id. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we
examine the entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of and contrary to the
challenged findings. See Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.
1998); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We may set aside the challenged finding
for factually insufficient evidence only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407.
The county court heard testimony and admitted evidence that Pleasant View
provided 67 days’ notice of termination of the lease and that it intended to seek eviction if
Gentry did not timely vacate the premises. The court also heard Gentry’s denial that he received
that notice.
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To the extent that Gentry’s complaints on appeal concern back rent for the period
after the notice of termination and before the judgment, we conclude that the record contains
evidence that supported the county court’s finding and judgment that Gentry owed $1,837 in
back rent. Pleasant View’s representative testified about the rent, and the county court admitted
a summary of Pleasant View’s log for accounts receivable from Gentry. The county court heard
testimony from Gentry disputing Pleasant View’s evidence, including testimony that he had
tendered payments that Pleasant View did not accept because of the pending litigation.
The county court was empowered to find Pleasant View’s evidence that Gentry
owed back rent and received timely notice of termination and impending eviction more credible
than Gentry’s evidence that he did not. See Nelson v. Najm, 127 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (trial court as factfinder in bench trial is sole judge of the
witnesses’s credibility). We may not pass on the credibility of the witnesses or substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder. George Joseph Assets, LLC v. Chenevert, 557 S.W.3d 755,
765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Viewing the evidence in the light
required by law, we conclude that the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to
support the court’s judgment.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: February 27, 2024
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