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Paul Rudnicki v. Thompson Petroleum Corp., J Cleo Thompson and James Cleo Thompson, Jr., L.P. and J Cleo Thompson Petroleum Management, LLC. ( 2024 )


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  • AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 20, 2024
    S In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-23-00125-CV
    PAUL RUDNICKI, Appellant
    V.
    THOMPSON PETROLEUM CORPORATION, J. CLEO THOMPSON AND
    JAMES CLEO THOMPSON, JR., L.P., AND J. CLEO THOMPSON
    PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-16848
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Smith
    Opinion by Justice Smith
    Appellant Paul Rudnicki appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor
    of appellees Thompson Petroleum Corporation (TPC), J. Cleo Thompson and James
    Cleo Thompson, Jr., L.P. (the Partnership), and J. Cleo Thompson Petroleum
    Management,     LLC    (Petroleum    Management)      on   Rudnicki’s   claim    for
    indemnification. In one issue Rudnicki argues that the trial court erred in granting
    appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying his motion because he
    established as a matter of law that he was entitled to indemnification under the
    Partnership’s limited partnership agreement, TPC’s articles of incorporation, and
    section 8.052 of the business organizations code. Because we conclude that the trial
    court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, we affirm.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Appellant Rudnicki is the former Chief Financial Officer and Vice President
    of TPC and Vice President – Finance of Petroleum Management. Appellees are
    family-owned entities formed by the J. Cleo Thompson, Jr. family. TPC oversaw
    and managed the other Thompson entities. Specifically, TPC provided employees
    to the Partnership. The Partnership owned, operated, and managed oil and natural
    gas interests in the Permian Basin. Petroleum Management was the General Partner
    of the Partnership and was responsible for managing its assets, including the
    employees provided by TPC. Thus, although they were separate entities, the day-
    to-day operations of the entities overlapped.
    William J. Clarke, who was previously General Counsel, Vice-President, and
    Secretary of TPC, brought suit against appellees TPC and the Partnership for failing
    to pay him a $10 million bonus he alleged he was promised by TPC, specifically
    Rudnicki, for work that he did for the Partnership. Both Clarke’s and Rudnicki’s
    employment with appellees ended prior to the lawsuit. TPC and the Partnership
    subpoenaed Rudnicki to take a deposition as a non-party, and Rudnicki notified the
    companies of his right to indemnification and advancement of costs in having to
    defend and respond to the deposition notice. The companies did not respond. Clarke
    –2–
    later added Rudnicki as a defendant in the lawsuit.1 Rudnicki filed cross-claims
    against TPC and the Partnership and a third-party petition against Petroleum
    Management seeking indemnification and advancement of costs from appellees for
    his expenses, including attorney’s fees, in defending against the suit. TPC and the
    Partnership settled their suit with Clarke and Clarke filed a notice of nonsuit of his
    claims against TPC, the Partnership, and Rudnicki.2 The trial court granted the
    nonsuit and ordered dismissal of all claims, thereby rendering Rudnicki’s
    indemnification claim as the only claim before the court.
    Prior to the dismissal order, Rudnicki moved for partial summary judgment
    on his indemnification and advancement claim. After the dismissal order, Rudnicki
    filed a second amended motion for partial summary judgment and appellees filed a
    cross-motion. The parties filed responses and replies to the opposing party’s motion,
    and the trial court held a hearing. The trial court granted appellees’ motion for
    summary judgment and denied Rudnicki’s motion for partial summary judgment.
    The trial court entered a final judgment ordering Rudnicki’s claims dismissed with
    prejudice and that Rudnicki take nothing on his indemnification claim. This appeal
    followed.
    1
    Clarke also added TLT Petroleum II, LLC, a Thompson entity created to house and distribute bonuses
    or “profit interests” to members. TLT is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    TLT also settled with Clarke and was nonsuited.
