Mengistu Taye v. 3000 Sage Apartments ( 2024 )

Motion to dismiss granted, Appeal Dismissed, and Memorandum Opinion filed
March 21, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-23-00935-CV
MENGISTU TAYE, Appellant
V.
3000 SAGE APARTMENTS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1212637
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal contending that the appeal
is moot. Appellant has filed a response to the motion opposing dismissal. After
considering the parties’ filings, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
The parties’ litigation began with appellee filing a forcible detainer petition in
justice court with respect to an apartment lease. Appellee requested that the justice
court award possession of the disputed property to appellee and award appellee
monetary relief, including unpaid rent. On August 9, 2023, the justice court signed
a judgment awarding possession to appellee and awarding various monetary relief
to appellee. Appellant appealed that judgment to the county court. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Ann. § 51.001. On November 9, 2023, the county court signed a
judgment awarding possession of the property to appellee, and further awarding
appellee its costs of court and post-judgment interest along with the deposit appellant
had previously provided to appeal the justice court’s judgment. The judgment,
however, did not award any further monetary relief to appellee. This appeal
followed from the county court’s judgment. Appellant did not post a supersedeas
bond and thus, while this appeal was pending, a writ of possession was executed and
possession of the property was returned to appellee.
Texas courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to decide moot controversies. See
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). Appeals from
forcible detainer actions ordinarily become moot “when the appellant ceases to have
actual possession of the property, unless the appellant has a potentially meritorious
claim of right to current, actual possession.” Olley v. HVM, L.L.C., 449 S.W.3d 572,
575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). It is undisputed that
appellant no longer has possession of the disputed apartment, and appellant has not
pointed to any basis by which he might have a claim of right to possession of the
apartment. Although appellant has pointed to various alleged bases by which his
subsequent eviction from the disputed apartment was harmful, that is not a basis for
making an appeal from a judgment in a forceable detainer action. See id. (“Judgment
of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination
of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to
immediate possession.”). Moreover, although appellant contests the justice court
erroneously included unpaid rent in its judgment, any error in that regard was
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nullified when he appealed the justice court’s judgment to the county court. See
Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
pet. denied) (“[I]t is well-settled that perfection of an appeal to county court from a
justice court for trial de novo vacates and annuls the judgment of the justice court.”).
Since the county court did not include an award of unpaid rent in its judgment, any
alleged error by the justice court does not create a controversy regarding the county
court’s judgment over which this court could exercise jurisdiction.
As there is no indication any live controversy remains between the parties
over which this court could properly exercise jurisdiction, we grant appellee’s
motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Zimmerer and Wilson.
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