    –3–
    Summary Judgment Standard of Review
    We review a summary judgment de novo. Trial v. Dragon, 
    593 S.W.3d 313
    ,
    316 (Tex. 2019). A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the moving
    party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 
    555 S.W.3d 79
    , 84 (Tex. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to
    the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84.
    We take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, and we indulge every
    reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Ortiz v. State
    Farm Lloyds, 
    589 S.W.3d 127
    , 131 (Tex. 2019). However, when both parties move
    for summary judgment on the same issue and the trial court grants one motion and
    denies the other, as the court did here, we consider both parties’ summary judgment
    evidence, determine the question presented, and render the judgment the trial court
    should have rendered if we determine it erred. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
    
    164 S.W.3d 656
    , 661 (Tex. 2005).
    Parties’ Competing Motions for Summary Judgment
    In his second amended motion for partial summary judgment, Rudnicki
    argued that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claim for
    indemnification against appellees. Specifically, Rudnicki contended that he was
    entitled to indemnification from the Partnership and from Petroleum Management
    under section 5.13 of the limited partnership agreement and from TPC under Article
    –4–
    Eleven of its Articles of Incorporation. Rudnicki included the limited partnership
    agreement and articles of incorporation as evidence in his motion for summary
    judgment.
    The Agreement of Limited Partnership provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    5.13 Indemnification of General Partner. To the fullest extent
    permitted by law, and subject to the procedures in Article 11 of the
    Partnership Act, on request by the Person indemnified the Partnership
    shall indemnify each General Partner and its Affiliates and their
    respective officers, directors, partners, employees, and agents and hold
    them harmless from and against all losses, costs, liabilities, damages,
    and expenses (including, without limitation, fees and disbursements of
    counsel) any of them may incur as a General Partner in the Partnership
    or in performing the obligations of the General Partner with respect to
    the     Partnership,      SPECIFICALLY          INCLUDING          THE
    INDEMNIFIED             PERSON’S          SOLE,      PARTIAL,        OR
    CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE, but excluding any such items
    incurred as a result of something for which the General Partner is liable
    under Section 5.8, and on request by the Person indemnified the
    Partnership shall advance expenses associated with the defense of any
    related action.
    “General Partner” is defined as Petroleum Management or “any other Person
    admitted pursuant to this Agreement in the capacity of general partner in the
    Partnership.”
    Rudnicki asserted that he was one of the people to be indemnified under
    section 5.13, as he was Vice President – Finance of the General Partner, Petroleum
    Management, and Chief Financial Officer and Vice President of the General
    Partner’s Affiliate, TPC. Rudnicki also asserted that he was acting on behalf of the
    General Partner, Petroleum Management, which managed the Partnership, with
    –5–
    regard to the allegations made by Clarke concerning his bonus compensation for
    work he did on behalf of the Partnership. Rudnicki emphasized that TPC conducted
    no business of its own except to supply employees to the Partnership and that
    appellees had consistently disregarded formal corporate distinctions between the
    entities.
    Appellees asserted in their motion for summary judgment that Rudnicki’s
    expenses did not fall within the parameters of the indemnification provision because
    “[h]is legal fees defending against [] Clarke’s claims were neither incurred as a
    General Partner nor in performing the obligations of the General Partner.” Instead,
    “they were incurred years after Rudnicki ceased working for” appellees and “could
    not have been incurred ‘as a General Partner,’ nor ‘in performing any obligations of
    the General Partner.’” Appellees emphasized that section 5.13 did not contain broad
    indemnification language such as “arise out of” or “are related to” as was at issue in
    the cases relied on by Rudnicki.
    Rudnicki responded that indemnity would be a hollow promise if it did not
    extend to former employees for actions arising during their employment, especially
    if an employer could simply terminate an employee to avoid its contractual
    obligation to indemnify. Rudnicki further argued that appellees misinterpreted “as”
    to require a “present tense timing of actions,” when the proper interpretation is
    “actions taken as a General Partner, not the timing of a lawsuit brought pertaining to
    –6–
    such actions.” Rudnicki asserted the same was true for actions taken in performing
    the obligations of the General Partner.
    Rudnicki also argued he was entitled to indemnification from TPC under
    Article Eleven of the Articles of Incorporation, which provides, in relevant part, as
    follows:
    The corporation may indemnify any director, officer or
    employee, or former director, officer or employee of the corporation,
    or any person who may have served at its request as a director, officer
    or employee of another corporation in which it owns shares of stock, or
    of which it is a creditor, against expenses actually and necessarily
    incurred by him and any amount paid in satisfaction of judgments in
    connection with any action, suit or proceeding, whether civil or
    criminal in nature, and which he is made a party by reason of being or
    having been such a director, employee or officer (whether or not a
    director, employee, or officer at the time such costs or expenses are
    incurred by or imposed by him[)]. The corporation may also reimburse
    to any director, officer or employee the reasonable costs of settlement
    of any such action, suit or proceeding. Such rights of indemnification
    and reimbursement shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to
    which such director, officer or employee may be entitled by law or
    under any by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise.
    Although Rudnicki acknowledged that the language under Article Eleven was
    permissive, he asserted that public policy, specifically the perceived benefit
    corporations obtain through indemnifying their officers and directors, favored the
    broad application of indemnification and reimbursement provisions so that
    indemnified persons received the broadest possible protection. Rudnicki also argued
    that the last sentence of Article Eleven—“Such rights of indemnification and
    reimbursement shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which such
    –7–
    director, officer or employee may be entitled by law or under any by-law, agreement,
    vote of shareholders, or otherwise”—authorized his rights of indemnification and
    reimbursement through other avenues such as section 8.052 of the business
    organizations code, which provides as follows:
    On application of a governing person, former governing person, or
    delegate and after notice is provided as required by the court, a court
    may order an enterprise to indemnify the person to the extent the court
    determines that the person is fairly and reasonably entitled to
    indemnification in view of all the relevant circumstances.
    TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 8.052(a).
    Appellees argued in their motion for summary judgment that these provisions
    are permissive, not mandatory, and thus Rudnicki had no contractual right to
    indemnification from TPC.
    Contract Construction
    We review the construction of a contract, including whether it is ambiguous,
    de novo. Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 
    471 S.W.3d 445
    , 449 (Tex. 2015). We must
    ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the agreement itself.
    Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    341 S.W.3d 323
    , 333
    (Tex. 2011). Generally, “the instrument alone will be deemed to express the
    intention of the parties for it is objective, not subjective, intent that controls.”
    Matagorda Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Burwell, 
    189 S.W.3d 738
    , 740 (Tex. 2006) (per
    curiam) (citation omitted). “We therefore ‘presume parties intend what the words
    of their contract say’ and interpret contract language according to its ‘plain, ordinary,
    –8–
    and generally accepted meaning’ unless the instrument directs otherwise.” URI, Inc.
    v. Kleberg Cnty., 
    543 S.W.3d 755
    , 764 (Tex. 2018) (first quoting Gilbert Tex.
    Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 
    327 S.W.3d 118
    , 126 (Tex. 2010);
    and then quoting Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 
    939 S.W.2d 118
    , 121 (Tex.
    1996)). Ambiguity does not exist simply because the parties disagree over a term’s
    meaning and present different interpretations of the agreement. Dynegy Midstream
    Servs., Ltd. P’ship v. Apache Corp., 
    294 S.W.3d 164
    , 168 (Tex. 2009); DeWitt Cnty.
    Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 
    1 S.W.3d 96
    , 100 (Tex. 1999).
    Construction of Indemnification Provisions
    We first begin with Rudnicki’s argument that he is entitled to indemnification
    under section 5.13 of the Partnership agreement. Rudnicki relies on several cases
    for the proposition that indemnification provisions should be applied broadly and
    that he is not excluded from indemnification simply because he was sued
    individually or no longer an officer or employee of the Thompson companies when
    he was brought into the lawsuit.
    Three of the cases on which he relies examine indemnification provisions that
    contain “by reason of” language. In United States v. Lowe, the court rejected the
    corporation’s argument that the former officer was per se precluded from being
    indemnified because he was sued individually when the bylaws provided that the
    corporation shall indemnify “[e]ach director and each officer or former director or
    officer of this corporation” for “liabilities imposed upon him and expenses
    –9–
    reasonably incurred by him in connection with any claim made against him . . . by
    reason of his being or having been such director or officer . . . .” 
    29 F.3d 1005
    , 1007
    n.3, 1009–1010 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). The court recognized “the breadth
    with which many courts have interpreted language such as ‘by reason of’” and noted
    that the “factual inquiry should be on the ‘connection between the complaint and
    [Lowe’s] corporate status.”           
    Id.
     at 1010–1011 (alteration in original; citation
    omitted). In Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, the Supreme Court of Delaware3 explained
    that the test for determining whether a corporate official was sued “by reason of the
    fact” of their corporate position is whether “there is a nexus or causal connection
    between any of the underlying proceedings . . . and one’s official corporate
    capacity.” 
    888 A.2d 204
    , 214 (Del. 2005). But the language in the corporation’s
    bylaws, which was also language contained in the Delaware General Corporation
    Law, provided: “Each person who was or is . . . involved in any action, suit or
    proceeding, . . . by reason of the fact that such person . . . is or was a director or
    officer of the Corporation . . . shall be indemnified . . . .” Id. at 211, 213 (emphasis
    in original). And, in In re DeMattia, an opinion out of this Court, the indemnification
    provision contained similar language: “the Company shall indemnify each Member
    who was, is, or is threatened to be made a party to any . . . suit . . . by reason of the
    fact that he or she is or was a Member.” 644 S.W.3d at 230 (emphasis in original).
    3
    “[C]ourts throughout the United States, including Texas, look to Delaware on matters of corporate
    law.” In re DeMattia, 
    644 S.W.3d 225
    , 230 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, orig. proceeding).
    –10–
    But the question at issue in DeMattia was whether the advancement provision linked
    back to the indemnification provision so that advancement was required for both
    current and former members; there was no question that indemnification was
    required for both current and former members because the language expressly stated
    “is or was a Member.” 
    Id.
     at 228–29, 232–33 (emphasis added).
    Rudnicki also relies on RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, in which this Court noted that
    the phrase “any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement”
    (in a consent to jurisdiction clause) was “broad and encompass[ed] all claims that
    have some possible relationship with the agreement, including those claims that may
    only ‘relate to’ the agreement.” 
    309 S.W.3d 686
    , 701 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no
    pet.) (emphasis added).
    Relying on the broad language in these cases, Rudnicki asserts that Clarke’s
    dispute over his bonus, which was allegedly promised to him by Rudnicki, as an
    authorized agent and corporate officer of TPC and the Partnership, has more than
    “some possible relationship” and “nexus or causal connection” to Rudnicki
    “performing the obligations of the General Partner with respect to the Partnership.”
    But regardless of whether the evidence supports Rudnicki’s argument that he was
    performing the obligations of General Partner at the time he allegedly authorized
    –11–
    Clarke’s bonus,4 the question we must answer is whether section 5.13 provides for
    broad indemnification like the cases on which Rudnicki relies.
    Our disposition turns on the following language in section 5.13: “all losses,
    costs, liabilities, damages, and expenses . . . any of them may incur as a General
    Partner in the Partnership or in performing the obligations of the General Partner
    with respect to the Partnership” (emphasis added). Specifically, our focus is on the
    words “incur as” and “incur . . . in.” As set out above, the cases Rudnicki cites to
    for support do not address this language. Nor does section 5.13 contain broad
    language such as “by reason of,” “arising out of,” or “relating to,” like the cases
    above.
    Appellees assert on appeal that the “[Partnership’s] Agreement could have
    provided for indemnification of expenses incurred ‘based on,’ ‘arising from,’ or
    similarly ‘related to’ a covered person’s performance of the obligations of the GP
    with respect to [the Partnership]. But that simply is not what it says.” We agree.
    We “are obliged to enforce the parties’ bargain according to its terms and may not
    rewrite a contract under the guise of interpretation.” In re DeMattia, 644 S.W.3d at
    234. Although indemnification provisions may generally be drafted broadly as in
    the examples above, this one was not.
    4
    The parties dispute whether Rudnicki was authorized to promise Clarke a bonus and whether, even if
    he was authorized, such would have been an obligation of the General Partner of the Partnership versus an
    obligation of TPC.
    –12–
    The parties have not directed us to any case, and we have not found one, in
    which a court has construed the phrase at issue here. In his reply brief, Rudnicki
    sets out several meanings of “incur” and urges us to adopt the second definition in
    the American Heritage Dictionary—“to become subject to as a result of one’s
    actions.” See Incur, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2022) (defining
    “incur” as “[t]o acquire or come into (something usually undesirable); sustain” or
    “[t]o become liable or subject to as a result of one’s action; bring upon oneself”); see
    also Aviles v. Aguirre, 
    292 S.W.3d 648
    , 649 n.2 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (setting
    out definitions of “incur,” including as “[t]o become liable or subject to” and “[t]o
    suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense)” (first quoting BLACK’S LAW
    DICTIONARY 768 (6th ed. 1990); and then quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 782
    (8th ed. 2004))); Vill. Place, Ltd. v. VP Shopping, LLC, 
    404 S.W.3d 115
    , 127 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (setting out multiple meanings of incur:
    “brought on,” “occasioned,” “caused,” and “to become liable to pay”). He did not
    present this specific definition or argument to the trial court in his motion for
    summary judgment. However, he maintains that to construe “incur” as appellees
    suggest “would completely nullify the purpose of agreeing to indemnify Rudnicki
    ‘to the fullest extent permitted by law’ as it is difficult to imagine a scenario when a
    General Partner or affiliate would ever incur attorneys’ fees while simultaneously .
    . . performing duties as a General Partner.”
    –13–
    But the meaning of the word “incur” by itself is not what is at issue here; the
    meaning of “incur as” or “incur in performing” is. Rudnicki’s attempt to substitute
    the American Heritage Dictionary’s definition in the place of “incur,” which
    includes the additional words “as a result of one’s actions,” broadens the provision
    in the partnership agreement because it essentially adds in the words that are missing,
    like “relates to,” “arises out of,” or “by reason of.” We decline Rudnicki’s invitation
    to add words to the agreement under the guise of applying a dictionary definition to
    construe the phrase’s common meaning.
    Rudnicki’s affidavit testimony provided, “From the time I received the
    Discovery Subpoena commanding my deposition from TPC and the J. Cleo
    Partnership, I have incurred and continue to incur expenses in defense of this action,
    which include reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs.” Rudnicki did not
    incur the litigation expenses “as” a General Partner or “in performing” its duties. By
    the time he began participating and defending himself in the suit, he was no longer
    employed by the Thompson entities and, thus, was no longer performing the
    obligations of Petroleum Management. Had the language in section 5.13 provided
    for broad indemnification such as for expenses incurred by reason of performing the
    obligations of the General Partner, or for expenses incurred arising out of the
    person’s role as director or officer of the General Partner, or for expenses based on
    the person’s performance of the obligations of the General Partner, our analysis
    might be different. But that is not the language before us, and we cannot write in
    –14–
    that language in construing the word “incur.”         To do so, would expand the
    partnership agreement’s limited indemnification provision to one that is much
    broader. Therefore, we conclude that Rudnicki was not entitled to indemnification
    under section 5.13.
    We next turn to the articles of incorporation. Although Article Eleven
    contains broad indemnification language—“by reason of being or having been such
    a director, employee or officer (whether or not a director, employee, or officer at the
    time such costs or expenses are incurred by or imposed by him[)]”—Article Eleven
    also expressly provides, “The corporation may indemnify any director, officer or
    employee, or former director, officer or employee of the corporation . . . against
    expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him and any amount paid in
    satisfaction of judgments . . . .” The word “may” in this context is permissive, not
    mandatory. See Thiagarajan v. Tadepalli, 
    430 S.W.3d 589
    , 596–97 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (noting similar phrase in articles of
    incorporation was permissive, not mandatory); see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §
    8.0003 (“A governing document of an enterprise may restrict the circumstances
    under which the enterprise must or may indemnify or may advance expenses to a
    person under this chapter.”).     Thus, TPC was permitted under its articles of
    incorporation to indemnify Rudnicki, but it was not required to.
    For the same reason, we reject Rudnicki’s argument that section 8.052 of the
    business organizations code entitled him to indemnification, as it also contains
    –15–
    permissive language. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 8.052(a) (“a court may order an
    enterprise to indemnify the person to the extent the court determines that the person
    is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all the relevant
    circumstances” (emphasis added)); see also TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 311.016
    (Code Construction Act provides that “‘[m]ay’ creates discretionary authority or
    grants permission or a power,” whereas “‘[s]hall’ imposes a duty”). Rudnicki did
    not plead or argue that he was entitled to indemnification under the code’s mandatory
    indemnification provision. See id. § 8.051(a).
    In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge the cases interpreting “may” as
    mandatory in certain contexts. For example, when the language provides that a party
    “may recover” attorney’s fees, “may” is not discretionary, just as when the language
    provides the party “shall be awarded” or “is entitled to” fees. Bocquet v. Herring,
    
    972 S.W.2d 19
    , 20 (Tex. 1998). However, the difference in the context of this and
    similar language is that the language relates back to the party seeking or requesting
    the benefit or right (“the party may recover”), not the party from whom the benefit
    or right is being sought, such as the corporation or trial court here (“the corporation
    may indemnify” or “the court may order”). Here, “may” is used as permissive, or
    discretionary language. See 
    id.
    We are also mindful of Rudnicki’s position that the broad policy goal of
    indemnification is to protect officers and directors from litigation expenses resulting
    from their duties as officer or directors. See In re DeMattia, 644 S.W.3d at 230
    –16–
    (“Indemnification encourages corporate service by protecting an official’s personal
    financial resources from depletion by the expenses incurred during litigation that
    results from the official’s service.”). However, we are required to construe and
    enforce the language before us, not interpret the provision by rewriting it to fit public
    policy. Id. at 234.
    We conclude that Rudnicki is not entitled to indemnification under section
    5.13 of the partnership agreement, Article Eleven of the articles of incorporation, or
    section 8.052 of the business organizations code. Therefore, the trial court did not
    err in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying Rudnicki’s
    motion for partial summary judgment.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    /Craig Smith/
    CRAIG SMITH
    230125F.P05                                  JUSTICE
    –17–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    PAUL RUDNICKI, Appellant                       On Appeal from the 298th Judicial
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-23-00125-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-16848.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
    THOMPSON PETROLEUM                             Justices Molberg and Reichek
    CORPORATION, J. CLEO                           participating.
    THOMPSON AND JAMES CLEO
    THOMPSON, JR., L.P., AND J.
    CLEO THOMPSON PETROLEUM
    MANAGEMENT, LLC., Appellees
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellees THOMPSON PETROLEUM
    CORPORATION, J. CLEO THOMPSON AND JAMES CLEO THOMPSON, JR.,
    L.P., and J. CLEO THOMPSON PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT, LLC recover
    their costs of this appeal from appellant PAUL RUDNICKI.
    Judgment entered this 20th day of March 2024.
    –18–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-23-00125-CV

Filed Date: 3/20/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/27/2024